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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
(See Appendix C for an explanation of acronyms) 
A river is any natural stream of water that flows in a channel with defined banks. 
There are 113 major river system basins in the world.  They carry on average over 15% 
of the world’s commerce.  “Approximately 80% of the world’s population (4.8 billion 
people) lives within 100 kilometers of the world’s major river basins.”1  Control of the 
river ways is vital to commerce and national security.  In the aftermath of the 9/11 
atrocities perpetrated against the United States, the US began the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT).  The riparian environments are strategically important in support of 
GWOT.  They can be used for shipment of weapons, contraband, and illegal drugs to 
support terrorist and insurgent operations. 
Over the past several years it has become apparent that the US Navy needed a 
brown water capability to better combat today’s threats.  “The Chief of Naval Operations 
Strategic Studies Group 24 recommended expanding the Navy’s green and brown water 
capability to rebalance the force so the United States Navy can better combat today’s 
green and brown water threat.”2 Addressing the National Defense Industry Association 
Expeditionary Warfare Conference in October 2005, the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO), Admiral Mike Mullen emphasized the new landward push.  "There are great 
opportunities for the global security environment. Maritime Domain Awareness -- that is 
where we are really going in respect to operations in green water and brown water as we 
evolve that over time."3 The CNO followed his comment a few months later when he 
established the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command in Little Creek, Virginia. 
“The U.S. Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 
in January 2006 to serve as a single functional command to centrally manage 
current/future readiness, resources, manning, training and equipping of the Navy’s 
expeditionary forces.”4 The NECC’s mission is to integrate all war fighting requirements 
for expeditionary combat and combat support elements.  In May of 2006 the NECC 
established Riverine Group One to serve as administrative command over three riverine 
squadrons. According to Rear Admiral Donald Bullard, NECC’s commander, 
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”we know there are many areas around the world where rivers are the main lines of 
communication.  We, the Navy, need to expand in order to go into that brown water 
environment, to be able to train and work with our combined allies and neighbors and 
make those lines of communication secure.”5 
The focus of the Navy’s riverine group will be on conducting maritime security 
operations (MSO) and theater security cooperation (TSC) in riparian areas of operations 
or other suitable areas.  This might entail protecting critical infrastructure, securing the 
area for military operations or commerce, preventing the flow of contraband, enabling 
power projection operations, joint, bi-lateral or multi-lateral exercises, personnel 
exchanges, and humanitarian assistance.6 MSO entails policing the maritime domain to 
prevent and/or disrupt terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy, environmental destruction and 
human trafficking.  Conducting exercises with other navies and providing Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) typify cooperative TSC operations.  The Riverine 
Force (RF) will be capable of deploying world-wide within 96 hours in support of MSO 
and TSC missions. 
The 2007 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Systems Engineering and Analysis 
(SEA) Integrated Project titled “Riverine Sustainment 2012” was a joint product 
developed by eight NPS SEA students and 17 National University of Singapore (NUS) 
Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) students.  The two cohorts combined students 
from various professional and academic backgrounds to form the Riverine Sustainment 
Team (RST).  The purpose of the RST was to define, analyze, and recommend 
alternatives for supply, repair, and force protection that increase sustainability of the 
riverine force in the riparian environment utilizing technologies currently in use or 
available for use by 2012.”  Additionally, a study was conducted into the potential for use 
of developing commercial technologies which could advance the riverine force 
communications capacity to handle the multiple types and high volumes of information 
necessary in modern tactical environments. 
Systems engineering is a top-down, problem solving process that captures 
stakeholders’ needs, analyzes alternatives and advocates a solution.  “Systems 
engineering is a management technology to assist and support policy making, planning, 
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decision making, and associated resource allocation or action deployment.  Systems 
engineers accomplish this by quantitative and qualitative formulation, analysis, and 
interpretation of the impacts of action alternatives upon the needs perspectives, the 
institutional perspectives, and the value perspectives of their clients or customers.”7   
The RST started with the RF’s operational concept and utilized a combination of 
the physical and functional architectures to develop the operation architecture.  Modeling 
and simulation enabled the RST to measure physical architecture alternatives that 
achieved RF sustainment functional objectives.  The RST utilized both deterministic and 
stochastic models for analyzing the riverine sustainment problem.  During the analysis 
models were developed Extend, SIMKIT, MATLAB, Excel and MANA to evaluate the 
performance and effectiveness of the various alternatives. 
The key findings of the functional groups are described as follows: 
Supply Group 
• Key factors of riverine sustainment supply success are supply ship cycle time, 
basing alternative, logistics connector survivability, operational availability of 
the SURC’s and cost.  Given the supply ship cycle time, basing alternative, 
and number of assets used, the RST was able to determine the most effective 
configuration of connectors. 
 
• Helicopters add very little to the overall performance of the configuration of 
connectors, but they increase the cost significantly.  If the RF operates from a 
FOB with a supply ship cycle time between 4-7 days, then the most effective 
connector is the LCU-2000.  This is because the LCU-2000 can carry the 
entire supply load in one run.  When the supply ship cycle time increases to 8-
9 days, then the LCU-2000 can no longer carry the entire supply load in one 
run.  Instead, the Jim G becomes the most effective connector.  This is 
assuming that the RF would have to procure an LCU-1610 and LCU-2000.  If 
the procurement of the two crafts is not necessary, then the LCU-2000 with an 
LCU-1610 would be the most cost effective configuration.  If only one vessel 
is used, then the Jim G will allow the maximum supply ship cycle time to 
maintain a 95% operational availability of SURC’s due to fuel if the supply 
ship cycle time is not specified. 
 
• If the RF operates from a Nobriza+Barge MOB with a supply ship cycle time 
between 4-7 days, then the most cost effective connector is the LCU-2000.  
Similar to the FOB, the Nobriza+Barge requires a seven day supply load that 
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can fit in the LCU-2000.  When the supply ship cycle time increases to 8-9 
days, then the LCU-2000 with an LCU-1610 is the most effective 
configuration.  Unlike the FOB, the Nobriza+Barge requires a slightly greater 
supply load that would require a LCU-2000 and a Jim G to do multiple runs.  
If only one vessel is used, then the Jim G will allow the maximum supply ship 
cycle time to maintain a 95% operational availability of SURC’s due to fuel if 
the supply ship cycle time is not specified. 
 
• If the RF operates from the RCSS, Endurance, or Sri Inderapura MOB with a 
supply ship cycle time between 4-7 days, then the most effective configuration 
of connectors is a Jim G with an LCU-1610.  The increase in supply load 
compared to the other basing alternatives requires multiple runs when a single 
Jim G or two LCU-1610’s are used.  When a Jim G and an LCU-1610 are 
combined, they can re-supply the MOB in one run.  When the ship cycle time 
increases to 8-9 days, then two Jim G’s is the most effective configuration.  If 
only one vessel is used, then the Jim G will allow the maximum supply ship 
cycle time to maintain a 95% operational availability of SURC’s due to fuel if 
the supply ship cycle time is not specified. 
 
• For a single connector, the Jim G supported the best supply ship cycle time.  
 
Repair Group 
• Increasing personnel, maintenance bays, or SURC did not have a significant 
effect on improving operational availability in the repair model, and with this 
in mind it is recommended that the status quo remain in place.  However, 
when considering the RST scenario constraint of maintaining at least 9 
mission ready SURC’s at all times, the alternative of increasing both 
personnel and maintenance bays was cheaper than procuring additional 
SURC’s.  Also, the model indicated that MSRT was the biggest factor that 
affected SURC operational availability.  MSRT’s exceeding 24-hours drove 
operational availabilities below 80%.  Given a logistically barren environment 
as presented in the RST scenario, it is vital that an exhaustive PUK is 
developed for the RF.  This PUK must not only contain high failure rate items, 
but also items that fail at moderate rates. 
 
• The model developed by the Repair Group can serve as a planning tool for a 
wide variety of future riverine warfare operations.  As key parametric changes 
can be easily implemented within the model, such as environmental concerns, 
Commander’s discretion, medical problems, and so forth, the Repair Group’s 
model has established a foundation upon which such studies can be made.  
Since every alternative, including the status quo, is very sensitive to MSRT, 
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the repair model may serve as a tool for repair re-supply planning and 
evaluation of logistics alternatives that involve faster connectors such as 
airlift. 
 
Force Protection Group 
• Current mortar defenses proposed by the RF are insufficient.  The analysis 
conducted in this study was with the aide of a host nation providing security 
beyond the FOB’s perimeters out to the expected mortar range.  Even though 
the best alternative improved on the baseline by severely decreasing the 
number of mortar rounds that hit the base, the modeling showed that three 
mortar rounds still struck the base.  This means that even with the mortar 
defenses proposed in this study, the FOB could expect to be hit by mortar 
rounds each time they are attacked.  If the RF is based at the a FOB ashore, 
then the host nation needs to provide robust perimeter defense.  For the 
decision maker deciding which basing alternative to consider, this is a major 
consideration because a MOB can move and prove less susceptible to mortar 
fire, especially with as wide a river as the Kampar. 
 
• The analysis also revealed that the ROSAMs were an excellent resource for 
force protection in two different scenarios.  The ROSAMs provide a reduction 
in manpower, which decreased the RF footprint and also promoted greater RF 
survivability when the FOB was attacked. 
 
• The MOB boat attack scenarios revealed that the Nobriza and Barge were the 
most cost effective means to defend the RF when they were operating from a 
MOB.  The Nobriza provided excellent firepower without added exposure of 
personnel, which was discovered to be a draw back for a patrol boat. 
 
• For perimeter defenses, IR illuminators coupled with the NVG’s are very 
valuable assets.  The RF should also consider using acquiring RDFW units for 




• Communications equipment in use by riverine forces requires modernization 
and increased capacity. 
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• Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) technology 
showed the greatest potential for addressing riverine force communications 
needs utilizing commercially available equipment currently in use in industry. 
 
Because of the short duration of this study there were numerous areas that were 
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A river is any natural stream of water that flows in a channel with defined banks. 
There are 113 major river system basins in the world.  They carry on average over 15% 
of the world’s commerce.  “Approximately 80% of the world’s population (4.8 billion 
people) lives within 100 kilometers of the world’s major river basins.”8  Control of the 
river ways is vital to commerce and national security.  In the aftermath of the 9/11 
atrocities perpetrated against the United States, the U.S. began the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT).  The riparian environments are strategically important in support of 
GWOT.  They can be used for shipment of weapons, contraband, and illegal drugs to 
support terrorist and insurgent operations. 
Over the past several years it has become apparent that the U.S. Navy needed to 
develop a brown water capability to better combat today’s threats.  “The Chief of Naval 
Operations Strategic Studies Group 24 recommended expanding the Navy’s green and 
brown water capability to rebalance the force so the at the United States Navy can better 
combat today’s green and brown water threat.”9 Addressing the National Defense 
Industry Association Expeditionary Warfare Conference in October 2005, the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Mike Mullen emphasized the new landward push.  
"There are great opportunities for the global security environment. Maritime Domain 
Awareness -- that is where we are really going in respect to operations in green water and 
brown water as we evolve that over time."10 The CNO followed his comment a few 
months later when he established the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command in Little 
Creek, Virginia. 
“The U.S. Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 
in January 2006 to serve as a single functional command to centrally manage 
current/future readiness, resources, manning, training and equipping of the Navy’s 
expeditionary forces.”11 The NECC’s mission is to integrate all war fighting requirements 
for expeditionary combat and combat support elements.  In May of 2006 the NECC 
established Riverine Group One to serve as administrative command over three riverine 
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squadrons. According to Rear Admiral Donald Bullard, NECC’s commander, “we know 
there are many areas around the world where rivers are the main lines of communication.  
We, the Navy, need to expand in order to go into that brown water environment, to be 
able to train and work with our combined allies and neighbors and make those lines of 
communication secure.”12 
The focus of the Navy’s Riverine Group will be on conducting maritime security 
operations (MSO) and theater security cooperation (TSC) in riparian areas of operations 
or other suitable regions.  This may entail protecting critical infrastructure, securing the 
area for military operations or commerce, preventing the flow of contraband, enabling 
power projection operations, joint, bi-lateral or multi-lateral exercises, personnel 
exchanges, and humanitarian assistance.13 MSO entails policing the maritime domain to 
prevent and/or disrupt terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy, environmental destruction and 
human trafficking.  Conducting exercises with other navies and providing Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) typify cooperative TSC operations.  The Riverine 
Force (RF) will be capable of deploying world-wide within 96 hours in support of MSO 
and TSC missions. 
The Riverine Sustainment Team (RST) examined RF Logistics, Force Protection 
(FP), and Repair in support of MSO in a riparian environment.  RST analyzed current RF 
baselines, technologies, force structures and assets and compared them with feasible 
alternative that could be fielded by 2012.  The study utilized agent-based and queuing 
models to support alternative analysis, feasibility screening, and recommendations. 
 
1.1.1 Countering the New Threat 
During the Cold War Era the U.S. Navy built an impressive blue water war-
fighting capability to counter Soviet Union ships, aircraft, and submarines.  In the late 
1980’s, the Soviet Union and its military power dissolved after sweeping political 
change.  The U.S. Navy no longer had a potential adversary that could challenge them on 
the high seas. “When the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, its people 
began to fully realize that it had entered into a new type of warfare, not against a 
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conventional army from a single hostile state, but rather against an unconventional enemy 
operating world wide in states that failed or were teetering on the brink of collapse.”14 
The U.S. military and especially its Navy were ill-equipped to be effectively 
utilized in the GWOT.  The previous two CNO’s made positive strides in moving the 
Navy from the deep blue water into the littorals.  In his speech to students and faculty at 
the Naval War College in August 2005, the CNO, Admiral Mike Mullen reiterated the 
landward objective. 
We cannot sit out in the deep blue, waiting for the enemy to come to us.  
He will not.  We must go to him.  We need a green-water capability and a 
brown-water capability.  I want the ability to go close in and stay there.  I 
believe our Navy is missing a great opportunity to influence events by not 
having a riverine force.  We're going to have one.15 
In March 2007 that push continued as the NECC deployed Riverine Squadron 
One to conduct security operations at the Haditha Dam on the Euphrates River in Iraq.  
This event marked the first U.S. Navy Riverine deployment since the Vietnam Conflict. 
 
1.1.2 Sustainment Definition 
Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary 
to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment.  The 
focus of sustainment in joint operations is to provide the Joint Force 
Commander (JFC) with the means to enable freedom of action and 
endurance and extend operational reach.  Effective sustainment determines 
the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations; 
allowing the JFC to seize, retain and exploit the initiative.16 
The RST focused on how best to support a Riverine Squadron in a logistically 
barren environment.  Logistically barren environment is defined as an operating area that 
is not serviced by an adequate airport or port facility.  These areas are typical unimproved 
areas with dense vegetation making them unsuitable for fixed-wing operations.  The RST 
decomposed sustainment into three distinct functional areas: supply, repair, and force 
protection. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) describe supply as “the procurement, distribution, 
maintenance while in storage, and salvage of supplies, including the determination of 
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kind and quantity of supplies”17  The U.S. military relies heavily on an extensive supply 
chain network to sustain its unit’s world wide.  Continental United States (CONUS) 
ports, strategic lift, forward logistic sites (FLS), intra-theater support, and shuttle lift are 
primary components of the U.S. military logistics system.  This collection of ports, 
connectors and transfers are responsible for moving a vast array of supplies anywhere in 
the world. 
The supplies that are transported by strategic lift and intra-theater shuttles can 
carry a multitude of products for the combatant commander.  Those supplies are 
separated into ten different classes which are illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Classes of Supplies18 
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Classes 1 (subsistence), 3 (petroleum, oils, and lubricants), 5 (ammunition) 
comprised a large majority of the overall supply demand.  The RST concentrated on the 
transfer of these classes and class 9 (repair parts) within the area of operation (AO) to 
sustain the RF. 
Another pivotal function of RF sustainment is repair.  Joint Publication 1-02 
defines repair as “the restoration of an item to serviceable condition through correction of 
a specific failure of unserviceable condition.”19  Proper preventive and corrective 
maintenance (repair) is vital to operational readiness.  Preventive maintenance includes 
routine inspections, testing, and service to keep equipment in the highest states of 
readiness.  When non-routine malfunctions occur, corrective maintenance must be 
conducted to return the equipment to good working order. The RST looked primarily at 
the repair of the RF’s 12 small unit riverine craft (SURC), and 65 pieces of rolling gear.  
The goal of the study was to find the optimal number of maintainers with the right mix of 
skill-sets to deliver the highest availability rates. 
The SURC was introduced in 2004 to replace the aging Riverine Assault Craft 
(RAC) and rigid raiding craft (RRC).  It provides “mobility, speed, endurance, firepower, 
payload, survivability, and command and control capabilities to support sustained 
operations in a riparian environment.”20 With its twin 440-horsepower engines, the 
SURC can accelerate from zero to 25 knots in 15 seconds and achieve a top speed of 40 
knots.  This boat is designed to operate in shallow river environments (2 foot draft), 
supports crew-served weapon systems from three gun mounts, and transports boarding 
teams of ten or less. 
The RF deploys with 65 pieces of rolling-gear.  Rolling-gear consists of SURC 
trailers, medium tactical vehicle replacements (MTVR’s), high mobility multi-purpose 
wheeled vehicles (HMMWV’s), 5-ton wreckers and various forklifts.  This support gear 
is vital to deploying and sustaining the RF. 
The third critical sustainment function is force protection. 
Force protection includes preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile 
actions against DOD personnel, resources, facilities, and critical 
information.  These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can 
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be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the integrated 
and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective 
employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the 
adversary.  Force protection is achieved through the tailored selection and 
application of multilayered active and passive measures, with the air, land, 
maritime, and space domains and the information environment across the 
range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk.  Intelligence 
sources provide information regarding an adversary’s capabilities against 
personnel and resources, as well as providing timely information to 
decision makers regarding force protection considerations.21 
The RST examined force protection measures for the forward operating base 
(FOB) in the riparian environment.  The FOB is an ashore, support base that requires a 
secured perimeter and actionable intelligence for force protection. The overarching goal 
of the force protection system (FPS) was to deter, predict, and deny the enemy.  Deter 
employs a system of warnings and show of force to ward off enemy and non-combatants 
alike.  Predict utilizes the RF’s intelligence resources (unmanned aerial vehicles, non-
organic and organic intelligence systems) to observe and forecast the enemy’s 
movements, intensions and actions.  And deny combines the RF base’s self-defense 
capabilities to engage hostile elements and block their entry.  Any FPS would be useless 
without effective communication. 
“Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from 
fighting with a small one; it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.”22  
Command, Control and Communications (C3) are vital to any military operations.  
“Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.”23 
No single activity in military operations is more important than C2.  Alone 
C2 will not destroy a single adversary target or affect a single emergency 
re-supply.  Yet, none of these essential joint force activities, or any others, 
would be possible without effective C2.  A superior communications 
system helps commanders to maintain the unity of effort to their forces’ 
capabilities at the critical times and places to win.24 
The RST communications effort focuses on enabling this connectivity in a 
coalition environment that includes not only joint forces, but also governmental, non-
governmental, and foreign military units. 
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1.1.3 Historical Analysis 
U.S. Navy Riverine Warfare is definitely not a term uttered or considered in many 
years.  However, with the emerging Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the Navy’s 
vision of effectively increasing its capabilities to combat this new threat, the U.S. Navy 
has established the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). This new command 
will essentially fill the capability gap in this new effort by increasing the Navy’s power 
projection capability. 
Riverine Warfare has always played a major role in every major conflict or 
campaign throughout the U.S. Military’s long and distinguished history.  This section 
will not detail the history of the U.S. Riverine Forces and campaigns.  However, this 
section will summarize lessons learned from these past historical events.  An important 
part of history is being able to draw conclusion from it and applying the lessons learned 
in order to make more informed decisions and not repeat the same mistakes over again. 
The U.S. military has historically maintained an “on again, off again” relationship 
with riverine forces.  During every major conflict throughout U.S. history there has arisen 
the need for a riverine capability.  This riverine capability was developed and deployed to 
meet the current needs and threats of the period.  However, once the conflicts were over, 
the riverine forces were disbanded.  There are several reasons for this occurrence though 
time.  Changes in political policies, budgetary constraints, and the primary focus of the 
U.S. Navy have all played major roles in the demise of a long standing U.S. Riverine 
Force and capability. 
From the Revolutionary War through the Vietnam Conflict, the Riverine force 
was developed and deployed within a year’s time.25  This war fighting capability gap was 
hastily fielded with ad hoc vessels and personnel to meet the requirements of those 
periods.  Tactics, training, craft concepts, and personnel experience had to be developed 
from scratch in order to field these forces. 
In every U.S. conflict, the U.S. riverine forces were developed with a large variety 
of riverine craft.  Each craft played various and vital roles. 
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Operations on or projected from inland waters have come to be called 
"riverine warfare." Here fighting craft, tailored as necessary to the 
environment, bring combined operations the unique advantages of power 
based afloat--greater mobility, ease of concentration, swift shift of 
objectives, speed, flexibility, versatility, and surprise.  If water permits, 
large ships like cruisers and destroyers blast aside opposition. For 
shallower depths many types of small warcraft develop to fit the need. We 
have seen this occur throughout United States history since riverine 
operations on small or large scale have entered into most of the limited or 
world wars that seem our fate26 
Attempts have been made to develop a single craft for riverine use, but all have 
fallen short of their objectives.  This is probably due to the large numbers of various 
missions and roles that a riverine force has to perform as well as the different operating 
environments these craft are subjected to. 
In summary, the U.S. needs to develop a permanent riverine war fighting 
capability and develop policies to ensure its longevity.  This riverine capability has 
proven itself again and again and by dismantling this force as soon as a major conflict is 
over is detrimental because the lessons learned, tactics, and personnel experiences are all 
lost in the sands of time.  An Inland Water Force must be thoroughly developed using 
proven engineering techniques and analysis in order to be effective, which takes time to 
do effectively.  Fielding ad hoc forces in a short period of time is essentially placing 
personnel in a heightened risk of danger due to inadequate training and ineffective, 
unproven equipment.  Using the systems engineering approach with detailed analysis will 
also prove that no one riverine craft is suited to effectively fill all the capabilities required 
for the numerous missions and environments that these craft will be subjected to.  An 
informed, decisive effort must be put forth in order to properly develop, train, and deploy 
these forces that can effectively and safely complete the required missions. 
 
1.2 PURPOSE 
This collaborative study will serve as Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA) 
Cohort 11 Integrated Project.  Biannually the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems 
Engineering sponsors this campus-wide effort at the Naval Postgraduate School.  On 
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December 12, 2006, the project team received the SEA-11 Capstone Project Objectives 
Memorandum from the institute with the following guidance: 
Collaborate with the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) to 
design a system of systems for performing emerging Navy missions 
associated with coalition operations in littoral and riverine environments.  
Potential Focus Areas:  capability gaps and potential options for enabling 
future multi-national operations; joint, interagency, and intergovernmental 
command and control and information exchange; and CONOPS for joint, 
interagency, and international operations.27 
The study was directed to assume a cooperative, international, environment, 
which echoed the U. S. Navy’s “1,000 Ship Navy” concept. 
All maritime nations are affected by these challenges and all must bear a 
hand in taken them on.  There is no one nation that can provide a solution 
alone.  A global maritime partnership is required that unites maritime 
forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, 
governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address mutual concerns.  
The concept is not actually about having 1,000 international ships at sea.  
Rather, it is more about capabilities, such as speed, agility and 
adaptability.  Membership in this navy is purely voluntary and has no legal 
or encumbering ties.  It is a free-form, self-organizing network of 
maritime partners –good neighbors interested in using the power of the sea 
to unite, rather than divide.28 
This initiative challenged the Navy to leverage its current partnerships and forge 
new ones to create a more secure maritime domain. 
SEA 11 was tasked to fully integrate international students from the Temasek 
Defence Systems Institute (TDSI) into the study. 
TDSI is a strategic alliance between two eminent institutions: the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the National University of 
Singapore (NUS).TDSI was established on 11 July 2001 to provide the 
platform to bring together military staff and defence technologists in an 
education and research environment. TDSI aims to produce graduates who 
understand the complexities of a military force, so as to be able to create 
maximum leverage by the integration of operations and technology.29 
The TDSI students came from several different academic backgrounds that 
included Operations Research, Weapon Systems, Communications, Information 
Assurance, and Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation (MOVES).  To leverage 
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the diverse talents of both groups, the SEA 11 Cohort and TDSI students formed the RST 
and developed four integrated project teams (IPT’s): supply, repair, force protection, and 
communications.  The four IPT’s addressed the critical operational issues and delivered 
the system engineering products within their functional area. 
The newly formed RST was given further instruction to seek out additional 
expertise within NPS. 
You will be expected to identify and integrate students and faculty from 
across the campus to participate in your projects.  This participation could 
include students who would join your groups, students doing related 
individual thesis topics, and faculty inside or outside NPS who have 
expertise related to your projects.  It will be your responsibility to 
integrate the efforts of outside participants in your projects.30 
In addition to the TDSI students and faculty, the project team collaborated with 
the Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS) and Tactical 
Network Topography (TNT) programs to gain additional insights.  The COASTS and 
TNT programs are bottom-up efforts which seek to provide timely situational awareness 
using commercial off-the-shelf wireless networking technologies. 
 
1.3 SCOPE 
The RST consisted of eight students from NPS and 17 from TDSI.  All NPS 
personnel were from the systems engineering and analysis curriculum, but their 
operational experiences were diverse:  three U.S. Naval Surface Warfare Officers (one 
with special boat training), a U.S. Army Artillery Officer, a U.S. Naval Submariner 
(former U.S. Marine), a U.S. Naval Flight Officer, and two recent graduates from the 
Naval Academy.  The SEA-11 Cohort began work on the campus-wide project in 
November 2006, with a completion date of June 2007.  In mid-November, the SEA-11 
and TDSI students shared their project ideas by way of video teleconference.  The final 
project tasking from the Wayne E. Meyer Institute was received in mid-December. 
In January 2007, the TDSI students arrived at NPS to begin their one year of 
instruction.  TDSI students were enrolled in several different curriculums at NPS:  
operations research (OR), information assurance (IA), communications, weapon systems, 
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sensor systems, and MOVES.  The TDSI student hailed from several different 
backgrounds:  four defense contractors from Singapore Technologies, three Singaporean 
government employees from the Defence Science and Technology Agency, one scientist 
from the Defence Science Organisation National Laboratory, six Singaporean Army 
Officers, a Singaporean Naval Officer, a U.S. Naval Submariner, and an Israeli Army 
Officer. 
The RST gathered and organized information from students, professors, experts, 
and stakeholders from NPS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Naval 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), Naval Special Warfare Group Four, Naval 
Special Warfare Group One, Logistics Support Group One, Naval Small Craft Instruction 
and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS), Special Boat Team Twenty-Two, and 
Naval Sea Systems Command’s (NAVSEA) Operations Logistics Group. 
The guidance from the Meyer’s Institute to the RST was to develop a system that 
addresses Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the riparian and littoral environment 
(Appendix B). Given the CNO’s recent comments, “there are great opportunities for the 
global security environment. Maritime Domain Awareness -- that is where we are really 
going in respect to operations in green water and brown water as we evolve that over 
time.31”,  the RST decided to focus on the landward areas that are referred to as brown 
water.  Within the brown water environment the RF has been tasked with the MSO 
mission. 
MSO is the principle mission for the riverine group.  MSO help maintain 
security on the seas, or in this case the rivers and inland waterways that 
the riverine squadrons will expected to operate.  They are one of the most 
important Navy efforts used to combat sea-based terrorism and other 
illegal activities, such as transporting components of weapons of mass 
destruction, hijacking, piracy, and slavery, also known as human 
trafficking.  In this case maritime security operations would be primarily 
involved in the rivers, lakes, harbors and deltas within the Joint Force 
Maritime Component Commander’s (JFMCC) battlespace.  To conduct 
these operations, the riverine group will be involved in patrol and 
interdiction, anti-piracy, and Maritime Interdiction Operations/Extended 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO/EMIO) with their area of 
operations.32 
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Once the problem was refined to MSO in the riverine environment, further 
bounding was required to support the project deadlines. 
To bound a project means to understand the limitations associated with the 
project, the changes that can be made to achieve desired objectives, and 
the important quantities that are likely to change as a result of the project.  
In systems terms, this means identifying the constraints, parameters, and 
variables for the project.  Constraints are the limits that must be observed 
for the project.  Constraints include realistic considerations related to 
things such as money, time, people, organizations, and society.  For 
example, most projects have budget time deadlines, and environmental 
impact constraints.33 
The RST initially bounded the problem to the area of operations (AO) which 
simplified the logistics considerations considerably.  Both the movement of the RF and 
supplies to sustain the RF to the AO were intentional left out to enable the timely delivery 
of this report. 
Based on functional areas the RST was divided into four integrated project teams 
(IPT’s):  Supply; Repair; Communications, and Force Protection.  Each group had one or 
two system engineering students and several TDSI students.  To the best extent possible, 
the TDSI students were place in IPT’s that would support their individual curriculum 
tracks.  This organizational IPT structure is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.   RST Breakdown 
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The Force Protection IPT was tasked with defining the FOB footprint and 
designing alternative architectures for FOB force protection. .  Developing a coalition 
command and control network was the responsibility of the Communications’ IPT.  Due 
to the overall vision of this project focusing on the sustainment of the RF, the 
Communications aspect did not develop along this functional area.  However, 
Communications of the RF is developed and discussed in Appendix E.  The Repair IPT 
focused on the man-hour requirement and critical skills need for the upkeep on the 
forces’ riverine craft and support equipment.  And comparing several throughput systems 
to support the FOB and MOB physical architectures was the goal of the Supply IPT. 
 
1.4 REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
1.4.1 Economy 
Indonesia, a vast polyglot nation, has struggled to overcome the Asian 
financial crisis, and still grapples with persistent poverty and 
unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, endemic corruption, a fragile 
banking sector, a poor investment climate, and unequal resource 
distribution among regions. The country continues the slow work of 
rebuilding from the devastating December 2004 tsunami and from an 
earthquake in central Java in May 2006 that caused over $3 billion in 
damage and losses. Declining oil production and lack of new exploration 
investment turned Indonesia into a net oil importer in 2004. The cost of 
subsidizing domestic fuel placed increasing strain on the budget in 2005, 
and combined with indecisive monetary policy, contributed to a run on the 
currency in August, prompting the government to enact a 126% average 
fuel price hike in October. The resulting inflation and interest rate hikes 
dampened growth through mid-2006, while large increases in rice prices 
pushed millions more people under the national poverty line. Economic 
reformers introduced three policy packages in 2006 to improve the 
investment climate, infrastructure, and the financial sector, but translating 
them into reality has not been easy. Keys to future growth remain internal 
reform, building up the confidence of international and domestic investors, 
and strong global economic growth. Significant progress has been made in 
rebuilding Aceh after the devastating December 2004 tsunami, and the 
province now shows more economic activity than before the disaster. 
Unfortunately, Indonesia suffered new disasters in 2006 and early 2007 
including: a major earthquake near Yogyakarta, an industrial accident in 
Sidoarjo, East Java that created a "mud volcano," a tsunami in South Java, 
and major flooding in Jakarta, all of which caused additional damages in 
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the billions of dollars. Donors are assisting Indonesia with its disaster 
mitigation and early warning efforts.34 
 
1.4.2 Geography 
Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world. It consists of five major 
islands and about 30 smaller groups. The figure for the total number of 
islands is 17,508 according to the Indonesian Naval Hydro-Oceanographic 
office. The archipelago is on a crossroad between two oceans, the Pacific 
and the Indian, and bridges two continents, Asia and Australia. This 
strategic position has always influenced the cultural, social, political, and 
economic life of the country.  The five main islands are: Sumatra, which is 
about 473,606 sq km in size; the most fertile and densely populated 
islands, Java/Madura, 132,107 sq km; Kalimantan, which comprises two-
thirds of the island of Borneo and measures 539,460 sq km; Sulawesi, 
189,216 sq km; and Irian Jaya, 421,981 sq km, which is part of the world's 
second largest island, New Guinea. Indonesia's other islands are smaller in 
size.  The archipelago is divided into three groups. The islands of Java, 
Sumatra, and Kalimantan, and the small islands in-between, lie on the 
Sunda Shelf which begin on the coasts of Malaysia and Indo China, where 
the sea depth does not exceed 700 feet. Irian Jaya which is part of the 
island of New Guinea, and the Aru Islands lie on the Sahul Shelf, which 
stretches north wards from the Australia coast. Here the sea depth is 
similar to that of the Sunda Shelf.  The land area is generally covered by 
thick tropical rain forests, where fertile soils are continuously replenished 
by volcanic eruptions like those on the island of Java.  The country is 
predominantly mountainous with some 400 volcanoes of which 100 are 
active. Mountains higher than 9000 feet are found on the islands of 
Sumatra (Mt. Leuser and Mt. Kerinci); Java (Mt Gede; Mt. 
Tangkubanperahu, Mt. Ciremai, Mt. Kawi, Mt. Kelud, Mt. Semeru and 
Mt.Raung), Sulawesi (Mt. Lompobatang and Mt. Rantekombala), Bali 
(Mt. Batur and Mt. Agung), Lombok (Mt. Rinjani) and Sumbawa (Mt. 
Tambora). The highest mountain is the perpetually snow-capped Mandala 
Top (15,300 feet) in the Jaya Wijaya mountain range of Irian Jaya.  Many 
rivers flow throughout the country. They serve as useful transportation 
routes on certain islands, for example, the Musi, Batanghari, Indragiri and 
Kampar rivers in Sumatra; the Kapuas, Barito, Mahakam and Rejang 
rivers in Kalimantan; and the Memberamo and Digul rivers in Irian 
Jaya.On Java rivers are important for irrigation purposes, i.e., the 
Bengawan Solo, Citarum and Brantas rivers.35 
Due to the large number of islands, Indonesia has about 54,716 km (about 
33,999 mi) of coastline, much more than most countries. The country 
claims all waters surrounding its islands to 12 nautical miles (22 km/14 
mi) from the coastline. Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone, an area of 
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the ocean in which the country controls fishing and other rights, extends 
200 nautical miles (370 km/230 mi) from its shore.36 
 
1.4.3 Climate and Weather 
The climate and weather of Indonesia is characterized by two tropical 
seasons, which vary with the equatorial air circulation and the meridian air 
circulation. The displacement of the latter follows the north-south 
movement of the sun and its relative position from the earth, in particular 
from the continents of Asia and Australia, at certain periods of the year. 
These factors contribute to the displacement and intensity of the Inter-
Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) which is an equatorial trough of low 
pressure that produces rain. Thus, the west and east monsoons, or the rainy 
and dry seasons, are a prevalent feature of the tropical climate.  The 
climate changes every six months. The dry season (June to September) is 
influenced by the Australian continental air masses; while the rainy season 
(December to March) is the result of the Asian and Pacific Ocean air 
masses. The air contains vapor which precipitates and produces rain in the 
country. Tropical areas have rains almost the whole year through. 
However, the climate of Central Maluku is an exception. The rainy season 
is from June to September and the dry season from December to March. 
The transitional periods between the two seasons are April to May and 
October to November.  Due to the large number of islands and mountains 
in the country, average coastal plain temperatures are 28 degrees 
Centigrade with an average relative humidity between 70% and 90%.”37 
Average rainfall in the lowlands varies from 1,780 to 3,175 mm (70 to 125 
in) per year, and in some mountain regions rainfall reaches 6,100 mm (240 
in) per year. The regions with the highest rainfall include the mountainous 
western coast of Sumatra and the upland areas of western Java, 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua.38 
 
1.5 PHYSICAL BASING ALTERNATIVES 
Riverine forces often operate in remote locations and may not be 
collocated with existing support facilities.  A Riverine Support Base 
should be established to provide operational and logistic support to the 
riverine forces.  Base sites should balance the ability to support riverine 
forces with force protection concerns while maximizing accessibility to 
land, water, and air re-supply and communications lines.  The Riverine 
Support Base functions must be tailored to the mission and expected 
deployment length.39 
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The RST envisioned three RF support base options: forward operating base 
(FOB), mobile operating base (MOB) and global fleet station (GFS). 
“The riverine support base functions must be tailored to the mission and expected 
deployment length.  Support functions include: 
• Operational Support.  C4I and operational planning and evaluation support are 
essential.  Communications with all attached joint forces special attention 
• Medical Support.  Emergency medical services must be provided.    Medical 
supply stocks, inventory control, and shelf life require special consideration. 
• Logistics.  Supplies flow to the riverine support base for further distribution to 
the supported units.  Supplies include ordinance, fuel, food repair parts, and 
medical. 
• Helicopter Support.  The employment of forces to remote and disperse areas 
makes it difficult to ensure lines of supply and communications.  To provide 
for emergency supply, MEDIVAC, and reinforcement support, a helicopter 
unit should be provided to the base.   
• Maintenance.  Facilities must be provided for weapons, ordinance, and 
riverine craft maintenance.  The scope of the maintenance support provided 
will depend on the expected combat damage along mission tempo and 
duration.  Contingency stocking and ready for issue spares.   
• Administration.  The riverine operating environment and the limited clerical 
manpower make conducting administrative tasks difficult for operating forces.  
Administrative task should be accomplished by support base personnel and, 
where possible, maintain service, pay, medical, and dental records. 
• Salvage.  The base or other supporting units can provide salvage support.40 
In addition, the support base maintained storage for the RF’s POL, water, 
ammunition, and food stores.  Finally, the support base provided force adequate 
protection and hotel services for the RF. 
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1.5.1 Forward Operating Base (FOB) 
For the purpose of this study the FOB was a support base that is located ashore 
along the river.   This support base contains space for command and control, intelligence, 
supply, warehousing, storage, docking, maintenance, administration, berthing, dining, 
shower and head facilities and hotel services.  “Ideally the base should accessible by air, 
road, and water in order to facilitate rapid and reliable lines of communication.”41  The 
FOB had an area that was cleared out to facilitate helicopters and unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) operations.  Also, a security perimeter with guard towers and fence lines 
was established to support force protection measures.  On the river adjoining the base, 
netting and other force protection measures were implemented to impede hostiles.  The 
riverbank’s ground composition is firm enough to support the launching and landing of 
patrol craft and logistic connectors.  The FOB acts as the ashore mission and logistics 
center hub for the RF.  Figure 2 depicts a FOB in Iraq. 
 
 
Figure 2.   FOB in Iraq42 
 
1.5.2 Mobile Operating Base (MOB) 
The MOB has all the capabilities of the FOB, but it is afloat on the river.  Unlike 
the GFS that operates in permissive environments in international waters, the MOB 
operates in a non-permissive environment.  The MOB heavy armor protects against small 
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arms and crew-served weapons.  In addition to the heavy armor, the FOB has a robust 
direct fire capability to defeat level one and two ambushes.  Figure 3 is the Columbian 
built MOB, the Nobriza. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Columbian MOB, Nobriza43 
 
1.5.3 Global Fleet Station (GFS) 
The CNO is currently developing a concept known as the Global Fleet 
Station.  GFS addresses the steady-state forward presence basing 
requirement critical to shaping and stability operations that enable 
persistent interaction with foreign navies and populations.  A GFS is a 
self-sustain home base from which to conduct regional shaping and 
deterrence operations.  It is a base from which tailored, adaptive force 
packages can be launched in response to natural disasters and actionable 
intelligence.  It affords a small force the ability to engage terrorist or 
terrorist networks.  A GFS is envisioned to have the ability to sustain and 
employ riverine units throughout a region in support of phase 0 operations 
or to conduct direct support of GWOT (e.g., surveillance, MIO, and 
combat insertion)44 
For the Riverine Sustainment study the GFS would operate in a permissive 
environment approximately 20 miles from the river mouth. Figure 4 is the San Antonio 
Class (LPD-17), an alternative GFS for the RF. 
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Figure 4.   The San Antonio Class (LPD-17)45 
 
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology section elaborates on the process the RST used to conduct its 
riverine sustainment analysis. 
Methodology is an open set of procedures for problem solving.  
Consequently, a methodology involves a set of methods, a set of activities, 
and a set of relations between the methods and the activities. Generally, 
these include a variety of qualitative and quantitative approaches from a 
number of disciplines that enable formulation, analysis, and interpretation 
of the phased efforts that re associated with the definition, development, 
and deployment of both an appropriate process and the product the results 
from use of this process.  Associated with a methodology is a structured 
framework into which particular methods are associated for the solution of 
a specific issue.46 
 
1.6.1 System Engineering 
Systems engineering is a top-down, problem solving process that captures 
stakeholders’ needs, analyzes alternatives and advocates a solution. 
Systems engineering is a management technology to assist and support 
policy making, planning, decision making, and associated resource 
allocation or action deployment.  Systems engineers accomplish this by 
quantitative and qualitative formulation, analysis, and interpretation of the 
impacts of action alternatives upon the needs perspectives, the institutional 
perspectives, and the value perspectives of their clients or customers.47 
System Engineering is not a new concept; it has been around since the early 
1900’s. 
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The term systems engineering dates back to Bell Telephone Laboratories 
in the early 1940’s.  The RAND Corporation was founded in 1946 by the 
United States Air Force and created systems analysis, which is certainly an 
important part of systems engineering.  The Department of Defense 
entered the world of systems engineering in the late 1940’s with the initial 
development of missiles and missile-defense systems.  The first attempt to 
teach systems engineering as we know it today came in 1950 at MIT.48 
Today, as projects become more complex and the margin of error shrinks, proper 
systems engineering is increasingly important. 
The systems engineering process as an organized approach to creativity.  It 
is not a pointless and unstructured free-for-all, nor is it a strict regimen for 
formulation, analysis and interpretations of large issues associated with the 
definition, development, and deployment of systems.  Often, one of the 
hardest points for many systems engineering students to understand is that, 
for most systems engineering problems, there is no single solution, and 
often no single best solution.  There are alternatives, some of which are 
better than others from some perspectives.  The student of systems 
engineering should not look forward to problems that are well-defined and 
that can be solved simply by finding the right tool.49 
According to Sage and Armstrong there are “three fundamental steps for a 
systems engineering activity: 
• Issue formulation 
• Issue analysis 
• Issue interpretation 
These are each conducted at each of the life-cycle phases that have been chosen 
for the definition, development, and deployment efforts that lead to the engineering of a 
system.  Regardless of the way in which the systems engineering life-cycle process is 
characterized and regardless of the type of product or system or service that is being 
designed, all characteristics of the phases of the systems engineering life cycles will 
necessarily involve: 
• Formulation of the Problem – in which the needs and objectives of a client 
group are identified, and potentially acceptable design alternatives, or options, 
are identified or generated. 
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• Analysis of the Alternatives – in which the impacts of the identified design 
options are identified and evaluated. 
• Interpretation and Selection – in which the options, or alternative courses of 
action, are compared by means of a n evaluation of the impacts of the 
alternatives and how these are valued by the client group.  The needs and 
objectives of the client group are necessarily used as a basis for evaluation.  
The most acceptable alternative is selected for implementation or further study 
in a subsequent phase of systems engineering. 
The RST model of the steps of the logic structure of the systems process, shown 
in Figure 5, is based upon this conceptualization.50  The solid lines flowing downward 
indicate the primary information flow and the dotted lines flowing upward depict the 
flow of feedback. 
 
 
Figure 5.   An Analytical Framework Used Throughout the Systems Engineering and 
Analysis Process.51 
 
1.6.2 Systems Architecture 
“Architecture as the scheme of arrangements of the components of a system, and 
it describes features that are repeated throughout the design and explains the relationship 
among the system’s parts.”52 
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Systems architecture begins with the system’s operational concept and 
includes the development of three separate architectures (functional, 
physical, and operational) as part of this decomposition.  The functional 
architecture defines what eh system must do, that is, the system’s 
functions and the data that flows between them.  The physical architecture 
represents the portioning of physical resources available to perform the 
system’s functions. Figure 6 suggests that the functional and physical 
architectures are developed independently of each other and then 
combined to form the operational architecture.  This suggestion is 
inaccurate, rather the two architectures are developed in parallel, but with 
close interaction to ensure that the operational architecture is meaningful 
when the functional and physical architectures are combined.53 
 
Figure 6.   Systems Architecture54 
 
An operational concept is a vision for what the system is (in general 
terms), a statement of mission requirements, and a description of how the 
system will be used.  The shared vision is from the perspective of the 
system’s stakeholders, addressing how the system will be developed, 
produced, deployed, trained, operated and maintained, refined, and retired 
to overcome some operational problem and achieve the stakeholders’ 
operational needs and objectives. Figure 7 shows the primary choices that 
were considered by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) engineers in determining an operational concept for landing on 
the moon during the 1960s.55 
In section two of this technical report the RST has developed an in-depth riverine 
sustainment operational concept. 
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Figure 7.   Alternate operational concepts for Apollo’s moon landing.56 
 
Time–tested engineering of systems has shown that the design process for 
a system has to consider more than the physical side of the system; the 
functions or activities that the system has to perform are a critical element 
for the design process to be successful on a consistent basis.  This is not to 
say that the designs of functions and physical resources for the system 
proceed independently; they cannot.  However, for success these two 
design elements must be equal partners tin the design process, providing 
checks on each other and complementing each other’s progress.  The 
functional architecture of a system contains a hierarchical model of the 
functions performed by the system, the system’s components, and the 
system’s configuration items (CI’s); the flow of informational and 
physical items from outside the system through the transformational 
processes of the system’s functions and on to the system’s items; and a 
tracing of input/output requirements to both the system’s functions and 
items.57 
The physical architecture of a system is a hierarchical description of the 
resources that comprise the system.  This hierarchy begins with the system 
and the system’s top-level components and progresses down to the CI’s 
that comprise each intermediate component.  The CI’s can be hardware or 
software elements or combinations of hardware and software, people, 
facilities, procedures, and documents (e.g., user’s manuals).58 
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There are two kinds of physical architectures: generic and instantiated. 
The generic physical architecture defines the hierarchy in general terms, 
for example, two processors with associated software, a person, and a 
building.  The instantiated physical architecture lays out the specifics of 
the processors, software, person, and building in enough detail to permit 
performance modeling of the system related to the requirements being 
addressed. The intent of systems engineers should not be to design these 
components but rather to state representative instantiations for the generic 
components that are sufficient to model the performance of the system and 
ensure that the requirements decomposition process makes sense. 
The exit criterion for the development of the physical architecture is the 
provision of a single physical architecture that is satisfactory in terms of 
detail, quantity, and quality for development of the operational 
architecture.  This satisfaction of detail, quantity, and quality is typically 
preceded by the creation of several alternate physical architectures for 
consideration during the development and refinement of the operational 
architecture.59 
The development process for the operational architecture is the activity 
during which the entire design comes together.  The operational 
architecture integrates the requirements decomposition with functional and 
physical architectures.  The process of developing the operational 
architecture provides the raw materials for the definition of the system’s 
external and internal interfaces and is the only activity in the design 
process that contains the material needed to model the system’s 
performance and enable trade-off decisions.  The design process is like 
peeling onion; each of these activities in the design process should be 
completed at a high level of abstraction (low level of detail), culminating 
in an operational architecture at this high level of abstraction for a set of 
sub-systems that comprise the system.  Then the entire process is repeated 
at lower levels of abstraction (greater detail) for the next tier of 
components (peel of the onion).  This repetition at lower and lower levels 
of abstraction (greater and greater detail) is continued as long as useful to 
the design process.  As details determine problems with the design, 
decisions are reviewed and changes are implemented at the higher levels 
of abstraction as needed.60 
 
1.6.3 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is a 
joint-concepts-centric capabilities identification process that allows joint 
forces to meet future military challenges. The Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System process assesses existing and 
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proposed capabilities in light of their contribution to future joint concepts. 
JCIDS, supported by robust analytic processes, identifies capability gaps 
and potential solutions. While JCIDS considers the full range of doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and 
facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions, for purposes of this Guidebook, the focus 
remains on the pursuit of materiel solutions.61 
 
1.6.4 RST Systems Engineering Design Process 
Systems engineering is rooted in problem solving and seeks to apply an 
organized, analytical process to the development of solutions to complex 
problems.  The process begins with identification of a want or desire for 
something and is based on a real or perceived deficiency.62 
The RST utilized proven systems engineering principles and architectures to 
define, analyze, and interpret riverine sustainment in 2012.  The RST also incorporated 
the DOTMLPF process to develop feasible alternatives for RF sustainment.  Finally, the 
RST used Buede’s functional, physical, and operational architectures as a blueprint for 
the analysis. 
 
1.6.5 Project Management Plan 
The Project Management Institute (PMI), the leading certification body for 
project management, defines project management as: the application of 
knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to project activities to meet 
project requirements.  Seasoned project teams view managing 
requirements and the project scope as the most critical elements of 
managing he project.  The Project and its requirements start with 
expressed needs and end only those needs are satisfied as evidenced by 
successful user validation.63 
The needs are met for the RST when the revised problem statement is addressed 
completely. 
Once technical and business requirements are established as consistent, the 
balance needs to be maintained.  The budget and schedule must enable 
achievement of the technical requirements.  Conversely, the technical 
requirements must be achievable with the budget and schedule.  Projects 
without congruency at eh outset are usually doomed and unrecoverable 
unless the inconsistencies are resolved early.  In some industries, projects 
of this type are known as a suicide run.  Throughout a projects’ duration, 
there is continual pressure to change the established agreements.  
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Schedules are compressed, available resources decreased, and technical 
features added.  The project team must be able to recognize and respond to 
serious inconsistencies.  When implementing schedule, budget, and 
technical changes, congruency must be reestablished or the project will 
fail.64 
Communication problems are the root cause of many project failures.  
Miscommunication routinely leads to conflict that can destroy teamwork.  
Communicating is difficult enough in familiar work, social, and family 
settings.  The project environment can be particularly challenging.  Due to 
their temporary nature, projects often bring together people who were 
previously unknown to each other, which is reason enough for 
miscommunication, especially in the early project phases.65 
At the beginning of the riverine sustainment project, not only was the RST 
divided by several thousand miles of ocean, there were cultural and language barriers as 
well.   The RST mitigated some of the barriers with a video teleconference (VTC) in mid-
November 2006.  During VTC both SEA-11 and TDSI students were able to share 
project concerns and ideas.  Afterward the students continued to discuss the study via 
email.  Upon arrival of the TDSI students on the NPS campus in early January 2007, the 
RST met to share personal expertise, preferences, and expectations.  From that very first 
meeting the entire RST knew their role and what was expected of them. 
Teamwork, so essential to effective project performance, receives 
considerable attention today.  We want our project staffs to become 
empowered teams – perhaps even self-directed teams.66 
The RST organized its member into functional IPT’s (that addressed certain facets 
of the riverine sustainment problem) that would build on their personnel strengths and 
preferences. 
An appropriate project cycle contributes significantly to doing the right 
project right the first time.  The project cycle as an orderly sequence of 
integrated activities, performed in phases leading to success.67 
As depicted in Figure 8, the RST broke the project into three phases:  definition, 




Figure 8.   RST Project Cycle 
 
The project cycle clearly articulated where the RST should be with respect to 
time.  In addition to the project cycle, the RST developed work break-down structures 
(WBS’s) for each IPT and for the overall project.  The WBS’s established what needed to 




• Current Operations in Iraq are an anomaly and MSO and TSC operations are 
pivotal mission for the RF. 
• Future areas of interest are the Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia 
• Minus POL, the RF must be capable of sustaining itself for 15 days prior to 
re-supply. 
• Kampar River is representative of many, but not all, riverine operating 
environments. 
• Area of Operation on the Kampar River is logistically barren. 
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• RF will encounter level II threats that are small unconventional warfare forces 
armed with small arms and crew-served weapons. 
• An abundance of crude oil exists in the AO, Diesel Fuel-Marine (DFM) is in 
high demand and is a target of insurgent forces 
• The riparian environment has relatively large numbers of indigenous 
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2. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff state that an operational concept: 
Is how the commander plans to accomplish the mission, including the 
forces involved; the phasing of operations; the general nature and purpose 
of operations to be conducted; and the interrelated or cross-Service 
support.  They should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of 
the level and duration of conflict to provide supporting and subordinate 
commanders a basis for preparing adequate support plans.68 
Buede elaborates: 
The developments of the operational concept serves the purpose of 
obtaining consensus in the written language of the stakeholders about what 
needs the system will satisfy and the ways in which the system will be 
used. By describing how the system will be used, the operational concept 
is providing substantial (but incomplete) information about the system’s 
interaction with other systems and the context of the system.69 
The operational concept includes a collection of scenarios, one or more for 
each group of stakeholders in each relevant phase of the system’s life 
cycle.  Each scenario addresses one way that a particular stakeholder will 
want to use, deploy, and fix the system; the scenario defines how the 
system will respond to inputs from other systems in order to produce a 
desired output.  Included in each scenario are the relevant inputs to and 
outputs from the system and the other systems that are responsible for 
those inputs and outputs.  The scenario should not describe how the 
system is processing inputs to produce outputs; rather the scenario focuses 
on the exchange of inputs and outputs by the system with other systems.  
It is critical that this shared vision be consistent with the collection of 
scenarios comprising the operational concept.70 
The RST operational concept serves as a roadmap for short notice RF operations 
in the 2012 time frame.  Emphasis is on short notice RF deployment to logistically barren 
environments. 
The RF group will be both inter- and intra-theater deployable.  
Effectiveness in the identified mission areas demands these units be 
quickly packaged and deployed from cases in the U.S.  This force will be 
ready to deploy within 96 hours from notification.  This will be 
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accomplished by ensuring most equipment is airmobile and all equipment 
is sea transportable71 
The RF is well suited to perform Maritime Security Operation missions, 
but not direct combat versus a large organized armed force.  The RF has a 
very limited capability to conduct high tempo/high intensity missions.72 
Given the RF’s limitations, they are better suited for operation in a lower threat 
level environment as depicted in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.   US Military Operations Spectrum 
 
The Kampar River in the coastal wetland of western Sumatra, Indonesia, was used 
to represent a logistically barren AO.  The Kampar river has the fourth highest ship 
density in Indonesia, but its river banks are lightly populated.  Isolated, densely vegetated 
terrain and cultivated land characterize the land masses on either side of the Kampar.  
The RF deployed for six months to the island of Sumatra to conduct phase 0 shaping 
operations (as depicted in Figure 10) to stem the tide of insurgent activity. 
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Figure 10.   U.S. Operating Phases73 
 
“A phase is a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large 
portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting 
activities for a common purpose.”74 
Phasing is a helpful method for defining requirement for an entire 
operation or campaign.  It assists the war-planners in identifying such 
requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose.  
There are six distinct phases:  shaping, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, 
stabilize, and enable civil authority.  Phase 0 or shaping operations (RF 
domain), are conducted to shape or influence perceptions of friend and foe 
alike.75 
For the RF these engagements fall under either MSO or TSC operations.  Shaping 
the strategic environment is vital to our national defense. 
Specifically, the RF performed patrol and interdiction operations on the Kampar 
River to intercept and deter arms shipments into the region. Classified as a Level II 
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Threat (Table 2), the insurgents employed guerrilla tactics and utilized small arms, crew-
served weapons, and mortars.  The goal was to thwart terrorist activity and assist the 
Indonesian Government in stabilizing the region. 
 
Table 2. Threat Levels76 
 
Desiring a long-term effect, a mobile training team (MTT), consisting of six 
instructors, was deployed as a part of the RF.  For the duration of the operation, the MTT 
trained Indonesian military and paramilitary forces in riverine warfare tactics and 
operations.  Enabled by the hands-on training the Indonesian forces assumed patrol and 
interdiction operations of the Kampar River at the conclusion of the RF deployment. 
 
2.2 OPERATIONAL PHASES 
Four phases were identified for RF planning purposes: pre-deployment, 
deployment, and withdrawal.  Pre-deployment phase activities prepare the AO for the 
arrival of the RF. 
Deployment encompasses the movement of forces and their sustainment 
resources from their original locations to a specific destination to conduct 
joint operations.  Employment encompasses the use of military forces and 
capabilities within an operational AO.  Sustainment is the provision of 
logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong 
operations until successful mission accomplishment.  The focus of 
sustainment is to provide the force with the means to enable freedom of 
action and endurance and extend operational reach.77 
At the completion of operations, withdrawal of forces and resources to their 
origination is executed. 
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2.2.1 Pre-Deployment Phase 
The pre-deployment phase consisted of battlespace preparation. Battle-space 
preparation activities included intelligence and environmental assessments of the AO and 
FOB construction (when the FOB is selected as the base alternative).  “Deployment 
planning and execution, like all operations, are guided by joint intelligence preparation of 
the battlespace for the full range of military operations.  The impact of the operational 
environment and the adversary must be assessed in relation to the assigned mission.”78 
Environmental (hydrographic/topographic) surveys were conducted in parallel to 
the intelligence assessment to reveal geographic constraints and assist in locating 
appropriate sites for the FOB and MOB.  In choosing a site for the FOB, force protection 
and logistic feasibility were considered.  An area approximately 10 miles east of the city 
of Telukmeranti was selected for the location of the FOB.  The NECC rapidly deployed a 
detachment from the Naval Construction Division (SeaBees) with equipment and 
construction materials to the site to construct the FOB.  Modifying an existing tent camp 
model, the Seabees constructed a tailor-made FOB that supported the various RF 
requirements.  First a security perimeter was established and remote force protection 
sensors were deployed.  Next the TOC, latrine, messing, and SURC maintenance 
facilities were built.  Designated SURC and helicopter re-fueling areas were reinforced 
with dirt and sand bag walls for additional protection.  Finally, personnel tents and 
storage areas were erected. 
 
2.2.2 Deployment Phase 
During deployment, units are echeloned, configured and scheduled for 
movement based on time-phased force and deployment data that 
synchronizes arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel with mission 
needs.  Time phasing allows for rapid theater reception and onward 
movement of arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel.79 
The most critical nodes supporting most deployment operations are the air 
and seaports of embarkation and debarkation.  Port efficiency or 
throughput is a function of the operational environment, capability of the 
port workforce, and level of port modernization.  In some instances, the 
existence of no port facilities (e.g., bare beach or austere landing strip) 
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will significantly hinder deployment and sustainment operations until 
temporary or fixed infrastructure can be considered.80 
The Kampar River area is logistically barren with no port facilities or suitable 
airports. 
Lines of Communications (LOC’s) are the land, water, and air routes 
which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and 
along which supplies and military forces move to support operations.  
LOC’s must be identified early in the planning process because the 
associated links (e.g., land, sea, or air routes) and nodes (e.g., home 
station, ports, staging areas, and destination) impact every aspect of 
deployment planning.81 
The AO has very few improved roadways and during the rainy season most of its 
roads are impassable (RF deployed during the rainy season), thus eliminating land routes 
for deployment and sustainment considerations. 
“A river squadron can be transported to a theater of operations by air, amphibious 
ship, or merchant vessel.”82  Airlift was by far most expeditious way of moving the RF, 
however the AO was not serviced by an adequate airport.  Even if a regional airport did 
exist the majority of the regional roadway would be impassable due to torrential rains.  
“Amphibious ships have sufficient billeting and vehicle square footage to accommodate 
the RF”83  Amphibious assault ships (LHA/LHD’s), amphibious transport docks (LPD’s), 
and tank landing ships (LST’s) are all desirable for RF transportation due to their large 
cargo capacities, berthing and well-decks. 
The RF minus the pre-deployment compliment of Seabees and security personnel 
were staged in Little Creek, Virginia for inter-theater transport aboard an amphibious 
ship. 
Staging is the process of concentrating troop units, transient personnel, 
and materiel between movements over LOC’s for mission-related 
purposes.  Purposes for staging may include, but are not limited to, any of 
the following mission related activities:  operational pause for rest, 
reorganization, or reconstitution of the force; reconfiguration of the unit 
loads or movement echelons for employment; pre-deployment training; 
rehearsal of unit missions; marshalling of forces; or to change the mode of 
transportation.84 
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Figure 11.   Amphibious Deployment Operations85 
 
Successful deployments were characterized by careful planning and 
flexible execution.  Careful and detailed planning ensures that only 
required personnel, equipment, and materiel are scheduled for movement, 
unit movement changes were minimized, and the flow of personnel, 
equipment, and materiel into theater does not exceed lift availability and 
the theater reception capability.86 
 
2.2.3 Employment Phase 
“Employment was the strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces”87  
Employment spans the phases of operation and incorporates all the activities required to 
complete the assigned mission.  The employment phase is by far the longest phase and is 
not completed until the mission is completed.88  Once in the AO, the RF was employed 
from one of three basing alternatives: FOB, MOB, or GFS.  The FOB was ashore 
approximately 30 miles up the Kampar River along the riverbank and had ample space 
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for the RF and its materiel.  The MOB was also 30 miles up river, but it is afloat in the 
Kampar River.  The GFS was afloat as well, but it is 10 miles off the coast of Sumatra in 
a more permissive environment. From their support base the RF was capable of 
conducting operations.  There are five categories that Navy riverine operations will likely 
fall into:  river control, riverine lines of communication interdiction, fire support, 
insertion/extraction, and theater security cooperation.  These five operation categories 
have distinct characteristics that have an affect force employment.89 
To be effective in the riverine environment, near continuous presence was 
required for river control.  The overarching goal of river control is to not only control, but 
also to monitor the flow of traffic and goods on the river way.  The RF utilized a division 
of SURC’s (four) for coordination, flexibility and mutual support to patrol the river for 
insurgent activity.  Protecting critical infrastructure, providing a secure area for the 
conducting of military operations and commerce, and supporting civil affairs efforts 
along the river were the objectives of river control.  RF requirements are: 
• Conduct patrols  
• Conduct Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) 
• Engage hostile forces on the river up to a level II threat 
• Coordinate and cooperate with joint forces or other coalition partners. 
Interdiction of riverine lines of communication involves impeding, disrupting or 
eliminating the means of movement of enemy personnel or supplies on the rivers or 
waterways accomplishes.  Interdiction denies the enemy secure areas in which to operate 
and affords a secure area for friendly forces to maneuver and operate.  Diligent battle- 
space intelligence preparation, careful planning, and persistent intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance are vital to this operation90 
The third and fourth RF mission areas are fire support and insertion/extraction 
mission.  Close coordination with joint and host nation forces are paramount in any fire 
support activity.  The SURC’s gun systems (MK-43, MK-19, and M-2) are capable of 
providing fire support for ground elements.  With its armament, maneuverability, range, 
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and speed the SURC is an excellent platform is an excellent platform for insertion and 
extraction of ground forces. 
The final primary mission area for the RF is TSC which vital in shaping the 
strategic environment.  The host nation must trust the RF’s intentions order to gain access 
to a country’s territorial waters. 91  These missions primarily focus on providing training 
or disaster relief to coalition partner nations. The footprint for TSC operations is typically 
small over short durations and is well suited for GFS basing.  TSC missions assure allies, 
dissuade adversaries, and deter aggression. 
 
2.2.4 Withdrawal Phase 
At the end of the operation the RF transitions from the employment phase to the 
withdrawal phase.  The RF in its entirety is transferred from the AO back to their 
homeport in Little Creek, Virginia.  The withdrawal phase demands the same in-depth 
planning that the other phases require. 
Withdrawal is not merely reversing the deployment process.  Withdrawals 
are planned and executed as discrete, mission-based operations within the 
overall context of the joint force mission.  Force protection is as important 
during withdrawal as during any other stage of the joint operation.  During 
this transition period, the withdrawal unit may not be able to fully sustain 
or defend itself because some or all of its elements are configured for 
movement and may not have full mission capability.  Equally important in 
the withdrawal process is a complete review of the environmental 
considerations applicable in the host nation environment.  Failure to take 
the host nation requirements for environmental compliance into account 




Figure 12.   Troop Withdrawal93 
 
2.3 RIVERINE SCENARIO 
The purpose of this scenario was to set the stage for a riverine maritime 
interdiction operation in order to model and analyze alternative basing, sustainment, force 
protection, and repair architectures for the RF in a logistically barren environment.  
Aspects of this mission were developed to serve as a baseline to perform analysis and 
modeling on this operation to extract logistics, force protection, and repair requirements 
in determine how each of these requirements affected the various basing alternatives. 
This particular area was chosen specifically for its geographical and 
hydrographical features.  The political situation and scenario have been fictionalized and 
do not represent the current state of affairs in Indonesia. 
 
2.3.1 Mission 
In support of a request from the Government of Indonesia the U.S. Riverine 
Squadron One was tasked to conduct Riverine Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) 
along the Kampar River in the Riau Province in Indonesia in order to stem the tide of 
insurgent weapons and materiel traveling up the Kampar River that are supporting 
insurgent efforts to seize the city of Telukmeranti.  The Riverine force was to patrol and 
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conduct MIO along a fifteen mile area downstream of the city of Telukmeranti (Figure 
13) in a coalition effort with Indonesian forces.  As requested by the Indonesian 
Government, this operation is to be conducted for a period of six months. 
 
Figure 13.   U.S. Riverine Force Area of Operations 
 
As a coalition effort and a show of support for Indonesia, the U.S. deployed a 
Mobile Training Team (MTT) in order to train Indonesian forces on riverine operations.  
These Indonesian forces will be trained and deployed in the conduct of the MIO and will 
serve as interpreters and crewmembers on these missions.  The U.S. forces will have a 
contingent of Indonesian military liaisons as a supplement to the Operation Center in 
order to expedite and coordinate U.S. and Indonesian military efforts. 
 
2.3.2 Situation 
Due to a weak economy, insurgent groups were attempting to overthrow the 
government of Indonesia.  Small skirmishes have erupted in several of the major cities 
between the local law enforcement organizations and the insurgents.  Indonesia declared 
a state of martial law and has dispatched its military and civil defense forces to these 
cities in order to restore peace.  The Indonesian Government was not successful in 
thwarting insurgent actions, due to their inability to stop the flow of insurgent weapons 
and materiel throughout the country along its inland waterways.  The insurgent weapons 
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and materiel were being transported into Indonesia from numerous points of origin.  
Since Indonesia had limited resources and poor diplomatic ties to most of these points of 
origins, Indonesia was seemingly left with one remaining option, stop the ingress and 
flow of insurgent weapons and materiel within their own borders. 
Intelligence reports suggested that the insurgents have increased their efforts at 
moving weapons and materiel along the Kampar River in order to seize the city of 
Telukmeranti.  The Mosque of Riau, located in Telukmeranti, is considered the Muslim 
religious center of Indonesia.  It was felt that if Telukmeranti were to fall to the 
insurgents, that faith in the Indonesian Government would falter and increase insurgent 
sentiment and support in Indonesia that could possibly lead to the demise of the 
Indonesian Government. 
In trying to stabilize the country and bolster support of the government, Indonesia 
requested the United States for assistance in helping them stop these insurgent shipments. 
The U.S. agreed to aid Indonesia in order to strengthen U.S. and Indonesian relations and 
show support for the Indonesian Government.  However, the Indonesian government 
expressed concerns that it desires to limit the number of U.S. forces on Indonesian soil 
and limit U.S. Military action to MIO along the Kampar River.  With the U.S. Military 
performing this specific task, the government of Indonesia felt that their own military and 
civil defense force could successfully restore peace to the region and maintain the local 
populations’ confidence in the Indonesian Government. 
The Indonesian Government also expressed concern that the U.S. efforts along the 
Kampar River should minimally impact commerce and traffic that would potentially 
weaken the Indonesian economy further.  Due to this concern, the U.S. and Indonesia 
agreed that the U.S. would conduct MIO along the 15 nautical miles to the east of 
Telukmeranti.  This particular patrol area was chosen for several reasons.  In this area 
along the Kampar River, there is much less maritime traffic density, therefore fewer 
vessels to search and less impact on the local commerce and economy due to delays in 
searching additional vessels.  This section of the river was also much narrower than other 
portions of the Kampar River.  The Kampar River is over five nautical miles wide when 
it flows into the Strait of Malacca, however in this area, the river was on average 1.5 
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nautical miles wide making it more manageable to patrol and perform MIO.  A tactical 
concern was that if the insurgents were on vessels that the likelihood of escape was 
greater the closer these vessels were to the Strait of Malacca due to the large traffic 
density of the Strait.  Performing MIO up river away from the Strait of Malacca would 
give the U.S. forces increased time to overtake and contain evading insurgent vessels.  
This area was also chosen because there are no roads that lead into Telukmeranti past this 
region.  If the base were closer to the Strait of Malacca, the insurgents might possibly 
bypass the U.S. efforts upon the river utilizing roads in the region and then use the river 
upstream to enter Telukmeranti.  With the patrol area located near Telukmeranti, 
insurgents had only two options for transporting their weapons and materiel into 
Telukmeranti.  These options were to try to evade the U.S. Riverine Force patrolling the 
river or move their weapons by land into Telukmeranti and contend with the Indonesian 
Army patrolling the region surrounding the city. 
 
2.3.3 Considerations Affecting Possible Courses of Action 
2.3.3.1 Terrain and Geography 
The Riau Province in Indonesia is mostly coastal lowlands with the 
interior of the island having densely vegetated, tropical, mountainous terrain.  The 
Kampar River region is densely vegetated coastal lowland with several small cities and 
cultivated areas along most of its banks.  Elevation in the region is predominantly less 
than 100 feet above sea level.  As depicted in Figure14, the region north of the Kampar 
River is undeveloped forests and south of the Kampar River is undeveloped forest, a 
large lumber farm, and agricultural land. 
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Figure 14.   Kampar Region Terrain Features 
 
2.3.3.2 Hydrography 
The Kampar River is one of the four busiest inland waterways in 
Indonesia.  The waterway is primarily used for the transportation of agricultural goods, 
logging, and textiles, namely paper.  The Kampar River is navigatable to a large variety 
of ships for over 50 miles inland from the Strait of Malacca with an average depth of 4 to 
5 fathoms. 
2.3.3.3 Transportation 
The Kampar River region ground transportation was limited to a few un-
improved roads.  Cross-country movement of vehicles is difficult due to the dense 
vegetation in the region; however wheeled vehicles can transverse on un-improved road 
throughout the few cultivated regions and lumber fields along the southern banks of the 
Kampar River.  During the rainy season, in which region gets on average 80 to 120 
inches of rainfall, the un-improved roads in this region were impassable due to the 
flooding and erosion. 
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Transportation in this region was primarily conducted upon the Kampar 
River.  Fishing along the Kampar River was once the mainstay of the local economies in 
the regions.  However, in the past few years, fishing in the region has become non-
existent due to the pollution of the Kampar River by the paper mills along its southern 
banks.  Maritime traffic upon the Kampar River consists of local merchant boats and 
small cargo boats and is summarized in the Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Typical Regional Ship Characteristics 
 
The local merchant ships were used for the transportation of local goods 
and personnel within the region.  These small wooden boats had small crew cabins and 
have the capacity to embark up to 30 standing personnel.  These vessels were powered by 
small outboard motors or push poles and transit in the shallow waters near the shores of 
the Kampar River. A typical Local Merchant ship is shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.   Typical Local Merchant Ships 
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The regional cargo ships were used for the transportation of commercial 
goods, such as paper and rubber, from the local industrial facilities to international ports 
along the Strait of Malacca.  These steel vessels were characterized by small crew cabins 
and either one or two masts.  A typical small regional cargo ship is shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.   Typical Small Cargo Ship 
 
2.3.3.4 Enemy Relative Combat Power 
The Indonesian insurgents have limited capacity to conduct large 
offensive operations against standing forces. Insurgent weapons are currently limited to 
small arms (AK-74’s), crew served weapons (RPG’s), improvised explosive devices 
(IED’s), and mortars (M-60’s).  Recent intelligence reports estimate insurgent strength to 
be approximately 500 personnel in the Kampar River region.  These insurgents were 
dispersed among several cells.  Insurgent areas of activity and estimated sizes are listed in 
the Figure 17. 
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Figure 17.   Approximate Insurgent Strength and Locations 
 
2.3.3.5 Friendly Relative Combat Power 
The Indonesian Military is approximately 200,000 personnel serving in the 
Army, Air Force, or Navy.  Indonesia also employs a Universal People’s Defense which 
is approximately 100,000 civilians trained as territorial militia personnel.  The Indonesian 
Navy, Customs Service, and Maritime Police have approximately 180 small craft which 
are utilized solely for coastal defense and port security.  Indonesia has no dedicated 
riverine force. 
Due to the importance of the Mosque of Riau in Telukmeranti, the 
Government of Indonesia has dispatched three thousand ground troops and a dedicated 
helicopter detachment to the Telukmeranti region.  These troops are tasked with securing 
the city and protecting the Mosque of Riau. Indonesian forces were to patrol the 
rainforest/un-improved regions surrounding the city in an effort to stop the flow of 
insurgent weapons into the city from landward approaches.  Indonesia established an 
outpost with approximately 200 military personnel within the U.S. area of operations in 
order to facilitate timely turnover of prisoners and render military assistance to U.S. 
Riverine Forces in the area. 
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The Indonesian Helicopter detachment consists of 6 Mi-2 helicopters 
located in the City of Telukmeranti and is tasked with providing direct air support and 
MEDIVAC/CASEVAC capabilities for both the Indonesian and U.S. forces.  Three Mi-2 
helicopters are configured to provide direct fire support while the remaining helicopters 
are configured to provide CASEVAC and lift functions.  Through coordination with 
Indonesian liaison officers, upon request these helicopters can respond and be on station 
within 20 minutes. 
 
2.3.3.6 Assumptions, Constraints, and Other Considerations 
• Indonesia will allow the introduction of U.S. military into the region to 
perform MIO. 
• The U.S. Area of Operations is currently a Threat Level II.  Level II 
threats are defined as “Small tactical unit, unconventional forces, 
guerrillas, may include significant stand-off weapon threats.”94 
• Operation is conducted during the Indonesian rain season, therefore all 
unimproved road in the region are impassible by wheeled vehicles. 
• Indonesia has limited the use of force for U.S. riverine forces.  Use of 
force is allowed for self defense of the U.S. riverine force only and 
cannot conduct direct action/offensive operations.  Use of force for 
self protection of the U.S. forces outside predetermined engagement 
zones must be coordinated with Indonesian forces. 
• Limited airfields and airfield capacities in the region may restrict 
support to the U.S. Riverine forces.  The only airfields in this region 
are in the cities of Telukmeranti and Kolomang and are small, 
unimproved facilities that can accommodate helicopter and small 
civilian aircraft only. 
• Indonesian forces have the ability to communicate through various 
methods with U.S. forces in the region. 
• Due to the weak Indonesian economy and rural area of operations, 
logistics support from host nation and region is limited. 
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• Medical care will be provided by host nation of Indonesia in the city of 
Kolomang, if required. 
• All suspect personnel detained by the U.S. military operations will be 
turned over to the host nation of Indonesia within 90 minutes. 
 
2.3.4 Basic Conduct of Maritime Interdiction Operations  
A riverine squadron consisted of three detachments.  Each detachment was 
comprised of 4 SURC’s, and each SURC was manned by two alternating boat crews.  A 
boat crew consisted of five personnel.  There was an eight man boarding team assigned to 
each detachment which was comprised of U.S. and Indonesian personnel.  Each MIO was 
performed by one detachment but on occasion was supplemented with additional craft as 
required by the situation.  One SURC and boat crew was on standby for various 
contingencies that arose during the course of a mission.  These contingencies included 
but were not limited to:  transport of prisoners within the AO, relieving a disabled SURC 
on patrol, and rendering additional assistance as required to operational boats. 
Each MIO mission was eight hours in duration after transit and turnover.  The 
MIO was conducted at various, random sites within the AO, but was limited to a 
minimum of one nautical mile away from the basing alternative in order to minimize 
possible friendly fire and fratricide should an insurgent attack occur.  Randomization of 
these search sites was an effort to provide the most force protection measures for these 
forces so that the insurgent forces could not foresee a pattern and mount an effective 
attack against these forces. 
The forces employed the technique of beaching two SURC’s, establishing a 
search site in which to conduct operations within, while one SURC serves as an escort for 
contacts of interest and the remaining SURC provides a sweeper/force protection 
function.  Contacts of Interest were determined by two methods.  The first method was 
any suspicious vessel was searched and the second was a random draw method.  The 
detachment lead would determine which vessels to search through communications with 
each boat crew or intelligence reports from the TOC, UAV’s, USV’s, or from non-
organic sensors.  Once a vessel was considered a contact of interest, the escort SURC 
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would approach, and through the use of Indonesian interpreters onboard, would then 
escort the contact of interest to the search site and beach them.  Once the contact of 
interest was beached, the escort SURC would fall back and provide protection for the 
search site and thwart any attempt of the contact of interest to escape.  The beached 
contact of interest would then be searched by the boarding team, any suspicious 
personnel would be detained and weapons confiscated.  If there were no weapons or 
suspicious personnel onboard, the contact of interest would be allowed to get underway.  
The average search time per vessel for the conduct of this operation was 10-15 minutes.  
Figure 18 depicts a generic search site set up for this operation. 
 
Figure 18.   MIO Search Site 
 
When suspicious personnel and or weapons were confiscated during a search, it 
was the detachment leaders’ decision to either transport these personnel and materiel to 
the Indonesian outpost by using an on-station asset or call for the standby SURC to 
perform this task.  This decision process also held for any casualty or unforeseen 
situation that occurred during the course of the mission.  Due to the dense forestation of 
the region, if a casualty situation occurred, the injured personnel had to be transported 
back via boat to the base of operations in order to be picked up by the Indonesian 
helicopters for transport to the medical facilities in Kolomang. 
If during the course of the mission the search site came under insurgent fire from 
landward position, it was the detachment leaders’ decision on the appropriate course of 
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action.  The search sites were previously coordinated with Indonesian forces; therefore 
self defense return fire was authorized.  However, the decision on whether to hold ground 
and engage the enemy or withdraw from the site was the detachment leaders’ 
responsibility. 
 
2.3.4 Enemy Courses of Action (ECOA) 
2.3.4.1 ECOA 1 Cease or Reroute Operations 
With U.S. military forces conducting operations upon the Kampar River, 
the insurgents may cease operations in this region, or cease operations upon the Kampar 
River and reroute their shipments to Telukmeranti via landward routes.  This course of 
action would slow the transport of insurgent weapons and materiel into the region due to 
the increased time required to transport this materiel over land during the rainy season.  
This materiel would have to be carried in by personnel on foot due to the impassable 
nature of the roads and terrain during this time. 
 
2.3.4.2 ECOA 2 Employ Decoys and Harassment 
Through observations of U.S. operations upon the Kampar River, the 
insurgents may find alternatives that may be feasible in order to try to sneak their 
weapons and materiel’s past the U.S. Riverine Forces.  Through the use of decoy vessels 
and just playing the odds of getting randomly searched by U.S. forces may be acceptable 
risks that the insurgents are willing to accept in order to continue their operations in 
Telukmeranti.  Harassment of U.S. forces may be an acceptable risk the insurgents are 
willing to take.  Through the use of insurgent land and water assets, engaging the U.S. 
forces in small skirmishes upon the river and search sites may draw attention from 
vessels upon the river and allow these vessels through the area relatively unnoticed. 
 
2.3.4.3 ECOA 3 Engagement of Forces 
The insurgents may assess that direct attacks upon the U.S. forces may be 
effective at causing a large number of U.S. casualties and damaging equipment.  These 
attacks may significantly degrade the Riverine Forces abilities at conducting MIO upon 
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the Kampar River and due to strong U.S. public opinion may cause the U.S. to withdraw 
from the region. 
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3. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
3.1 FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS AND PURPOSE 
“Architecture is the scheme of arrangements of the components of a system, and it 
describes features that are repeated throughout the design and explains the relationship 
among the system’s parts.”95  In system engineering the functional architecture describes 
what the system must do, its interfaces, and flows.  The RST developed the functional 
architecture in parallel with the physical architecture for the study.  The RST began the 
functional analysis by performing stakeholder analysis, which involved identifying and 
interviewing pertinent stakeholder.  After conducting stakeholder analysis, the RST 
developed system decompositions, functional flow block diagrams, input/output models 
and objective hierarchies for their functional architecture. 
System decomposition is technique used to better understand a system by 
breaking its attributes into smaller blocks.  A system can be decomposed by its functions, 
states, components and hierarchical structure.  Functions simply describe what the system 
is intended to do by taking a particular set of inputs and producing a set of outputs.  
States utilize a collection of variables to identify system condition.   Components are a 
logical break-down of the system’s parts; they are further categorized by structure, flow 
and operation.  Finally, hierarchical structure considers the physical and functional 
relationship between the system’s components.96 
A functional flow block diagram (FFBD) is used to illustrate a system in its 
functional terms.   A FFBD consists of functional blocks connected by and/or connectors 
and arrows to depict the system’s functional flow.  Using a hierarchical approach the 
FFBD reflects activities as they occur during the system’s life cycle.  The FFBD should 
cover all applicable functions and inherent sequences.  Functional blocks in the FFBD 
follow a progressive numbering scheme that preserves proper sequence and continuity.97  
The FFBD is a powerful tool in functional analysis execution. 
The input/output model is a very useful apparatus for analyzing the needs and 
constraints of a system.  The input/output model specifically describes how inputs 
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(controllable and uncontrollable) are put through a system process and outputs (intended 
and by-products) are derived.  Controllable inputs are the inputs that can be controlled 
such as resources, procedures, or organization structure.  Uncontrollable inputs are rarely 
controlled and include weather, demand, and governmental interference.  Intended 
outputs are the desired products of the system and should be maximized.  They are the 
primary reason for having the system in the first place.  By-products are usually 
unintended and can have positive or negative effects.  In most cases by-products, such as 
pollution, have a negative impact and should be minimized.  The input/output model is 
beneficial in defining a system’s boundaries and boundary conditions.98 
The objectives hierarchy is a top-down process that starts with the client’s ends 
and creates a logical progression down through ways and means to metrics.  Effective 
need, functions, sub-functions, objectives and evaluation measures comprise the 
objectives hierarchy.  The client’s effective need is discovered after conducting 
stakeholder analysis.  Functions and subsequent sub-functions are processes that 
transform inputs into outputs that are mutual exclusive and collectively exhaustive.  
Objectives refer to the system’s goals and those goals are measured by evaluation 
measures.  Good evaluation measures, MOP’s and MOE’s, are measurable, quantifiable, 
and directly related to the objective.99  The objectives hierarchy takes considerable effort, 
but when done correctly it yields powerful results. 
 
3.1.1 Initial Problem Statement 
System engineering is an organized approach to complex problem solving.  It 
combines engineering know how with sound business judgment to create viable 
solutions. The first step in system engineering is identifying the stakeholders’ primitive 
need, which is a want or desire based on a real or perceived shortfall.100  From the Wayne 
E Meyer’s Institute Integrated Project Tasking, “Collaborate with the Naval 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) to design a system of systems for performing 
emerging Navy missions associated with coalition operations in littoral and riverine 
environments.”101, the RST constructed an initial problem statement:  “Define, analyze, 
and recommend alternatives that increase sustainability and connectivity of cooperative, 
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adaptive force packages in the riparian environment utilizing technologies currently in 
use or available for use by 2012.”  The initial problem statement served as a starting point 
to decompose the riverine sustainment system. 
 
3.2 STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
3.2.1 Stakeholders 
The RST visited several stakeholders in order to gain insight and determine which 
issues were most relevant in order to focus the project and develop alternatives which 
would be beneficial to these stakeholders.  Figure 19 depicts the RST stakeholder 
locations. 
 
Figure 19.   RST Stakeholder Map 
 
The Primary Stakeholders of the SEA-11 Riverine Sustainment project were 
NECC, River Group One (RIVGRU ONE), and River Squadron One.   Other 
stakeholders that had valuable insights into this project and would benefit from this study 
are:  SBT-22, NAVSCIATT, LOGSU-1, NCW-1, and NSWC.  These primary and 
secondary stakeholders missions, operations, and organizations all have common aspects 
that were analyzed in this study. 
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3.2.2 Stakeholder Input 
Stakeholder input and feedback are an essential part of the systems engineering 
and design process in that stakeholder needs are developed into operational requirements 
and ensures that the developed outputs of the alternative designs are validated by the 
stakeholder feedback.102  Once the scope of the project was focused on riverine 
operations, the RST made several trips to discuss relevant issues and RST goals in order 
to attain stakeholder buy-in and inputs for developing the project.  This initial contact and 
input from the stakeholders was invaluable.  The largest takeaway from these discussions 
was that the NECC and River Group One had been focused on taking over the Marine 
Corps Small Combatant Craft Company’s role in Iraq, primarily the guarding of the 
Haditha Dam in Baghdad.  This narrow focus was due to the short amount of time that 
the NECC and River Group One had to stand up, develop operational capabilities and 
deploy forces within a year’s time.  The full capability of the riverine forces was 
currently in development and there were many aspects to conducting the myriad of 
operations that these forces were tasked with that had not been explored in depth. 
 
3.2.3 Core Documentation 
As no member of the RST had operational knowledge of the riverine squadrons, 
numerous core documents were reviewed to gain valuable insights and knowledge about 
riverine operations and force structure.  For historical references the RST reviewed The 
Center for Naval Analysis’ Renewal of Navy’s Riverine Force Capability:  A Preliminary 
Examination of the Past, Current, and Future Capabilities, the Marine Corps Center for 
Lessons Learned Small Craft Company’s Deployment in Support of Operational Iraqi 
Freedom II:  A summary of lessons and Observations, the Naval Historical Divisions The 
U.S. Navy’s Operations on Inland Waters, and Brown Water, Black Berets by LCDR 
Thomas J. Cutler.  The RST was able to determine capability gaps from these documents 
and increase the teams’ knowledge of the problems with riverine operations and lessons 
learned from past operations.  In order to understand the current riverine force structure 
and operations the RST studied the U.S. Navy Riverine Force Concept of Operations.  
Reviewing and understanding these core documents allowed the RST to explore 
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capability gaps within the current riverine force structure and apply lessons learned from 
past experiences in developing feasible alternatives for filling these gaps. 
 
3.3 SYSTEM DECOMPOSITION 
A system is defined as “an assemblage or combination of elements or parts 
forming a complex or unitary whole.”103  The purpose of system decomposition is to 
analyze the current system and its elements in order to have an increased understanding 
of the system.  Systems are comprised of functions, components, hierarchical structure, 
and states.104  After researching the history of riverine warfare and present day concepts, 
RST analyzed the systems of the existing RF supply, command and control, repair, and 
force protection. 
A function is a definite, purposeful action that a system must accomplish to 
achieve one of the system’s objectives.105  The components affect and influence the 
system.  There are structural, operating, and flow components.  Structural components are 
the physical aspects of the system, operating components are the entities required to 
perform system processing, and flow components are the material, energy, or information 
being altered.106  The hierarchical structure, which is broken down to super system, 
lateral system, and sub system, helps show where the functions and components exist.  
Finally, the states of the system are the different variables used to reflect the condition of 
the system at a specific time.107 
 
3.3.1 Supply Group 
The decomposition of riverine supply, based on the U.S. Navy Riverine Force 




























































Figure 20.   Riverine Force Decomposition 
 
3.3.1.1 Functions 
The functions of supply are to manage, distribute, move, and to bring 
back.  Supplies are first controlled and organized.  After a request has been made, the 
supplies are prepared for shipment.  Then, supplies are transported to the destination of 
the requestor.  Certain unused materials are returned supply for redistribution. 
3.3.1.2 Components 
Structural components comprise the physical aspects of RF Supply.  These 
include the supply ship, operating base, and logistic connector.  The operating component 
is the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE), which is the entity that provides many of 
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the logistic services and support.  Flow components include Supply Classes I, II, III, IV, 
V (W), and IX that are distributed to the RF.108 
 
3.3.1.3 Hierarchical Structure 
Super systems for RF Supply are the top-level organizations.  These 
include NECC, Support Base Commander, and Supply Corps.  Lateral systems indirectly 
support or perform the functions of the RF Supply.  Lateral systems include the small 
boat unit, logistic connectors, and CSSE.  Sub systems directly support the RF Supply.  
Sub-systems include C4ISR, FP, supply support, maintenance support, utilities support, 
and landing support.109 
 
3.3.1.4 States 
States are the operational phases that reflect the condition of the RF 
logistics.  The different phases are pre-deployment, deployment, and withdrawal.  The RF 
assembles the allotted initial pack out supplies in the pre-deployment phase.  During the 
deployment phase, the RF is re-supplied through logistic channels in the area of 
operations.  The RF during the withdrawal phase packs up and transports the un-used 
supplies out of the current operational area. 
 
3.3.2 Repair Group 
Currently, many aspects of riverine maintenance are conducted in an informal 
manner through the use of contractors. In order to formalize this process, the RST began 
with a systems decomposition of the current system, detailed in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21.   Maintenance System Decomposition 
 
3.3.2.1 Functions 
The functions of the maintenance system were derived from U.S. Army110 
and Marine Corps111 maintenance doctrine, and were tailored to fit our concept of 
operations.  In order to conduct maintenance in a Level II threat environment, this study 
determined that the following maintenance functions had to be accomplished: Service, 
Repair, Replace, and Evacuate.  Service was defined as the process of identifying faults 
through preventive maintenance in order to maintain the operational readiness of the 
boat.  Repair represented the act of fixing a damaged boat in this study.  Replace allowed 
for the substitution of serviceable parts or end items for those that are damaged, and 




Components represented the physical constructs of the riverine 
maintenance system and are split into three categories: structural, operating, and flow.  
Structural represented the physical make up of the system which included the nine 
mechanics and 12 SURC craft.  Operating represented the entities required to carry out 
the maintenance function which included the maintenance/supply section as a subordinate 
part of the CSSE, but also required support from other CSSE’s in order to function.  Flow 
represented the maintenance system’s interaction with other elements within the logistics 
system and was comprised of Class II and Class XI parts, Class III POL, and Class VII 
major end items. 
 
3.3.2.3 Hierarchical Structure 
Within the hierarchical structure, super systems for RF maintenance 
system were the top-level organizations.  These included the NECC, the Riverine Group, 
Support Base, and Squadron Commander.  Lateral systems provided indirect support to 
the maintenance system, such as the logistic vessel unit, and engineering support.  Sub 
systems directly supported the maintenance system through include supply support, 
transportation support, and structural support. 
 
3.3.2.4 States 
States were the operational phases that reflected the condition of parts and 
equipment, as they flowed through the maintenance system.  In this study, the 12 SURC’s 
and the 65 pieces of rolling gear were bounded such that they were either fully mission 
capable (FMC) or non-mission capable (NMC).  If a piece of equipment was NMC, it 
was categorized into the following sub states: awaiting parts, awaiting repair, being 
serviced, or evacuated for depot level maintenance. 
 
3.3.3 Force Protection Group 
The systems decomposition model for the Force Protection System (FPS) (Figure 
22) represented an overview of the functions, physical composition, and relationship of 
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the FPS to other systems.  The model improved the RST’s understanding of how the FPS 
operates and the assets available to the FPS. 
 
Figure 22.   FP Decomposition 
 
3.3.3.1 Functions 
The overarching function for the Force Protection System (FPS) of the 
riverine FOB is to protect the RF, and other detachments, while operating within and in 
close proximity to the FOB.  The functions that comprise protection are deterring, 
denying, and predicting the threat.  Deterrence is defined as “the prevention from action 
by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence 
of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.”112  In the context of protecting the 
FOB, the FPS hopes to deter civilians from entering the immediate perimeter of the FOB 
to decrease the amount of contacts, and of course, dissuade attacks by hostile forces.  A 
denial measure is defined as “to withhold the possession, use, or enjoyment of.”113  For 
protection of the FOB, the FPS is denying enemy forces a successful attack by destroying 
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enemy personnel, weapons, and the means to assemble personnel and weapons.  
Predicting the threat is the ability of the FPS to have the correct force for the correct 
threat, primarily through the use of intelligence.  The addition and use of intelligence for 
force protection is what separates force protection from self defense,114 creating a more 
proactive, efficient force. 
 
3.3.3.2 Components 
The structural component of the FPS is the personnel the RF would assign 
to security, as well as other security detachments provided by the NECC.  The 
operational component consists of the weapons, sensors, communication equipment, 
vehicles, and various security elements required of the FPS to accomplish the mission.  
The security elements that are generally required in security are the command element, 
patrolling elements, and stationary or guard elements.  The FPS flow component enables 
interaction with other parts of the RF.  The entities that flow through the FPS are 
information and logistics.  Information could take the form of communications and other 
data to provide situational awareness for the FPS.  Logistics could take the form of food, 
ammunition, fuel, and other necessities the FPS requires to maintain operations. 
 
3.3.3.3 Hierarchical Structure 
The FPS of the RF is considered part of the support element.115  As such, 
the super system of the FPS consists of the RF, NECC, and the JFMCC.  The lateral 
systems of the FPS include the other members of the RF support element such as:  
combat service, materiel, and vehicle maintenance.  Given the coalition environment the 
RF can operate in, various lateral systems include other FPS’s provided by coalition 
partners.  The subsystems of the FPS include patrolling, stationary, and command 
elements and the equipment utilized by the FPS.  The subsystems also include the 
logistics chain, medical detachment, and messing detachment that contribute to the FPS 
fulfilling its mission. 
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3.3.3.4 States 
The states of the FPS are the conditions the components of the FPS can be 
in as they pertain to FP.  For the security personnel, these states include on and off of 
watch.  The vehicles and electronics equipment that comprises the FPS, such as the 
sensors and communications gear, can be on or off.  Finally, the weapons used in the FPS 
can be in the firing, ready, or clear mode.  Firing mode is when the weapon is engaging 
the enemy.  The ready mode is when the weapon has ammunition loaded and, but has 
some type of safety mechanism that must be turned off to fire.  The clear mode is the 
weapon has no ammunition in the chamber and is unloaded with the safety on. 
 
3.4 INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL 
An Input-Output model is a very useful tool for “thinking about the needs and 
constraints” of a proposed system.116  Each group developed an input-output model.  
When developing the model, each group analyzed which inputs are necessary to achieve 
the desired outputs.  Inputs are classified as either controllable or uncontrollable.  
Controllable inputs can be classified as physical, human, informational, and economic.  
Uncontrollable inputs can be classified as environmental characteristics and existing 
conditions.117   In essence, controlled inputs are elements that can be manipulated and 
changed while uncontrollable inputs cannot.  These inputs in the different systems 
resulted in intended outputs and by-products.  Intended outputs justify the existence of 
the system, while by-products often suggest constraints that the new system must meet.118 
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3.4.1 Supply Group 
The input-output model for RF Supply is shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23.   RF Supply Input-Output Model 
 
The controllable inputs of RF Supply include the logistic connector, storage, 
manpower, communications, and cost of maintenance and operations.  Supply of the RF 
up river will be accomplished by the logistic connectors.  Logistic connectors may be one 
or more vessels or aircrafts that transfer the supplies to the RF.  Once the supplies are 
delivered to the operating base, they must be stored in order to be readily available for the 
RF.  Whether storage is on land or ship, the storage area must be an optimal size.  
Depending on supply requirements and the logistic connectors used, there are certain 
amounts of manpower required to distribute the supplies to the RF.  Adequate lines of 
communication must also be established between the RF, operating base, and supply 
ship.  The entire operation will require certain costs.  The costs include time and money 
to utilize the logistic connectors as well as maintain them. 
The uncontrollable inputs of RF Supply include weather, sea state, threats, enemy 
tactics, and civilian interactions.  Sea state is “a scale that categorizes the force of 
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progressively higher seas by wave height.”119  Weather and sea state can affect how often 
the RF will be re-supplied.  In extreme weather conditions, the RF may go several days 
without re-supply.  In sea state zero, re-supplying the RF may be easier.  Threats and 
enemy tactics can also affect re-supply of the RF.  The enemy can attempt to disrupt the 
flow of supplies to the RF, and enemy tactics will adapt and change throughout the 
duration of an operation.  Finally, civilian interactions along the river will affect the RF 
and logistic connectors due to varying traffic density and the enemies’ ability to blend in 
with the local civilian population. 
The intended output of RF Supply is sustainment.  Sustainment can be achieved 
by performing timely re-supply of the RF.  Supplying the RF with adequate resources, by 
providing the proper logistic connectors and storage facilities, enables it to be operational 
for as long as possible. 
Byproducts of RF logistics include unit training, the use of Allied resources, 
evolving threat, and disrupting other RF systems.  While performing their missions, the 
RF and personnel re-supplying them will gain experience.  Their experience will enable 
them to be more proficient in future operations.  A negative byproduct, however, is the 
use of Allied resources.  Requesting the use of certain vessels or aircrafts means that they 
cannot be used in other parts of the world.  Using certain resources, such as manpower 
and communication assets, may also disrupt other operations that may need the same 
resources.  Finally, the threat may also learn from the actions of the RF and find other 
ways to disrupt the flow of supplies. 
 
3.4.2 Repair Group 
The input-output matrix “is a useful device for thinking about the needs and 
constraints for a proposed system.”120  Figure 24 represents the input output model for the 




Figure 24.   Repair Input-Output Model 
 
After examining the U.S. Army and Marine Corps maintenance systems, the RST 
developed the following controllable inputs:  personnel, parts on-hand, boats, and rolling-
gear.  Personnel represented the nine highly-qualified maintenance technicians in each 
squadron’s maintenance section.  For this study, there were 12 SURC patrol crafts and 65 
pieces of rolling-gear that were to be maintained by the RF maintenance section.  Parts 
on-hand consisted of service items that were to be maintained by the RF in their pack-up 
kit (PUK).  Parts that were mission critical, or had a high failure rate, were placed in the 
PUK.  However, any effort to return an item to serviceable condition was met with two 
key environmental challenges: geographic location and weather.  Furthermore, 
supporting operations from a MOB introduced new challenges in repairs rendered while 
afloat.  Simple engine changes conducted ashore at the FOB became major logistical 
challenges at the MOB.  Uncontrollable inputs included operational availability, which 
was calculated as: 
o
MTBFA
MTBF MCRT MPRT MSRT
= + + +  
Operational Availability121 
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In this study, Operational Availability (Ao) was defined as “the probability that a 
system or product will be available to perform its intended mission or function when 
called upon to so at any point in time.”122  MTBF was the mean time between 
maintenance actions (including both preventive and corrective maintenance).   What has 
been referred to as the mean time to repair (MTTR) was broken down into the mean time 
to perform corrective maintenance (MCRT) and the mean time to perform preventive 
maintenance (MPRT). Mean supply response team (MSRT) was based upon the RST 
scenario parameters which varied from 24 to 144 hours.  Mean administrative delay time 
(MADT) was built into the MCRT and MPRT functions within model and is further 
discussed in Chapter 5. It is important to note that these maintenance actions did not 
occur in a vacuum, as enemy tactics influenced the number of maintenance personnel 
available to perform maintenance.  Furthermore, enemy actions and weather limited the 
use of supply routes, which hindered the RF’s ability to receive and move replacement 
parts in a timely manner. 
The intended outputs were increased operational readiness rates due to lower 
MTTR rates, optimal manning and optimal maintenance facilities.  Specifically, lower 
MTTR rates led to higher availability rates.  Facing a multitude of threats, the RF 
required a highly effective maintenance system that minimized MTTR times with the 
optimum mix of personnel.  To accomplish this optimization, this study “searched the 
cost/availability trade space to find the lowest cost and highest availability inventory 
solution.”123  The by-products of this model were injured personnel, environmental 
contamination from spills, the identification of additional maintenance issues, and 
additional damage resulting from the repair.  Maintenance is an inherently hazardous 
operation, as performing repairs on SURC’s and rolling-gear can be both hazardous to 
personnel and the surrounding environment.  For these reasons, every measure must be 
implemented to safeguard RF personnel and the habitat they are operating in.  
Occasionally, repair parts and tools are damaged in the performance of preventive and 
corrective maintenance.  Also, during maintenance actions, additional equipment defects 
are discovered and rectified prior to major system failures. 
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3.4.3 Force Protection Group 





Figure 25.   Force Protection System Input Output Model 
 
The controllable inputs of the RF FPS include the base layout, perimeter defenses, 
communications, personnel, sensors, weapons, and barriers.  The base layout consists of 
base facilities and locations such as troop housing, mess halls, fuel storage, and 
showering facilities.  For force protection, base layout is an important consideration so 
that high value or volatile facilities are not overly vulnerable.  Perimeter defenses include 
the types and locations of the barriers and bunkers and may include the locations of 
sensors, signs, and other detection systems.  When the RF is forward based, the perimeter 
defenses are layered in a variety of ways to optimize detection of contacts and provide 
effective security measures from possible enemy assaults.  Communications consists of 
the facilities, procedures, and equipment used for communications by the security forces.  
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All of these communication elements are controlled to ensure expedient information flow 
while maintaining security.  The number of personnel assigned to the FPS is also 
controlled to maintain the highest protection posture while providing adequate personnel 
rest.  The types of sensors and sensor layout will be controlled to ensure the greatest 
capability given the operating environment.  Finally, weapon types will be controlled in 
their usage and placement to supply the necessary firepower and effective fields of fire 
for the envisioned threat while maintaining high states of readiness. 
The uncontrollable inputs include the environment, threats, and civilian 
interactions.  The weather and water level of the river make up the environment.  Threat 
comprises the size and type of enemy forces as well as enemy weapons, vehicles, and 
tactics.  For this study, the FPS faced a Threat Level II threat that included at most 150 
people with AK-47’s, crew served weapons, and improvised explosive devices.  The final 
uncontrollable input is the civilian interactions with the FPS.  Civilians can positively 
provide indications of threats and negatively disguise threats based on traffic and activity 
near the RF. 
The intended outputs of the FPS are increased deterrence, reduced vulnerability, 
and increased responsiveness.  Increased deterrence is desired against enemies to prevent 
attack, but also to prevent civilians from entering areas requiring a response by the FPS.  
Increased deterrence is difficult to achieve for the small RF footprint desired because in 
its nature increasing deterrence requires a demonstration of capability and force size.  The 
FPS must also demonstrate capabilities without revealing relevant tactics to enemy 
forces.  Reduced vulnerability consists of a reduction in the possibility of a security 
breach, damage to the basing facility and/or injury to personnel should an attack occur.  
Increased responsiveness, essentially the ability to respond to enemy threats rapidly, is 
critical in successfully defending the base against enemy attacks and other events 
requiring an increase in force protection posture. 
The by-products of the FPS are an evolved threat, collateral damage, and other RF 
systems disrupted.  An evolved threat defined as the enemy has discovered sufficient 
means to bypass or overcome the FPS.  This could be in the weapons and tactics the 
enemy employs against the RF.  If the enemy evolves and becomes more capable, more 
77 
effective enemy attacks may place the RF and its coalition partners at a greater risk.  
Collateral damage could take the form of injured civilians or damaged equipment as a 
result of the FPS’s actions.  Finally, other RF systems, such as maintenance or logistics, 
could be disrupted because of the operations being conducted by the FPS.  For example, 
if the FPS results in the slowing of traffic around the FOB, or creates many false alarms, 
the movement of supplies into the FOB could potentially decrease. 
 
3.5 FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 
The completion of System Decomposition and the Input-Output model lead into 
defining the problem in terms of functions performed by the RF.  RST bounded the 
problem by using a MIO scenario on the Kampar River in Indonesia.  By defining the 
exact scenario, a list of global functions could be developed that focused on areas for the 
RST to research.  This “decomposition, often referred to as top-down structuring, begins 
with the top level system function and partitions that function into several sub-
functions.”124  The RST composed the functional hierarchy into four global functions:  
engage, deploy, C4ISR operations, and sustainment as shown in Figure 26.  Each one of 
these global functions was used as insight to determine potential solutions in terms of 
hardware, manpower, data, or software.  Then each global function was decomposed into 
sub-functions to scope and further define the problem.  Each function was defined using 
standard military definitions from Joint Pub 1-02. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Riverine Force Functional Hierarchy 
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Engage is to bring the enemy under fire.125  A series of related major operations 
aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.126  
Sub-functions of engage include: 




Deploy is the relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas.  
Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, 
specifically including intra-continental U.S., inter-theater, and intra-theater movement 






C4ISR is the exercise of authority and direction by a designated commander over 
assigned and attached forces in accomplishment of the mission.  C4ISR is performed 
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 
procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.128  Sub-Functions 
of C4ISR include: 
• Deliver the commander’s intent 
• Exchange tactical data 
• Direct supporting arms 
• Exchange Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services required to 
maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment.129  Sub-





Interaction with stakeholders and the needs analysis showed a capabilities gap in 
two major functions.  The first gap identified was the communication interaction with 
allied forces.  A common operating picture that would be able to connect older legacy 
technology with newer technology employed by the RF was needed in order to 
effectively use host nation forces in current RF missions. 
The second gap identified is an assumed lack of support for creating large basing 
options in host countries.  Therefore a logistic system needs to be developed to sustain a 
small operating force in any terrain that is located upstream away from the littorals, with 
waterways being the primary mode of transportation. 
The need to improve the supply chain and develop a solution to replace the “Iron 
Mountain” approach became the research focus after system decomposition and initial 
stakeholder feedback.  With this need in mind, the functions of sustain and C4ISR were 
analyzed by looking at the supply, repair, communication, and protection functional 
hierarchies. 
 
3.5.1 Supply Group 
The supply functional hierarchy shown in Figure 27 illustrates four major sub-
functions.  The supply sub-functions are:  management, maintain, movement, and 
bringing back of supplies.  While management is more of an enabler than a true function, 
the RST included the function at this level of the hierarchy because of its significance.  
However, the RST primary focus was on the sub-functions of maintain, movement, and 
bring back to determine mechanisms that would increase overall performance of the RF.  




Figure 27.   Supply Functional Hierarchy 
 
3.5.1.1 Maintain 
Maintain is the operational physical process synchronizing elements of the 
logistic system to deliver the “right thing” to the “right place” at the “right time” in order 





Figure 28.   Maintain Functional Hierarchy 
 
Request is the function of asking to fill a need, by first identifying the gap 
between actual and desired amounts, generating a request to submit through proper 
channels, and ensuring confirmation of request and arrival of materiel. 
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• Identify Need – act of defining criterion that requires supply personnel 
to react in order to ensure that supply levels remain able to accomplish 
the mission.131 
• Identify Gap – act of recognizing minimum supply requirements and 
comparing to actual status in order to obtain minimum specified 
overlap.132 
• Generate Request – perform the physical act of notifying the supply 
chain via message or voice. 
• Confirmation – perform the physical act of ensuring request is 
received and confirming arrival of materiel. 
 
Receive is the function of classifying, accounting, and reporting of 
personnel or materiel from the intra-theater deployment phase to a sea, air, or surface 
transportation point of debarkation to the marshalling area.133 
• Classify – act of recognizing composition of received supplies and 
labeling according to Department of Defense standard ten classes of 
supplies.134 
• Count – accurate counting of materiel received. 
• Report – transmission of data or a report from the originating terminal 
to the end receiver to acknowledge receipt and quantity of supplies.135 
 
Storage is the act of placing materiel onboard a vessel or in a facility. 
Storage relates to the act of securing those items stored in regard to class, size, volume, 
and weight in a manner that they do not shift or move during at-sea periods, using 
methods and equipment as approved by higher authority.136 
• Class – act of storing supplies segregated by the Department of 
Defense ten supply classes in order to facilitate handling137. 
• Size – act of storing supplies segregated by class into further parcels in 
order to accommodate square foot restrictions on board conveyances. 
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• Volume – act of storing supplies segregated by class into further 
parcels in order to accommodate cubic foot restrictions on board 
conveyances. 
• Weight – act of storing supplies segregated by class into further 
parcels in order to accommodate weight (lbs/tons) restrictions on 
board conveyances. 
 
The issue items process consists of order fulfillment, pre-positioning, 
composition, and packaging of materiel and/or equipment in preparation for movement to 
staging and loading areas, in an operation.138  
• Order Fulfillment – reconciliation of the consumers request for 
supplies and verify correct supplies are pre-positioned. 
• Pre-Position – place supplies at a designated location to reduce 
reaction time and ensure timely loading.139 
• Composition – act of arranging pre-positioned supplies having a 
specific function in order to be packaged as an entity for ease of 
movement.140 
• Containerization – use of containers to utilize cargo for transportation 
and storage.  Containerization incorporates cargo packaging, storage, 
transportation to loading area, and security together with visibility of 
container and its contents into a distribution system from source to 
consumer.141 
 
The supply train function encompasses activities associated with 
delivering products and services to customers via a route, either land, water, and/or air 
that connects an operating force with a base of operations and along which supplies and 
forces move.142  Supply train is also the control of routes to include redundancy to ensure 
throughput as well as protection to prevent interruption of delivery. 
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• Protect – preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of supply 
mission related personnel, equipment, and infrastructure deployed or 
located within a given operational area.143 
• Redundancy – shifting of mutually supporting supply routes designed 
to absorb throughput if main route is cut.  Also, prevents initial 
observations of the whole supply train by the enemy and gives the 
commander options to move supplies.144 
 
3.5.1.2 Movement 
Movement is the routing of personnel and cargo over lines of 
communications.145  Sub-functions of movement are shown in Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29.   Movement Functional Hierarchy 
 
The loading function is defined as the process of staging, lifting, and 
setting in place personnel, and materiel on board ships, aircraft, trains, road vehicles, or 
other means of conveyance not to exceed the total weight of passengers and/or materiel 
carried on board a ship, aircraft, train, road vehicle, or other means of conveyance.146 
• Stage – organizing and preparation for movement of materiel at 
designated areas to meet the operational commander’s requirements.147 
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• Lift – act of placing materiel on board a vessel using any means 
available to the unloading entity.148 
• Set in Place – act of properly ordering, organizing and securing 
materiel on board a vessel in a manner that they do not shift or move 
during transit.149 
 
Transport is the start of conveyance along an established supply route, 
travel along that route and stopping at the desired debarkation point for the materiel 
carried. 
• Start – act of removing any attaching entities and beginning travel to 
destination. 
• Travel – act of moving from starting point to stopping point. 
• Stop – act of navigating vessel to desired position and attaching any 
entities needed to end travel. 
Unloading of troops, equipment, or supplies from a conveyance includes 
the functions of lifting the cargo, and staging for the next phase of movement whether to 
store or load onto another form of conveyance. 
• Lift – act of removing materiel on board a vessel using any means 
available to the unloading entity.150 
• Stage – organizing and preparation for movement of materiel at 
designated areas to meet the operational commander’s requirements.151 
 
3.5.1.3 Bring Back 
Bring Back is the return of personnel or materiel from the area of 
operations whether by CASEVAC or disposition.  Sub-functions of bring back are shown 




Figure 30.   Bring Back Functional Hierarchy 
 
Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) is the unregulated movement of 
casualties that can include transport both to and between medical treatment facilities.  
Functions of CASEVAC also used to specifically identify a casualty for reporting 
purposes based upon the casualty type and the casualty status.152 
• Identify Casualty – recognizing a casualty for reporting purposes in 
order to call for evacuation and begin stabilization.153 
• Stabilize – act of securing airway, controlling hemorrhage, treating 
shock, immobilizing fractures, and preparing casualty for 
evacuation.154 
• Transport – removal of a casualty by any of a variety of transport 
means (air, ground, rail, or sea) from a theater of military operation to 
health service center to include en route medical care.155 
• Hospitalization – admitting the casualty to a medical treatment facility 
capable of providing inpatient care.156 
 
Disposition is the act of preparing to remove waste from operational areas 
by proper handling, and stowage.  All waste will then undergo either retrograde which 
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entails recycling and salvage, or disposal which covers discharging, destroying, or 
decontamination of waste. 
• Handling – following proper procedures for the retrieval, storage, or 
repositioning of non-hazardous, potentially hazardous, and hazardous 
waste. 
• Stowage – placing materiel into a hold or compartment to prevent 
leaks and prepare for retrograde or disposal.157 
• Retrograde – evacuation of waste from area of operations in 
preparation for recycling or salvage.158 
• Disposal – discharge, destruction, or decontamination of waste on 
location if permissible or evacuation of waste from area of operations 
in preparation for discharge, destruction, or decontamination. 
 
3.5.2 Repair Group 
After completion of the systems decomposition and input-output analysis, this 
study focused on the functions necessary to accomplish the maintenance task in a riverine 
squadron within the scenario bounds, primarily patrol and interdiction.  In order to 
sustain the force, from a maintenance perspective, the two functions of preventive and 
corrective maintenance would have to be accomplished with the following sub-functions:  




Figure 31.   Repair Group Functional Hierarchy. 
 
The sub-function preventive maintenance represents the tests, measurements, 
adjustments (calibration), and parts replacement, performed specifically to prevent faults 
from occurring.  This sub-function allows for the systemic inspections, malfunction 
detection, and correction of incipient failures either before faults occur or before they 
develop into major defects.  This sub-function differs from corrective maintenance in that 
it is executed according to a schedule determined by the manufacturer.  Notional 
examples of preventive maintenance include the replacement of the air filter upon 1000 
hours of use, or a monthly fire extinguisher check. 
The corrective maintenance sub-function represents those actions carried out to 
restore a defective item to a specified condition in which the item is fully mission cable 
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and can successfully complete its mission. According to Marine Corps, “the detection of 
the defective equipment may occur during routine preventive maintenance checks and 
services or through operational failure of equipment.”159  It includes the same functions 
as preventive maintenance; however, the phases of corrective maintenance are not 
governed by a discrete schedule, and can be very time consuming due to the inherent 
nature of corrective maintenance.  Phase I involved problem isolation, Phase II required 
repair parts are obtained, and Phase III entailed correcting the faulty equipment. 
The core of the preventive maintenance sub-function is service.  Service 
represents operations performed periodically to keep the item in proper operating 
conditions; i.e., clean, preserve, drain, paint, and replenish fuel levels, lubricants, and 
hydraulic fluids.  Scheduled inspections of various parts and components of the 
equipment are checked for malfunctions and replaced or repaired as necessary. 
Pre-Combat Checks and Inspections (PCC/PCI) are included under the preventive 
maintenance sub-function, as they occur according to a time schedule based on mission 
timelines.  PCC/PCI’s are necessary checks and inspections of equipment prior to 
executing a combat mission or before the routine use of equipment.  Commanders 
normally specify PCC/PCI’s in operations orders or through memorandum and require a 
back brief in regards to the status of critical items of equipment prior to executing the 
mission or routine use of the equipment. 
The service and PCC/PCI sub-functions represent different ways in which faults 
are detected.  However, after identification of a malfunction, the faults are corrected in 
the same manner through repairing, replacing, ignoring, adjusting or evacuating.  In 
corrective maintenance the types of malfunctions under consideration would have a 
detrimental effect on the mission and thus cannot be ignored, hence the ignore function is 
not included under this function. 
The repair, replace, adjust, evacuate and ignore sub-functions were developed 
using U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine and are now described.  Repair represents 
restoring the item to a serviceable condition by replacing unserviceable parts or by any 
other action required, using available tools, equipment, and skills including welding, 
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grinding, riveting, straightening, adjusting, facing, etc.  Replace is ordering serviceable 
components, assemblies, and sub assemblies for unserviceable parts.  It also represents, 
when necessary, the replacement of the entire end item, i.e. boat or truck, when 
necessary.  Adjust represents the necessary calibrations made periodically to optimize 
system performance.  Evacuation represents two processes, first moving by towing or 
lifting a SURC back to the FOB or MOB for repairs performed by the squadron’s 
maintenance team.  Second, it represents evacuating the item out of theater for depot 
level maintenance, outside the capability of the riverine squadron.  Ignore is the action of 
not doing anything when a defect is found.  This can occur when operational 
engagements preclude maintenance, or when dictated by the unit commander.  This study 
focused on malfunctions that would cause mission failure so this action is not considered 
in the study, but it is mentioned as it was considered in our analysis. 
 
3.5.3 Force Protection Group 
The first three tiers of the functional hierarchy for the FPS are shown in Figure 
32. 
 
Figure 32.   Force Protection System Functional Hierarchy 
 
As described in the system decomposition of force protection, the sub-functions 
of protecting the RF were predicting, deterring, and denying the threat.  Although 
predicting the threat is not intrinsic to protecting the RF, the degree of success in this area 
served as an amplifying or reducing factor for the other two functions.  Successful 
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predictions allowed the FPS to accurately scale defenses and consider tactics in 
preparation of an attack by insurgents, thus increasing denial and deterrence.  Likewise, 
misused or uncollected intelligence decreased deterrence and denial.  The sub-functions 
of predicting the threat were gathering intelligence, analyzing intelligence, and protecting 
intelligence.  Gathering intelligence meant the collection of intelligence from people and 
equipment comprising the FPS.  Analyzing intelligence meant filtering intelligence to 
extract useful information.  Finally, protecting intelligence meant securing friendly 
intelligence from the enemy. 
The next sub-function of protecting the RF was deterring the threat.  The sub-
functions of deterring were warning and showing force.  Warning and showing force 
comprised the mechanisms through which deterrence was accomplished because both 
elements were ways of indicating to the enemy that any threatening actions may not 
succeed.  The RST defined warnings as the actions intended to inform civilians and deter 
hostile forces.  The sub-functions of warnings were visual and audible queuing, as they 
comprised how warnings were accomplished.  Visual queuing meant that warnings were 
transmitted to people through their visual senses, and audible queuing with an equivalent 
definition.  Showing force by the FPS was defined as the combination of actions that 
demonstrated the capability of the RF and coalition forces which would effectively deter 
enemy aggression.  Although showing force may be considered as a manifestation of 
visual and audible warnings, it defers from these concepts in the RST’s definition 
because a show of force may not be directly intended as a warning.  Showing force was 
often used as a means to prepare the RF for possible enemy actions.  Showing force 
included the sub-functions of conducting operations and fortifying structures.  
Conducting operations were the practiced assaults and changes in posture designed to 
intimidate possible attackers.  In the operational environment, these operations were 
called random anti-terrorist measures.  Fortifying structures meant additions to structures 
to make them less susceptible to attacks, thereby discouraging enemy actions. 
The final sub-function of protecting the RF was denying the threat.  Denying the 
enemy a successful attack was accomplished by actively and passively denying the 
enemy.  The RST defined actively denying as denying the enemy a successful attack 
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through action directed at the enemy.  The sub-functions of actively denying were the 
functions of the detect to engage sequence.  There are several different constructs of the 
particular functions involved in this sequence, but for the purposes of this study, the RST 
used a construct that was comprised of the functions detect, locate, track, identify, and 
engage.  Detection was defined as “the perception of an object of possible military 
interest but unconfirmed by recognition.”160  The RST defined locate as simply locating 
the object.  Track meant “to display or record the successive positions of a moving 
object.”161  Identify was defined as “The process of determining the friendly or hostile 
character of an unknown detected contact.”162  Finally, engage meant “to bring the enemy 
under fire.”163 
The RST defined passive denial as denying the enemy a successful attack through 
inaction or actions not directed at the enemy.  The sub-functions of passively denying 
were blocking, concealing, and moving.  The RST defined blocking as physically 
obstructing the enemy’s weapons from affecting intended targets.  Concealing meant 
masking critical facilities, weapons, and equipment from the enemy.  Moving meant 
simply moving away from a threatening area. 
 
3.6 FUNCTIONAL FLOW DIAGRAM AND CONTEXT MODEL  
A Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) is a tool describing the system and its 
elements in functional terms.164  FFBD’s should include coverage of all activities in a 
systems life cycle and show proper activity sequences and interface interrelationships.165  
The RST compiled FFBD’s for each of the three overarching functions of sustain and one 
for communications.  Each FFBD’s starts with top layer functions and then decomposes 
these functions into second and third layer functions.  This decomposition allows for the 
RST to describe the system in functional terms and shows what is required of each 
function rather than how each function should be accomplished.166 
 
3.6.1 Supply Group 
The supply enhanced FFBD used control structures such as iteration and looping 
in order to add simplicity to a complex flow of functions.  Looping was a control 
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structure that was a repetition of a unique set of functions until exit criterion was 
satisfied.  A loop control structure began and ended with a loop (LP) node.  An iteration 
control structure was a repetition of a unique set of functions until a domain set was 
satisfied.  An iteration control structure began and ended with an iteration (IT) node.167  
The FFBD also used AND nodes to show that all functions occurred simultaneously and 
the flow could not continue on until the process was complete.  An OR node showed a 
decision based on certain criteria.  The RST supply FFBD is shown in Figure 33.  The 
overall FFBD began with issue items (to base) which started the FFBD of materiel from 
the delivery vehicle to the RF.  The output of the FFBD was the bringing back of waste 
as needed and a feedback loop to send the request for needed materiel. 
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Figure 33.   RST Supply Functional Flow Block Diagram 
 
The first fidelity test of the FFBD was to send a bullet to the RF.  The bullet was 
issued to the base (function 2.4) and loaded (function 3.1) onto the logistic connector.  
Upon loading completion, the supply train (function 2.5) dictated which route to follow 
and if additional protection was needed.  The logistic connector started, traveled, and 
stopped (function 3.2) at the basing alternative of the RF. 
The bullet was then unloaded (function 3.3) and the RF began the receiving 
process (function 2.2) as well as the retrograde and disposition processes (functions 4.2.4 
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and 4.2.5).  This loop (LP1) was repeated until all bullets were removed from the delivery 
ship and accounted for by the RF and all waste transported out of the operational area.  
Upon receipt completion, the issue of items to RF (function 2.2) began or the bullets were 
placed into storage by class (function 2.3.1), size (function 2.3.2), volume (function 
2.3.3), and weight (function 2.3.4) for later issue to the RF. 
Accounting for the items issued (function 2.4), identifying the gap (function 
2.1.2), and identifying the need (function 2.1.1) all fed into the request generation 
(function 2.1.3) and confirmed (function 2.1.4).  This request was a direct feedback into 
the issue items to base (function 2.4) to ensure the correct amount of materiel continued 
to flow. 
The second set-up to test the response of the FFBD was to cause an interruption in 
sending a bullet to the RF.  The bullet was issued to the base (function 2.4) and loaded 
(function 3.1) onto the logistic connector.  Upon loading completion, the supply train 
(function 2.5) dictated which route to follow and if additional protection was needed.  
The logistic connector started, traveled, and while traveling was lost due to enemy 
hostility.  The bullet was never received (function 2.2) and retrograde and disposition 
(functions 4.2.4 and 4.2.5) never occurred.  The loop (LP1) was repeated until all bullets 
were removed from the delivery ship but due to enemy action, all bullets have been lost.  
Therefore the loop ends, however issuance of items to RF (function 2.2) continued. 
Accounting for the items issued (function 2.4), identifying the gap (function 
2.1.2), and identifying the need (function 2.1.1) all fed into the request generation 
(function 2.1.3).  However, the gap identified (function 2.1.2) was much larger.  The 
request was generated (function 2.1.3) and confirmed (function 2.1.4). The request was a 
direct feedback into the issue items to base (function 2.4) to ensure the correct amount of 
materiel continued to flow. 
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3.6.2 Repair Group 
The following assumptions were considering when developing the preliminary 
Maintenance Flow Diagram (MFD): 
• All malfunctions detected in the process were mission critical. 
• They degraded the operational readiness of the troops in the Area of 
Operations if no actions were taken to rectify them. 
• Although all of the maintenance personnel were well-trained, such that there 
was a reasonable expectation that they could perform all maintenance tasks 
within their Level of Repair, some malfunctions fell beyond the skill level of 
the nine maintenance personnel. 
These assumptions were met with the following constraints in the further 
development of the MFD:  operational readiness, level of repair, time, and parts 
availability.  Operational readiness was the overarching factor that determined how the 
maintenance procedures were designed and implemented.  As a function of the SURC 
reliability and its subcomponents, operational readiness calculations were used to 
determine how often there would be a critical failure. Operational readiness is also a 
function of re-supply times, repair times and the availability of maintenance personnel to 
conduct repairs.  The level of repair limited the types of malfunctions that could be 
rectified by operators under operational environments and conditions.  For the purposes 
of this study, the Level of repair was limited to the first and second echelons of 
organizational maintenance, and the third echelon of intermediate maintenance.    At the 
lowest echelon, repairs consist of cleaning and greasing, and other such tasks.  The 
second echelon is where scheduled maintenance and fault isolation takes place and is 
performed by skilled personnel.  The third echelon involves tasks that may include minor 
hull/structural (welding) repair and installing external parts.  In all three of these levels, 
“Plug and Play” modularity in SURC maintenance and strong parts support are vital to 
decreasing the amount of time it takes to return a faulty system to the desired level of 
readiness, thereby allowing the commander maintain a high level of operational 
reliability.  In this case, time refers to the total amount of delay between the identification 
of malfunctions to the instant the equipment is ready for deployment. 
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Upon identification of a malfunction, the commander had four options: repair, 
replace, ignore or evacuate, which he had to decide so as to fulfill the minimal 
operational readiness required for mission accomplishment.  The functional flow 
diagram, Figure 34, shows how each SURC, and its associated parts, flowed through the 
maintenance system, both for preventive and corrective maintenance.  That is, 
malfunctions were identified during preventive maintenance, pre-combat inspection, or 
through operator diagnosis which required corrective maintenance. 
 
Figure 34.   Maintenance Functional Flow Block Diagram 
 
If repair is selected, then flow involved the time to order and replace parts, and 
return the SURC to normal operation.  If the commander decided to replace the boat, a 
replacement was sent forward to the patrol area, and the defective boat was towed to the 
FOB for repairs.  For malfunctions that did not affect the patrol’s mission, the 
commander chose to ignore the fault.  Malfunctions requiring level four echelon 
intermediate maintenance, which involves heavy body, hull turret, and frame repair, or 
depot level maintenance (e.g., overhaul, fabrication, machining, etc.), an evacuation of 
the damaged SURC was coordinated and a replacement was brought forward into the 
AO.  Replacement in this study refers to the replacement of the entire boat and not just 
the malfunctioned parts.  The RST looked at three possible scenarios where the 
replacement option was selected. First, the malfunction identified was beyond the skill 
level of the operators, and if the boat was essential for mission accomplishment it had to 
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be replaced.  Second, the malfunction identified was within the skill level of the 
operators, but the total time required for repair was greater than that of a replacement, 
based upon the availability of replacement parts at the FOB. The third situation involved 
a boat that was damaged beyond immediate repair, away from the FOB, and the 
commander had to decide whether or not to tow the damaged boat back to the FOB and 
send in a replacement.  This decision was primarily based on how far the boat is into its 
eight hour mission.  If the commander chose to ignore the malfunction, the boat 
continued on patrol.  Evacuation represented the instance when the equipment needed to 
be moved to a depot level maintenance facility, either ashore or afloat, and is no longer a 
responsibility of the squadron’s maintenance system accept for accountability (i.e., the 
overall calculation of the percentage of the squadron’s boats which are fully mission 
capable). 
 
3.6.3 Force Protection Group 
The FPS functional flow demonstrated the functional order of the FPS as it would 





Figure 35.   Force Protection Functional Flow Block Diagram 
From the Force Protection Functional Hierarchy, gathering intelligence, analyzing 
intelligence, and protecting intelligence were the sub-functions of predicting the threat.  
Before attempting to deter or deny the threat, the FPS tried to predict the threat to 
effectively coordinate defensive activities based on the threat.  Gathering intelligence was 
the first sub-function of predicting the threat because no predictions could be made 
without intelligence.  Intelligence could be gathered by the FPS or from other sources.  
For example, coalition partners may notice some unusual traffic activity and would seek 
follow up observations by the personnel of the FPS.  This gathered intelligence would 
then flow into the next two sub-functions of predicting the threat, analyzing and 
protecting intelligence.  In the previous example, the FPS would take observations of the 
traffic and check against historical data or past observations to deduce if there was 
something unusual.  In the meantime, analyzed data and analysis conclusions would be 
secured from enemy forces. 
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The next function that occurred during protection is deterring the threat.  
Deterrence occurs to avoid being attacked and, likewise, avoid having to deny the enemy 
a successful attack, so this function occurred before denying.  The sub-functions for 
deterring the threat were warning and showing force.  Warnings and showing force were 
independent methods of achieving deterrence, so the “or” block was used between the 
two. 
The final group of functions that occurred in the process of protection was the 
sub-functions of denying: engaging, blocking, and concealing.  Concealing was the first 
function that would occur in these sub-functions because critical facilities should be 
masked in the initial construction of the base, so concealing would occur prior to an 
attack by the enemy.  As intelligence on possible attacks became more available, changes 
in concealment may occur.  The next two functions, engaging and blocking, would occur 
simultaneously, so the “and” block was used between these two functions.  The 
construction process to increase blocking might occur long before an enemy attack, but 
the act of blocking the enemy’s weapons does not occur until the enemy attacks.  The 
enemy may be engaged before the enemy is able to fire a weapon, but if the enemy is 
able to make the first strike on our forces, the two engaging and block would occur 
simultaneously. 
 
3.7 REVISED PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Often a design team will plunge into a project without thoroughly 
investigating what the top level objectives of the project are or should be.  
Even as the needs analysis progresses, needs and problem statements may 
have to be "adjusted" to incorporate new information.  What was first 
thought to be a bona fide need may suddenly be transformed into another 
one.  However, the goal of the project should remain the same; the 
apparent need simply becomes different as the designer understands it 
better.168 
After completing most of the functional architecture, the RST adjusted the 
problem statement:  “Define, analyze, and recommend alternatives for supply, repair, and 
force protection that increase sustainability of the riverine force in the riparian 
environment utilizing technologies currently in use or available for use by 2012.” 
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3.8 OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY AND METRICS 
Purpose of the hierarchy of objectives is to find what is important to the system’s 
stakeholders in a value sense; that is, the stakeholders would (should) be willing to pay to 
obtain increased performance (or decreased cost) in any one of these objectives.169  Using 
the revised problem statement as the top level objective to be achieved an objectives 
hierarchy was built using the functional hierarchy as a guide to account for all functions 
have a purpose in the system.  If any functions objective is deemed unnecessary the 
function would then not be an integral part of the system.  Therefore, the function could 
be eliminated or rolled into a similar function to fit the stakeholder objectives. 
The RST broke the riverine systems of systems into four functional areas: engage, 
deploy, C4ISR, and sustainment.  The sustainment function was furthered narrowed 
down to supply, repair, and protect.  Each one of these top level functions were further 
decomposed into a functional hierarchy which was used to create an objective hierarchy 
for each function of supply, repair, and protect. 
 
3.8.1 Supply Group 
The objective of supply was to ensure that the customer receives “what they 
want”, “when they want it”, “where they want it”.  Ensuring that the customer has the 
ability to do the task at hand was the major objective of the logistics team.  If the 
customer lacks the materiel to complete the job then supply was not performing correctly.  
The key evaluation measure (EM) for supply was percent of time that the MIO mission 
was halted due to lack of materiel, such as fuel, water, food, repair parts, or ammunition. 
The effective need was to design a supply system to move materiel to a forward 
base (ashore or afloat) in a logistically barren area.  Specifically, the system must 
transport, store, and distribute materiel, as well as return waste as efficiently and 
effectively as possible.  Using the effective need as the top level objective the RST was 
able to create a top level objective hierarchy based upon the functional hierarchy and 




Figure 36.   Top Level Supply Objectives Hierarchy. 
 
The RST took each of the top level functions in the objective hierarchy and 
decomposed the functions to include an objective statement and an EM.  Further breaking 
down each of the sub-functions to also include an objective statement and an evaluation 
measure created a lower level objective hierarchy in which metrics could be determined.  
The metrics could then be grouped into lower level evaluation measures to quantify the 
results for certain functions of the system.  The lower level evaluation measures were 
then combined to create over arching evaluation measures in order to have a quality to 
compare each of the basing alternatives and logistic connector alternatives. 
The first function of management was considered to be integral to this system 
however, our primary focus was on the functions of maintain, movement, and bring back.  
Therefore management was explained in detail as a part of Appendix F.  Every EM has 
factors that are either time based, percent based, or effect based.  Effects are multipliers 
that either raise or lower the quantity.  For example a learning effect of 0.9 lowered the 
load time of a logistics connector while a learning effect of 1.1 raised the load time of a 
logistics connector.  All of the factors under each objective were what the RST consider 
to be the most influential.  The RST realizes there are many factors that are not included 
due to limitations in time and modeling but recommend each of these objectives for 
further study to explore the trade space of each factor. 
 
3.8.1.1 Maintain 
The second function of supply was maintain as shown in Figure 37.  The 
function of Maintain had four sub-functions of request, receive, storage, and issue items.  
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The objective of 2.0 Maintain was to ensure flow of materiel.  Every logistics connector 
event dealing with the logistics train had a maintain entity. 
EM2.0:  Accurate Flow of Materiel 
Factors: 
• EM2.1 Accurate Relay of Need (%) 
• EM2.2 Accuracy of Receipt (%) 
• EM2.3 Accuracy of Storage (%) 
• EM2.4 Performance of Issue Items (%) 
• EM2.5 Supply Train Performance (%) 
Supply Accuracy Equation: 
 






Figure 37.   Maintain Objectives Hierarchy 
 
The objective of 2.1 Request was to transmit accurate requests as needed. 
EM2.1:  Accurate Relay of Need 
Factors: 
• EM2.1.1 Identifying Need (%) 
• EM2.1.2 Identifying Gap (amount of materiel) 
• EM2.1.3 Request Generation 
• EM2.1.4 Confirmation Acknowledge 
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Accurate Need Equation: 
 
* * *AccurateNeed Need Gap Request Confirmation=  
 
The objective of 2.1.1 Identify Need was to correctly identify goods 
needed for supply per logistics connector event.  This EM quantifies the percentage of 
time that the personnel correctly record the material needed and do not identify materiel 
needed as food when in actuality it is fuel. 
EM2.1.1:  Identifying Need 
Factors: 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Storage Accessibility (percentage of time the storage area was 
accessible to physically view materiel on hand to determine need) 
• Following Procedure (percentage of time that the personnel identify 
the needed materiel correctly following procedures) 
Identify Need Equation: 
 
* *Need Procedures Accessibility Learning=  
 
The objective of 2.1.2 Identify Gap was to correctly identify amount of 
materiel needed for supply per logistics connector event. 
EM2.1.2:  Identifying Gap 
Factors: 
• Current Level (amount of materiel at base) 
• Max Storage Level (amount of storage for materiel at base) 
• Historical Consumption Rate 
• EM3.0 Total Movement Time 
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Identify Gap Equation: 
 
- ( * 3.0)Gap MaxStorage Currentlevel HistoricalRate EM= +  
 
The objective of 2.1.3 Generate Request was to create & transmit an 
accurate request as required.  Further study into the system has shown that without a 
request no materiel will be sent.  Therefore the RST decided that EM2.1.3 Request 
Generation was done on time, and accurate, 100% of the time. 
EM2.1.3:  Request Generation 
Factors: 
• Request Generated 
 
The objective of 2.1.4 Confirmation was to ensure that request is received 
per request.  The RST considered this to be a requirement of the system.  Therefore the 
EM2.1.4 Confirmation Acknowledgment was done efficiently and correctly 100% of the 
time. 
EM2.1.4:  Confirmation Acknowledgement 
Factors: 
• Confirmation Acknowledgement 
 
The objective of 2.2 Receive was to accurately count materiel delivered 
per logistics connector event. 
EM2.2:  Accuracy of Receipt 
Factors: 
• EM2.2.1 Accuracy of Classify (%) 
• EM2.2.2 Accuracy of Count (%) 
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• EM2.2.3 Report Sent 
Receive Accuracy Equation: 
 
* *Accuracy Classify Account Report=  
 
The objective of 2.2.1 Classify was to accurately classify cargo for storage 
per logistics connector event.  This EM is the percentage of time that personnel correctly 
classify food as food and fuel as fuel.  
EM2.2.1:  Accuracy of Classify 
Factors: 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Following Procedure (percentage of time personnel follow procedure 
and  correctly classify materiel) 
Classify Accuracy Equation: 
 
= *Classify Procedure Learning  
 
 
The objective of 2.2.2 Count was to accurately count materiel into 
inventory per logistics connector event.  This EM is the percentage of time personnel are 
correct when counting the materiel brought into inventory. 
EM2.2.2:  Accuracy of Count 
Factors: 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Following Procedure (percentage of time personnel follow procedure 
and correctly count materiel) 
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Count Accuracy Equation: 
 
= *Count Procedure Learning  
 
The objective of 2.2.3 Report was to confirm receipt of materiel per 
logistics connector event.  The RST considered this to be a requirement of the system.  
Therefore the EM2.2.3 Report was done efficiently and correctly 100% of the time. 
EM2.2.3:  Report Sent 
Factors: 
• Report Sent 
 
The objective of 2.3 Storage was to ensure safety and security of materiel 
by storing properly between logistics connector events. 
EM2.3:  Accuracy of Storage 
Factors: 
• EM2.3.1 Class Accuracy (%) 
• EM2.3.2 Size Accuracy (%) 
• EM2.3.3 Volume Accuracy (%) 
• EM2.3.4 Weight Accuracy (%) 
Storage Accuracy Equation: 
 
* * *Accuracy Class Size Volume Weight=  
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The objective of 2.3.1 Class was to store materiel by class as required.  
This EM is the percentage of time that the materiel received is stored in the proper place. 
EM2.3.1:  Class Accuracy 
Factors: 
• Correct Location (percentage of time materiel is correctly stored in the 
right location) 
• Correct Labeling (percentage of time that the materiel was labeled 
correctly upon receipt) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Class Accuracy Equation: 
 
= * *Class Location Labeling Learning  
 
The objective of 2.3.2 Size (ft2) was to store materiel by square footage as 
required.  This EM is the percentage of time that materiel required to be stored by square 
footage is actually stored by square footage.   
EM2.3.2:  Size Accuracy 
Factors: 
• Matching Cargo to location by square footage (percentage of time 
materiel is correctly stored by square footage) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Size Accuracy Equation: 
 
2 = *Size Accuracy Matching cargo to ft Learning  
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The objective of 2.3.3 Volume (ft3) was to store materiel by cubic feet as 
required.  This EM is the percentage of time that materiel required to be stored by volume 
is actually stored by volume. 
EM2.3.3:  Volume Accuracy 
Factors: 
• Matching Cargo to location by cubic feet (percentage of time materiel 
is correctly stored by volume) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Volume Accuracy Equation: 
 
 = *3Volume Accuracy Matching cargo to ft Learning  
 
The objective of 2.3.4 Weight (lbs) was to store materiel by weight as 
required.  This EM is the percentage of time that materiel required to be stored by weight 
is actually stored by weight. 
EM2.3.4:  Weight Accuracy 
Factors: 
• Overloading Logistic Connector (percentage of time logistics 
connector is overloaded with materiel) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Weight Accuracy Equation: 
 
 = (1- )*Weight Accuracy  Overload Learning  
 
The objective of 2.4 Issue Items was to ensure timely and complete 
preparation before issuance as required per request.  This EM is the performance rating of 
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how well the RF personnel issue items based on time.  The longer the time to issue items 
the poorer the performance. 
EM2.4:  Performance of Issue Items 
Factors: 
• Accuracy of Correct Fulfillment (percentage of time personnel issue 
an item correctly) 
• Preparation Time for issue (time in minutes to prepare items for 
issuance) 
Issue Items Performance Equation: 
 
= (1+(1- ))Issue Items Time Accurracy  
 
EM2.4A:  Accuracy of correct fulfillment 
Factors: 
• EM2.4.1 Accuracy of Order Fulfillment  
• EM2.4.3.1 Accuracy of Composition 
Correct Fulfillment Accuracy Equation: 
 
= *Accuracy Fulfillment Composition  
 
EM2.4B:  Preparation Time for issue 
Factors: 
• EM2.4.2 Pre-Position Time for Issuance  
• EM2.4.3 Composition Time  
• EM2.4.4 Containerization Time 
Issue Preparation Time Equation: 
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Time Pre - Position Composition Containerization= + +  
 
The objective of 2.4.1 Order Fulfillment was to fill orders as requested.  
This EM is the percentage of time personnel issue items and that item was desired by the 
requesting party. 
EM2.4.1:  Accuracy of Order Fulfillment 
Factors: 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Accuracy of Order Fulfillment (percentage of time personnel issue 
items and that item was desired) 
Order Fulfillment Accuracy Equation: 
 
= *Accuracy Fulfillment Learning  
 
The objective of 2.4.2 Pre-Position was to collect items for issue as 
required.  This EM is the amount of time to locate, retrieve, and move items to stage for 
issuance. 
EM2.4.2:  Pre-Position Time 
Factors: 
• Movement for pre-position time (time in minutes to lift, transport, set 
in place items requested) 
• Materiel Search Time (time in minutes to locate and retrieve items 
requested) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Pre-Position Time Equation: 
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( )*Time Pre - Position Search Learning= +  
 
The objective of 2.4.3 Composition was to organize items for issue as 
required.  This EM has a time based component as well as an accuracy component.  The 
accuracy component is the percentage of time personnel issue the correct number of 
items requested. 
EM2.4.3.2:  Composition Time 
Factors: 
• Organization Time (time in minutes to organize items requested for 
containerization) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Composition Time Equation: 
 
*Time Organization Learning=  
 
EM2.4.3.1:  Composition Accuracy 
Factors: 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Composition Accuracy (percentage of time personnel issue the correct 
number of items) 
Composition Accuracy Equation: 
 
*Accuracy Composition Learning=  
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The objective of 2.4.4 Containerization was to package materiel for issue 
as required.  This EM is the amount of time in minutes to package all items requested as 
necessary. 
EM2.4.4:  Containerization Time 
Factors: 
• Packaging Retrieval Time (time in minutes to retrieve packing 
material) 
• Organizing Materiel for packaging time (time in minutes to organize 
packing material) 
• Packaging Time (time in minutes to physically prepare the item for 
issue) 
• Issue Time (time in minutes to transfer the items to the requesting 
personnel) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Containerization Time Equation: 
 
( )*Time Retrieval Organizing Packaging Issue Learning= + + +  
 
The objective of 2.5 Supply Train was to monitor route availability, 
maintainability, and protection per logistics connector event. 
EM2.5 Supply Train Performance 
Factors: 
• Route Availability (%) 
• Route Maintainability (%) 
• Connector Protection (%) 
Supply Train Performance Equation: 
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* *SupplyTrainPerformance Availability Maintainability Protection=  
 
The objective of 2.5.1 Protection was to protect logistics connector per 
logistics connector event.  This EM was the percentage of time the logistics connector 
survives one transport event up the river to deliver materiel and then returning to the 
supply ship for the next delivery. 
EM2.5.1 Survivability 
Factors: 
• Susceptibility (percentage of time the logistics connector is open to an 
effective attack) 
• Vulnerability (percentage of time the logistics connector is destroyed 
due to an effective attack) 
Survivability Equation: 
 
Survivability = Susceptibility*Vulnerability  
 
The objective of 2.5.2 Redundancy was to ensure route was available and 
maintained per logistics connector event.  This EM was the percentage of time the 
logistics connector route can be used for one transport event up the river to deliver 
materiel and then returning to the supply ship for the next delivery. 
EM2.5.2:  Route Status 
Factors: 
• Route Availability (percentage of time the route was open for transit 
when called for at an unknown point in time) 
• Route Maintainability (percentage of time the route was retained in a 
transit state by personnel) 
Route Status Equation: 
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*Status Availability Maintainability=  
 
EM2.5.2.1:  Route Availability 
Factors: 
• Weather Effect  
• Water Terrain Effect (due to flooding, drought, dams, or debris) 
• Route Knowledge – Predictive (intelligence on route) 
• Route Certainty (percentage of faith by commander route is available) 
• Resource Effect (personnel and equipment to clear river) 
• Political Constraints (host nation agreement) 
• Hostility Effect (due to enemy fire or massing of troops) 
Route Availability Equation: 
 
( ,   ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  )Availability f Weather Water Terrain Knowledge Certainty Resources Politics Hostility=  
 
EM2.5.2.2:  Route Maintainability 
Factors: 
• Hostility Effect (due to enemy fire or massing of troops) 
• Route Knowledge – Predictive (intelligence on route) 
• Resource Effect (personnel and equipment to clear river) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Route Maintainability Equation: 
 




The third function of supply was movement as shown in Figure 38.  The 
function of movement had three sub-functions of loading, transport, and unloading.  The 
objective of 3.0 Movement was to minimize the time per logistics connector event.  
Every logistics connector event dealing with the logistics train had a movement entity 
that affected the amount of time needed to transfer materiel. 
 
EM3.0:  Total Movement Time 
Factors: 
• EM3.1 Loading Time (hours) 
• EM3.2 Transport Time (hours) 
• EM3.3 Unloading Time (hours) 
• Transport Event 









Figure 38.   Movement Objectives Hierarchy 
 
The objective of 3.1 Loading was to minimize load time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.1:  Load Time 
Factors: 
• EM3.1.1 Stage Time (hours) 
• EM3.1.2 Lift Time (hours) 
• EM3.1.3 Set in Place Time (hours) 
Load Time Equation: 
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SetinPlaceLiftStageLoadTime ++=  
 
The objective of 3.1.1 Stage was to minimize the load time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.1.1:  Stage Time 
Factors: 
• Travel to Supply Hub Time (hours) 
• Maneuvering Time (hours) 
• Mooring Time (hours) 
• Delay due to Supply Preparation (hours) 
• Safety Effect (due to human limits and protecting people) 
• Weather Effect 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Illumination Effect (due to natural lighting) 
Stage Time Equation: 
 
( * )(( ) ( )* * ) ( )StageTime Weather Learning Travel Maneuver Moor Safety Illum Delay= + + +
 
The objective of 3.1.2 Lift was to minimize load time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.1.2:  Lift Time 
Factors: 
• Rigging Time (hours) 
• Transfer Time (hours) 
• Safety Effect (due to human limits and protecting people) 
• Weather Effect  
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
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• Illumination Effect (due to natural lighting) 
Load Lift Time Equation: 
 
( * )(( )* * ( ))LiftTime Safety Weather Transfer Learning Illum Rigging= +  
 
The objective of 3.1.3 Set In Place was to minimize load time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.1.3:  Set In Place Time 
Factors: 
• Placing Time (hours) 
• Securing for Sea Time (hours) 
• Ballasting Time (hours) 
• Safety Effect (due to human limits and protecting people) 
• Weather Effect 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Illumination Effect (due to natural lighting) 
Set in Place Time Equation: 
 
( )* * * *SetInPlaceTime Placing Securing Safety Weather Learning Illum Ballasting= + +  
 
The objective of 3.2 Transport was to minimize transport time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.2:  Transport Time 
Factors: 
• EM3.2.1 Start Time (hours) 
• EM3.2.2 Travel Time (hours) 
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• EM3.2.3 Stop Time (hours) 
Transport Time Equation: 
 
StopTravelStartimeTransportT ++=  
 
The objective of 3.2.1 Start was to minimize transport time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.2.1:  Start Time 
Factors: 
• Casting Off Time (hours) 
• Maneuvering Time (hours) 
• Equipment Check Time (hours) 
• Safety Effect (due to human limits and protecting people) 
• Weather Effect 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Illumination Effect (due to natural lighting) 
Start Time Equation: 
 
( )* * * *StartTime Casting Maneuvering Equipment Safety Weather Learning Illum= + +  
 
The objective of 3.2.2 Travel was to minimize transport time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.2.2:  Travel Time 
Factors: 
• Weather Effect 
• Illumination Effect (due to natural lighting) 
121 
• Obscurant Effect (due to smoke, fog, rain, dust, or visual impairment) 
• Distance (nautical miles) 
• Speed (knots) 
• Hostility Effect (due to enemy fire or massing of troops) 
• Navigation Effect (due to traffic density) 
• Sand Effect (due to dust or sand damaging equipment) 
• Ice Effect (due to cold or ice damaging equipment) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Travel Time Equation: 
 
( )
( * * * * * * * )
DistanceTravelTime
Speed Weather Illum Obscurant Hostility Navigation Sand Ice
=  
 
The objective of 3.2.3 Stop was to minimize transport time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.2.3:  Stop Time 
Factors: 
• Maneuvering Time (hours) 
• Mooring or Beaching Time (hours) 
• Equipment Rigging for unload Time (hours) 
• Weather Effect 
• Safety Effect (due to human limits and protecting people) 
• Illumination Effect (due to natural lighting) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Stop Time Equation: 
 
( )(( )* * * ( ))StopTime Safety Maneuvering Mooring Weather Illum Learning Rigging= + +  
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The objective of 3.3 Unloading was to minimize unload time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.3:  Unload Time 
Factors: 
• EM3.3.1 Lift Time (hours) 
• EM3.3.2 Stage Time (hours) 
Unload Time Equation: 
 
UnloadTime Lift Stage= +  
 
The objective of 3.3.1 Lift was to minimize unload time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.3.1:  Lift Time 
Factors: 
• Rigging Time (hours) 
• Transfer Time (hours) 
• Safety Effect (due to human limits and protecting people) 
• Weather Effect 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Illumination Effect (due to natural lighting) 
Unload Lift Time Equation: 
 
( * )(( )* * ( ))LiftTime Safety Weather Transfer Learning Illum Rigging= +  
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The objective of 3.3.2 Stage was to minimize unload time per logistics 
connector event. 
EM3.3.2:  Stage Time 
Factors: 
• Delay due to Supply Receive Preparation (hours) 
• Storing Time on Base (hours) 
• Safety Effect (due to human limits and protecting people) 
• Weather Effect 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
Stage Time Equation: 
 
( )* * *StageTime Delay Storing Safety Weather Learning= +  
 
3.8.1.3 Bring Back 
The fourth function of supply was bring back as shown in Figure 39.  The 
function of bring back has two sub-functions of CASEVAC and disposition.  The 
objective of 4.0 Bring Back was to return personnel or equipment effectively as required.  
Every logistics connector event dealing with the logistics train has a bring back entity that 
affected the amount of time needed to transfer materiel. 
EM4.0:  Recovery Time Personnel, Disposition Time Materiel 
Factors: 
• EM4.1 Recovery Time (minutes) 





Figure 39.   Bring Back Objectives Hierarchy 
 
The objective of 4.1 CASEVAC was to evacuate casualties as quickly as 
required. 
EM4.1:  Recovery Time 
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Factors: 
• EM4.1.1 Casualty Identification Time (minutes) 
• EM4.1.2 Stabilization Time (minutes) 
• EM4.1.3 Transport Time (minutes) 
• EM4.1.4 Hospitalization Time (minutes) 
Casualty Recovery Time Equation: 
 
RecoveryTime Casualty Stabilization Transport Hospitalization= + + +  
 
The objective of 4.1.1 Identify Casualty was to minimize time to 
recognize and begin treatment of casualties as required. 
EM4.1.1:  Identify Casualty Time 
Factors: 
• Recognize Time (minutes) 
• Hostility Effect (due to enemy fire or massing of troops) 
• Illumination Effect (due to natural lighting) 
• Weather Effect 
• Terrain Effect (due to dense jungle and heavy forest) 
Identify Casualty Time Equation: 
 
( )* * * *IdentifyTime Recognize Hostility Illum Weather Terrain=  
 
The objective of 4.1.2 Stabilize was to minimize time of no treatment and 
maximize time of survival for transport as required. 
EM4.1.2:  Treatment Time 
Factors: 
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• Retrieval Time (minutes) 
• Field Treatment Time (minutes) 
• Hostility Effect (due to enemy fire or massing of troops) 
• Weather Effect 
• Illumination Effect (due to natural lighting) 
Casualty Treatment Time Equation: 
 
( )* * *TreatmentTime Retrieval Field Hostility Weather Illum= +  
 
EM4.1.2.1:  Stabilization Time 
Factors: 
• Treatment Time (minutes) 
• Time Factor (hours) 






The objective of 4.1.3 Transport was to minimize time of evacuation for 
casualties as required. 
EM4.1.3:  Transport Time 
Factors: 
• Distance (nautical miles) 
• Speed (knots) 
• Number of conveyances (# available) 
• Weather Effect 
• Illumination Effect (due to natural lighting) 
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• Terrain Effect (due to dense jungle or forest) 
• Hostility Effect (due to enemy fire or massing of troops) 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Navigation Effect (due to traffic density) 
• Ice Effect (due to ice or cold damage to equipment) 
• Obscurant Effect (due to smoke, fog, rain, dust, or visual impairment) 





peed * #Conveyances Effects
 
 
The objective of 4.1.4 Hospitalization was to minimize time to recovery. 
EM4.1.4:  Hospitalization Time 
Factors: 
• Transport Unload Time (minutes) 
• Hospital Readiness Time (minutes) 
• Surgeon Availability Time (minutes) 
• Following Procedures (probability procedures followed, %) 
• Following Doctors Orders (probability doctors orders followed, %) 
Hospitalization Time Equation: 
 
( )* *HospitalizationTime Transport Readiness Surgeon Procedures DocOrders= + +  
 
The objective of 4.2 Disposition was to safely return waste materiel. 
EM4.2:  Disposition Safety 
Factors: 
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• EM4.2.1 Handling Safety (%) 
• EM4.2.2 Materiel Safeguarded Correctly (%) 
Disposition Safety Equation: 
 
*Safety Handling Safeguarding=  
 
The objective of 4.2.1 Handling was to prevent injury to personnel and 
damage to storage or equipment per materiel storage event.  This EM was the percentage 
of time that waste was properly handled and personnel follow procedures to ensure safety 
of the basing alternative and personnel assigned. 
EM4.2.1:  Handling Safety 
Factors: 
• Correct Retrieval (percentage of time waste was retrieved properly) 
• Safely Received (percentage of time that there was no personnel 
injured in receiving waste materials) 
• Correct Packaging (percentage of time the waste material was properly 
packaged for storage) 
• Following Procedures (percentage of time personnel follow procedures 
while dealing with waste material) 
Handling Safety Equation: 
 
Safety = Retrieval* Receive* Packaging* Instructions  
 
The objective of 4.2.2 Stowage was to ensure proper safeguarding of 
waste material as required.  This EM was the percentage of time that waste is correctly 
safeguarded until retrograded or disposed. 
EM4.2.2:  Materiel Safeguarded Correctly 
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Factors: 
• Correct Control (percentage of time waste material was correctly 
controlled) 
• Correct Isolation (percentage of time waste material was correctly 
isolated as required) 
Materiel Safeguard Equation: 
 
Safeguarded = Control* Isolation  
 
The objective of 4.2.3 Retrograde was to recycle or salvage materiel as 
required.  This EM is the percentage of time that waste is correctly identified for 
retrograde. 
EM4.2.3: Identify for Retrograde 
Factors: 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Accurate Identification (percentage of time waste material is correctly 
identified for retrograde) 
• Following Procedures (percentage of time personnel follow procedure 
to identify waste material for retrograde) 
Retrograde Identification Equation: 
 
= * *Retrograde Identification Procedures Learning  
 
The objective of 4.2.4 Disposal was to discharge, destroy, or 
decontaminate material as required.  This EM was the percentage of time that waste is 
correctly identified for disposal. 
EM4.2.4:  Identify for Disposal 
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Factors: 
• Learning Effect (due to competency, knowledge, experience, training) 
• Accurate Identification (percentage of time waste material was 
correctly identified for disposal) 
• Following Procedures (percentage of time personnel follow procedure 
to identify waste material for disposal) 
Disposal Identification Equation: 
 
= * *Disposal Identification Procedures Learning  
 
3.8.1.4 Operational Feasibility 
The attributes of the logistic connector operational feasibility are shown in 
Figure 40.  Operational Feasibility was the capability of a system to be satisfactorily 
integrated and employed for field use.  The RST examined many attributes of the logistic 
connectors and determine that operational feasibility had five sub-attributes of reliability, 
availability, maintainability, transportability, and manpower supportability.   The 
objective of 5.0 Operational Feasibility was to ensure logistic connectors are feasible for 
the supply mission as required.  Every logistics connector event dealing with the logistics 
train had an operational feasibility entity that affects the performance of the logistic 
connector. 
EM5.0:  Operational Feasibility 
Factors: 
• EM5.1 Reliability 
• EM5.2 Availability 
• EM5.3 Maintainability 
• EM5.4 Transportability 
• EM5.5 Manpower Supportability 
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Operational Feasibility Equation: 
 




Figure 40.   Logistics Connector Operational Feasibility 
 
The objective of 5.1 Reliability was to ensure reliability of logistic 
connector as needed.  The RST determined that the logistics connector must be reliable 
100% of the time.  The problem in calculating the amount of time for each transport 
event and the amount of materiel to be moved was considered to be highest priority 
therefore reliability was assumed to be 100%. 
The objective of 5.2 Availability was to ensure availability of logistic 
connector as needed.  The RST determined that the logistics connector must be available 
100% of the time.  The problem to calculate the amount of time for each transport event 
and the amount of materiel to be moved was considered to be highest priority therefore 
availability was assumed to be 100%. 
The objective of 5.3 Maintainability was to ensure maintainability of 
logistic connector as needed.  The RST determined that the logistics connector must be 
maintainable 100% of the time.  The problem to calculate the amount of time for each 
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transport event and the amount of materiel to be moved was considered to be highest 
priority therefore maintainability was assumed to be 100%. 
The objective of 5.4 Transportability was to ensure transportability of 
logistic connector as needed.  The RST determined that the logistics connector was 
transported and in theater before the supply operation began.  The concern was weather 
the logistics connector was carried by the supply ship and performed its transport runs or 
the basing option kept control of the logistics connector and met the supply ship at the 
beginning of every supply cycle.  The RST determined the logistics connector would be 
kept as a part of each basing option and if a logistics connector was lost due to enemy 
hostility another logistic connector would be delivered before the next cycle time.  
Therefore, the transportability of the logistics connectors was considered but left to be an 
area of further study. 
The objective of 5.5 Manpower Supportability was to ensure manpower 
supportability of logistic connector as needed.  The RST determined that each logistics 
connector was capable of operating with the same amount of crew.  However the amount 
of manning on each logistics connector was influenced by weather, hostility, safety, and 
RAM (reliability, availability, maintainability) effects.  Each of these areas was 
considered by the RST, but because the main metric was time for each transport event 
and the amount of materiel to be moved, the manpower supportability was assumed to be 
constant and feasible for all logistic connector alternatives. 
 
3.8.1.5 Overall Supply Evaluation Measures 
Based on a completed objective hierarchy the RST was able to create 
overall evaluation measures that are of grave importance to stakeholders.  For the supply 
objective hierarchy the most important measure was Operational Availability of the 
SURC due to fuel.  This measure was a function of factors including: 
• EM2.1 Request 
• EM2.5 Supply Train 
• EM3.0 Total Movement Time 
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• EM4.2 Disposition Safety 
• Supply Ship Cycle Time 
SURC Operational Availability (Fuel) Equation: 
 
SURC
oFUELA = 1, 2.5, ,f(EM2.  EM EM3.0, EM4.2 CycleTime)  
 
Another measure of vital importance was the Operational Habitability of 
the basing alternative and logistic connector combination.  This measure takes into 
account the storage level of food and water in order to ensure the RF subsistence.  
Operational Habitability was a function of: 
• EM2.1 Request 
• EM2.5 Supply Train 
• EM3.0 Total Movement Time 
• EM4.2 Disposition Safety 
• Supply Ship Cycle Time 
Operational Habitability (Food and Water) Equation: 
 
BASE
oFOOD & WATERH ( 2.1, 2.5, 3.0, 4.2, )f EM EM EM EM CycleTime=  
 
The third overall evaluation measure for supply was throughput.  
Throughput is defined as the amount of materiel per unit time.  This measure was useful 
in determining which logistics connector performed the best.  Throughput was a function 
of: 
• EM2.1.2 Identify Gap 
• EM2.5 Supply Train 
• EM3.0 Total Movement Time 










3.8.2 Repair Group 
The elements of this study’s objectives hierarchy were comprised of the subject, 
the objective (O), and the evaluation measure (EM).  Objectives were related back to the 
repair and replacement functions of the functional hierarchy with the additional objective 
of involving personnel.  In order to develop a maintenance system that was both efficient 
and feasible, the RST sought to minimize the number of personnel and maximize the 
operational readiness rate (percentage of FMC craft) throughout the squadron.  Figure 41 
delineates the Maintenance Objectives Hierarch within the RF system. 
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Figure 41.   Maintenance Objective Hierarchy 
 
At the time of this study, the maintenance officer from Riverine Group One 
expressed a concern that there may not be enough dedicated maintenance personnel 
throughout the squadron to accomplish the riverine mission. One of goals of the RST was 
to develop a contingent of various types of maintenance personnel and maintenance 
facility configurations, and evaluate their effect on the time it would take to complete 
repairs given the availability of replacement parts--the results of which directly 




3.8.2.1 Managing Personnel 
The RST determined that two objectives had to be achieved in order to 
increase operational readiness.  The first was to optimize the number and type of 
personnel available to conduct maintenance.  It would be possible but infeasible to 
increase the total number of personnel and number of personnel in each skill set without 
limit, so we sought to find that maximum number of personnel and maximum number of 
personnel in each skill set that would allow the maintenance section to achieve a 90% or 
better availability rate for the squadron (the inherent availability, or Ai, of SURC’s 
reported by Raytheon in the March 26, 2007 SURC FRACAS indicated an Ai of 
98.45%).170  The type of skill set versus the likelihood of a particular failure is discussed 
in the following chapter. 
 
3.8.2.2 Repairing the Fleet 
The second objective which must be met in order to increase the 
operational readiness rate was to decrease the mean time to repair (MTTR).  In order to 
decrease the repair time, the RST had to find the optimum amount of available personnel 
and the optimum tonnage of replacement parts.  Optimizing the available personnel 
pertains to the mathematical efficiency of the number of personnel available to conduct 
maintenance at any given time.  That is, the study’s goal was to prove that there was such 
a thing as too few and too many maintenance personnel with regard to ensuring 
maximum operational availability of SURC’s. Optimizing the tonnage of repair parts 
represent was defined as having the maximum amount of parts available for repair while 
at the same time avoiding the mountain of materials on a beach concept.  In both cases of 
personnel and replacement parts onsite was limited by space, as a RF system requirement 
was a small footprint171 in theatre. Therefore, the numbers of personnel and the tonnage 
of repair parts had to remain in check. 
 
3.8.3 Force Protection Group 
The objectives hierarchy for the FPS was a construct to measure the effectiveness 
and efficiency of competing architectures for the FPS.  The RST traced the objectives 
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into the functional hierarchy to increase traceability and cohesion of objectives.  The 
objectives and evaluation measures tied into the functions of the FPS provide the analysis 
of the system’s effectiveness.  The construct for measuring the efficiency of the system 
was developed in the operational suitability of the system, which was an independent 
objectives hierarchy that considered the suitability of a system’s architecture.   
Each function presented in the functional hierarchy was given a corresponding 
objective, designated by the “O”, but only the lowest level functions were assigned EM’s. 
or measures of performance (MOP).  With each group of related MOP’s, there was an 
independent measure, or measures, of effectiveness (MOE) designed to provide a higher 
level of understanding on the performance of the group of MOP’s.  
The highest level objective for the FPS was to efficiently protect the riverine force 
at the base of operations by predicting enemy courses of actions and deterring and 




Figure 42.   Top-level Functions and Objectives for the FPS 
 
As was stated earlier in the functional hierarchy for the FPS, predicting was the 
first of the sub-functions that comprised protecting.  Figure 43 is the objectives hierarchy 
corresponding to the functional decomposition of predicting. 
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Figure 43.   Predicting Threat Objectives Hierarchy 
 
The sub-functions of predicting the threat described in the functional hierarchy 
were gathering intelligence, analyzing intelligence, and protecting intelligence.  The 
objective of gathering intelligence was to collect and transfer intelligence.  The MOP for 
gathering intelligence was number of intelligence messages sent as this would be 
representative of the gathering process.  In terms of FP, the objective of analyzing the 
threat was to determine the enemy courses of action.  The MOP for analyzed intelligence 
was percentage of assumptions proved true over assumptions. For protecting intelligence, 
the objective was to protect critical information from leaking to the enemy with the MOP 
as percentage of information intercepted. 
The MOE for these MOP were time to repel attack and percentages of defensive 
assets utilized were used.  If the FPS was successful at predicting the threat then the time 
required to repel an enemy attack was minimized.  Percentage of defensive assets utilized 
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was also considered as an MOE to prevent selecting an unnecessarily large FPS.  The 
next sub-function of protecting the RF was deterring the threat.  Figure 44 shows the 
objective hierarchy for deterrence. 
 
 
Figure 44.   Deterrence Objectives Hierarchy 
 
The objective of deterring was to dissuade the enemy from attacking because no 
attack translates to zero damage to the RF.  The sub-functions for deterring were warning 
and showing force.  The objective of warning was to effectively warn people of their 
intrusion.  The RST defined an effective warning as one that is early, accurate, and results 
in a desired action.  This way the warnings served as a filtering device between civilians 
and the enemy due to the assumption that civilians would not normally enter areas where 
they would potentially be harmed.  The MOP for warning were the number of people 
warned and the percentage of people repelled by the warning, as applied to a visual or 
auditory queues.  Number of people warned reflected the clarity of the warning signal 
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and how easily a person or group identified the warning.  Percentage of people repelled 
measured the success of the warning at creating the desired affect.  For example, the 
desired affect were for civilians to leave the area and for the enemy to possibly cease an 
attack attempt. 
The next sub-function of deterring was showing force.  The objective of showing 
force was to deter people by showing defensive capability.  Although showing force was 
primarily directed at would-be attackers, the general civilian population was used in the 
objective because showing force also aims to stop civilians from entering restricted areas, 
in a similar fashion as the use of warnings.  The sub-functions of showing force were 
conducting operations and fortifying structures.  The objectives of conducting operations 
were to prepare for attacks and present force.  The corresponding MOP for these 
objectives were:  time to repel attack and number of attacks from areas where operations 
were conducted.  Conducting operations was interpreted as the change in posture that 
demonstrates a certain defensive capability with the goal of altering enemy courses of 
action, giving the enemy less avenues to attack.  The objective of fortifying structures 
was to prepare for attacks and demonstrate greater defensive capability.  The 
corresponding MOP for these objectives was number of attacks on defensive positions 
that were increasingly fortified. 
The MOE for these MOP’s was number of attacks over time.  The more 
successful the FPS was at deterrence, the less enemy attacks would occur over time.  The 
final sub-function of protecting the RF was denying the threat.  Figure 45 shows the 




Figure 45.   Denial Objectives Hierarchy 
 
The main objective under denial was to deny the enemy a successful attack.  The 
sub-functions of denial explained in the functional hierarchy for the FPS were actively 
denying and passively denying.  The objective of actively denying was to deny the enemy 
a successful attack through actions directed at the enemy.  The sub-functions of actively 
denying consisted of detect, locate, track, identify, and engage.  The objective of detect 
was to detect contacts with the MOP of range of detection and probability of detection.  
The objective of locate was to locate the source of detection. The MOP for this objective 
was time to locate after detection.  The objective of track was to maintain contact with an 
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object of interest as it moves with time spent on object after locating as the MOP.  The 
objective of identify was to identify the character of a contact as hostile or friendly with 
the MOP’s range a contact can be identified and time to identify after contact detected.  
The objective of engage was to bring firepower on the enemy with the MOP’s of weapon 
range, probability of kill, and probability of hit. 
The next sub-function of denying was passively denying.  The objective of 
passively denying was to deny the enemy a successful attack without direct action.  The 
sub-functions for passively denying were blocking, concealing, and moving.  The 
objective of blocking was to decrease the adversary’s weapons from damaging their 
intended targets.  The MOP for this objective was the damage to RF structures and 
personnel when attacked.  Number of personnel killed and injured quantified the damage 
to personnel while the damage to facilities can be qualitatively determined as operational 
or non-operational.  The objective of concealing was to prevent adversaries from 
detecting defensive positions and critical base structures.  The MOP for this objective 
was the number of defensive positions and critical structures detected by adversaries. The 
final sub-function of passively denying was moving.  The objective of moving was to 
move critical infrastructure to prevent effective engagements by the adversary.  The MOP 
for this objective was the maneuverability of critical infrastructure which could be 
measured in speed of the platform for a MOB. 
The selected MOE’s for the various MOP’s associated with denial were the 
number of failed attacks and the fractional exchange ratio.  The number of failed attacks 
was qualitatively determined based on the severity of damage proportional to the size and 
complexity of the enemy attack.  The fractional exchange ratio, or loss of RF versus 
enemy forces, was used to see how well each FPS protected its most important asset, 
people. 
Aside from the objectives, MOP’s, and MOE’s that relate to functions, the RST 
also evaluated the FPS in terms of operational suitability, or how efficient the FPS was in 
the operating environment.  Figure 46 shows the operational suitability of the FPS. 
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Figure 46.   FPS System Suitability 
 
Availability meant how available the various assets were for the FPS in terms of 
their operational readiness.  The metric for availability was percentage of time a given 
system was operationally available.  Supportability, survivability, and maintainability all 
played a role in overall system operational availability.  The supportability considerations 
for the FPS related to the logistical demands of the various components.  For example, 
people require food, water, shelter, and other materials whereas a sensor package requires 
some type of power source.  The ease in obtaining supplies or storing supplies for these 
systems, measured in time to obtain supplies and shelf life, determined the supportability 
of a system.  Survivability considered how robust the competing architectures were in the 
operational environment.  This was measured in the number of times the system breaks as 
a result of the elements or enemy courses of action.  Maintainability of the FPS applied to 
how well the sensor and weapon systems were maintained in the operating environment.  
Some of the higher technology sensor and weapon systems that are currently being 
developed, and will be deployed by 2012, might provide great capability, but also create 
significant maintenance challenges.  The metric for maintainability was time spent in 
maintenance, or off-line.  Reliability described how often the system performed as 
intended.  Reliability related to weapon systems in how often they would jam, sensors in 
how often they failed or provided false alarms, and barriers in how often they failed or 
the levels of firepower different barrier systems could take.  The percentage of times the 
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system failed performing its intended function was used as the metric for reliability.  This 
way the reliability could apply across the different components in a FPS, such as, the 
percentage a weapon jams, or a sensor system breaks.  Trainability considered the ease of 
which the RF personnel could perform the required activities to make a FPS architecture 
successful.  The metric for trainability is time. 
The suitability of the FPS was considered when the RST constructed the 
operational architecture, but the FPS did not conduct an analysis of the system’s 
suitability because there are currently no requirements on how well a FPS must meet 
these objectives.  The RST did, however, conclude that a suitable system must possess 
these characteristics. 
This construct for the FPS also ties into the overarching analysis for the 
alternatives for sustainment of the RF.  As it relates to the overall analysis conducted by 
the RST, the success of the FPS in the basing alternatives will provide a qualitative 
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4. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
4.1 PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS AND PURPOSE 
The physical architecture of a system is a hierarchical description of the 
resources that comprise the system.  This hierarchy begins with the system 
and the system’s top-level components and progresses down to the 
configuration items (CIs) that comprise each intermediate component.  
The CIs can be hardware or software elements or combinations of 
hardware and software, people, facilities, procedures, and documents (e.g. 
user’s manuals).172 
The purpose of developing a physical architecture is a “belief that the operational 
architecture development is predicated on having a variety of interesting physical 
architectures to match with the functional architecture.  Therefore, the primary product of 
this function for designing the physical architecture is a reasonable number of interesting 
physical architectures that can be combined with the functional architecture and 
evaluated to determine their effectiveness in meeting the objectives established in the 
requirements.”173 
These “interesting physical architectures” were developed in parallel with the 
functional architectures discussed in Chapter Three of this report.  This chapter is 
therefore focused on developing and analyzing the alternatives that enable the functional 
and physical architectures of the various systems examined by the RST and are 
summarized in a morphological chart.  “A complete and all-inclusive alternative rarely 
emerges in its final state.  It begins as a hazy but interesting idea.”174  The RST generated 
a list of possible alternatives that may be able to perform the functions and objectives for 
overall RF sustainment.  Although some alternatives had little likelihood of being 
feasible, the “idea is that it is better to consider many alternatives than to overlook one 
that might be preferred.”175These alternatives were subjected to a feasibility analyses and 
risk analyses. 
Feasibility analysis is essentially narrowing down the number of alternatives to a 
few feasible ones, consistent with the schedule requirements and available resources.176  
“All proposed alternatives are not necessarily attainable.”177  They are considered in 
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order to prevent overlooking alternatives that might be preferred.178  After generating a 
list of alternatives, the RST did further research and eliminated alternatives that were 
deemed infeasible due to specific capabilities and requirements.  Further analysis was 
only conducted on the feasible alternatives that performed the required functions and met 
the overall system requirements. 
Risk is the “probability and severity of loss linked to hazards.”179  “Risk analysis 
is accomplished to determine the way(s) in which the risk can be eliminated, or 
minimized if not eliminated altogether.”180  The different alternatives that the RST 
generated each had risk.  The RST examined these risks in order to be aware of possible 
limitations of each alternative.  The RST also sought ways to mitigate these risks.  Risk 
analysis included technical risk, cost risk, schedule risk, and programmatic risk.  
Technical risk is “the possibility that a technical requirement of the system will not be 
achieved.”181  Cost risk is “the possibility that a specified allocated budget will be 
exceeded”182 and was examined and used in this study as a means of comparison between 
alternative architectures.  Schedule risk is “the possibility that a project will fail to meet 
the scheduled milestones”183 which in this study was limited to systems that could be 
deployed by 2012.  Programmatic risks are “the occurrence of events, imposed on the 
program/project which are the result of external influences.”184  Programmatic risks are 
not discussed in this report. 
 
4.2 NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY COMMAND ELEMENTS 
The Navy established NECC in January 2006 to serve as a single 
functional command to centrally manage the current and future readiness, 
resources, manning, training, and equipping of the Navy Expeditionary 
Force.  NECC’s primary role is to provide combat-ready units across the 
full range of joint and service specific expeditionary missions to the 
JFMCC/Navy Component Commanders (NCC’s).  These expeditionary 
capabilities provided by the NECC Force includes Naval Coastal Warfare 
(NCW), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Mobile Diving and Salvage 
(MDS), expeditionary logistics, expeditionary engineering and 
construction, riverine, maritime expeditionary security, maritime civil 
affairs, expeditionary training, and Expeditionary Combat Readiness 
Center (ECRC). 
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Based on operational requirements, NECC will deploy mission-specific 
units or multi-mission integrated adaptive force packages to fulfill 
JFMCC/NCC demands by using an existing solid foundation of core 
capabilities in the Navy Expeditionary Force and emerging new mission 
capabilities.  Combining these forces under a unified command structure 
increases the overall readiness and responsiveness of the Navy to support 
existing and evolving irregular warfare missions in major combat 
operations (MCO), MSO, or maritime homeland security/defense.185 
In Figure 47, the basic functions and capabilities are broken out across the board 
for the NECC Force.  The capabilities listed in black exist in today’s NECC and the ones 
in red are capabilities to be fielded in the near future. 
 
 
Figure 47.   NECC Functions and Capabilities186 
 
“The NECC Force delivers unique skill sets to MSO to ensure access across the 
maritime operational environment.  Expeditionary effects-based operations solidify 
access by influencing an enemy to perform in a desired way or by denying an enemy’s 
ability to use asymmetric engagements to disrupt naval and joint forces in an 
expeditionary environment.  By supporting expeditionary effects-based operations, the 
NECC Force provides the following unique and essential contributions to MSO: 
156 
• Secures the assigned operational environment for the flow of the joint forces 
and logistics from the sea base to ashore. 
• Expands the JFMCC/NCC area of influence and situational awareness in the 
green and brown water environments. 
• Provides tools to enhance TSC activities. 
• Support of the 1,000 ship Navy concept improves relationships with and 
access for countries that lack traditional navies. 
• Improves the ability of the United States and partner nations to deny terrorist 
activity, stem piracy, and interdict the flow of illegal arms, drugs, and human 
trafficking. 
• Optimizes the interdependency with Naval Special Warfare, U. S. Coast 
Guard, and U. S. Marine Corps in the shared expeditionary environment.”187 
 
Figure 48 illustrates how a NECC full-spectrum adaptive force package would 
lay–out in a JFMCC environment. 
 
 
Figure 48.   NECC Support of the JFMCC Environment188 
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The following list comprises the NECC Elements represented in Figure 48 and 
what types of mission they perform in the green/brown water environment. 
 
• EOD forces detect, locate, and dispose of unexploded ordnance.   
• Diving and salvage operations are done by MDS teams. 
• The MESF provide expeditionary security ashore and afloat. 
• Expeditionary Engineering is conducted by the NCF. 
• Expeditionary Logistics Support (cargo handling, support and customs) is 
handled by the Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Forces (NELSF). 
• The RF conducts MSO and TSC operations in the riparian environment. 
• Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG) conducts the hearts and minds 
campaign 
• Expeditionary Training Command (ETC) trains foreign partners in any of the 
aforementioned disciplines. 
These commands and several other smaller support elements comprise the NECC 
Fore Structure. 
 
4.3 RIVERINE SQUADRON ELEMENTS 
The riverine squadron contains a variety of elements to provide a capable, 
baseline force.  When this baseline force is not deemed capable enough to meet the 
various demands of the operational environment, the squadron is augmented with other 
elements from the NECC.  Without any of these augments, the squadron is comprised of 
224 personnel divided into three detachments. 
The command element is in charge of the tactical operations center 
(TOC)/planning cell as well as carrying out the squadron’s administrative duties.  To 
accomplish both of these tasks, the command element has 23 personnel consisting of four 
administrative personnel, four intelligence personnel, six operations/planning personnel, 
six C4I personnel, and the commanding and executive officer.189  Operating the TOC 
enables the command element to control the squadron and is the command element’s 
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most important function.  The TOC relays vital information in the form of voice and data 
transmissions throughout the RF, to coalition forces, and to higher headquarters.190  The 
TOC also contains all the relevant information about the operational area including maps 
of the battlespace with the location of coalition units and displays current intelligence 
reports.191  Aside from the four administrative personnel, the 19 people assigned to the 
TOC must establish a watch schedule to operate the TOC 24 hours a day. 
The mission element consists of 159 personnel and contains three detachments. 192  
Each detachment is comprised of a three person command team, a two person medical 
support team, an eight person boarding team, and four boats manned by two crews of five 
personnel.  The mission element, therefore, has under its control twelve SURC’s 
designed to carry out a vast array of missions. 
The supporting element contains 42 personnel and is responsible for the 
maintenance, logistics, force protection, training, medical support, and combat service 
support for the squadron.  For maintenance there are nine mechanics for the SURC’s and 
rolling gear.193  These mechanics must have the equipment and facilities “to conduct 
routine and combat related maintenance.”194  For logistics, there are four personnel 
responsible for restocking the squadron’s supplies as well as monitoring the level of 
supplies.  The squadron has 17 force protection personnel to provide security for the 
operating base and protection for the mission element when operating close to the base.195   
The training cell has three personnel assigned to ensure RS personnel have achieved the 
necessary training and qualifications.  The medical support has eight corpsmen, two 
corpsmen responsible for the base of operations and two corpsmen deploying with each 
detachment within the mission element.  Finally, there are seven personnel assigned to 
the combat service support element with the primary function of motor transport 
support.196 
 
4.4 ADAPTIVE FORCE PACKAGES 
The adaptive force package concept is a new concept that has not been clearly 
defined.  The RST developed a definition for adaptive force packages that will 
encompass and define this term to its fullest extent.  Adaptive force packages are 
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“tailorable force modules”197 which will allow for “rapid, land, sea, air and battlespace 
dominance”198.  Tailorable force modules enable the commander to tailor a force 
structure to meet the requirements of the operation while minimizing force size.  This 
decrease in force size is offset by increased capabilities through the application of new 
technologies.199  These smaller forces result in “reduced O&S cost, reduced logistics tail, 
and will allow for the faster application on new technology.”200  The RST defined 
adaptive force packages as the right size force with the correct mix of skill sets to 
effectively conduct an operation. 
 
4.5 BASING ALTERNATIVES 
4.5.1 Forward Operating Base 
The RF may perform a multitude of missions which may require various adaptive 
force packages.  Therefore, it is necessary the FOB be an easily scalable, rapidly 
deployable structure able to accommodate fluctuations in personnel, facilities, and 
equipment.  In this scenario the RST recognized that the RF required additional 
capabilities from various detachments within the NECC including EOD, UAV, MESF, 
civil affairs, and linguists.  A small element of host nation forces, in this case the 
Indonesian Army, would also be present with the RF to provide coordination and conduct 
training.  The RST reasoned that the total additional personnel from these augments 
would be around 125 people, bringing the total number of personnel for the RF in this 
scenario to approximately 350.  The RST also determined for this scenario that the RF 
would be best supported from a single base containing all of the riverine squadrons’ 
elements.  The FOB, therefore, had to provide all of the functions of a squadrons’ support 
base such as “command oversight, planning, staging, logistics and maintenance201” in 
addition to the requirement for each detachment of the mission element and the 
augmented detachments. 
The RST leveraged the existing Navy Construction Battalion (Seabees) automated 
tent camp architecture to design an FOB for the RST.  The facilities that comprise the 
Seabee’s tent camps are already in use today and they can be constructed rapidly and are 
easily configurable with other augments within NECC.  The Seabees designed four 
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camps for the RF.  Three of the camps are identical and were created to support a 
detachment.  The other camp was designed to support the command and supporting 
elements that comprise the RF, serving as the support base.  This way, the RF could 
conduct distributed operations along a river if required.  The four camps all contain 
identical facilities and can be configured in different combinations as desired.  In addition 
to the riverine squadron, most of the other augments within the NECC also have tent 
camp designs.  This made FOB planning from the entire RF easier because the 
augmented forces’ structures are similar to the riverine squadron.  Figure 49 is an 
illustration of how the tent camps were combined for the FOB in this scenario. 
 
 
Figure 49.   Forward Operating Base Configuration 
This model was built using Google Sketch, so that every building could be drawn 
to scale and uploaded to the operational environment in Google Earth.  This base is just 
one of many configurations possible, with the understanding that configuration changes 
are based on the preferences of a squadrons’ commanding officer.202 
161 
The camp was configured with considerations for force protection and 
convenience of conducting operations.  The majority of the structures located in the FOB 
are berthing tents for the RF personnel.  These tents hold approximately six people each 
and are 18 feet wide and 25 feet long.203  The model here shows a configuration of 59 
tents for a total of 354 people on the FOB.  The berthing tents were placed in a horse shoe 
pattern around the perimeter of the base to conceal critical facilities and facilitate a faster 
response by the resting personnel to the perimeter if a major attack on the FOB occurred. 
At the center of the FOB are the TOC’s.  These are the most critical structures to 
the RF and were placed in the center of the FOB to provide maximum concealment and 
protection.  The TOC is constructed with the same tent used for berthing, but reinforced 
with sandbags to increase survivability.  One of these tents would be designated as the 
TOC for the planning cell while the other three can serve as mission planning areas for 
the three detachments.  The TOC is the major consumer of power for the RF.  The current 
power source for the RF is a trailer of two 30 KW generators, however the RST decided 
that two 60 KW generators would provide the necessary power for the added facilities. 
For the general storage of non-hazardous material such as food, clothing, and 
other supplies, the RF uses 10 ISO TRI- CON four-door containers and 48 ISU-90CS 
four-door containers.  The ISU-90CS is nine feet wide, seven feet and four inches long, 
and seven feet and seven inches high204 while the ISO TRI-CON is eight feet wide, six 
feet and five and one-half inches long, and eight feet high.  These structures were placed 
around the armories and to the right of the TOC’s to conceal and protect these facilities.  
To protect the left side of the TOC, medical, and mess tents, the RST placed some of the 
water structures required for the RF.  The two structures represent a configuration of 63 
900 gallon SIXCON’s to hold the water used for drinking, cooking, hygiene, and medical 
purposes.  The SIXCON containers are generally configured in groups of six that are 
eight feet wide, twenty feet long, and eight feet high, the dimensions of one 900 gallon 
module is six feet, six inches wide, eight feet long, and 4 feet high.205 
To decrease the amount of water shipped into the FOB, the RST also included the 
Tactical Water Purification System (TWPS) to provide water for maintenance, shower, 
and laundering purposes.  The RST assumed filtered river water would be suitable for 
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these purposes, but did not want to risk using river water for the other purposes due to the 
agricultural and paper mill contamination that are located in close proximity to the FOB 
along the river.  The TWPS can cycle through 1500 gallons of water per hour, and, 
through its use of reverse osmosis and micro-filtration technologies, can filter brackish 
water.206 
The maintenance tents used by the squadron were located along the river and near 
the boat launching and recovery area to decrease the amount of time to transport the 
SURC’s in and out of the water.  These tents are 25 feet wide and 40 feet long207 and 
provide the space where maintenance can be conducted on the RF’s rolling gear and 
SURC’s.  Space was provided between these tents and the shore line to ease the 
movement of rolling in and out of the maintenance tents. The five modified ISU-90 
containers used to store lubricants and other hazardous material related to maintenance 
were also located near the maintenance tents for convenience. 
The fuel for the RF is contained in 72 SIXCON containers which were located 
near the river to ease in the refueling of the SURC’s.  These containers were configured 
in modules of 36 SIXCON’s and would be reinforced by berms to protect them from a 
potential attack from the river.  The other sensitive storage structures are the armories, 
which were surrounded on all sides by the general storage container to protect them from 
assault, and the rest of the squadron if they were to detonate.  The armories used by the 
RF are modified ISU-90 containers.  Five of these containers are used to store the 
weapons and ammunition of the RF and the other three are outfitted for EOD material. 
To increase the sanitation and quality of life at the FOB, the RST added a laundry 
and showering facility and three four stall heads.  The laundry and showering facilities 
are located close to the maintenance facility because of their shared water supply while 
the heads were placed around the perimeter of the base for sanitation reasons. 
The power for the FOB was supplied by 3 60 KW generators that could be 
distributed throughout the base.  These generators are not depicted, but the main power 
consumers of the FOB are the TOC’s and the TWPS, so these generators would be 
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located near these facilities.  These generators would also be configured with a single 
SIXCON container to provide 900 gallons of fuel storage. 
The perimeter defenses were not included in this model of the FOB because they 
will be analyzed as a part of the FPS. 
 
4.5.2 Mobile Operating Base 
The MOB has all the capabilities of the FOB, but is afloat on the river.  As stated 
earlier, the support functions include operational support, medical support, logistics, 
helicopter support, maintenance, administration, and salvage.208  In order to determine 
what the MOB would be comprised of, the RST generated a list of possible alternatives.  
Afterwards, the RST performed research in order to decide which alternative was feasible 
for further analysis.  Finally, the RST examined the risks that existed with each feasible 
alternative. 
 
4.5.2.1 Analysis of Alternatives 
The RST considered the functions of force protection, supply/logistics, 
and maintenance when generating a list of possible MOB’s capable of supporting and 
sustaining the RF.  The list of alternatives was compiled after discussions with 
stakeholders and research was performed in this area.  The following is a list of possible 
platforms that have the potential of being a MOB or part of a MOB. 
 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
The LCS is “a focused mission ship designed to optimize warfighting in 
the Littoral Battlespace.”209  There are two designs for the LCS: a Lockheed Martin 




Figure 50.   Lockheed Martin LCS210 
 
The Lockheed Martin LCS is a monohull vessel which has a length 378.3 
ft, a beam of 57.4 ft, a 13.5 ft draft, and a max speed greater than 40 knots.  It has both a 
stern ramp and side door to launch and recover small boats.  It also has a universal 3-axis 
overhead crane system for positive control movement of off-board vehicles.  The 
Lockheed Martin LCS has various defense systems such as a 3D air search radar, EO/IR 
gunfire control system, and decoy launching system.  It can also launch Rolling Airframe 
Missiles, and it is equipped with medium caliber guns.  The modular weapon zone in the 
Lockheed Martin LCS accommodates a variety of other offensive and defensive 
weapons.  The Lockheed Martin LCS has a larger hangar and flight deck than current 
surface combatants, and it can carry two H-60 helicopters and multiple UAV’s.211   
The General Dynamics LCS has a completely different design than the 




Figure 51.   General Dynamics LCS.212 
 
The General Dynamics LCS has a length of 416 ft, a beam of 99 ft, a 14.4 
ft draft, and a max speed greater than 40 knots.  It has a stern door and crane to launch 
and recover small boats.  The General Dynamics LCS is capable of carrying various 
offensive and defensive systems such as a multi-function phased array radar, towed array 
sonar, mine detection sonar, close-in weapon system, medium caliber guns, vertical 
launch system, anti-ship missile launchers, and anti-submarine torpedo tubes.  Just like 
the Lockheed Martin LCS, the General Dynamics design has a larger hangar and flight 
deck than current surface combatants.  It can carry two H-60 helicopters and multiple 
UAV’s.213 
 
High Speed Vessel (HSV) 
High Speed Vessel (HSV)–2 Swift is a high-speed catamaran that “will be 
used to develop concepts, capabilities and reconfigurable mission modules for multiple 




Figure 52.   HSV215 
 
The HSV has a length of 321.5 ft, a beam of 88.6 ft, an 11.25 ft draft when 
loaded, and a max speed greater than 45 knots.  It has a stern ramp and crane to launch 
and recover small boats.  The large hangar can carry land and sea vehicles.  The HSV is 
capable of carrying multiple armaments such as the MK 96 Stabilized Gun, MK 45 Snake 
Eyes, and MK19 Grenade Machine Gun.  It also has an aft flight deck to launch and 
recover UAV’s and helicopters.216 
 
Logistic Support Vessel (LSV) 
Logistic Support Vessel (LSV)–1 Frank S. Besson Class is currently in 
service with the U.S. Army and the Philippine Navy.  The LSV is capable of transporting 
cargo to shallow terminal areas, under-developed coastlines, and inland waterways.  




Figure 53.   Logistic Support Vessel (LSV)218 
 
The LSV has a length of 272 ft, a beam of 60 ft, a 12 ft draft, and a max 
speed of 11.6 knots.  There are optional configurations to include the helicopter variant, 
semi-submersible variant, and the troop carrier variant.  The helicopter capable variant 
deploys and retrieves helicopters and patrol boats.  Helicopters are concealed below a 
modular flight deck while patrol boats are concealed behind the stern ramp. The semi-
submersible variant takes on boats for transport, repair, and launch.  Finally, the troop 
carrier variant provides berthing for 150 troops.219 
 
Riverine Combat Support Ship (RCSS) 
The RCSS concept was developed by naval officers enrolled in the MIT 
Department of Mechanical Engineering.  The plan was to convert an LST-1179 Newport 
Class tank landing ship to a craft that supports the RF.  Changes were made to include 
providing greater fuel and ammunition capacities for small boats, providing Intermediate 
Maintenance Activity (IMA), establishing a Joint Operating Center (JOC), and increasing 




Figure 54.   The RCSS221 
 
The RCSS has a length of 522 ft, a beam of 69 ft, a 19.8 ft draft, and a 
max speed greater than 20 knots.  The LST’s original stern gate and causeway equipment 
provide enough moorage capacity for 20 combatant crafts.  The RCSS will also have 
portside doors to access floating causeways.  The RCSS has surface search and 
navigation radars as well as a MK46 Optical Sight System.  There are two MK38 25 mm 
machine guns and eight universal mounts for .50 caliber machine guns and MK40 
grenade launchers.  The RCSS has the original aft flight deck as well as a forward flight 
deck to accommodate helicopter and UAV operations.222 
 
Barges and Barracks Ships 
There exist numerous types of barges and barrack ships in the USN 
inventory.  Their troop capacities range from 100 to 1000 personnel.  Vietnam RF’s used 
self propelled barracks ships (APB) and non-self propelled barracks craft (APL) as part 




Figure 55.   APB-39 Mercer in support of Mobile Riverine Forces.224 
 
The APB-39 Mercer was reclassified as APL-39.  For this particular 
barracks ship, the length is 328 ft, the beam is 50 ft, and the draft is 11 ft.  Small boats 
can moor alongside on a floating causeway as shown in Figure 55.  Also, the APL has 
multiple universal gun mounts for defense. 
 
Nobriza 
The Nobriza is a Colombian Navy Riverine Support Patrol Vessel.  Figure 
56 is the Nobriza. 
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Figure 56.   The Nobriza225 
 
The Nobriza has a length of 129 ft, a beam of 31 ft, a draft of less than 4 
ft, and a max speed of 9 knots. The Nobriza has been modified with a crane to recover 
small boats for maintenance purposes.  It is armored and has automatically controlled 
MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers, two double-barrel M2 .50 caliber machine guns, and 
numerous other crew served weapons.  It also has a flight deck to launch and recover 
UAV’s and helicopters.226  Although the Nobriza lacks the personnel capacity to 
accommodate an entire RF, several Nobriza’s or a single Nobriza with another platform 
may provide an excellent alternative for a MOB in the riparian environment. 
 
Endurance Class LST 
The Republic of Singapore Ship (RSS) 207 Endurance Class LST replaced 
the ex-County class LST’s of the Republic of Singapore Navy.  One of the principal 
missions of this platform is to serve “as a multi-purpose Logistics Support and Command 
ship in support for naval operations.”227  Figure 57 is the RSS-207 Endurance. 
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Figure 57.   RSS-207 Endurance228 
 
The Endurance has a length of 522 ft, a beam of 69 ft, a 16.4 ft draft, and a 
max speed greater than 15 knots.  The Endurance has large well-deck capable of 
accommodating numerous landing craft and small boats.    There are two 25 ton deck 
cranes to recover small boats.  The Endurance has advanced surveillance radars and 
multiple anti-surface and anti-air weapon and sensor systems.  This weapon system 
includes a gun fire control system, electro-optic director, 76 mm Oto Molera gun, two 0.5 
inch machine guns, and two missile systems.  The Endurance has a flight deck and 
hangar to accommodate two helicopters.  Unlike older LST’s, it has highly automated 
and integrated systems, which enable reduced manning for the ship.229 
 
Teluk Bone LST 
The Kapal Republik Indonesia (KRI), or Republic of Indonesia Ship, 511 
Teluk Bone is the former USN LST-839 Iredell County.  Decommissioned from the USN 
in 1970, the LST-839 was loaned to Indonesia and renamed Teluk Bone to serve as one 




Figure 58.   LST-839 Iredell County231 
 
The Teluk Bone has a length of 328 ft, a beam of 50 ft, a 14 ft draft, and a 
max speed of 12 knots.  The Teluk Bone has a large well deck to carry vehicles.  Besides 
the well deck, it uses floating causeways to moor small boats alongside.  Also, the Teluk 
Bone has multiple gun mounts and a flight deck 
 
Sri Inderapura LST 
The Kapal Di-Raja (KD), or Royal Ship, 1505 Sri Inderapura is the former 
USN LST-1192 Spartanburg County.  Decommissioned from the USN in 1994, the LST-
1992 was sold to Malaysia and renamed Sri Inderapura in 1995.  The LST was one of the 
Newport LST class, which replaced the traditional bow door design LST.  One major 
change is that amphibious vehicles can be launched from the ship’s stern deck.232  Figure 




Figure 59.   LST-1192 Spartanburg County233 
 
The Sri Inderapura has a length of 522 ft, a beam of 69 ft, a 20.2 ft draft, 
and a max speed greater than 15 knots.  The Sri Inderapura also has multiple gun mounts 
and a flight deck.  The Sri Inderapura along with other MOB alternatives was further 
analyzed in order to determine whether or not they would be feasible as a MOB. 
 
4.5.2.2 Feasibility Analysis 
In order for a MOB alternative be feasible it must have adequate troop 
capacity, storage capacity, must be able to maneuver in the river, and must be able to 
perform maintenance and support on the SURC’s with the added constraint that 
alternatives must be capable of being employed by 2012.  Using these factors, the RST 
evaluated the different alternatives to determine their feasibility. 
Troop capacity is an important factor.  For the RST scenario, the RF and 
bolt on detachments consisted of approximately 250 to 300 personnel while operating 
from the MOB.  As a result, the MOB must have sufficient berthing for the RF.  At the 
very least, berthing for 150 personnel will suffice, but this results in most troops 
alternating the use of the racks, which is known as hot-racking. 
The MOB must have enough storage capacity to sustain the crew and RF 
for at least 15 days.  Storage capacity includes storage for food, ammunition, water, and 
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fuel.  A 15 day supply of food will be approximately 100 pallets that are 46 cubic feet 
and 0.5 ton each. On average, each day the RF will require 2.5 lbs of ammunition per 
person and for 15 days, this will be about four tons of ammunition.  The space needed for 
ammunition is almost 400 cubic feet.  This figure does not include ammunition for the 
MOB’s weapons.  Personnel will need about six gallons of drinking and cooking water 
that cannot come from the river.  Nearly 20 gallons per person must be purified from the 
river for the heads.  This results in storage of approximately 50,000 gallons of drinking 
and feeding water plus nearly 6,000 gallons of purified water that is required each day.  
The SURC’s will consume approximately 40,000 gallons of fuel in 15 days.  The MOB 
will need fuel storage for the SURC as well as itself.  Adequate storage tanks for water 
and fuel are ideal, but if the tanks are not big enough then separate storage containers 
such as SIXCON’s must fit on the ship.  Each SIXCON can carry 900 gallons of liquid.  
Its total volume is 208 cubic feet, and the overall weight will be close to five tons.  The 
actual number for storage capacity depends on the total number of personnel in the MOB. 
Operating mostly in confined river-ways, the MOB must be able to 
maneuver in small areas with shallow depths.  For the RST’s scenario, the AO has a 
minimum depth of eight meters and width of one mile.  Maintaining and supporting the 
small boats is necessary.  The MOB must be able to either store the SURC’s inside the 
platform or have them moor alongside.  Well decks can accommodate small boats, while 
floating causeways can moor boats alongside.  The MOB must also have some area to 
perform maintenance on the boats. 
The alternatives for the MOB could be a single platform or a combination 
of platforms.  To summarize, the MOB, at a minimum, should have 150 extra racks for 
the RF.  As far as storage, the MOB needs at least 5000 cubic feet of storage for food, 
400 cubic feet of storage for ammunition, 50,000 gallon drinking and feeding water 
tanks, 6,000 gallons of purified water made each day, and 40,000 gallon fuel tanks just 
for the SURC’s.  If storage tanks for water and fuel are not big enough, then adequate 
storage for SIXCON’s is necessary.  The MOB must also have a draft less than 26 feet, 
and it should be able to store the SURC’s and perform maintenance on the boats.  Finally, 
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the MOB must be available by 2012.  The feasibility matrix for the MOB can be seen in 
Table 4. 





LCS NG G G G
HSV NG G G G
LSV NG NG G G
RCSS G G G G
Barge G G NG G
Nobriza NG NG G NG
RSS-207 Endurance G G G G
KRI-511 Teluk Bone NG G G G
KD-1505 Sri Inderapura G G G G
Nobriza + Barge G G G G
Multiple Nobrizas G NG G NG
G: Go     NG: No Go  
Table 4. MOB Feasibility Matrix 
 
Troop capacity was the driving factor for the MOB.  Many of the 
alternatives were infeasible because they did not have enough berthing for the estimated 
RF.  The LCS may be an excellent ship by itself, but when supporting an RF, it does not 
have enough space to berth all of the personnel.  The total number of racks in the 
Lockheed Martin LCS is 75234 and the General Dynamics LCS is 110.235  The KRI-511 
Teluk Bone, being a former USN LST, may have some of the capabilities we need to 
support the RF except for the troop capacity.  The troop capacity is only 145.236 
The LSV and the HSV are capable of having 150 racks, but they were 
deemed infeasible because extra berthing is either temporary or limits other 
capabilities.237  Using the troop carrier variant of the LSV limits what other capabilities 
the LSV has such as storing platforms and other supplies as well as launching and 
recovering helicopters and UAV’s.  The deck space that would normally be used for 
storage will be used for racks instead.  The HSV normally has room for only 65 extra 
troops.  It can temporarily be reconfigured to have 87 extra racks, but for the scenario, 
this type of living condition for six months is not ideal.238  A barge is another platform 
that was considered infeasible.  Although a tug can move the barge to a specific location 
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on the river, the barge by itself is not maneuverable to meet with SURC’s if necessary.  
Finally, the Nobriza may perform well in the riverine environment by itself, but it cannot 
support the entire RF.  The troop capacity of the Nobriza is 43, the storage capacity is too 
small to handle supplies for the RF, and it is unable to support all of the SURC’s by 
itself.239  Multiple Nobriza’s can accommodate the troops and the SURC’s.  However, 
there still is not enough storage for fuel and water for the RF; each Nobriza can only 
make water and store fuel for its own crew. 
The four feasible alternatives for the MOB are the RCSS, RSS-207 
Endurance, KD-1505 Sri Inderapura, Nobriza + Barge.  Table 5 provides more 
information on the MOB’s. 
 
Alternative Self Defense Crew Troop Capacity Storage Capacity Maneuverability Maintenance 
RCSS
Surface Search Radar,                    
MK46 Optical Sight System,         
(2) Mk- 38 25 mm Chain Guns,     
Mk-15 CIWS,                                 
(8) Universal Gun Mounts,            
Forward and Aft flight decks
248 352
253,570 gal for fuel, 
42,808 gal for water,  
Well deck,             
Food storage for 
crew and troops for 
30 days 
Length 522.25 ft, 
Beam 69.75 ft,    
Draft 19.8 ft            
Speed 20+ knots
Well Deck and Causeway,     
IMA with maintenance 
support facility shops based 








Surveillance Radar,                        
Anti-Surface/Air Sensor System,   
76mm Oto Melara,                         
(2) Mistral SAM,                            
(2) .5 in machine gun,                    
Gun Fire Control System,              
Aft flight deck for two 
helicopters.  
65 350
Well Deck, Hangar, 
and Tank Deck for 
storage
Length 462.6 ft,      
Beam 68.9 ft,          
Draft 16.4 ft            
Speed 15+ knots
Well Deck and Causeway,     




Surface Search Radar,                    
Mk-15 CIWS,                                 
(2) twin 3"/.50 cal,                          
(2) .25mm chain guns,                    
(6) .50 cal,                                      
Aft flight deck
248 307
150,000 gal for fuel,  
42,808 gal for water,  
Well deck,                  
Food storage for 
crew and troops for 
30 days                
Length 561.75 ft, 
Beam 69.75 ft,       
Draft 20.2 ft            
Speed 20+ knots
Well Deck and Causeway,     
Ship's Force to include Hull 
Technicians, Machinery 
Repairmen, Electricians, and 
other maintnenace related 




Nobriza:                                          
Mk-19 40 mm grenade launcher,   
(2) double-barrel M2 .50 caliber 
machine guns,                                 
multiple small arms,                       




+ 30 in 
barge




38,600 gal for fuel,    
25,890 gal for water, 
Adequate storage in 
barge 
Nobriza:                  
Length 128.8 ft,      
Beam 31.2 ft,          
Draft 3.1 ft              
Speed 9 knots          
Barge size varies 
approximately 300 
ft by 50 ft
Causeway,             




Table 5. Feasible MOB Information.240 241 242 243 244 245 
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The RCSS, Endurance, Sri Inderapura, and Nobriza + Barge are capable of 
supporting the RF as a MOB.  They have adequate sensors, surveillance, and weapon 
systems for defensive and offensive measures.  They have enough racks for the troops as 
well as storage capacity for the necessities, such as food, water, fuel, and ammunition.  
Their sizes are small enough for the AO.  They are also fully capable of supporting and 
maintaining the SURC’s, whether the boats are inside in a well deck or outside moored to 
a floating causeway.  These alternatives were further analyzed to determine any potential 
risks in each platform. 
 
4.5.2.3 Risk Analysis 
There are many risks associated with the different alternatives for the 
MOB.  Some of these risks include technology availability and change in the AO.  The 
alternatives for the MOB belong to another country, do not exist yet, or are being used for 
other operations.  So, there exists a possibility that the MOB will not be available.  Also, 
the alternatives may be feasible in the RST’s scenario, but hazards exist when the size of 
the AO decreases.  For the risk analysis, the RST assumed that the number of troops will 
remain at approximately 224 personnel. 
Certain risks exist with the RCSS.  A major risk is that the RCSS is not 
available because funding, which is approximately $160 million, was not allocated for the 
proposed LST-1179 Class conversion.  Or, if the LST does get converted, the RCSS is 
used for a different mission other than the MIO for the RST’s scenario.  Possible ways to 
mitigate the risk is to convert multiple LST’s to the RCSS or use another amphibious ship 
if the AO permits.  However, if the AO becomes significantly smaller, a MOB as large as 
the RCSS will be infeasible.  The RF may have to use a smaller MOB, a FOB, or a GFS. 
Another way to mitigate the risk that the RCSS may not be available is to 
use a former USN LST-1179 Class ship that is currently used in other navies.  For 
example, Malaysia’s KD-1505 Sri Inderapura may be capable of replacing the RCSS 
even though it will not have the changes that the MIT report proposed.  Other countries, 
such as Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Australia, Spain, and Morocco, have former USN LST-
1179 Class ships.246  Depending on the location of the AO, these countries can play a role 
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in coalition operations.  However, there still exists the possibility that these ships will not 
be available for the RF due to the use by the other countries for other operations.  Again, 
this results in the RF having to use a smaller MOB, a FOB, or a GFS. 
The RF is not limited to just LST-1179 Class ships from other countries.  
Singapore’s RSS 207 Endurance Class ship has similar capabilities of the RCSS and is a 
feasible alternative for a MOB.  However, the same risk that it may not be available 
exists.  There are only four ships in the class, and they may already be in use by the 
Republic of Singapore Navy. 
Like the other platforms, the Nobriza/Barge combination has the risk that 
they are not available for use for the same reasons.  As a result, the RF will have to use a 
different basing option if the number of troops remains at 224. 
The level of effectiveness and performance of each alternative can help 
determine more ways to mitigate the risk.  For example, if one MOB performed 
extremely well, then having more ships in the inventory to prevent the risk of non-
availability may be an easier decision to make. 
 
4.5.3 Global Fleet Station 
The RF will require a support base to conduct command oversight, 
planning, staging, logistics and maintenance.  The support base may be 
afloat or shore.  Its choice will be dependent on the mission and options 
available.  The support base and associated systems must provide 
connection to theater logistics systems to ensure continuity of supply and 
support.247 
A sea base is the likely choice if the area of operations supports.  A variety 
of vessels can be used, including amphibious vessels such as the Dock 
Landing Ship, High Speed Vessels, logistics vessels, commercial vessels, 
or barges. Naval ships are optimal if available as they provide 
communications assets, hotel services, and logistics support.  Amphibious 
ships have excess capacity for food, fuel, and ammunition.  Sea Bases can 
re-supply quickly using standard Navy methods.  They can be relocated to 
reduce vulnerability and have inherent defenses.  They can also be 
relocated, as operations develop to extend the range of the riverine 
forces.248 
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The GFS is the current Navy sea base initiative.  “The purpose of a GFS is to 
establish a persistent sea base of operations from which to aggregate, disaggregate and re-
aggregate force packages tailored for a variety of missions within a regional area of 
interest, focusing primarily on Phase 0/Shaping and Stability operations, TSC, maritime 
domain awareness, and tasks associated specifically with the war on terror.”249 
GFS is a direct application of the Naval Operations Concept, 2006, 
representing an adaptive force package that supports the 1000-Ship Navy 
concept within a regional area of interest.  Each GFS is self-sustaining sea 
base from which to provide a persistent presence to conduct regional 
Phase 0 operations ranging from TSC activities to maritime interdiction 
and counter-piracy.  It is a sea-station from which tailored and adaptive 
force packages are launched in response to humanitarian crises, natural 
disasters, and counter-terrorism tippers.  It is a center for intelligence and 
information fusion in support of enhanced global maritime awareness, and 
when networked with other fleet stations, each GFS fusion center will 
serve as an intelligence feeder for global maritime intelligence integration.  
Most importantly, these information fusion centers offer increased 
regional maritime domain awareness to host nation partners provide 
timely queuing to interdict illegal transnational activities.250 
At a minimum, each GFS include a modularly configurable ship (e.g. 
LPD, LSD, HSV, LCS) capable of serving as the primary 
station/command ship to transport a variety of riverine craft and 
helicopters/UAV’s, mobile training teams, Seabees, materiel, medical 
teams, other innovative Navy and Marine Corps adaptive force packages, 
and  a limited security force.  This ship provides sufficient C4I, limited 
medical facilities, configurable classroom space, and containerized 
Intermediate/Depot Level maintenance shops (Expeditionary Maintenance 
Facilities) to sustain Phase 0 operations throughout the region.  A 
helicopter detachment (and eventually a UAV detachment) provides air 
support for each GFS.  As a persistent sea base, each GFS serves as a self 
contained head quarters for regional operations, and has the capacity to 
repair and service all ships, small craft, and aircraft assigned.251 




Figure 60.   GFS Alternative the Wasp Class (LHD-1)252 
 
The GFS command ship must maintain robust and secure joint C4I 
capabilities. There should be a medical treatment facility onboard the GFS 
command ship able to provide medical support/humanitarian assistance as 
well as sufficient combat construction equipment and material to support 
Phase 0 operations in remote locations.  The information fusion cell is 
equipped with sufficiently robust and secure communications to handle 
the fusion of open source information as well as tactical and operational 
intelligence.  The GFS needs to have sufficient language expertise 
onboard to provide direct interaction with indigenous populations 
throughout the region.253 
One of the major constraints for the RST’s concept of GFS is that is operational 
by 2012.  Given the current 10 – 20 year timeframe to develop and build a ship, the RST 
used existing fleet of U.S. Navy Ships for GFS alternatives.  In Table 6, logistical 





Table 6. U.S. Amphibious Ship Capacities254 
 
“The GFS concept is based on the establishment of a network of sea based fleet 
stations worldwide, each one servicing a specific region and are of responsibility.  
Suggested locations for these initial sea based GFS’s include Southeast Asia, Eastern 
Africa, Arabian Gulf, South Asia, South and Central America.”255  The RST’s GFS was 
located in a permissive environment 10 to 20 miles from the Kampar River mouth in 
Sumatra, Indonesia. 
 
4.5.4 Supply System 
The amount of supply to keep the Riverine Force (RF) operating was based upon 
the demand for class I (subsistence), III (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), V (ammunition), 
and IX (repair parts) supplies.  Each supply class demand rate was dependent upon the 
number of personnel on the support base and operational tempo of the force.  For ease of 
labeling all tables and figures the RST designated the mobile operating base alternative 
as: a barge and Nobriza as Mobile Operating Base 1 (MOB1), and a RCSS type vessel as   
Mobile Operating Base 2 (MOB2).  The most likely number of personnel at each of the 
basing alternatives is documented in Table 7.  The maximum and minimum number of 
personnel expected at each basing alternative is in Table 8. 
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Personnel FOB MOB1 MOB2
Linguists 6 6 6
Civil Affairs 6 6 6
MESF 72 0 0
UAV 20 20 20
EOD 6 6 6
MTT 6 6 6
Inodnesian Forces 30 30 30
RF 224 224 224
Ship Crew 0 62 222
Connector Crew 10 10 10
Likely Personnel 380 370 530  
Table 7. Most Likely Number of Personnel at Each Basing Alternative. 
 
Minimum Most Likely Maximum
FOB 350 380 430
MOB1 340 370 520
MOB2 500 530 580
Number of Personnel at Basing Alternative
 
Table 8. Minimum, Most Likely, and Maximum Number of Personnel at Each Basing 
Alternative. 
 
4.5.4.1 Feed Plan 
Each basing alternative was a unique force assigned for mission 
accomplishment.  All basing alternatives had a storage capacity for 15 days for food.256  
The feed plan consisted of a triangular distribution with a minimum, maximum, and most 
likely number of people.  Each person on the basing alternative eats at 0600, 1200, 1800 
and a quarter eat at 2400. 
On 21 June 1995, the Surgeon General released a revised policy on the use 
of the MRE (Meals Ready to Eat) as the sole source of subsistence.  This 
revised policy allows MRE’s to be consumed as the sole source of 
subsistence for up to 21 days.257 
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“Even though studies have concluded that individuals can subsist solely on 
MRE’s for up to 21 days, morale generally begins to suffer after two or three days.”258  
Based on the fact that the RF cannot subsist solely on MRE’s for the entire operation, the 
RST determined that the meals served at the FOB were Utilized Group Rations Heat and 
Serve (UGR H&S) for breakfast and supper supplying two hot meals a day for all 
personnel.  For lunch MRE’s (Meals Ready to Eat) were served.  The UGR H&S meals 
were delivered by pallet with eight Unitized/Individuals (U/I’s) each containing 50 meals 
for a total of 400 servings per pallet.259  MRE’s were delivered by pallet with 48 U/I’s 
each containing 12 meals for a total of 576 servings per pallet.260 
Each meal during the day was complimented with pouch bread and UHT 
milk.  Pouch bread was delivered by pallet with 15 U/I’s each containing 96 servings for 
a total of 1440 servings per pallet.261  UHT milk was delivered by pallet with 120 U/I’s 
each containing 27 servings for a total of 3240 servings per pallet.262  Every breakfast 
was complimented with breakfast cereal delivered by pallet with 50 U/I’s each containing 
72 servings for a total of 3600 servings per pallet.263  Table 9 summarizes the number of 
pallets needed for the FOB alternative. 
 
Max Personnel Storage Capacity


















430 15 2 765 3.25 2 1
Total Servings: 12900 11475 20963 12900 6450
Total Pallets: 32 20 15 4 2 73
Total amount of food for 15 days at the FOB
FOB
 
Table 9. 15 Day Food Supply for FOB 
 
The MOB planning factor for food was based on historical shipboard 
consumption of 5.62 lbs per person per day.  Non-refrigerated food was 3.20 lbs per man 
per day and refrigerated food accounts for 2.42 lbs per man per day.264  MRE’s were 
included to account for the meals eaten by the RF personnel performing the MIO.  Table 
10 summarizes the number of pallets needed for MOB1 and MOB2 alternatives. 
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520 15 3.2 240 2.4
Total Lbs: 24960 3600 18720
Total Pallets: 25 6 19 50
580 15 3.2 240 2.4
Total Lbs: 27840 3600 20880
Total Pallets: 28 6 21 55
MOB1
MOB2
Total amount of food for 15 days at MOB1 and MOB2
 
Table 10. Total Amount of Food for 15 Days at MOB1 and MOB2 
 
Based on Table 10 each basing alternative had a different storage capacity.  
The minimum storage capacity needed for 15 days was calculated in Table 11.  Each of 
the pallet size, volume, and weights for the FOB was taken from the Defense Logistics 
Agency Ration website.265  Pallet sizes sent to the MOB’s were based upon the standard 
Navy pallet of 13.33 square feet, average volume of 47.8 cubic feet, and an average 
weight of 1000 pounds. 
 
UGR MRE Bread Milk Cereal Total
Pallets 32 20 15 4 2 73
Size (ft2) 426.6 320 200 53.3 26.7 1026.5
Volume (ft3) 1529.6 1122 766.5 171.2 100.0 3689.3
Weight (lbs) 34176 21960 4950 7880 920 69886
Non-Refrig MRE Refrig. Total
Pallets 25 6 19 50
Size (ft2) 332.7 96 249.5 678.3
Volume (ft3) 1193.1 336.6 894.8 2424.5
Weight (lbs) 24960 6588 18720 50268
Pallets 28 6 21 55
Size (ft2) 371.1 96 279.9 747
Volume (ft3) 1330.8 336.6 1003.8 2671.2
Weight (lbs) 27840 6000 21000 54840
MOB1
MOB2
Storage for 15 days of food at the FOB
Storage for 15 days of food at MOB1 and MOB2
FOB
 
Table 11. Storage at Each of the Basing Alternatives. 
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4.5.4.2 Fuel Plan 
The fuel plan was determined from the results in Appendix G and the 
addition of fuel to operate each of the basing options.  Each of the basing options had a 
minimum of 15 days of storage.  The total storage requirements are shown in Table 12. 
 



















FOB 15 1993.77 2288 0 385 4666.77 70001.55 469710.4 9358.5 234.86
MOB1 15 2153.88 2152 550 760 5615.88 84238.2 565238.32 11262 282.62
MOB2 15 2153.88 7200 550 760 10663.88 159958.2 1073319.5 21385 536.66
Total amount of fuel for 15 days at each basing alternative.
 
Table 12. Fuel Storage for the Basing Alternatives. 
 
The FOB base fuel usage is a combination of three 60 KW generators at 
106 gallons per hour plus 2000 gallons per day for tent heaters, messing, and other 
services around the base.  MOB1 daily consumption of fuel is based upon the Nobriza 
using 48 gallons per hour266 to operate and the barge using 1000 gallons per day.  MOB2 
(converted LST 1179 class ship) has a much higher consumption.  MOB2’s daily 
consumption is based on operating two generators and two main engines 24 hours a day.  
The generators consumed 2400 gallons per day while the main engines consume 4800 
gallons per day.267 
The FOB use of the logistic connector would be only to move supplies 
from the supply vessel to the FOB.  Therefore the need for fuel would be zero due the 
fact that the logistic connector would refuel its organic fuel tanks when taking on stores 
at the supply ship.  The MOB’s had a much higher use for the logistic connectors if liquid 
waste was not contracted to an outside service provider.  If the MOB’s logistical 
connector was used to transport liquid waste, then every day the blackwater and 
graywater was unloaded and transported out the sea.  This involves a 10 hour trip to 
dump the waste water. 
All three of the basing options had a need for patrol craft to perform a 
picket mission in the vicinity of the support base.  For all the basing options there was 
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one SURC operating 24 hours a day to patrol the river area near the FOB and ward off 
any potential attackers.  All of the basing options also had the requirement to provide one 
patrol craft to protect the logistic connectors when they made a supply run. 
 
4.5.4.3 Water Plan 
Due to advances in water purification, the RST determined that the 
majority of the water demand was provided through river water purification.  According 
to the Marine Corps Reference Publication 4-11A Vol. 1 CSS Field Reference Guide 
personnel the FOB will consume 8.9 gallons of water per person per day to sustain the 






Field Feeding 2.8 0.8







Table 13. Daily Gallons of Water per Person Required in a Tropical Zone.268 
 
MOB1 and MOB2, since being waterborne use a much higher level of 
consumption to operate the ship.  The rule of thumb for shipboard use is 30 gallons per 
person per day for all services269.  The RST determined that of the 30 gallon usage per 
day only 8.9 gallons will be needed to be delivered for feeding and drinking.  The other 
21 gallons will be produced by shipboard water purification systems in order to supply 























FOB 430 15 9 3870 58050 481815 7760.7 240.91
MOB1 520 15 9 4680 70200 582660 9385.03 291.33
MOB2 580 15 9 5220 78300 649890 10467.9 324.95
Total amount of drinking/hygiene water for 15 days at each basing alternative.
 
Table 14. Water Storage for Each Basing Alternative. 
 
4.5.4.4 Ammunition Plan 
The amount of ammunition needed at each of the basing alternatives was 
based upon a Marine Corps infantry battalion consumption.  A Marine Corps infantry 
battalion consumes about 2.5 lbs of ammunition per person per day.270  Since the RF was 
not utilized for full combat operations the total consumption per person was less.  To 
compensate for the differences the RST determined the number of personnel most likely 
to be involved in a fire fight.  Table 15 summarizes the number of personnel most likely 
to expend ammunition. 
 
Armed Personnel FOB MOB1 MOB2
Linguists 0 0 0
Civil Affairs 0 0 0
MESF 72 0 0
UAV 0 0 0
EOD 6 6 0
MTT 0 0 0
Inodnesian Forces 0 0 0
RF 170 170 170
Ship Crew 0 31 110
Connector Crew 10 10 10
Likely Personnel 258 217 290  
Table 15. Number of Armed Personnel at Each Basing Option Likely to Expend 
Ammunition. 
 
Based on the number of personnel who expend ammunition the RST was 
able to determine the amount of ammunition needed for a minimum of 15 days.  Table 16 
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summarizes the storage needed for a minimum 15 days of ammunition.  However, 
palletized ammunition comes in much greater quantities than what the RF will be 
expending.  Therefore the amount of ammunition to be transferred up the river to the 
basing alternative will be no more than one or two pallets a week. 
 
Weapon Number of Weapons Ammo/DODIC
Sustain Rate 







M16A3 224 CTG, 5.56mm Ball (A059) 3.88 869.12 80640 3356 1 93
M203 39 CTG, 40mm HEDP (B546) 1.14 44.46 2650 1372 1 60
12 GA 500A2 36 CTG, 12 GAGE (A011) 1.27 45.72 9000 3268 1 197
M9 224 CTG, 9mm Ball (A363) 0.79 176.96 92160 2860 1 521
M240B 33 CTG, 7.62mm Ball (A131) 7.65 252.45 38400 3769 1 152
MK43 29 CTG, 7.62mm Ball (A131) 7.65 221.85 38400 3769 1 173
M2 32 CTG, CAL .50 (576) 78.60 2515.20 9600 3700 1 4
MK19 19 CTG, 40mm HEDP (B542) 16.80 319.20 3816 1518 1 12
MK21 2 CTG, 7..62mm Ball (AA11) 21.40 42.80 38400 3652 1 897
MK67 -- Grenade Frag (G881) 1.00 1.00 1530 1324 1 1530
M9 72 CTG, 9mm Ball (A363) 0.79 56.88 92160 2860 1 1620
M16A3 27 CTG, 5.56mm Ball (A059) 3.88 104.76 80640 3356 1 770
M203 36 CTG, 40mm HEDP (B546) 1.14 41.04 2650 1372 1 65
12 GA 500A2 13 CTG, 12 GAGE (A011) 1.27 16.51 9000 3268 1 545
MK21 2 CTG, 7..62mm Ball (AA11) 21.40 42.80 38400 3652 1 897
M2 9 CTG, CAL .50 (576) 78.60 707.40 9600 3700 1 14
M240B 10 CTG, 7.62mm Ball (A131) 7.65 76.50 38400 3769 1 502
MK19 5 CTG, 40mm HEDP (B542) 16.80 84.00 3816 1518 1 45
M252 3 CTG, 80mm HE (B868) 0.46 1.38 159 2008 1 115
M9 50 CTG, 9mm Ball (A363) 0.79 39.50 92160 2860 1 2333
M16A3 25 CTG, 5.56mm Ball (A059) 3.88 97.00 80640 3356 1 831
M203 5 CTG, 40mm HEDP (B546) 1.14 5.70 2650 1372 1 465
12 GA 500A2 5 CTG, 12 GAGE (A011) 1.27 6.35 9000 3268 1 1417
MK21 0 CTG, 7..62mm Ball (AA11) 21.40 0.00 38400 3652 1 0
M2 4 CTG, CAL .50 (576) 78.60 314.40 9600 3700 1 31
M240B 5 CTG, 7.62mm Ball (A131) 7.65 38.25 38400 3769 1 1004
MK19 5 CTG, 40mm HEDP (B542) 16.80 84.00 3816 1518 1 45
M252 3 CTG, 80mm HE (B868) 0.46 1.38 159 2008 1 115
M9 50 CTG, 9mm Ball (A363) 0.79 39.50 92160 2860 1 2333
M16A3 25 CTG, 5.56mm Ball (A059) 3.88 97.00 80640 3356 1 831
M203 5 CTG, 40mm HEDP (B546) 1.14 5.70 2650 1372 1 465
12 GA 500A2 5 CTG, 12 GAGE (A011) 1.27 6.35 9000 3268 1 1417
MK21 0 CTG, 7..62mm Ball (AA11) 21.40 0.00 38400 3652 1 0
M2 4 CTG, CAL .50 (576) 78.60 314.40 9600 3700 1 31
M240B 5 CTG, 7.62mm Ball (A131) 7.65 38.25 38400 3769 1 1004
MK19 5 CTG, 40mm HEDP (B542) 16.80 84.00 3816 1518 1 45












4.5.4.5 Repair Plan 
All the basing alternatives have 12 SURC’s attached to perform the MIO.  
Based on information given to the RST from NECC the repair parts consumption rate for 
















12 15 46.7 560 8400 9 120 4
13 15 46.7 607 9100 10 133 5
14 15 46.7 653 9800 10 133 5
15 15 46.7 700 10500 11 147 5
16 15 46.7 747 11200 12 160 6
Total amount of repair parts for 15 days at each basing alternative.
 
Table 17. Summary of Repair Parts Needed at All Basing Alternatives. 
 
4.5.4.6 Waste Plan 
Each of the basing alternatives generates waste whether human or from 
consumables.  All of this waste needs to be disposed of properly.  The FOB, being land 
based, disposed of human waste at the four hole head burn-out facilities on base.  The 
mobile operating base alternatives, however, was not able to dispose of blackwater, 
graywater, or bilge water overboard.  Therefore the MOB alternatives were be forced to 
load all of the waste onto the logistic connector or contract services from the host nation 
in order to dispose of the waste. 
The amount of waste generated at the FOB was based on the 5.6 lbs per 
person per day from consumables.  The calculation for blackwater and graywater 
production at the MOB alternatives is based upon an amount equal to 125% of the total 
water consumption.  Since each person on board a ship consumes about 30 gallons per 
day the amount of liquid waste to be brought back to the supply ship is summarized in 
























MOB1 520 15 30 1.25 19500 292500 2427750 39104 1214

















FOB 430 15 5.6 2408 36120 72 963 18
MOB1 520 15 5.6 2912 43680 87 1165 22
MOB2 580 15 5.6 3248 48720 97 1299 24
Total amount of waste water for 15 days at each basing alternative.
Total amount of solid waste for 15 days at each basing alternative.
 
Table 18. Amount of Waste Storage at Each Basing Alternative. 
 
4.5.4.7 Physical Flow 
The movement of materiel up the river was determined by the craft that is 
carrying it and the physical properties of the materiel.  Repair parts, ammunition, and 
food were all palletized and stacked on the deck of the logistics connector in order to 
facilitate transfer.  Liquids (fuel and water) were either transported by SIXCON 
containers or inside organic liquid tanks of the craft. 
A SIXCON is a 77” wide, 96” long, by 48” high liquid shipping container 
that can be easily placed on the deck area of a logistic connector.  The shipping mode 
weight of a SIXCON is 2,600 lbs. and the operational weight is 9,500 -10,500 lbs 
dependent on the density of the 900 gallons of liquid.  Each SIXCON had a volume of 
203.95 cubic feet and a deck area of 52 square feet.  Each SIXCON was outfitted with 
components for inter-connecting to other SIXCON’s to create a large mobile liquid 
station.  Normal configuration was six stacked and inter-connected to form an ISO/ANSI 
configured 8’ x 8’ x 20’ module.  This configuration was useful since it fits inside the 
normal storage containers found at a FOB.  However, this is not a requirement and many 
could be interconnected to form a large liquid tank. 
Along with the liquid SIXCON’s would be an inter-connected pump.  The 
pump sits in the same size structure as the SIXCON and weighs 2300 lbs.  These pumps 
were part of the deck space loading in order to offload the liquids without actually 
moving SIXCON’s around.  Since any number of SIXCON’s can be connected to a pump 
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only one would be necessary.  However, the major concern was to ensure that pump head 
to the pump was maintained. 
In order to the move the materiel up the river the RST had to create a 
physical flow to understand the operational complexities.  Figure 61 and Figure 62 detail 
the intricacies of the physical flow and the number of options available to the RF to move 
materiel.  Once the physical flow was completed the RST was able to scope the area of 
study to a much smaller number of options in order to effectively evaluate those options.  
Entities highlighted in Figure 61 and Figure 62 show which options the RST focused on 
during the deliver phase and the return phase. 
 
 
Figure 61.   Delivery Service Options of the RF. 
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Figure 62.   Return Service Options of the RF. 
 
4.6 SUPPLY GROUP 
4.6.1 Analysis of Alternatives 
The logistics connector alternatives were based on the objectives hierarchy and 
metrics for supply.  Specifically, the RST looked at throughput and loading/unloading 
time to determine possible for airborne and seaborne logistics connectors.  Throughput 
was measured by cargo capacity in weight and volume versus the speed of the platform 
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empty and fully loaded.  Seaborne logistics connectors loading time was dependent on 
method of loading and amount of supplies to be loaded.  The RST examined three 
different methods of transfer from the supply ship to the logistics connector:  well decks 
common to big deck amphibious ships, roll-on/roll-off ramps common to pre-positioned 
ships and crane systems common to most supply ships. Loading time for airborne 
logistics connectors depended solely on the amount of supplies that were transferred.  
The following list of logistic connector alternatives to be fielded by 2012 was developed 
after stakeholder interviews and focused research. 
 
4.6.1.1 Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) 
“The LCAC’s mission is to land heavy vehicles, equipment, personnel, 
and cargo in amphibious assaults.”271  It combines the heavy lift capacity of other surface 
vehicles with the high speeds of helicopters.  It is also less affected by weather compared 
to other ship-to-shore delivery means.272  Figure 63 is the LCAC. 
 
 
Figure 63.   Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)273 
 
194 
LCAC Parameter Analysis274 
• Maneuverability: The length of the LCAC is 88 ft.  The overall beam 
is 47 ft.  Its draft is 3 ft. 
• Speed: 40+ knots unloaded.  25+ knots loaded. 
• Capacity:  LCAC cargo area dimension is 1,809 sq. ft.  Weight 
capacity is 60 tons. 
• Food:  Based on an average pallet weight of 1040 lbs, an LCAC can 
carry 115 pallets of food, yielding 119,600 lbs or 59.8 tons.  Based on 
an average pallet size of 13.75 sq. ft, an LCAC could carry 131 pallets 
if they did not weigh over 60 tons and were not stacked.  This would 
result in 1801 sq. ft.  When carrying food, the LCAC is limited by 
weight instead of area. 
• Water/Fuel:  Assuming one SIXCON weighs five tons, an LCAC can 
carry 12 SIXCON’s, yielding 60 tons.  The area of a SIXCON is 52 sq. 
ft.  When combined to form a SIXCON system, three SIXCON’s are 
stacked side-by-side with another SIXCON on top each of each 
SIXCON making an 8 ft x 8 ft x 20 ft system.  The area of the system 
is 160 sq. ft.  Based on this area, the LCAC could carry 11 SIXCON 
systems or 66 individual SIXCON’s if they did not weigh over 60 
tons.  This would result in 1760 sq. ft.  When carrying water or fuel, 
the LCAC is limited by weight instead of area. 
• Ammunition/Repair Parts:  Assuming one pallet of ammunition or 
repair parts weighs 1,000 lbs, an LCAC can carry 120 pallets of 
ammunition and repair parts, yielding 120,000 lbs or 60 tons.  The area 
of the pallet is 13.33 sq. ft.  An LCAC could carry 135 pallets of 
ammunition and repair parts if they did not weigh over 60 tons and 
were not stacked.  This would result in 1800 sq. ft.  When carrying 
ammunition or repair parts, the LCAC is limited by weight instead of 
area. 
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• Throughput:  Based on a distance of 40 nm, the throughput of the 
LCAC going from the supply ship to the operating base is (60 
tons)*(25 nm/hr)/(40 nm) = 37.5 tons/hr.  This value does not take into 
account the time to load, unload, and return to the supply ship to begin 
a new run if necessary.  Taking into account the return trip to the 
supply ship, the throughput is (60 tons)/[(40 nm/25 nm/hr)+(40nm /40 
nm/hr)] = 23 tons/hr. 
• Load/Unload:  The LCAC has a bow ramp to loan and unload 
supplies.  Its small size allows it to fit in USN amphibious ships.  Not 
only can the LCAC beach itself, but, unlike other landing crafts, the 
LCAC has the capability of traveling over land. 
 
4.6.1.2 Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 1610 Class 
The LCU’s mission is the same as the LCAC, but it is capable of carrying 
heavier supplies.  “Its welded steel hull provides high durability with deck loads of 800 
pounds per square foot.”275  Figure 64 is the LCU-1610. 
 
 
Figure 64.   Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 1610 Class276 
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LCU-1610 Parameter Analysis277 
• Maneuverability:  The LCU-1610 has an overall length of 135 ft and 
a beam of 29.5 ft.  Its aft draft is 6 ft 10 in, and its forward draft is 3 ft 
6 in to enable beaching. 
• Speed:  12 knots unloaded.  6 knots loaded. 
• Capacity:  The LCU-1610 cargo deck area is 1,850 square feet and 
capacity is 143 tons. 
• Food: Based on weight, the LCU-1610 can carry 275 pallets of food, 
yielding 143 tons.  Based on area, the LCU-1610 can carry 134 pallets 
that are not stacked.  This results in 1842 sq. ft.  Because the pallets 
are capable of being stacked, the capacity for food is limited by 
weight. 
• Water/Fuel:  Based on weight, the LCU-1610 can carry 28 
SIXCON’s, yielding 140 tons.  Based on area, the LCU-1610 can carry 
11 SIXCON systems or 66 SIXCON’s, resulting in 1760 sq. ft.  The 
capacity for water and fuel is limited by weight. 
• Ammunition/Repair Parts:  Based on weight, the LCU-1610 can 
carry 286 pallets of ammunition and repair parts, yielding 143 tons.  
Based on area, the LCU-1610 can carry 138 pallets that are not 
stacked.  If the pallets are stacked, it can carry 276 pallets.  These 
result in an area of 1839 sq. ft.  The capacity for ammunition and 
repair parts is limited by area. 
• Throughput:  (143 tons)(6nm/hr)/(40nm) = 21.45 tons/hr.  Both legs, 
(143 tons)/[(40 nm/6 nm/hr)+(40 nm/12 nm/hr)] = 14.3 tons/hr. 
• Load/Unload:  Figure 64 shows the LCU-1610 loading troops in a roll 






4.6.1.3 Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) 
The LCM is smaller than the LCU and LCAC, but it is capable of carrying 
the same weight as the LCAC.  “The LCM’s mission is to land personnel, supplies, and 
equipment in an amphibious assault or in direct support of maritime pre-positioning force 
operations.”278  Figure 65 is the LCM. 
 
 
Figure 65.   Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM-8)279 
 
LCM Parameter Analysis280 
• Maneuverability:  The LCM has an overall length of 73 ft and a beam 
of 21 ft.  Its aft draft is 4 ft 10 in, and its forward draft is 4 ft 5 in. 
• Speed: 12 knots unloaded.  6 knots loaded. 
• Capacity:  The cargo deck area is 588 square feet, and the capacity is 
60 tons. 
• Food:  Based on weight, the LCM can carry 115 pallets of food, 
yielding 119,600 lbs or 59.8 tons.  Based on area, the LCM can carry 
42 pallets of food if they are not stacked or 84 if they are stacked.  
This results in 577 sq ft.  The capacity for food is limited by area. 
• Water/Fuel:  Based on weight, LCM can carry 12 SIXCON’s, 
yielding 60 tons.  Based on area, the LCM can carry three SIXCON 
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systems or 18 SIXCON’s, resulting in 480 sq. ft.  The capacity for 
water and fuel is limited by weight. 
• Ammunition/Repair Parts:  Based on weight, the LCM can carry 
120 pallets of ammunition and repair parts, yielding 60 tons.  Based on 
area, the LCM can carry 44 pallets of ammunition and repair parts if 
they are not stacked or 88 if they are stacked.  This results in 586 sq. 
ft.  The capacity is limited by area. 
• Throughput:  (60 tons)(6nm/hr)/(40nm) = 9 tons/hr.  Both legs, (60 
tons)/[(40 nm/6 nm/hr)+(40 nm/12 nm/hr)] = 5.3 tons/hr. 
• Load/Unload:  The LCM has a bow ramp and can beach itself.  It also 
fits in USN amphibious ships. 
 
4.6.1.4 Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 2000 Class 
The LCU-2000 Class is a larger landing craft that replaced the older LCU-
1466 Class.  “These LCUs were built to commercial shipbuilding standards specifically 
for the U.S. Army.”281  Figure 66 is the LCU-2000. 
 
 




LCU-2000 Parameter Analysis283 
• Maneuverability:  The LCU-2000 has an overall length of 174 ft and 
a beam of 42 ft.  Its aft draft is 9 ft, and its forward draft is 4 ft for 
beaching. 
• Speed:  11.5 knots unloaded.  8 knots loaded. 
• Capacity:  The LCU-2000 has a cargo deck area of 2,558 square feet 
and a capacity of 350 tons. 
• Food:  Based on weight, the LCU-2000 can carry 673 pallets of food, 
yielding 699,920 lbs or 349.96 tons.  Based on area, the LCU-2000 can 
carry 186 pallets of food if they are not stacked and 372 pallets if they 
are stacked.  That results in 2558 sq. ft.  The capacity for food is 
limited by area. 
• Water/Fuel:  Based on weight, the LCU-2000 can carry 70 
SIXCON’s, yielding 350 tons.  Based on area, the LCU-2000 can carry 
15 SIXCON systems or 90 SIXCON’s, yielding 2400 sq. ft.  The 
capacity for water and fuel is limited by weight. 
• Ammunition/Repair Parts:  Based on weight, the LCU-2000 can 
carry 700 pallets of ammunition and repair parts, yielding 350 tons.  
Based on area, the LCU-2000 can carry 191 pallets of ammunition and 
repair parts if they are not stacked and 382 if they are stacked.  This 
results in 2546 sq. ft.  The capacity for ammunition or repair parts is 
limited by area. 
• Throughput:  (350 tons)(8 nm/hr)/(40nm) = 70 tons/hr.  Both legs, 
(350 tons)/[(40 nm/8 nm/hr)+(40nm/11.5 nm/hr)] = 41 tons/hr. 
• Load/Unload:  It has a larger deck and can carry more weight, but it is 
too large to be carried by amphibious ships.  However, it does have 





4.6.1.5 SEACOR Marine 126’ MiniSupply Jim G 
The Jim G is a mini supply vessel by SEACOR Marine.  “Outstanding 
water and cargo fuel capacities allow these vessels to keep multiple offshore locations up 
and running.”284  Figure 67 is the Jim G. 
 
 
Figure 67.   MiniSupply Jim G by SEACOR Marine.285 
 
Jim G Parameter Analysis286 
• Maneuverability:  The 126 ft mini supply vessel has a beam of 32 ft.  
Its loaded draft is 10 ft 7 in. 
• Speed:  11 knots. 
• Capacity:  The Jim G has separate tanks for oil and water transport.  It 
stores up to 28,931 gallons of fuel, 4,269 gallons of potable water, and 
56,287 gallons of drill water (drill water tanks can be used for oil).  It 
also has a cargo deck area of 1,825 square feet and a capacity of 296 
tons.  The maximum capacity is 320 tons. 
• Food:  Based on weight, the Jim G can carry 569 pallets of food, 
yielding 591,760 lbs or 295.88 tons.  Based on area, the Jim G can 
carry 132 pallets if they are not stacked and 264 pallets if they are 
stacked.  This results in 1815 sq. ft.  The capacity for food is limited 
by area. 
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• Water/Fuel:  The Jim G can carry a total of 89,487 gallons of water 
and fuel as long as the total weight does not exceed 320 tons. 
• Ammunition/Repair Parts:  Based on weight, the Jim G can carry 
592 pallets of ammunition and repair parts, yielding 296 tons.  Based 
on area, the Jim G can carry 136 pallets if they are not stacked and 172 
pallets if they are stacked.  This results in 1813 sq. ft.  The capacity of 
ammunition or repair parts is limited by area. 
• Throughput:  (320 tons)(11 nm/hr)/(40 nm) = 88 tons/hr.  Both legs, 
44 tons/hr. 
• Load/Unload:  It may be possible to carry the Jim G on USN 
amphibious ships.  If not, the Jim G is transportable by heavy sea lift.  
However, it does not have its own ramp, and it cannot beach itself.  
Because it cannot beach itself, it must be able to moor alongside a pier 
or a floating causeway. 
 
4.6.1.6 150’ Crew/Fast Support Vessel Sharon F 
The Sharon F is a crew/fast support vessel by SEACOR Marine.  Its 
aluminum hull allows it to reach greater speeds while transporting cargo and liquids.  
Figure 68 is the Sharon F. 
 
 




Sharon F Parameter Analysis288 
• Maneuverability:  The 150 ft vessel has a beam of 28 ft.  Loaded 
draft is 10 ft. 
• Speed:  24 knots unloaded.  22 knots loaded. 
• Capacity:  The Jim G has separate tanks for oil and water transport.  It 
stores up to 18,429 gallons of fuel, 1,200 gallons of potable water, and 
36,000 gallons of drill water (drill water tanks can be used for oil).  It 
also has a cargo deck area of 1,804 square feet and a capacity of 268 
tons.  The maximum capacity is 296 tons. 
• Food:  Based on weight, the Jim G can carry 515 pallets of food, 
yielding 535,600 lbs or 267.8 tons.  Based on area, the Jim G can carry 
131 pallets if they are not stacked and 262 pallets if they are stacked.  
This results in 1801 sq. ft.  The capacity for food is limited by area. 
• Water/Fuel:  The Jim G can carry a total of 55,629 gallons of water 
and fuel as long as the weight does not exceed 296 tons. 
• Ammunition/Repair Parts:  Based on weight, the Jim G can carry 
536 pallets of ammunition and repair parts, yielding 268 tons.  Based 
on area, the Jim G can carry 135 pallets if they are not stacked and 170 
pallets if they are stacked.  This results in 1800 sq. ft.  The capacity of 
ammunition or repair parts is limited by area. 
• Throughput:  (296 tons)(22 nm/hr)/(40 nm) = 162 tons/hr.  Both legs, 
(296 tons)/[(40 nm/22 nm/hr)+(40 nm/24 nm/hr)] = 85 tons/hr. 
• Load/Unload:  It may be possible to carry the Sharon F on USN 
amphibious ships.  If not, the Sharon F is transportable by heavy sea 
lift.  However, it does not have its own ramp, and it cannot beach 
itself.  Because it cannot beach itself, it must be able to moor alongside 





4.6.1.7 H-60 Helicopter 
The H-60 series is a multipurpose helicopter that is capable of cargo lift.  
All services have this helicopter in their inventory.  Figure 69 is the H-60. 
 
Figure 69.   SH-60 Seahawk.289 
 
H-60 Parameter Analysis290 
• Speed:  160 knots unloaded.  110 knots loaded. 
• Capacity:  The H-60 has an internal cargo area of 13 sq. ft.  It has a 
cargo capacity of 4.5 tons.  The maximum external lift capacity is 5 
tons.  For modeling purposes, the RST assumed that cargo will only be 
transported externally.   
• Food: The H-60 can carry nine pallets of food, yielding 9,360 lbs or 
4.68 tons. 
• Water/Fuel:  The H-60 can carry only one SIXCON, yielding five 
tons. 
• Ammunition/Repair Parts:  The H-60 can carry 5 pallets of 
ammunition or repair parts, yielding five tons. 
• Throughput: (5 tons)(110 nm/hr)/(40 nm) = 13.75 tons/hr.  Both legs, 
(5 tons)/[(40 nm/110 nm/hr)+(40 nm/160 nm/hr)] = 8.15 tons/hr. 
• Load/Unload:  Because cargo will be carried externally, hooks and 




4.6.1.8 H-53E Super Stallion/Sea Dragon Helicopter 
“Developed specifically for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, the H-53E 
series is the heaviest lift helicopter in service.”291  Figure 70 is the H-53E. 
 
 
Figure 70.   H-53E.292 
 
CH-53E Parameter Analysis293 
• Speed:  150 knots unloaded.  110 knots loaded. 
• Capacity:  The CH-53E has an internal cargo area of 225 sq. ft with a 
height of 6.5 ft.  The maximum external lift capacity is 16 tons.  For 
modeling purposes, the RST assumed that cargo will only be 
transported externally.   
• Food: The CH-53E can carry 30 pallets of food, yielding 15.6 tons. 
• Water/Fuel:  The CH-53E can carry three SIXCON’s, yielding 15 
tons. 
• Ammunition/Repair Parts:  The CH-53E can carry 32 pallets of 
ammunition or repair parts, yielding 16 tons. 
• Throughput: (16 tons)(110 nm/hr)/(40 nm) = 44 tons/hr.  Both legs, 
(16 tons)/[(40 nm/110 nm/hr)+(40 nm/150 nm/hr)] = 25 tons/hr. 
• Load/Unload:  Because cargo will be carried externally, hooks and 




4.6.1.9 MV-22 Osprey 
“The MV-22 Osprey is a high-speed, rotary-wing aircraft currently being 
produced for the Marine Corps assault role.”294  Figure 71 is the MV-22. 
 
 
Figure 71.   MV-22.295 
 
MV-22 Parameter Analysis296 297 298  
• Speed:  300+ knots unloaded.  110 knots loaded. 
• Capacity:  The MV-22 has an internal cargo area of 96 sq. ft with a 
height of 5.4 ft.  It has a cargo capacity of 9,610 lbs tons or 4.8 tons.    
The maximum external lift capacity is 5 tons.  For modeling purposes, 
the RST assumed that cargo will only be transported externally.   
• Food: The MV-22 can carry nine pallets of food, yielding 9,360 lbs or 
4.68 tons. 
• Water/Fuel:  The MV-22 can carry only one SIXCON, yielding five 
tons. 
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• Ammunition/Repair Parts:  The MV-22 can carry 5 pallets of 
ammunition or repair parts, yielding five tons. 
• Throughput: (5 tons)*(110 nm/hr)/(40 nm) = 13.75 tons/hr.  Both 
legs, (5 tons)/[(40 nm/110 nm/hr)+(40 nm/300 nm/hr)] = 10 tons/hr. 
• Load/Unload:  Because cargo will be carried externally, hooks and 
wires will be used. 
 
All connector alternatives were further analyzed in order to determine 
whether or not they would be feasible as a connector. 
 
4.6.2 Feasibility Analysis 
In order for an alternative for the connector to be feasible it must have throughput, 
it must be able to carry at least one SIXCON, and it must be survivable.  Using these 
factors, the RST analyzed the different alternatives to determine feasibility.  Throughput 
was measured as tons per hours.  When calculating the throughput, the RST assumed the 
distance between the supply ship and the operating base was on average 40 nm.  For a re-
supply mission of 300 tons, if a supply ship stays on station for 24 hours, the throughput 
must be 12.5 tons/hr.  Possessing the capability to carry one SIXCON was only an issue 
for the aircrafts.  If an aircraft cannot carry a SIXCON, then the aircraft will be unable to 
re-supply the RF.  A SIXCON weighs approximately five tons when full.  To be safe, the 
minimum weight capacity should be 5.5 tons. The connector must be survivable.  This 
was only an issue for the sea vessels.  The vessel must have a steel hull for protection, 
and it must not bring a lot of attention to itself.  
From the list of alternatives, the RST did further evaluation on their feasibility as 
a connector.  To summarize, the connector must have a throughput of 12.5 tons/hr, be 
able to carry a SIXCON, and must have a steel hull if it is a vessel. The feasibility matrix 
for the connector can be seen in Table 19. 
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Alternative Throughput Cargo Weight Survivability
LCAC G G NG
LCU-1610 G G G
LCM-8 NG G G
LCU-2000 G G G
Jim G G G G
Sharon F G G NG
H-60 NG NG G
H-53 G G G
MV-22 NG NG G
G: Go  NG: No Go  
Table 19. Connector Feasibility Matrix. 
 
Throughput was a problem for the LCM-8, the H-60, and the MV-22.  Their 
throughputs were less than 12.5 tons/hr, and that did not include the time to load and 
unload.  Having multiple H-60s and MV-22s will increase the throughput to be greater 
than 12.5 tons/hr, but they are at the limit when lifting SIXCON’s.  The Sharon F has a 
great throughput because of its speed, but its aluminum hull makes it more vulnerable 
when attacked.  The LCAC has a decent throughput, but its load noise also makes it 
vulnerable because of the attention that it brings to itself, which was confirmed with the 
NECC’s Technology and Strategy Department Head.299  The four feasible alternatives for 
the connector are the LCU-1610, LCU-2000, Jim G, and H-53.  Table 20 provides a 














t (tons/hr) Maneuverability Load and Unload
LCU-1610 143 1850 12 6 14.3
Length: 135 ft    
Beam: 29.5 ft      
Max Draft: 6 ft
Bow ramp, Can 
beach itself, Can fit 
in amphibs 
LCU-2000 350 2558 11.5 12 41
Length: 174 ft    
Beam: 42 ft        
Max Draft: 9 ft
Bow ramp, Can 
beach itself, Cannot 
fit in amphibs
Jim G 296.8
1825 + Separate 
Storage for Fuel 
and Water
11 11 44
Length: 126 ft    
Beam: 32 ft        
Max Draft: 10 ft 7 in
No bow ramp, 
Cannot beach itself, 
Can fit in amphibs
H-53 16 External 150 110 25 Air Space Cargo lift
 
Table 20. Summary of Feasible Connectors300 301 302 303 
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The LCU-1610, LCU-2000, Jim G, and H-53 are capable of re-supplying the RF 
as connectors.  They have a large cargo capacity and reasonable speeds resulting in a high 
throughput.  These feasible alternatives were further analyzed to determine any potential 
risk in each platform. 
 
4.6.3 Risk Analysis 
The RST performed risk analysis to identify potential areas that would affect the 
supply of the RF.  Risk was broken down into operational availability and military 
capability risks.  Table 21 describes each of the risk categories. 
 
Risk Category Description
Operational Availability Risk that an option will preclude the achievement of operational availability target
Military Capability Risk that an option will result in delay or failure to achieve required capability
 
Table 21. Types of Risk for Logistic Connectors.304 
All of the alternatives have the risk of unavailability; however, the Jim G has the 
greatest risk because it is a commercial vessel.  The Navy would have to lease or buy the 
Jim G, whereas the other platforms belong to the U.S. military.  If the Jim G was 
purchased, then it would have to be lifted from CONUS to the AO.  Another risk that 
exists when using non-military platforms is the lack of commonality.  Different 
equipment and instructions can affect the operations. 
Another risk is military capability risk.  One capability that the connectors should 
have is to provide self-defense.  Losing a connector has a severe impact on the success of 
the mission.  Although the alternatives have gun mounts and other measures of self-
defense, there still exists the risk of being destroyed by an attack.  Another capability is 
adaptability to changes in the AO.  AO changes affect the performance of the connectors.  
The length between the supply ship and the operating base has a huge impact on the 
connectors.  If the length increases, certain connectors may not be able to adequately re-
supply the RF.  Further analysis should then be performed to take into account fuel 
consumption and endurance/range of the connectors. 
209 
4.6.4 Logistic Connector Configuration 
To satisfy the needs of moving materiel up the river the RST determined that each 
feasible alternative would require a unique loading style in order to move the maximum 
amount of materiel in accordance with priority of need at the base alternative. 
The LCU 1610 has a maximum payload of 140 tons, cargo area of 1,850 square 
feet, and has no capacity for storing liquids internally other than for its own engine and 
crew consumption.  The LCU 2000 has a maximum payload of 350 tons, cargo area of 
2,550 square feet, and has no capacity for storing liquids internally other than for its own 
engine and crew consumption.  The SEACOR Jim G has a maximum payload of 320 
tons, cargo area of 1,825 square feet, and has capacity for storing liquids internally other 
than for its own engines and crew consumption.  Table 22 shows the different 














Waste Sixcon Pallet ft
2 Materiel 
Tonnage
Waste Carrying 1850 140 52 54 70.2 21 17 16 13.33 69.8
Non Waste Carrying 1850 140 52 45 58.5 25 20 0 13.33 81.5
Fuel 
gals. Fuel Tons Water gals.
Water 
Tons Waste gals. Waste Tons Pallets Pallet Tons
Waste Carrying 18900 63.41 15300 63.50 14400 64.8 33 16.75













Waste Sixcon Pallet ft
2 Materiel 
Tonnage
Waste Carrying 2558 350 52 80 104 0 55 25 13.33 246
Non Waste Carrying 2558 350 52 80 104 0 80 0 13.33 246
Fuel 
gals. Fuel Tons Water gals.
Water 
Tons Waste gals. Waste Tons Pallets Pallet Tons
Waste Carrying 70000 234.85 49500 205.43 22500 101.25 35 17.76












Waste Carrying 1825 320 180 40000 134.20 13.33 320
Non Waste Carrying 1825 320 180 40000 134.20 13.33 320
Fuel 
gals. Fuel Tons Water gals.
Water 
Tons Waste gals. Waste Tons Pallets Pallet Tons
Waste Carrying 54000 181.17 23800 98.77 17300 77.85 35 17.76








Table 22. Connector Configurations 
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The first configuration concerns the movement of materiel up the river as well as 
reserving space on board the logistic connector for the movement of waste water down 
the river on a daily basis.  The number of SIXCON’s for the LCU 1610 and LCU 2000 is 
dependent on the deck space of the craft and the ability to stack the SIXCON’s on top of 
each other.  The configuration was two SIXCON’s stacked.  The total number of 
SIXCON’s on any configuration is not the total amount of materiel that was carried.  The 
number of each type of SIXCON was used to prioritize the loading of materiel.  First 
priority was fuel followed by water and then pallets of food, ammunition, and repair 
parts.  The platform was loaded by priority until maximum capacity of materiel tonnage 
reached.  The second configuration of each logistic connector was the ability to move 
fuel, water, and pallets up the river but only solid waste such as cardboard and plastics 
that has been palletized down the river. 
 
4.7 REPAIR GROUP 
4.7.1 Analysis of Alternatives 
For this study, the RST used the nominal group technique (NGT), whereby the 
screening of alternatives involved “a discussion and clarification” of ideas which led to a 
“prioritization” of alternatives.305  This of course, was triggered by an initial question 
from one of the study’s key clients, CAPT David Balk, USN, Naval Expeditionary 
Combat Command’s Strategy and New Technology Officer, “How should we do 
maintenance?”306 
For the purposes of scenario development, this trigger question307 was placed 
within the bounds of maintaining a small footprint, which this study defined as, “the 
amount of personnel, spares, resources, and capabilities physically present and occupying 
space at a deployed location.”308  From this point, the RST used the NGT to develop the 
following system level objectives, for which our alternatives had to meet: minimize 
footprint, minimize mechanic to equipment ratio, maximize acceptable operational 
availability (Ao) and minimize acceptable cost in terms of dollars per man and 
maintenance dollars per deployment.  Considering these system level requirements, the 
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bounds of the scenario, and most importantly, the needs of the client, the RST formulated 
three distinct alternatives. 
For the first alternative, the RST modified the existing maintenance system by 
increasing the number of maintenance personnel, assuming that all personnel had a “jack-
of-all-trade” baseline skill set, from nine to an optimal number which was determined 
through modeling and analysis.  It is also important to note that the initial decision to 
look into this alternative was primarily due to a point paper written by Construction 
Mechanics (CM) Chief Petty Officer Robert Grenier in which he explains,  “The 
optimum ratio for CM [personnel] is one mechanic-for each five pieces of [civil 
engineering support equipment] assigned (1:5 ratio).  Obviously, many factors such as 
training, experience, environment, and equipment condition will cause the optimum ratio 
to vary.”309  Riverine squadrons are currently billeted nine maintainers.  Based on sixty 
five pieces of rolling gear and twelve SURC’s, the mechanic to equipment ratio for the 
RST’s scenario is 1:9.  This alternative also involves increasing the number of personnel 
of a particular skill set; that is, increasing the number of electronics technicians, 
enginemen, or machinist mates within the pool of maintenance men.  A recent quarterly 
report from Raytheon Technical Services, who is under contract to provide Customer 
Logistics Support, which includes SURC failure reporting, showed that electronic failures 
made up only 5% of system failures.310  With this in mind, the RF of 2012 will be 
outfitted with new and improved command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment and capabilities which 
could result in a higher percentage of electronics failures over the course of a RF 
deployment.  Therefore, the alternative of increasing the number electronics technicians, 
in this case, merits further analysis. 
The second alternative increased the number of SURC’s deploying with the RF.  
This particular alternative raised concern within the RST, as it appeared to be 
counterintuitive to the definition of “small footprint.”    With regard to preventive and 
corrective maintenance checks, the intent of this alternative was to ensure that an 
adequate number of fully mission capable SURC’s were operationally available 
throughout the RST.  In the scenario, the SURC’s had to be surge ready, that is, while 
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one detachment of four SURC’s was on patrol, another detachment of four SURC’s 
would be ready to deploy in order to augment the currently deployed detachment, while 
one SURC remained in an alert status—adding up to 9 fully mission capable SURC’s at 
all times. This led back to the queuing issue of multiple SURC’s requiring preventive or 
corrective maintenance at the same time—raising the question, “Will twelve SURC’s be 
enough?” 
The third alternative involved increasing the number of maintenance facilities 
from one to two.  The baseline for the FOB, MOB and GFS basing alternatives only has 
provisions for one maintenance facility (i.e., one SURC can be repaired in a maintenance 
facility at one time). However, there was a risk of increased mean time to repair and 
decreased operational availability due to multiple boats requiring repairs that could only 
be performed in a single maintenance facility.  The intent of modeling this alternative 
was to determine the right number of maintenance facilities necessary to fulfill RF 
mission requirements while meeting both preventive and corrective maintenance needs—
particularly those performed in a maintenance facility (e.g., 500-hour engine checks, 
Raytheon Technical Representative contractor checks, etc.). 
The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh alternatives involved the following 
combinations of the previously discussed alternatives: 
• Fourth: Increase personnel and facilities. 
• Fifth: Increase personnel and SURC’s. 
• Sixth: Increase SURC’s and facilities. 
• Seventh: Increase Personnel, maintenance facilities and SURC’s. 
 
4.7.2 Feasibility Analysis 
RST could not successfully conduct a feasibility analysis on the repair system’s 
alternatives.  A feasibility analysis is conducted to eliminate the infeasible alternatives 
generated during the alternatives analysis.  This elimination is done using a crucial 
element of any feasibility analysis, the requirements, which filter out infeasible 
alternatives.  However, from discussions with Riverine Group One’s Material Officer, 
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LCDR Frank Okata and other key stakeholders, RST learned system level requirements 
were not defined for the repair system.  What RST did receive in regards to requirements 
were a list of crucial DOTMLPF type constructs that LCDR Okata felt were necessary for 
a squadron to efficiently conduct maintenance.  These constructs included: mechanic to 
equipment ratio and skill sets, additional SURC’s, and additional maintenance bays. 
Mechanic to equipment ratio falls into the personnel aspect of the DOTMLPF 
solution set.  According to CMC (SCW) Grenier’s point paper, the mechanic to 
equipment ratio should be one mechanic for every five pieces of rolling gear.311  In order 
to meet this ration, the RF would require six additional maintenance personnel—bringing 
the number from 9 to 15.  Currently, the RF maintenance effort is being fulfilled with a 
1:8 mechanic-to-equipment ratio.  This maintenance effort also includes the baseline skill 
sets of enginemen, machinist’s mate and electronics technician.  These skill sets are 
evenly distributed within the riverine maintenance corps; however, a recent   SURC 
Reliability, Maintainability and Availability (RMA) report (Figure 72), from Raytheon 
Integrated Defense Systems, indicates that 50% of the SURC system failures were 
propulsion related.312 
 
Figure 72.   2006 SURC RMA Report Percent of Failures by System 
 
Based on the percentage of propulsion related failures, RST felt that varying both 
the number of personnel and their skill sets was necessary, as it was believed that the RF 
maintenance organization may not be optimally aligned to the types of failures that are 
most likely to occur.  For example, the three electronics technicians may not be optimally 
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employed in the RF maintenance effort when only 12% of the failures are electronic in 
nature; whereas the machinist’s mates and enginemen are being tasked with the repair of 
propulsion, hull, and transportation failures which make up the majority of the SURC 
failures. 
The addition of a thirteenth SURC is an element of the material aspect of the 
DOTMLPF solution.  The requirement according the CNA REPORT is each squadron 
will have 12 SURC’s.  However, the RST wanted to add float SURC’s in order to assess 
the overall affect on maintenance.  Since the requirement to have 12 SURC’s is met, 
increasing the number of SURC’s will not create any infeasible alternatives. In the same 
light, the facility aspect of the DOTMLPF solution is represented by increasing the 
number of maintenance bays.  Currently, the manning and facilities requirements are 
already being met; however, key changes in the organization of the Riverine Support Unit 
(RSU) could help to alleviate the maintenance load placed on the RF and decrease the 
footprint of deployed forces.313 
 
4.7.3 Risk Analysis 
RST performed risk analysis to identify areas within the repair system that would 
be prone to some probability of loss or chance of not achieving the overall goal of 
producing a more efficient maintenance system.  In examining risk to the system, the 
RST first considered the alternatives, and then looked at the repair systems ability to meet 
the requirement of functionality of RF 2012.  The two biggest risks the RST identified 
were budget and training. 
Budget has the greatest impact on the RF maintenance system based on the 
alternatives of adding additional boats or personnel.  With regard to personnel, there may 
not be funds available to pay for the additional sailors. “The bottom line: a 322,000-sailor 
Navy by 2013, 27,000 fewer than today’s active force and 54,000 less than in 2004.  The 
bulk of the latest proposed cuts, about 19,000 sailors, will take place over the next two 
years.”314  For this study, the risk of personnel cuts by 27,000 billets, while increasing the 
number of personnel in specialty occupations, increases the likelihood that there will not 
be enough personnel to meet the demand for the three riverine groups. 
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Furthermore, along with the cost of additional personnel, the cost of additional 
maintenance bays and boats was considered.  The Navy will receive 24 SURC’s as the 
USMC starts to hand over the riverine mission.  In addition, the Navy requested in its 
2008 emergency war budget, funds to buy 12 additional boats, 8 SURC’s and 4 specialty 
boats, bringing the total number of boats for the riverine force to 36, 12 for each squadron 
(site).315  There is no funding for additional float SURC’s, therefore there is a possibility 
that the Navy will not be able to purchase float boats as outlined in this study.  The 
maintenance bay will present less risk in that literally four stakes and a tarp will suffice.  
However for this study we will use 25 X 40 ft Shop Vehicle Maintenance tent used by the 
Seabees, which was the smallest tent within the inventory, capable of meeting the 
dimensions of the SURC.  Again, LCDR Okata recommended one tent, so the 
requirement has already been met and no alternatives could be eliminated. 
Training is another risk.  Will there be enough properly trained mechanics to 
support the riverine squadron?  With the addition of added command and control 
hardware and software, the RF will require additional skilled labor to keep equipment 
functioning properly.  Which raises the following issue: will the current three skill sets, 
EN, MM, and ET, be adequate or should more be included?  Based on the current force 
structure and historical data on SURC maintenance316 the answer is, “Yes,” but it is 
possible this may be incorrect.  The chapter on modeling and analysis describes in further 
detail the effect of the aforementioned alternatives on the RF. 
The overall risk assessment for this analysis is medium probability medium 
impact.  The largest contributor to this assessment is budget, i.e. allocation of money to 
pay for additional personnel and boats.  Essentially, since the Navy is conducting a 
reduction in personnel levels and based on the current purchase plan for additional 
SURC’s there may not be enough personnel or boats to execute our recommendations as 
laid out in this study.  Training presented low risk and low probability.  The Navy is 
drawing down its personnel in order to pay for modern equipment.  Therefore many of 
the highly skilled jobs will be retained so it can be expected that maintenance personnel 
may experience a restructuring within their field, but no major shortage of personnel. 
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4.8 FORCE PROTECTION GROUP 
4.8.1 Analysis of Alternatives 
The RST used the systems engineering design process to create sub-functions and 
objectives for a complete FPS.  For the analysis of alternatives, the problem was scoped 
further to those physical components that provided the functions associated with denying 
the threat for specific scenarios.  The drivers for these architectures were the potential 
threats to the RF’s base of operations.  Due to time constraints, the RST could not 
examine every threat facing the RF at the base of operations, but the RST examined a 
range of threats from a less capable to a more capable enemy. 
The operational setting in this report highlighted an insurgent force that was in the 
process of acquiring more capability through the influx of weapons.  Assuming the RF 
deploys to the area before the insurgents have gathered a significant capability, the RF 
would likely face a lower level insurgency force only capable of smaller, harassing 
attacks.  If the MIO operation proves unsuccessful throughout the course of the 
deployment, then the insurgent force could develop a significant capability and, likewise, 
attempt more significant attacks with more people and weapons. 
The RST chose a mortar assault as the lower-level attack and a commando raid 
and boat assault as examples of higher level attacks.  The same sub-functions of denying 
applied across each of these types of attack; however, the physical architectures for each 
attack were different.  Each of these attacks was linked to alternative physical 
architectures using morphological charts.  Table 23 is the morphological chart for 
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Table 23. Deny Mortar Threat  
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The RF has no assets in it’s baseline that can detect and engage a mortar threat 
aside from host nation personnel providing perimeter security out to the expected range 
of enemy mortar fire.  However, as these host nation land forces were not a part of the 
RF, they were not considered in the baseline architecture.  To serve the blocking 
function, the RF has at its disposal sandbags, which could block mortars from affecting 
their targets by hardening them.  The baseline achieves the conceal function only for the 
FOB alternative through the configuration of the tent structures.  At the FOB, for 
example, the berthing tents were placed around the TOC to hide it from the enemy.  
Finally, the move function can only be achieved for the MOB basing alternatives, as the 
FOB cannot rapidly move the critical structures during the length of a mortar assault. 
The additional components added to create the other physical architectures were a 
mortar, counter-fire radar, and UAV.  A discussion of the specific make and model of 
these components occurs later in this section.  Table 24 is the morphological chart for 
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Table 24. Denying Commando Raid Threat 
 
The baseline architecture for the detect to identify and engage functions consisted 
of RF personnel and their weapons positioned along the perimeter of the base.  
Concertina wire and sandbags were used for the baseline architecture to accomplish the 
block function.  Like the mortar attack, the base configuration and sandbags could also be 
used to conceal the critical structures of the base.  The move function did not apply for 
the commando raid because the commando raid is a landward attack and could only be 
conducted against a FOB.  The Sensor Fence and Mortar architecture was added to the 
baseline and provided additional components to achieve the detect to identification and 
engage functions.  The Remote Operated Small Arms Mount (ROSAM) architecture 
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replaced the personnel required to handle the RF weapons on the perimeter with 
ROSAMs.  The ROSAMs are outfitted with a sensor package that provides detection to 
identification with human interaction.  Table 25 is the morphological chart for denying 
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Table 25. Denying Boat Attack Threat 
 
Much like the baseline defense for the commando raid at the FOB, the detect to 
identification and engage functions are accomplished by the perimeter personnel outfitted 
with the RF’s weapons.  Here, of course, the personnel are those employed along the 
banks of the river.  The next architecture saw the addition of the WhisprWave water 
barrier which was described later in the section.  The barrier provided more to achieve the 
blocking and concealing functions.  The water barrier and ROSAM architecture replaced 
the personnel on the banks of the river with ROSAMs.  The final two architectures for the 
FOB FPS against a boat attack had Patrol Boats (PB).  The PB’s provided extended 
detection and identification and were also outfitted with weapons to provide further 
engaging capability. 
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The MOB architectures considered were the RCSS and the Nobriza and Barge 
combination.  The RST limited the analysis of the FPS for the MOB architectures to the 
RCSS and the Nobriza and barge configurations because the capabilities of the RCSS, 
Endurance, and the KD 1505 were approximately equivalent.  The radars and weapon 




As advanced as some sensors have become, there are few sensor packages 
as effective as humans.  Humans fulfilled all of the functions of a good sensor in that they 
detected threats, located threats, tracked threats, and identified threats from otherwise 
benign targets.  The baseline for each of the alternative systems relied heavily on the use 
of humans as sensors.  The 17 personnel already assigned to security for the riverine 
squadron were augmented with Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) 
personnel to serve as the primary manning for the FOB FPS.  The force assigned was 
dictated by the architecture of the FPS, but contained enough personnel to allow for three 
eight-hour rotations. The security personnel for the MOB architectures included the 17 
security personnel plus the crew for each of the craft alternatives. 
For the FPS, the use of humans as sensors not only applies to the 
personnel that are conducting patrols on land and on small craft in the water, but also to 
coalition forces and the local population.  The Indonesian Army and their informants 
provided warnings of impending threats far beyond the RF’s sensor range.  In Honduras, 
for example, U.S. forces leveraged the local villages surrounding their own encampments 
to provide information about enemy activity.317 
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Night Vision Devices 
The RF personnel were outfitted with night vision devices such as night 
vision goggles (NVG’s) and night vision binoculars (NVB’s), which greatly enhanced 
their capability to operate in low light conditions. When enhanced with infrared (IR) 
illuminators, personnel protecting the base were able to survey the surrounding areas with 
limited or no ambient light.  The personnel of the RF were already equipped with NVG’s, 
so this equipment is a part of the baseline sensor package.   The RST modeled the 
AN/PVS-7 currently used by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps for our analysis. 
 
Sensor Fences 
The SensorFence is simply a wire mesh fence with geophones and 
accelerometers attached.  The geophones detect vibrations on the fence and acoustic 
signatures up to 50 feet away.  The same components can also attach to concertina wire 
in the same fashion.   The SensorFence was developed by the Applied Research 
Laboratory in Penn State University to create a low cost alternative for making high tech 
fences.  Figure 73 is a picture of a sensor fence node. 
 
Figure 73.   SensorFence 318 
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Electro-Optics and Infrared Sensors 
This category of sensor includes thermal imagers, laser rangefinders, and 
laser designators.  It is an important category of sensors because it performs the whole 
range of functions from detection to identification. 
Thermal imagers pick up infrared signatures which targets inevitably emit. 
Because of their ability to “sense” and detect targets both in the day and night, they serve 
to enhance base protection as well as to conserve manpower by providing 24/7 
continuous surveillance for perimeter defense.  When deployed along the river, on boats 
or unmanned surface vessels, they increase the capability of the crew to detect, locate, 
identify, and track targets. 
Laser range finders and designators are essential in providing accurate fire 
to neutralize threats at long distance, and therefore reducing the chances of damage to 
coalition property and friendly fire.  Laser rangefinders provide commanders of crew-
served weapons and mortar counter-fire batteries the ability to accurately identify the 
target range and, therefore, effectively direct fire.  Laser designators, on the other hand, 
are useful target indicators for missiles and aircraft providing close air support, as well as 
troops wearing NVG’s. 
There are currently several sensor systems that are a combination of 
thermal imagers, laser range finders, and laser designators.  The RST chose to look at 
these combinations of sensors in a few different systems to avoid integration issues that 
arise from using separate sensors.  For the FPS, there were different packages of these 
systems for different platforms and basing alternatives. 
To provide increased surveillance for the FOB, the RST used FLIR’s 
ThermoVision Sentry II system.  This system does not contain a laser rangefinder or 
designator, but provides the continuous coverage and dual fields of view at 20 and 5 
degrees.319  The Sentry II can also slave itself to other sensors to create an autonomous 
and shared network of sensors.  Figure 74 is a picture of the Sentry II. 
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Figure 74.   ThermoVision Sentry II320 
 
FLIR’s SeaFLIR III system is the newest version of a combination system 
that can provide a thermal imager, laser rangefinder, and laser pointer.  The sensor also 
has an auto-track function to allow the user to easily remain “locked” onto targets.321  
These sensors are currently being outfitted for SURC’s although there is still some 
uncertainty about how many craft will obtain them.322  For the purpose of analysis, the 
SEAFLIR III sensor system was outfitted on the PBL and the RF’s USV, the Sea Fox.  
Figure 75 is a picture of the SeaFLIR III. 
 
Figure 75.   FLIR’s SeaFLIR III323 
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The Mk 46 MOD 1 Optical Sight System (OSS) is the sensor system 
outfitted for the RCSS.  This system currently serves as a thermal imager and laser 
rangefinder, with an additional laser designator under development.324  The Mk 46 MOD 
1 OSS is used on all U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers as integrated with the 
ship’s MK 34 weapon system.  “The MK 46 OSS enables 24-hour surveillance, 
intelligence gathering and reconnaissance.”325  Figure 76 shows the MK 46 MOD 1. 
 
 
Figure 76.   Mk 46 MOD 1326 
 
Radars 
Radar deployed along the river enables continuous surveillance, 
monitoring and tracking of the boats along the river. Suspicious boats can be detected 
from at least a couple of miles away and this allows preventive actions to be taken to 
apprehend the suspects before they can approach the base close enough to cause damage 
and injury. 
The radar operated by the RCSS is the AN/SPS-67.  The “AN/SPS-67 is a 
short-range, two-dimensional, surface-search/navigation radar system that provides 
highly accurate surface and limited low-flyer detection and tracking capabilities.”327  The 
latest version, the AN/SPS-67(V)3 (Figure 77)“provides digital moving target indication, 
automatic target detection and track-while-scan for surface targets.”328 
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Figure 77.   The AN/SPS-67 Radar329 
 
The use of a counter-fire radar also served as an improvement to any of 
the basing alternatives.  Despite the excellent range of many sensors, the fact still remains 
that in operating areas where there is dense jungle, target identification can be incredibly 
difficult.  There is the possibility in these instances that the enemy may be able employ 
an indirect fire weapon before being detected.  The typical indirect fire weapon available 
to insurgent type forces is some form of mortar.  Counter-fire radars represent an 
excellent capability to locate the source of an enemy’s indirect weapon, such as a mortar, 
and ensure that the enemy is not able to fire a second time.  The RST chose the 
Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR).  The LCMR was originally developed for 
the Special Operations Command, but was employed for Operation Iraqi Freedom as a 
Limited Procurement Urgent Capability.330  The radar used in the beginning of the 
conflict, the Q-36 Firefinder, is limited in its searching capability to only 90 degrees at a 
time.  Insurgents who could get close enough to the radar would simply fire when the 
azimuth was not facing them.331  The LCMR’s continuous 360 degree search was 
procured to supplement the more accurate Q-36.  The LCMR is currently limited to a 100 
meter error for target location at five kilometers, but the Army is seeking improvement to 
make the system accurate to 25 meters at this distance, which would allow counter-fire in 
populated environments.332  Figure 78 is a picture of the LCMR. 
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Figure 78.   The Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar (LCMR)333 
 
4.8.1.2 Weapons 
The potential weapons outfit of the RF is large.  A list of all potential 
weapons available to the squadron in the different baseline packages is listed below.  The 
RST used the FOB and feasible MOB alternatives in these weapons packages. 
 
Command and supporting element arms 
• 65- M16-A3 service rifles 
• 9- M203 Grenade Launchers 
• 6- 12 GA Mossberg 500A2 shotguns 
• 65- M9 9 mm pistols 
• 9- M240B 7.62 mm machine guns 
• 14- Mk43 7.62 mm machine guns 
• 7- M2 .50 cal machine guns 
• 4- Mk19 40 mm auto grenade launchers 
 
Security Detachment Arms (FOB only) 
• 72- M9 9 mm pistols 
• 27- M16-A3 service rifles 
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• 36- M203 Grenade Launchers 
• 49- 5.56 mm MOD 727 Carbine 
• 13- 12 GA Mossberg 500A2 shotguns 
• 2- Mk21 rifles 
• 10- M240B 7.62 mm machine guns 
• 9- M2 .50 cal machine guns 
• 5- Mk19 40 mm auto grenade launchers 
 
Detachment arms (x3 for total mission element) 
• 53- M16-A3 service rifles 
• 10- M203 Grenade Launchers 
• 10- 12 GA Mossberg 500A2 shotguns 
• 2- Mk21 rifles 
• 53- M9 9 mm pistols 
• 8- M240B 7.62 mm machine guns 
• 10- M2 .50 cal machine guns 
*4- SURC’s equipped with 
• 1 Mk43 7.62 mm machine guns 
• 1 M2 .50 cal machine guns 
• 1 Mk19 40 mm auto grenade launchers 




• 2- Mk38 25 mm Chain Guns 
• Mk15 CIWS 
• 8- Universal gun mounts for chosen configuration of command and 
supporting element weapons. 
227 
Nobriza + Barge 
• Mk19 40 mm grenade launcher 
• double barrel .50 cal  machine guns 
• multiple small arms 
(Barge may include weapons mounts where necessary) 
 
Mortar 
There are two mortar systems the RST considered.  The first was the 
M120 120 mm mortar.  This mortar contains significant firepower with a 70 meter killing 
radius and a range from 166 meters to 7200 meters and requires a crew of 5.334  The 
M120 weighs 319 lbs and tows on a trailer behind a HMMWV.  Figure 79 is a picture of 
a 120 mm mortar. 
 
Figure 79.   M120 120 mm Mortar335 
 
Precision Guided Mortar Munition(PGMM) 
The PGMM is a laser-guided 120 mm mortar cartridge capable of 
defeating enemy personnel under strict protective cover such as buildings and armored 
vehicles with low collateral damage.  Once the round is in flight, onboard sensors and 
processors calculate the munitions’ position and, several seconds later, track the laser 
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pointed on a specific target provided by a forward observer. The PGMM’s accuracy can 
remain as well as 1m within specified point guided by the laser.336  Such rounds, when 
used with either the M120 or the Dragon Fire II, enhanced the accuracy of the weapon.  
Figure 80 is the PGMM. 
 
 
Figure 80.   Precision Guided Mortar Munition (PGMM)337 
 




0 600 (point target) 4000 45
0 2000 4100 100
0 1100 (area target) 4000 85
0 2200 7500 30-84 (rapid rate of fire)
0 3000 175 (automatic)
0 classified 4500
34 165 440
220 7900 16 (burst) 4 sustained
M203 40 mm Grenade Launcher
M-16 A2/A3 5.56 mm Assault Rifle 
M240B 7.62 mm Heavy Machine Gun
M249 5.56 mm Heavy Machine Gun
M2 12.7 mm .50 cal Machine Gun
Sustained Rate of 
Fire (rds/min)
M120 120 mm Mortar
YardsWeapons
Mk 38 25 mm chain gun
Mk 15 CIWS
 
Table 26. Weapon Parameters338,339 
 
4.8.1.3 Barriers 
Concertina, Sandbags, and Berms 
The RST considered barrier systems on the land and water.  Barriers 
primarily represent the physical manifestation of the functions blocking and concealing, 
but they can also serve as a deterrent.  Currently, the only barrier system the RF deploys 
with is concertina wire in conjunction with berms and sandbags the Seabees can construct 
with soil.  Many times barriers are constructed using material found in the local area.  For 
the purposes of analyzing alternatives, however, the RST only considered the use of 
concertina wire and two berms to protect fuel as the baseline barriers.  Figure 81 is a 
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triple layer configuration of concertina wire used by the RST and Figure 82 is a diagram 
of a berm. 
 




Figure 82.   Berm Configuration341 
 
Floating Barriers 
To advent the baseline concertina wire, there are a multitude of water 
barriers that could be employed around the FOB to prevent crafts from entering the area 
of operations.  Some barrier systems allow other items to be constructed on them, such as 
fences and sensor equipment.  The WhisprWave Corporation has developed a variety of 
barriers for the purposes of force protection.  Their Rapidly Deployed Small-Craft 
Intrusion Barrier (RD-SCIB) was selected as the barrier of choice because it can be 
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deployed easily and provides the necessary protection against the threat of crafts.  Figure 
83 demonstrates the additions of a sign and a fence system on WhisprWave models. 
 
   
 
Figure 83.   Configurations of enhanced Whisper Wave Models342 
 
Land Barriers 
The U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps are currently using Geocell 
Systems’ Rapid Deployment Fortification Wall (RDFW) for force protection measures.343  
The RDFW is a series of stackable plastic cells that can be filled with soil in a variety of 
configurations to essentially replace sand bags in a less labor intensive manner.  In a 
recent test against a series of 40 lb detonations of C4, the RDFW was reduced from a 42 
inch wall to a 31.5 inch wall.  “With RDFW, a crew of 6 laborers and one equipment 
operator can build a wall 100 feet long, four feet wide, and four feet high in one hour. An 
equivalent sandbag wall requires 35 laborers over 19 hours to construct.”344  The RDFW 
could not only be used to construct barriers, but also serve as flood barriers or provide 
improved roads in muddy conditions, which are useful in a riparian environment.  Figure 
84 shows a front loader dropping soil into the RDFW. 
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Figure 84.   The Rapid Deployment Fortification Wall345 
 
4.8.1.4 Carrier Platforms 
Light Patrol Boat (PBL) 
“The Light Patrol Boat (PBL) is a lightly armed Boston Whaler type craft 
with no armor. This craft is constructed of fiberglass with reinforced transom and 
weapons mount areas. It is powered by dual outboard motors and is highly maneuverable. 
It is useful in interdicting a lightly armed adversary but should not be used to engage a 
heavily armed or well organized enemy. It functions effectively in policing actions, 
harbor control, diving and surveillance operations, riverine warfare, drug interdiction, and 
other offensive or defensive purposes. 
The weapon mountings can include .50 caliber heavy machine guns or 
7.62 mm machine guns mounted on 180-degree mounts, providing an effective weapon 
employment in any direction. Due to its unique hull design, the PBL is excellent for the 
riverine environment, allowing it to operate in virtually any water depth. Its two low-
profile engines are capable of providing eight hours of continuous operation at a fast 
cruise speed of 25-plus knots. It displaces 6,500 lb. fully loaded and is transportable via 
its own trailer, helicopter sling, or C-130 aircraft. Normal crew size is three 
personnel.”346  Figure 85 is a picture of a PBL. 
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Figure 85.   Light Patrol Boat347 
 
HMMWV 
The HMMWV (High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle) is a light, 
highly mobile, diesel-powered, four-wheel-drive vehicle equipped with an 
automatic transmission. Based on the M998 chassis, using common 
components and kits, the HMMWV can be configured to become a troop 
carrier, armament carrier, S250 shelter carrier, ambulance, TOW missile 
carrier, and a Scout vehicle… … All HMMWV’s are designed for use 
over all types of roads, in all weather conditions and are extremely 
effective in the most difficult terrain. The HMMWV’s high power-to-
weight ratio, four-wheel drive and high ground clearance combine to give 
it outstanding cross-country mobility.348 
 
USV 
The USV selected for analysis in the FPS by the RST was the Sea Fox 
designed and built by Northwind Marine.  “The Sea Fox is a purpose-built medium USV 
platform with an aluminum hull and a 220 horsepower heavy fuel (diesel of JP-5) engine 
powering a water jet propulsion system.”349  The Sea Fox is 5 meters long and because of 
its powerful engine, “has speed, maneuverability, and range comparable to a SURC.”350  
The Sea Fox has a maximum capacity of 1000 pounds and is currently outfitted with a 
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speaker system to enable communication through the USV as well as a variety of sensor 
packages to include “infrared/white light spotlights, infrared/thermal scanners, 
infrared/radar launch detectors, and surface scanning (navigational) radar, to meet 
specific mission requirements.”351  The Sea Fox does not currently carry weapons, 
however, but could possibly employ them in the future.  Figure 86 is a picture of the Sea 
Fox. 
 
Figure 86.   The Sea Fox USV352 
 
UAV 
Complimenting the Sea Fox is ONR's lightweight UAV, the Silver Fox. 
Weighing in at 20 pounds, the $50,000 Silver Fox is powered by an off-
the-shelf 0.91 cubic inch 4-stroke model aircraft engine, has a ceiling of 
1,000 feet, a cruising speed of 60 knots and an endurance of 10 hours 
when operating on 87 Octane 50:1 mixed gas. Its modular construction 
allows it to be broken down into several components which can all be 
transported in a case (dimensions: 60"x14"x15") equivalent to an 
oversized golf bag.353 
The Silver Fox currently carries a maximum payload of 4 pounds and can 
be integrated with the Sea Fox, so the Silver Fox can provide detection at longer ranges 
and follow up with closer inspection by the Sea Fox.354 
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Figure 87.   Silver Fox UAV355 
 
Remote Operated Small Arms Mount (ROSAM) 
The Remote Operate Small Arms Mount (ROSAM) (Figure 88) was 
issued a type classification as the Mk49 MOD 0 Gun Weapon System as of December 19, 
2005.356  The Mk49 can mount a variety of weapons already in use, including the M2HB 
.50 cal machine gun, the GAU-17 7.62 mm Minigun, and the Mk19 40-mm grenade 
launcher.357  Some of the attributes listed for the system are: “stabilized, 2-axis mount, n 
x 360 degree traverse, -20 to +60 degree elevation range, lightweight: less than 250 lbs, 
marinized and ruggedized for demanding SOCOM applications, crew serviceable in case 
of electrical failure, integrated fire control computer, sophisticated auto tracking 
capability, Navy standard power, mounting, and communications interfaces.”358 
 
Figure 88.   Mk49 MOD 0/ROSAM with M2HB Bushmaster .50 caliber machine gun359 
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4.8.1.5 Physical Architectures and Their Employment 
Each of the architectures introduced in the morphological charts contained 
the components shown above in different configurations.  The figures below display the 




Figure 89.   Mortar Threat FPS Architectures 
 
As mentioned earlier in this section, the baseline of the RF has no assets 
dedicated to mortar defense.  The additional architectures included either the mortar and 
the LCMR, the mortar and the UAV, or the mortar, the LCMR, and the UAV.  Figure 90 




Figure 90.   Commando Raid FPS 
 
The RST configured the M2 .50 caliber machine guns at various posts 
with triple-layer concertina wire across the perimeter in addition to a four man patrol as a 
baseline.  Aside from the .50 caliber machine guns, each personnel would be outfitted 
with the M16A3.  The second architecture added the mortar and Sensor Fence.  The 
mortar provided extra firepower against a possible assaulting force, while the Sensor 
Fence added an extra layer of defense and detection against infiltrations of the enemy in a 
raid scenario.  The final architecture replaced the two personnel operating the M2 
machine guns with ROSAMs.  Figure 91 is the architectures used to counter a boat attack 




Figure 91.   Boat Attack on FOB FPS 
 
The baseline architecture for the FPS against a boat attack consisted of 
four two- man crews operating M2 .50 caliber machine guns along the banks of the river.  
The second architecture added the WhisprWave barrier.  The WhisprWave was snaked so 
the SURCs would not be hindered in their movement from the base, and to block the line 
of sight of the enemy to the moored SURCs and the FOB.  The third architecture replaced 
the crews operating the M2 .50 caliber with the ROSAMs in addition to the WhisprWave 
Barrier.  The final two architectures had the same configuration as the second and third 
architecutre with a PBL operating along the perimeter.  Figure 92 is the configurations 




Figure 92.   RCSS Boat Attack FPS 
 
The baseline RCSS contains the Mk 15 CIWS, Mk 49 OSS, the AN/SPS-
67 Radar, 25 mm chain guns, and 8 universal weapons stations.  The RST decided to use 
eight M2 .50 caliber machine guns for the weapons stations.  This made the RCSS more 
like the KD-1505 and the Endurance because they employ .50 cal machine guns on their 
weapon stations.  The RST assumed the ship’s crew would man all the components of the 
RCSS’s FPS so the employment of personnel was not considered.  The second 
architecture consisted of a PBL in addition to the RCSS.  Figure 93 is the architectures 




Figure 93.   Nobriza and Barge Boat Attack FPS 
 
The baseline Nobriza and Barge configuration consists of the weapons and 
sensors already present on the Nobriza plus whatever gun mounts might be placed on the 
barge.  The Nobriza has twin barrel .50 cal machine guns on the forward and aft ends of 
the vessel and a Mk 19 40 mm grenade launcher which are all operated remotely by 
personnel below deck.  The RST considered the baseline of weapons for the barge to be 
8-.50 cal machine gun as shown in Figure 93.  The detection equipment of this 
architecture was provided by the personnel manning the weapons on the barge and the 
FLIR sensor and navigation radar on the Nobriza.  For this architecture, the manning 
requirement by the FPS was 16 people because the crew of the Nobriza operate the 
weapons and sensors of the Nobriza.  The next architecture had the added the PBL and 
WhisprWave barrier.  The WhisprWave barrier could be deployed off the barge because 
the barge was stationary in the water. 
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4.8.2 Feasibility Analysis 
The RST was not able to conduct a feasibility analysis on the FPS because the 
requirements for force protection are not developed.  The only limiting factor in the 
selection of alternatives was the time frame set by the RST of a deployable system by 
2012.  All of the components selected for the architecture met this requirement in that 
they are either currently operational, or mature in testing. 
 
4.8.3 Risk Analysis 
The RST considered a variety of risks for the FPS including technical, diplomatic, 
quality of life, and military capability risk.  Table 27 describes each of the risk categories. 
 
Risk Category Description
Technical Risk that technology will not mature.
Diplomatic Risk of adverse reaction from or consequence to an ally or coalition partner.
Quality of Life Risk that an option will create a real or perceived degradation in the quality of life or safety of our people.
Military Capability Risk that an option will result in delay or failure to achieve a desired capability.  
 
Table 27. Types of Risk for the FPS360 
 
The technical risks for the FPS were derived from the use of several emerging 
technologies as components in the FPS architectures.  Though a majority of these 
components are currently in the final stages of development, there still exists the risk that 
these technologies will not mature.  The Mk46 MOD 1 is undergoing a laser designator 
upgrade, the LCMR is undergoing an upgrade, the Dragon Fire II is undergoing testing at 
the Marine Corps Warfighter Lab, and the Sea Fox, Silver Fox, and Mk49 MOD 0 
weapon system will likely see upgrades in the near future. 
The diplomatic risk affects the FPS in a variety of ways.  The host nation may 
restrict the use of certain weapons such as mortars, or require the RF to decrease the 
amount of stand off distance between the base of operations and civilian traffic due to 
impeding commercial traffic on the river or land.  Decreasing the stand off distance 
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between the base of operations and civilian traffic would decrease the assessment zone 
and engagement zones and lower the time the FPS has to assess potential threats and 
engage the enemy.  Restricting the use of mortars and certain ammunition would make 
the FPS less capable against long range threats.  As diplomacy changes, the rules of 
engagement may also change which could further restrict the capabilities of the FPS’s 
components. 
The risks associated with quality of life also incorporate diplomatic risk in their 
affects on the safety of the RF personnel.  If the host nation or other coalition forces 
provide less support to the RF, the threat environment could shift beyond the capacity of 
the FPS, thereby creating an unsafe operational environment.  Collateral damage, and 
other negative incidents, might also create a higher threat environment that could 
decrease the safety of RF personnel.  For example, if collateral damage occurred human 
intelligence provided by locals might degrade, making the FPS less prepared for enemy 
courses of action.  Meanwhile an increase in sympathy for enemy forces could increase 
the access and availability of weapons and increase recruits. 
The risk associated with military capability address the FPS components 
performance in the operational environment.  Some components of the FPS might be less 
adaptable to various climates and not operate at the same level in all geographic 
environments.  Decreasing sensor range and detection probabilities, as well as the 
frequency of weapon’s jamming, are examples of the potential consequences.  The degree 
to which architecture for the FPS can adapt across a spectrum of geographic 
environments will determine the susceptibility of the system to these risks.  Again, the 
threat environment could also fluctuate to a level beyond the current capacity of a given 
FPS.  A FPS that cannot adapt to the increased demands is more at risk to failure in 
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5. MODELING OVERVIEW 
5.1 MODELING PURPOSE AND COMPONENTS 
The operational architecture combines the physical and functional 
architectures so as to meet the originating requirements and related 
derived requirements.  This combination of the physical and functional 
architectures requires the allocation of functions to physical resources; at 
this point the system’s design can be simulated and analyzed in terms of 
the originating requirements and operational concept of the stakeholders.  
As the physical and functional architectures are integrated, the interfaces 
of the system (both external and internal) can also be defined and 
designed.”361 
The RST used this process to define and develop the riverine sustainment problem 
for further modeling and analysis. 
Initially, the design process establishes functional and physical 
decompositions, which are united to form the operational architecture.  
The operational architecture divides the design problem into chunks, 
primarily along eh lines of the physical architecture.  The operational 
architecture provides a complete description of the system design, 
including the functional architecture allocated to the physical architecture, 
derived input/output, technology and system-wide, trade off, and 
qualification requirements for each component, an interface architecture 
that has been integrated as one of the components, and complete 
documentation of the design and major design decisions.362 
The RST started with the RF’s operational concept and utilized a combination of 
the physical and functional architectures to develop the operation architecture.  Modeling 
and simulation enabled the RST to measure physical architecture alternatives that 
achieved RF sustainment functional objectives.  The RST used Extend, SIMKIT, and 
MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform Automata) simulation programs to test the 
performance and effectiveness of the various alternatives.  This section discusses what 
software used, model setup, and data outputs that the RST employed in the Riverine 





5.2 SUPPLY GROUP 
There were several objectives for the RST in the operation of transferring supply 
between the supply ship and the operating base for the riverine forces.  One objective was 
to assess the optimal number and combination of supply crafts required to support 
different kinds of operating base.  Another objective was to assess the effect of the supply 
ship turn around time.  To address those objectives of this study, a simulator was 
developed based on the event graph paradigm363 364 365 and the Listener Event Graph 
Objects (LEGOS) framework.366 367  Another simulator was developed using Extend that 
further evaluates the “best” connectors and measures operational availability and 
operational habitability. 
 
5.2.1 SIMKIT Software 
The riverine logistic supply process was modeled using the event graph paradigm, 
and the simulator was built based on SIMKIT and the LEGOS framework.  The discrete 
event simulation (DES) movement model can be found in Buss & Sanchez.368  The 
simulator was designed to derive the performance variables based on different mix of 
supply helicopters and different types of sea supply crafts.  The motivation to use DES in 
modeling RF logistic operations was due to the dynamic and stochastic nature of such 
operations.  Analytic and algorithmic models are not applicable due to the lack of 
consistent formulae to model the dynamic composition.  Similarly, despite the fact that 
there are existing logistic management systems that can effectively ensure the continuous 
support of the RF, such systems require long periods of operation time within a defined 
AO before it stabilizes at optimum level.  The locations of the AO tend to be “fluid” and 
the duration considerably short term (180 days) compared to other campaigns.  As such, 
DES became the ideal approach to model such operations, “averaging” out the dynamic 
and stochastic elements, to provide the basis which the RST would recommend for 
Riverine logistic support strategy to be based upon.  The simulation was event driven 
rather than time step dependent (such as agent based models are).  This was due to the 
259 
fact that discrete event modeling reduces the simulation time, especially when the logistic 
support can be easily considered as events. 
 
5.2.2 SIMKIT Set-up 
Multiple simulation runs have been performed by adjusting mainly three set of the 
parameters: operating base parameters; mix of supply crafts; and position of the operation 
base.  The parameters for the FOB, Norbriza+Barge (MOB1), and RCSS/Endurance/Sri 
Inderapura (MOB2) are given in Table 28. The supply connectors’ parameters are given 
in Table 29.  The supply connector mix for the operating bases are given in Table 30.  
The supply ship cycle time has also been varied from 4 days to 9 days in discrete 
increments. 
 
Base Capacity (ton) Threshold (ton) Storage (days)
FOB 495 67 15
MOB1 529 73 15
MOB2 818 110 15  
 
Table 28. Operating Base Parameters 
 
Supply Craft Unit LCU-1610 Jim G LCU-2000 CH-53
Speed kts 6 ± 2 9 ± 2 6 ± 2 100 ± 10
Weight tons 106 330 260 10
Loading time ton/min 2 1 2 2
Unloading time ton/min 4 2 4 2  
 
Table 29. Supply Craft Parameters 
 
The RST limited the total number of vessels to two in order to minimize the 
number of assets in the AO. 
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LCU-1610 Jim G LCU-2000 CH-53 LCU-1610 Jim G LCU-2000 CH-53
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 2 0 1 0 2
0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0
0 0 2 1 0 2 0 1
0 0 2 2 0 2 0 2
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 2 1 0 0 2
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 2 1 1 0 2
0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0
0 2 0 1 2 0 0 1
0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 2
1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1
1 0 1 2
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
1 1 0 2
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
Combination for FOB and MOB1 Combination for MOB2
 
 
Table 30. Supply Connector Mix 
 
The model was capable of simulating weather conditions and the affect on 
performance due to speed and capacity reduction.  In particular, the RST simulated four 
types of weather conditions: clear weather, wind at 20-40 knots, sea state at 3-5, and 
visibility less than 500 yards.  The supply crafts have the same speed and capacity 
reduction factors for the different types of weather conditions.  The speed and capacity 
reduction factor when the wind was 20-40 knots was 0.2.  The speed and capacity 
reduction factor when the sea state was at 3-5 was 0.5.  The speed reduction factor when 
visibility was less than 500 yards was 0.9, and there was no capacity reduction factor. 
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5.2.3 SIMKIT Data Outputs 
The metrics were organized into 3 parts: supply ship, operating base and supply 
craft as described below: 
 
5.2.3.1 Metrics for Supply Ship 
Queue Length: This is the mean number of supply connectors waiting in 
the queue for loading of supply.  There is a possibility that the number of supply 
connectors exceed the number of loading operation capacity such as wharf, dock or 
crane, or personnel.  Under such circumstances, the supply connector has to wait outside 
the supply ship until the resources are available. 
Available Loader: This is the mean number resources available to conduct 
the loading operation, such as wharf, dock or crane, personnel. 
Delay In Queue: This is the mean time that each supply connector waits in 
the queue. This is the time from when the supply connector arrives at the loading bay to 
the time when the loading operation actually commences. 
Loading Time: This is the mean amount of time required to load the 
supply connector.  The loading time is a function of the amount of supply carried 
onboard, which is either the capacity of the supply connector or the outstanding amount 
to be delivered, whichever is lower. 
Presence Duration: This is the mean amount of time required for the 
supply ship to be present for the entire supply operation.  This is the time from the arrival 
of the supply ship to the time when the supply demands are loaded onto the supply 
connector. 
Number of global supply ship arrival: This is the number of occurrence 






5.2.3.2 Metrics for Operating Base 
Unloader Queue: This is the mean number of supply connectors waiting in 
the queue for unloading the supply.  There is a possibility that the number of supply 
connectors exceed the number of unloading operation capacity such as wharf, dock or 
crane, personnel.  Under such circumstances, the supply connector has to wait outside the 
operating base until the resources are available. 
Available Unloader: This is the mean number of resources available to 
conduct the unloading operation, such as wharf, dock or crane, personnel. 
Delay in Queue: This is the mean time that each supply connector waits in 
the queue. This is the time from when the supply connector arrives at the operating base 
to the time when the loading operation actually commences. 
Unloading Time: This is the mean amount of time required to unload the 
supply connector.  The unloading time is a function of the amount of supply carried 
onboard, which is either the capacity of the supply craft or the outstanding amount to be 
delivered, whichever is lower. 
Mean Supply Level: This is the mean supply level at the operating base.  
The supply level is continuously being depleted based on the consumption rate and will 
only be incremented after the unloading operation is complete. The mean supply level 
will be lower if the entire supply chain is slow. 
Supply Request level: This is the amount of supply requested each time 
when the supply ship arrives.  This is the difference between the operating base 
maximum capacity and the current supply level. 
Percent Time Supply Below Threshold Level: This it the fraction of time 
when the supply level dipped below designated threshold level. 
Percent Time Supply is Negative: This it the fraction of time when the 
supply level dipped into negative level 
Duration Supply Below Threshold Level: This it the duration of time when 
the supply level dipped below designated threshold level. 
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Duration Supply is Negative: This is the duration of time when the supply 
level dipped into negative level 
Number of Occurrences Supply Below Threshold Level: This is the 
number of occurrences when the supply level dipped below designated threshold level. 
Number of Occurrences Supply Below Zero: This is the number of 
occurrences when the supply level dipped into negative level 
Time to Deliver One Batch of Supply: This is the time required for the 
delivery of the entire batch of supply.  This is the time from the arrival of supply ship to 
the unloading of the entire supply level requested at the operating base. 
 
5.2.3.3 Metrics for Supply Craft 
Percent Loading State: This is the fraction of time when the supply 
connector conducts the loading operation.  It includes the time in the loading queue. 
Percent Unloading State: This is the fraction of time when the supply 
connector conducts the unloading operation.  It includes the time in the unloading queue. 
Percent Ingress: This is the fraction of time when the supply connector 
travels from the supply ship to the operating base. 
Percent Egress: This is the fraction of time when the supply connector 
travels from operating base to the supply ship. 
Traveling Time: This is the mean time for the supply connector to travel 
from the supply ship to the operating base and back to the supply ship. 
 
5.2.4 SIMKIT Software Processes, Assumptions and Limitations 
The modularity approach using listeners and adaptors allowed piecewise building 
of the simulation, which improved the confidence level of the model while reducing the 
syntax and semantic errors in coding.  By identifying the relevant events relating to the 
logistic support structure, the DES was quickly designed and built on SIMKIT Java 
Libraries. 
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The DES used involved the modeling of several entities that individually 
encompasses various event states. The models were subsequently coded in SIMKIT in 
Java Language. The following illustrate the various entities models, represented in event 
graphs. 
 
5.2.4.1 SeaSupplyCraftCreator Listener Object 
The event graph for the SeaSupplyCraftCreator Listener Object is as 
shown in Figure 94. At the start of the simulation, the run event scheduled the 
SeaSupplyCraftCreator event, which also recursively scheduled itself until the required 
quantity of SeaSupplyCraft was created. Upon creating each SeaSupplyCraft, the 




Figure 94.   Event Graph for SeaSupplyCraftCreator Object 
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5.2.4.2 SeaSupplyScheduler Listener Object 
The event graph for the SeaSupplyScheduler Listener Object is as shown 
in Figure 95. At the start of the simulation, the run event simply initialized the state 
variables and did not schedule any event.  An ArrivalSeaSupplyCraftDepot event added 
the new SeasSupplyCraft into the list.  If supply demand was more than supply delivered, 
it  scheduled a DeploySeaSupplyCraftFromDepot event.  The FuelRequest event 
cumulated the demand request and scheduled the DeploySeaSupplyCraftFromDepot 
event if the demand was not met and that there were available SeaSupplyCraft.  The 
DeploySeaSupplyCraftFromDepot, when scheduled, removed the SeaSupplyCraft from 
its list and cumulated the supply delivered quantity.  It also rescheduled itself if the 
demand was not met and that there were available SeaSupplyCraft. Note that 
ArrivalSeaSupplyCraftDepot was the same event in SeaSupplyCraftCreator object and 




Figure 95.   Event Graph for SeaSupplyScheduler Object 
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5.2.4.3SeaSupplyCraftDepot Listener Object 
The event graph for the SeaSupplyCraftDepot Listener Object is as shown 
in Figure 96.  At the start of the simulation, the run event simply initialized the state 
variables and did not schedule any event.  An ArrivalSeaSupplyCraftDepot event added 
the new SeasSupplyCraft into the list after stamping the time and updating its states.  The 
DeploySeaSupplyCraftFromDepot event removed the first available SeaSupplyCraft 
from the list and scheduled the ArrivalGlobalSupplyStation event after recording its time 
in the depot. Note that ArrivalSeaSupplyCraftDepot was the same event in 
SeaSupplyCraftCreator object, and DeploySeaSupplyCraftFromDepot was the same 
event in SeaSupplyScheduler object. 
 
 
Figure 96.   Event Graph for SeaSupplyCraftDepot Object 
 
5.2.4.4 SupplyStation Listener Object 
The event graph for the GlobalSupplyStation Listener Object is as shown 
in Figure 97.  At the start of the simulation, the run simply initialized the state variables 
and did not schedule any event.  The ArrivalSupplyStation event updated the state of the 
SeaSupplyCraft to loadingState and also stamped the time of arrival. The SeaSupplyCraft 
was placed in the queue. The ArrivalGlobalSupplyStation then scheduled the 
startLoading event if there were available loader.  The StartLoading event removed the 
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first SeaSupplyCraft in the queue, received the queue delay, decremented the number of 
available loader, stamped the start loading time and scheduled the EndSeaLoading event 
to occur after the loading time Tloading.  The EndSeaLoading event updated the loading 
time and incremented the number of available loader.  It also scheduled StartLoading 
event if there were SeaSupplyCraft in the queue.  The end loading event scheduled the 




Figure 97.   Event Graph for SupplyStation Object 
 
5.2.4.5 Travel Manager Listener Object 
The event graph for the TravelManager Listener Object is as shown in 
Figure 98.  At the start of the simulation, the run event simply initialized the state 
variables and did not schedule any event.  The SeaSupplyCraftIngress event stamped 
time, set the SeaSupplyCraft state, configured the waypoint for the path and scheduled 
StartMoving event.  The StartMoving event scheduled the EndMoving event to be 
occurred after moving time Tmove, which in turn scheduled the ArrivalAtOperatingBase 
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event.  Similarly, the SeaSupplyCraftEgress event stamped time, set the SeaSupplyCraft 
state, configured the waypoint for the path and scheduled StartMoving event.  The 
StartMoving event scheduled EndMoving event to be occurred after moving time Tmove, 
which in turn scheduled the ArrivalSeaSupplyCraftDepot event.  Note that 
SeaSupplyCraftIngress event was the same event in the SupplyStation object while 
SeaSupplyCraftEgress was the same event in the OperatingBase object. 
 
 
Figure 98.   Event Graph for TravelManager Object 
 
5.2.4.6 OperatingBase Listener Object 
The event graph for the OperatingBase Listener Object is as shown in 
Figure 99.  At the start of the simulation, the run event simply initialized the state 
variables and did not schedule any event.  The ArrivalAtOperatingBase event updated the 
state of the SeaSupplyCraft to UnloadingState and also stamped the time of arrival.  The 
SeaSupplyCraft was placed in the queue. The ArrivalAtOperatingBase then scheduled the 
startUnloading event if there was an available unloader. The StartUnloading event 
removed the first SeaSupplyCraft in the queue, received the queue delay, decremented 
the number of available unloaders, stamped the start unloading time and scheduled the 
EndSeaUnloading event after unloading time TUnloasding has lapsed.  The 
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EndSeaUnloading event updated the unloading time and incremented the number of 
available unloaders.  It also scheduled StartUnloading event if there were SeaSupplyCraft 
in the queue.  The end unloading event scheduled the SeaSupplyCraftEgress event.  After 
the end of the unloading event, the OperatingBase object also updated the fuel level and 
computed the next time when fuelRequest event should have been scheduled based on the 
linear consumption rate.  It also canceled the previously scheduled fuelRequest since the 




Figure 99.   Event Graph for OperatingBase Object 
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5.2.5 SIMKIT Assumptions 
There were several assumption made to simplify the simulation. They were 
categorized in the following groups. 
 
5.2.5.1 Simulation 
Weather conditions in the simulation assumed the effect of speed variation 
in relation to the maximum permissible movement and loading/unloading speed settings. 
It did not affect other factors such as supply ship arrival time or closure of the forward 
base supply capabilities. 
 
5.2.5.2 Supply Ship 
Loading operations were assumed to be completed after all supply demand 
has been loaded onto the supply connector even though the supply connectors were still 
underway to the operating base.  Loading and unloading of the supply ship would be 
planned with best efficient approach such that loading and unloading of sea supply craft 
would not interfere with a helicopter.  Supply ship had sufficient resources to load all 
supply crafts concurrently.  Loading time was assumed to be a triangle distribution. 
 
5.2.5.3 Supply Status 
The simulation took the supply quantity as a combination of fuel, water, 
food and miscellaneous (weapons and ammunition). 
 
5.2.5.4 Supply Connector 
The supply connectors assumed a constant mean speed of movement 
throughout the delivery once it was deployed. The speed varied with weather conditions 
and assumed a triangle distribution. 
 
 
5.2.5.5 Supply Connector Depot 
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The supply depot was not onboard both supply ship and operating base. 
The location was assumed to be close to the global supply ship at the mouth of the river 
such that the traveling time from the depot to the global supply ship was negligible. 
 
5.2.5.6 Operating Base 
Consumption rate was assumed to be a linear depreciation function.  The 
operating base had sufficient resources to unload all supply connectors concurrently.  
Unloading time was assumed to be a triangle distribution. 
 
5.2.6 SIMKIT Limitations 
In addition to the assumptions which simplified the simulation, there were also 
limitations which the RST felt could improve the simulation in terms of user-friendliness 
and also in better modeling of the logistic process. These limitations were not 
implemented due to time limitation of the project study, but will definitely benefit future 
improvement. The limitations are grouped in the following sub-sections; 
 
5.2.6.1 Simulation 
Simulation did not support GUI interface for changing of variables. Time 
was limited for the complete implementation of the GUI interface.  Simulation did not 
allow changing of consumption rate after the simulation started.  Simulation did not cater 
for hostile attack on the entities such as a terrorist plan to deny the replenishment 
capability of the task force.  Terrain is a simple representation of 2D map without terrain 
details and limitation of movement. Simulation programmer need to work out the exact 
path and speed variation. 
 
5.2.6.2 Supply Ship 
Simulation did not allow the changing of the re-supplying position of the 




Simulation did not allow the break down of supply into fuel, water, food 
and others. 
 
5.2.7 EXTEND Model 
5.2.7.1 Software 
The second model used was EXTEND which is a discrete event model.  
The Extend model was a follow on to the SIMKIT model and was used to further analyze 
the riverine logistics problem.  The Extend simulation was designed to replicate the flow 
of supplies from a supply ship to a forward operating base inland operating from a 
riverbank or on the river. 
The model was developed to analyze the two best single logistic 
connectors determined by the SIMKIT model.  The use of Extend allowed for the RST to 
derive performance variables about each basing alternative based on the capabilities of 
the LCU-2000 and SEACOR “Jim G”.  The capabilities of both logistics connectors were 
modeled and affected by numerous factors to include speed, environment, connector 
capacity, and loading/unloading constraints.  Since these factors and many others are 
involved in this complex operation of riverine logistics an analytical or algorithmic 
approach was difficult.  Therefore, Extend allowed for the dynamic modeling of these 
variables. 
The Extend model was time driven that allowed events to happen based 
upon a time scale.  All activities in the model were simulated to happen in real time based 
upon an hour long time step.  This allowed for the RST to examine the two logistics 
connectors and two basing alternatives interactions over time. 
 
5.2.7.2 Set Up 
The inputs to the model are summarized in Table 31.  These inputs were a 
compilation of research completed by the RST in terms of basing alternatives, logistics 
connectors and the riparian environment on the Kampar River in Indonesia.  Table 31 
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includes all assumptions and limitations of the Extend model as well as the distribution 




1.EM2.0 Accurate Flow of Materiel Output
Model outputs the exact amounts delivered by supply ship 
and received by basing alternative.  Used as a check to 
ensure model is accounting materiel correctly.
  A.EM2.1 Accurate Relay of Need Output
Model outputs the exact amount needed by the basing 
alternative per supply event.  Used as a check to ensure 
model is accurately asking for the correct amount of 
materiel each supply event.
    1.EM2.1.1 Identifying Need 100%
RST assumed personnel did identify the need accurately 
100% of the time.  However this parameter is suspected of 
having significant impact on the results of this study and as 
such warrants further investigation.
      a.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      b.Storage Accessibility 100%
RST assumed the basing alternative and RF personnel able 
to access storage all the time.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact ono the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      c.Following Procedure 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
    2.EM2.1.2 Identifying Gap Output
Calculated by model given inputs and drives the number of 
logistic connector transport events to achieve all materiel 
delivery.
      a.Current Level Output Level of class of supply at time requested by model.
      b.Max Storage Level (fuel) FOB 84000 gals Total storage of fuel at config 1 basing alternative.
      c.Max Storage Level (fuel) MOB 160000 gals Total storage of fuel at config 2 basing alternative.
      d.Max Storage Level (water) FOB 70000 gals Total storage of drinking water at config 1 basing alternative.
      e.Max Storage Level (water) MOB 79000 gals Total storage of drinking water at config 2 basing alternative.
      f.Max Storage Level (food) FOB 92 pallets Total storage of food pallets at config 1 basing alternative.
      g.Max Storage Level (food) MOB 55 pallets Total storage of food pallets at config 2 basing alternative.
      h.Hist Consumption Rate (fuel) FOB ~5600 gals/day
Model calculates based on optempo of SURC's, and basing 
alternative use.  SURC fuel use is a triangular distribution 
minimum of 20, most likely of 21, and maximum of 25 per 
operating hour of SURC.  Base fuel use is a triangular 
distribution minimum of 95, most likely of 96, and 
maximum of 98 per operating hour of the base.
      i.Hist Consumption Rate (fuel) MOB ~10700 gals/day
Model calculates based on optempo of SURC's, and basing 
alternative use.  SURC fuel use is a triangular distribution 
minimum of 20, most likely of 21, and maximum of 25 per 
operating hour of SURC.  Base fuel use is a triangular 
distribution minimum of 290, most likely of 300, and 
maximum of 310 per operating hour of the base.
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      j.Hist Consumption Rate (water) FOB ~5600 gals/day
Model calculates based on # of personnel at base and 
gallons of water consumed per person.  Personnel at base is 
a triangular distribution minimum of 350, most likely of 
380, and maximum of 430 per day.  On average a person 
uses 9.0 gallons for drinking, feeding and hygiene.
      k.Hist Consumption Rate (water) MOB ~10700 gals/day
Model calculates based on # of personnel at base and 
gallons of water consumed per person.  Personnel at base is 
a triangular distribution minimum of 500, most likely of 
530, and maximum of 580 per day.  On average a person 
uses 9.0 gallons for drinking, feeding and hygiene.
      l.Hist Consumption Rate (food) FOB ~4661 Lbs/day
Model calculates based on # of personnel at base and lbs of 
food per meal.  Personnel at base is a triangular distribution 
minimum of 350, most likely of 380, and maximum of 430 
per meal.  On average a person eats 3.7 lbs for breakfast, 
2.82 for lunch, 3.58 for supper, and 2.82 for midrats.
      m.Hist Consumption Rate (food) MOB ~3656 lbs/day
Model calculates based on # of personnel at base and lbs of 
food per meal.  Personnel at base is a triangular distribution 
minimum of 500, most likely of 530, and maximum of 580 
per meal.  On average a person eats 5.6 lbs of ships stores 
per day and the boat team personnel eat 0.9 lbs of MRE's 
per day.
      n.EM3.0 Total Movement Time Output Model calculates based upon all the logisitc connector time inputs.
    3.EM2.1.3 Request Generation 100% Requirement of system to always be able to generate a request.
    4.EM2.1.4 Confirmation Ack. 100% Requirement of system to always be able to generate a request.
  B.EM2.2 Accuracy of Receipt 100%
RST assumed RF personnel did accurately receive materiel 
into storage 100% of the time.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
    1.EM2.2.1 Accuracy of Classify 100%
RST assumed RF personnel did accurately classify food as 
food and fuel as fuel 100% of the time.  However this 
parameter is suspected of having significant impact on the 
results of this study and as such warrants further 
investigation.
      a.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      b.Following Procedure 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
    2.EM2.2.2 Accuracy of Count 100%
RST assumed RF personnel did accurately count materiel 
into storage 100% of the time.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.  
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      a.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      b.Following Procedure 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
    3.EM2.2.3 Report Sent 100% Requirement of system to always be able to send report.
  C.EM2.3 Accuracy of Storage 100%
RST assumed RF personnel did accurately store materiel 
100% of the time.  However this parameter is suspected of 
having significant impact on the results of this study and as 
such warrants further investigation.
    1.EM2.3.1 Class Accuracy 100%
RST assumed RF personnel accurately separated materiel by 
class of supply 100% of the time.  However this parameter 
is suspected of having significant impact on the results of 
this study and as such warrants further investigation.
      a.Correct Location 100%
RST assumed RF personnel did place materiel in the correct 
location 100% of the time.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      b.Correct Labeling 100%
RST assumed all materiel was correctly labeled as what type 
of supply and the RF personnel read the label correctly 
100% of the time.  However this parameter is suspected of 
having significant impact on the results of this study and as 
such warrants further investigation.
      c.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
    2.EM2.3.2 Size Accuracy 100%
RST assumed RF personnel accurately stored materiel on 
logistic connector and basing alternative 100% of the time.  
However this parameter is suspected of having significant 
impact on the results of this study and as such warrants 
further investigation.
      a.Matching Cargo by square feet 100%
RST assumed RF personnel accuratetly stored materiel by 
square feet 100% of the time.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      b.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
    3.EM2.3.3 Volume Accuracy 100%
RST assumed RF personnel accurately stored materiel on 
logistic connector and basing alternative 100% of the time.  
However this parameter is suspected of having significant 
impact on the results of this study and as such warrants 
further investigation.  
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      a.Matching Cargo by cubic feet 100%
RST assumed RF personnel accuratetly stored materiel by 
cubic feet 100% of the time.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      b.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
    4.EM2.3.4 Weight Accuracy 100%
RST assumed RF personnel accurately stored materiel on 
logistic connector and basing alternative 100% of the time.  
However this parameter is suspected of having significant 
impact on the results of this study and as such warrants 
further investigation.
      a.Overloading Logistic Connector 0%
RST assumed RF personnel accuratetly stored materiel by 
weight 100% of the time.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      bLearning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
  D.EM2.4 Performance of Issue Items 100%
RST assumed RF personnel issued items perfectly 100% of 
the time.  However this parameter is suspected of having 
significant impact on the results of this study and as such 
warrants further investigation.
    1.EM2.4A Accuracy of Fulfillment 100%
RST assumed RF personnel accurately fulfilled materiel 
requests 100% of the time.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      a.EM2.4.1 Accuracy of Order 100%
RST assumed RF personnel issued the desired item 100% of 
the time.  However this parameter is suspected of having 
significant impact on the results of this study and as such 
warrants further investigation.
        1.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
        2.Accuracy of Order 100%
RST assumed RF personnel issued the desired item 100% of 
the time.  However this parameter is suspected of having 
significant impact on the results of this study and as such 
warrants further investigation.
      b.EM2.4.3.1 Composition Accuracy 100%
RST assumed RF personnel issued the desired number of 
items 100% of the time.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        1.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
        2.Composition Accuracy 100%
RST assumed RF personnel issued the desired number of 
items 100% of the time.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.  
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    1.EM2.4B Preparation Time for Issue 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      a.EM2.4.2 Pre-Position Time 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        1.Movement for pre-position 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        2.Material Search Time 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        3.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      b.EM2.4.3.2 Composition Time 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        1.Organization Time 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        1.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      c.EM2.4.4 Containerization Time 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        1.Packaging Retrieval Time 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        2.Organizing Material for Package 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        3.Packaging Time 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        4.Issue Time 0 hours
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        5.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
  E.EM2.5 Supply Train Performance Output Model calculates based on inputs.
    1.EM2.5.1 Survivability 90%, 95%, 99%
Inputs to model.  Test of each logistics connector 
performing its mission with 1 out of ten, 1 out of 20, and 1 
out of 100 transport events where a logistic connector is 
lost.
      a.Susceptibility Varies
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.  
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      b.Vulnerability Varies
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
    2.EM2.5.2 Route Status 90% Percentage of time the route is open for the logistic connector to perform a transport event.
      a.EM2.5.2.1 Route Availability 90%
RST detemined that wind > 40kts and sea state >5 (12 ft) 
would shut down the route for 24 hours.  Each weather 
effect occurs 10% of the time and the RST assumed that the 
two effects are significantly dependent therefore a route 
availability would be 90%.  However, this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        1.Weather Effect 0.9 See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected route availability
        2.Water Terrain Effect 1.0 See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected route availability
        3.Route Knowledge 100%
RST assumed RF personnel had knowledge of the route 
100% of the time.  However this parameter is suspected of 
having significant impact on the results of this study and as 
such warrants further investigation.
        4.Route Certainty 100%
RST assumed RF personnel were 100% certain about 
condition of route 100% of the time.  However this 
parameter is suspected of having significant impact on the 
results of this study and as such warrants further 
investigation.
        5.Resource Effect 1.0
RST assumed RF personnel had the resources 100% of the 
time.  Therefore there was not effect from lack of resources.  
However this parameter is suspected of having significant 
impact on the results of this study and as such warrants 
further investigation.
        6.Political Constraints 100%
RST assumed RF personnel had no political restraints 100% 
of the time.  However this parameter is suspected of having 
significant impact on the results of this study and as such 
warrants further investigation.
        7.Hostility Effect 1.0
RST assumed that the hostile forces in the area would not be 
able to close the supply route due to the Indonesian Army 
patrolling the river banks.  However an ambush would 
affect the chance of losing a logistic connector and is 
accounted for in EM 2.5.1 Survivability.  However, this 
parameter is suspected of having significant impact on the 
results of this study and as such warrants further 
investigation.
      b.EM2.5.2.2 Route Maintainability 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        1.Hostility Effect 1.0
RST assumed that the hostile forces in the area would not be 
able to close the supply route due to the Indonesian Army 
patrolling the river banks.  However an ambush would 
affect the chance of losing a logistic connector and is 
accounted for in EM 2.5.1 Survivability.  However, this 
parameter is suspected of having significant impact on the 
results of this study and as such warrants further 
investigation.  
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        2.Route Knowledge 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        3.Resource Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
        4.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
2.EM3.0 Total Movement Time Output Model calculates dependent on all factors in the model.
  A.EM3.1 Loading Time Varies Model calculates based on all the factors and effects dealing with loading.
    1.EM3.1.1 Stage Time Varies
Calculated by model given inputs and drives the amount of 
time the logistic connector was on loading supplies per 
transport event.
      a.Travel Time to Supply Hub 0 hours RST assumed the logistic connector would be on station and not keep the supply ship waiting at all times.
      b.Maneuvering Time 15 min.
RST assumed the most time to maneuver in preparation for 
mooring in the worst weather conditions the logisitic 
connector did operate.
      c.Mooring Time 15 min. RST assumed the most time to moor, in the worst weather conditions, in which the logisitic connectors did operate.
      d.Delay Time due to Preparation 0 hours RST assumed that the supply ship would always be prepared to off load materiel as needed.
      e.Safety Effect 1.0
RST assumed that all events were completed as safely as 
possible therefore there were no mishaps or personnel hurt 
and the events were not hinder.  However, this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      f.Weather Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      g.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      h.Illumination Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
    2.EM3.1.2 Lift Time Varies Model calculates based upon all the factors and effects dealing with lift.
      a.Rigging Time 0 hours
RST assumed the supply ship would have all necessary 
equipment ready for transfer and the connecting of hoses 
and pallets to crane would be negligible.
      b.Transfer Time - Supply Ship Liquids 600 gpm RST assumed the smallest transfer rate found on Naval replenishment ships in the fleet.
      c.Transfer Time - Supply Ship Pallets 2 per min. RST assumed the smallest transfer rate found on Naval replenishment ships in the fleet.
      d.Safety Effect 1.0
RST assumed that all events were completed as safely as 
possible therefore there were no mishaps or personnel hurt 
and the events were not hinder.  However, this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.  
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      e.Weather Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      f.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      g.Illumination Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
    3.EM3.1.3 Set In Place Time 0 hours
RST assumed this parameters inputs would all be zero or 
accounted in other categories for the model.  However, this 
parameter is suspected of having significant impact of the 
results of this study and as such warrants further 
investigation.
      a.Placing Time 0 hours
RST assumed the placing of pallets and containers in the 
logistics connector was part of the transfer time.  However 
this parameter is suspected of having significant impact on 
the results of this study and as such warrants further 
investigation.
      b.Securing for Sea Time 0 hours
RST assumed that the crew of the logistics connector would 
be able to secure for sea as quickly as the cargo could be 
loaded.  However, this parameter is suspected of having 
significant impact on the results of this study and as such 
warrants further investigation.
      c.Ballasting Time 0 hours
RST assumed the crew of the logistics connector would be 
able to ballast out the connector as the cargo is loaded.  
However this paramter is suspectetd of having significant 
impact on the results of this study and as such warrants 
further investigation.
      d.Safety Effect 1.0
RST assumed that all events were completed as safely as 
possible therefore there were no mishaps or personnel hurt 
and the events were not hinder.  However, this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      e.Weather Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      f.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      g.Illumination Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
  B.EM3.2 Transport Time Varies Model calculates time based on inputs and effects.
    1.EM3.2.1 Start Time 30 min. RST assumed the most time to begin travel.
      a.Casting Off Time 15 min. RST assumed the most time to cast off, in the worst weather conditions, in which the logisitic connectors did operate.
      b.Maneuvering Time 15 min.
RST assumed the most time to maneuver in preparation for 
travel in the worst weather conditions the logisitic connector 
did operate.  
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      c.Equipment Check Time 0 hours RST assumed that the crew of the logistics connector checked all equipment and were ready for sea at all times.
      d.Safety Effect 1.0
RST assumed that all events were completed as safely as 
possible therefore there were no mishaps or personnel hurt 
and the events were not hinder.  However, this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      e.Weather Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      f.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      g.Illumination Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
    2.EM3.2.2 Travel Time Varies Model calculates based upon all the factors and effects dealing with travel.
      a.Weather Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      b.Illumination Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      c.Obscurant Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      e.Distance 40 nm
RST determined from point of anchorage of supply ship to 
where the FOB or MOB would be located.  However this 
parameter is suspected of having signinficant results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      f.Speed - LCU 2000 8-12 kts
Triangular distribution with a minimum of 8, maximum of 
12 and most likely value of 10.  However this paramter is 
suspected of having significant results on this study and as 
such warrants further investigation.
      g.Speed - SEACOR "Jim G" 7-11 kts
Triangular distribution with a minimum of 7, maximum of 
11 and most likely value of 9.  However this paramter is 
suspected of having significant results on this study and as 
such warrants further investigation.
      h.Hostility Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      i.Navigation Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      j.Sand Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      k.Ice Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      l.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
    3.EM3.2.3 Stop Time 30 min. RST assumed the most time to end travel.
      a.Maneuvering Time 15 min.
RST assumed the most time to maneuver in preparation for 
travel in the worst weather conditions the logisitic connector 
did operate.  
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      b.Mooring or Beaching Time 15 min.
RST assumed the most time to maneuver in preparation for 
travel in the worst weather conditions the logisitic connector 
did operate.
      c.Rigging for Unload Time 0 hours
RST assumed the logistics connector would have all 
necessary equipment ready for transfer and the connecting 
of hoses and pallets onto forklift would be negligible.
      d.Weather Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      e.Safety Effect 1.0
RST assumed that all events were completed as safely as 
possible therefore there were no mishaps or personnel hurt 
and the events were not hinder.  However, this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      f.Illumination Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      g.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
  C.EM3.3 Unload Time Varies Model calculates dependent on all factors in the model.
    1.EM3.3.1 Lift Tiime 0 hours
RST assumed the logistics connector did not have any delay 
due to moving of materiel.  This parameter is also accounted 
for in the transfer time of each logistics connector.  
However this parameter is suspected of having a significant 
impact on the results of this study and as such warrants 
further investigation.
      a.Rigging Time 0 hours
RST assumed the logistic connector had all the necessary 
equipment ready for transfer and the connecting of hoses 
and pallets to crane would be negligible.
      b.Transfer Time - LCU 2000 Fuel 100 gpm RST assumed the smallest transfer rate found on LCU 2000 craft.
      c.Transfer Time - LCU 2000 Pallets 4 per min. RST assumed the smallest transfer by forklifts at the basing alternative.
      d.Transfer Time - LCU 2000 Water 100 gpm RST assumed the smallest transfer rate found on a SIXCON pump.
      e.Transfer Time - SEACOR Fuel 150 gpm RST assumed the smallest transfer rate found on SEACOR "Jim G".
      f.Transfer Time - SEACOR Pallets 2 per min. RST assumed the smallest transfer rate found on SEACOR "Jim G".
      g.Transfer Time - SEACOR Water 300 gpm RST assumed the smallest transfer rate found on a SEACOR "Jim G".
      h.Safety Effect 1.0
RST assumed that all events were completed as safely as 
possible therefore there were no mishaps or personnel hurt 
and the events were not hinder.  However, this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      i.Weather Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      j.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
susupeced of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.  
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      k.Illumination Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
    2.EM3.3.2 Stage Time 0 hours
RST assumed the basing alternative was always ready to 
unload the materiel from the logistics connectors.  However 
this paramter is suspected of having significant impact on 
the results of this study and as such warrants further 
investigation.
      a.Delay due to Preparation Time 0 hours
RST assumed the basing alternavtive was always perpared 
to receive and unload the supplies from the logistics 
connectors.  However this parameter is suspected of having 
significant impact on the results of this study and as such 
warrants further investigation.
      b.Storing Time on Base 0 hours
RST assumed that the logistics connector would unload all 
materiel as quickly as the equipment allowed and the base 
would be able to unload all materiel at the maximum rate of 
the logistics connector.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      c.Safety Effect 1.0
RST assumed that all events were completed as safely as 
possible therefore there were no mishaps or personnel hurt 
and the events were not hinder.  However, this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      d.Weather Effect Input See Table XX for various input parameters and how they affected time.
      e.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
3.EM4.0 Recovery Time Personnel 0 hours
RST assumed host nation would provide medical facilites 
and critical care centers to stabilize and begin the recovery 
of personnel.  However, this parameter is suspected of 
having significant impact on the results of this study and as 
such warrants further investigation.
4.EM4.0 Disposition Safety Materiel 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
  A.EM4.2 Disposition Safety 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
    1.EM4.2.1 Handling Safety 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      a.Correct Retrieval 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      b.Safely Received 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      c.Correct Packaging 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.  
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      d.Following Procedure 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
    2.EM4.2.2 Materiel Safeguard Correct 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      a.Correct Control 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      b.Correct Isolation 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      c.Following Procedure 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
    3.EM4.2.3 Retrograde 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      a.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      b.Accurate Identification 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      c.Following Procedure 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
    4.EM4.2.4 Identify for Disposal 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      a.Learning Effect 1.0
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.
      b.Accurate Identification 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
      c.Following Procedures 100%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such has been further investigated in Appendix 
F.  
286 
5.EM5.0 Operational Feasibility 100.0% RST assumed the logistics connector modeled were feasible after the feasibility screening.
  A.EM5.1  Reliability 100.0%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
  B.EM5.2 Availability 100.0%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
  C.EM5.3 Maintainability 100.0%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
  D.EM5.4 Transportability 100.0%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.
  E.EM5.5 Manpower Suitability 100.0%
Beyond the scope of this study.  However this parameter is 
suspected of having significant impact on the results of this 
study and as such warrants further investigation.  
Table 31. Assumptions, stochastic, and deterministic parameters of model. 
 
In Table 32 the RST determined the percentage of time each one of the 
effects would occur and how they affected the logistics connectors.  The RST made the 
assumption that all effects would have a similar affect on every river borne logistic 
connector. 
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Water Terrrain Navigable Constrained Restricted Navaigable Constrained Restricted
% Occurrence 80% 20% 0% 80% 20% 0%
LCU 2000 0 0.5 1 0 0 1
Seacor 0 0.5 1 0 0 1
Route Availability 100% 100% 100%
Obscurant Clear 1-2k yds 500-1k yds <500 yds Clear 1-2k yds 500-1k yds <500 yds
% Occurrence 40% 30% 20% 10% 40% 30% 20% 10%
LCU 2000 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 0 0 0 0
Seacor 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 0 0 0 0
Sand None Dust Storm Sand Storm None Dust Storm Sand Storm
LCU 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seacor 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wind <20 kts >20 - <40 kts >40 kts <20 kts >20 - <40 kts >40 kts
% Occurrence 60% 30% 10% 60% 30% 10%
LCU 2000 0 0.2 1 0 0 1
Seacor 0 0.2 1 0 0 1
Route Availability 100% 100% 0%
Sea State <S.S. 3 >3 - <5 S.S. > S.S.5 <S.S. 3 >3 - <5 S.S. > S.S.5
% Occurrence 60% 30% 10% 60% 30% 10%
LCU 2000 0 0.5 1 0 0 1
Seacor 0 0.5 1 0 0 1
Route Availability 100% 100% 0%
Night Full Half New Full Half New
LCU 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seacor 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hostility None Light Damaging Deadly None Light Damaging Deadly
% Occurrence 70% 25% 4% 1% 70% 25% 4% 1%
LCU 2000 0 0 1 1.1 0 0 0 0
Seacor 0 0 1 1.1 0 0 0 0
Route Availability 100% 100% 100% 100%
Ice Cold Light Storm Cold Light Storm
LCU 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seacor 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capacity reduction FactorSpeed Reduction Factor
*Sand storms do not occur in the RST AO therefore not a consideration in the model.
*Ice storms do not occur in the RST AO therefore not a consideration in the model.
*RST determined by 2012 illumination will not be a factor in operating logistic connectors.
 







5.2.7.3 Data Outputs 
The overarching metrics that were useful in comparing the LCU-2000 
against the SEACOR “Jim G” are described below.  Each score for each type of 
configuration was deduced by averaging 30 runs in order to ensure an adequate sample 
size. 
Operational availability of the SURC’s due to fuel was measured by the 
number of times the storage capacity on the base reached a level of two days worth of 
supply or roughly 15 % of total.  This was determined by the RST as the amount that the 
operational commander would limit operations in order to conserve ready fuel levels to 
maintain the basing alternative operating and plan for any contingencies. 
Operational habitability of the base due to food and water was measured 
by the number of times the storage capacity on the base reached a level of two days worth 
of supply or roughly 15% of total.  This was determined by the RST as the amount that 
the operational commander would limit operations in order to conserve ready food and 
water levels to maintain basing alternative operating and plan for any contingencies. 
Throughput metric was measured by determining the total amount of 
materiel moved per transport event divided by the total amount of time per transport 
event.  This metric allowed the RST to evaluate how each logistics connector performed 
given all the inputs of the model over time.  Each throughput measurement was then 
averaged over the 180 days to find the averaged maintained throughput for each logistics 
connector. 
Supply ship on-station time measured the length of time the supply ship 
was at the logistics rendezvous point to off-load all materiel needed by the RF.  This 
metric allowed for the RST to see which basing and logistic configuration achieved the 
goal of less than 24 hours supply ship on-station time.  Percent level of storage for fuel, 
water and food measured the average level of supply at the basing alternative over the 
entire operation length of 180 days.  This metric allowed for the RST to compare 
modeling configurations with regard to how closely they operated near the threshold.  
The number of logistic connectors lost is the measurement of an average amount of 
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connectors lost over the 180 day operation.  This metric allowed for the RST to compare 
the survivability of each operation and how costly the movement of materiel would be in 
terms of lost dollars and personnel. 
 
5.2.7.4 Software Processes and Limitations 
Extend modeling of Riverine logistics gave the RST a unique insight into 
how the flow of materiel would happen and the different problems that would be 
encountered.  The flow of materiel in Extend is separated into hierarchical blocks to 


































Figure 100.   Extend hierarchical blocks 
 
The first block is the Supply Ship Arrival block.  This block entails the 
different speeds that the supply ship can travel in order to set the supply ship cycle time.  
Inside this block are the amounts of materiel that needs to be transported to the basing 
alternative.  The next block is the loading block.  This block takes all the necessary 
materiel to be moved in terms of fuel, water and food and turns them into a single 
batched item for the logistics connector to move.  The amount of each commodity that is 
batched is dependent upon the priority of the materiel that needs to be moved and the 
capacity of the logistic connector.  The priority of materiel was fuel followed by water 
and finally pallets of food.  Because the logistics connectors were always limited by gross 
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tonnage and not deck space (cubic feet), the RST designed the model to take into account 
that only certain combinations of materiel could be carried each time.  For example an 
LCU-2000 can carry 70,000 gallons of fuel but would only be able to carry 10,000 
gallons or water and no pallets of food.  All of these factors were taken into account and 
depending on the amount of each commodity of materiel a best fit was hard coded into 
the blocks to limit the number of capacity configurations needed to be modeled. 
Once the materiel is loaded the convoy travels up the river.  This block 
included the effects such as water terrain, obscurants, wind, sea state, and hostilities on 
speed.  Also in this block was the survivability option that the RST varied for each 
configuration.  As the connector traveled up the river the total amount of time was 
recorded using timer blocks. 
If the connector made the trip to the basing alternative and was not lost the 
unloading process would begin.  This process is based upon the amount of materiel that 
was loaded and the longest time to off-load an individual commodity.  The RST made the 
assumption that the logistic connector would be able to off-load all three types of 
commodities at the same time, therefore the one commodity with the slowest unload time 
would be the limiting factor. 
As soon as all materiel was unloaded the logistic connector would enter 
the return trip block in order to travel down the river back to the supply ship for the next 
load if needed.  If the supply ship was completely unloaded already the logistic connector 
would just sit and wait for the next supply ship to arrive.  Travel back down the river also 
included the effects of water terrain, obscurants, wind, sea state, and hostilities on speed. 
The limitations discovered in Extend mostly depended on the ordering of 
the blocks and particular block functions.  The batching of supplies required that at least 
one of each type of commodity be batched each time.  This limited the model because the 
RST had to make the assumption that every transport event carried fuel, water, and food.  
Forcing the reservation of space for each commodity is not necessarily how a load master 
would load-out the logistic connector in order to maximize the amount of materiel each 
connector run.  The second limitation has to deal with the ordering of the blocks.  To 
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ensure that the proper amount of each commodity was carried and did not exceed the 
capacity of the logistics connector, gates were implemented into the model to prevent the 
calculation of supplies until the logistic connector was in place to receive the on-load. 
 
5.3 REPAIR GROUP 
5.3.1 Software and Setup 
The RST Repair Group used EXTEND version 6.0.8 to conduct the modeling the 
RF maintenance function.  The foundation for this model was based upon queuing theory, 
whereby the fundamental DOTMLPF resources of SURC’s, maintenance personnel and 
maintenance bays were employed according to the RST scenario’s operational cycle, 
illustrated below in Figure 101. 
 
Figure 101.   RF Maintenance Function Model Block Diagram 
 
The intent of this model was to show utilization rates of maintenance personnel 
and maintenance facilities based over a six month period within the confines of a twelve-
hour work day.  These utilization rates are directly related to the RST’s maintenance 
alternatives of 1) increasing the number of maintenance personnel, 2) varying the number 
of maintenance bays between one and two, and 3) increasing the number of SURC’s 
deployed with the RF, which were all part of the resource pool.  
The SURC’s inherent availability, or Ai, reported by Raytheon in the March 26 
2007 SURC FRACAS indicated an Ai of 98.45%.369  However, this figure was based 
upon mean time between failure (MTBF) and mean time to repair (MTTR) alone, and did 
not account for mean corrective repair time (MCRT), mean preventive repair time 
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(MPRT), mean administrative delay time (MADT) or mean supply response time 
(MSRT).  The RST defied operational availability as: 
o
MTBFA
MTBF MCRT MPRT MSRT
= + + +  
RST Operational Availability370 
 
Please note that the RST incorporated MADT into the MCRT and MPRT 
functions of the RF maintenance model as inherent delays involving a normal distribution 
between .5 and 1.5 hours. 
The first input to this model were the preventive maintenance parameters, defined 
by the U.S. Marine Corps SURC Maintenance and Service Plan, Figure 102, as it 
provided the periodicity, the type of maintenance, the labor hours and the required 
consumable materials required for each preventive maintenance check.  For the purposes 
of the RST scenario, annual and semi-annual checks were omitted, as these checks were 
completed during the pre-deployment phase. 
 
Min Qty Adj Tot Min Hours
SERVICE FUEL TANK
Drain FO Tank water off 15 1 12 180 3
Drain FO Tank Filters water off 5 2 12 120 2
Properly Dispose of Hazardous Material 5 1 12 60 1
REMOVE AND CLEAN SEA WATER 
STRAINERS
Remove and Clean Sea Water Strainers 15 2 12 360 6
GREASE WATERJET THRUST BEARING 
AND STEERING RODS
Grease Thrust Bearing 5 1 4 20 0.33




LABORPM ACTIONS (USMC) Periodicity
Monthly
 
Figure 102.   SURC Preventive Maintenance Example371 
 
The second input to this model, the corrective maintenance parameters, was 
derived from a recent Reliability, Maintainability and Availability (RMA) report (Figure 
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103), from Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, which provided the percent of failures 
by system. 
 
Figure 103.   2006 SURC RMA Report Percent of Failures by System372 
 
The RST used these percentages of failures in conjunction with a SURC failure 
report provided by NSWCCD Little Creek (Table 33), that listed the mean time to repair 
(MTTR) for such failures.373 
 
SYSTEM ACTION REPAIR TIME (hrs)
Exhaust Hanger Bracket Installed bolts on port exhaust bracket 1.61
SURC Hull Dimensions Repaired.  All holes filled with welder. 5.97
SURC Trailer Assy. Welded the rear bunk supports. 12.34  
 
Table 33. SURC Failure and Maintenance Report Excerpt 
 
In order to generate a likelihood of the type of system failure in terms of 
Auxiliary, Propulsion, Hull, Electrical or Transportation, and a most likely time period 
for repair, the system failures provided by NSWCCD Little Creek were arranged by 
system type, and their respective maintenance times were computed by triangular 
distribution (i.e., least, greatest and most likely) using a Microsoft EXCEL statistical 
analysis tool kit.  With regard to the 12.34 hours spent on repairing a SURC Trailer 
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Assembly (Table 33), it is important to note that new all-terrain boat trailers are currently 
being shipped to Riverine Squadron One, and according to the RIVGRU Materiel 
Officer, the RF expects significant improvements regarding the number of transportation 
related failures.374  As with any new system, there is a possibility of increased failure 
reporting at its inception.  Commonly referred to as the “bath tub curve,” Figure 104 
“illustrates certain relative relationships.  Actually, the curve may vary considerably 
depending on the type of system and its operational profile.  Further, if the system is 
continually being modified for one reason or another, the failure rate may not be 
constant.”375 
 
Figure 104.   Typical failure-rate curve relationships 
 
This diagram has particular relevance to new electronics equipment such as Blue 
Force Tracker (BFT) and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) systems, which will be 
installed on all SURC’s for use by 2012.  These modifications are expected to have a 
significant impact on the RF maintenance function in terms of skill set allocation (e.g., 
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too many mechanics and not enough electronics technicians) in order to maintain desired 
levels of operational availability.  
With regard to contractor scheduled maintenance, “The SURC  and Riverine 
Assault Craft are a maintenance intensive watercraft…we must conduct maintenance on 
these craft weekly by trailering the watercraft and allowing our Raytheon Field Service 
Representative to conduct scheduled maintenance to ensure optimal performance. 
(Recommendation) weekly 24 hour stand down back to riverine launch/recover site in a 
secure area where our Field Service Representative can conduct scheduled 
maintenance.”376  Typical maintenance activities of the field representative are described 
in Table 34. 
CONTRACTOR SCHEDULED SERVICE Periodicity
TRANSMISSION 500-HOUR SERVICE
Check flexible coupling & mounting pads 500 hrs
Inspect Clutch Disc for cracks & wear 500 hrs
Inspect Gears for wear 500 hrs
Check indicators for accuracy 500 hrs
Clean Oil Cooler 500 hrs
Replace Zinc Anode 500 hrs
Replace Suction Filter 3000 hrs
ENGINE ADJUSTMENTS
Adjust injection press. & Atomizer 250/1000 hrs
Adjust clearance intake/exhaust 250/1000 hrs
ENGINE MINI-OVERHAUL
Clean engine lube oil cooler 2000 hrs
Replace engine impeller 2000 hrs
Clean engine sea water system 2000 hrs
Clean engine fresh water system 2000 hrs
Adjust of injector timing 2000 hrs
Overhaul fuel feed pump 2000 hrs
Lap the intake & exhaust valves 2000 hrs  
 
Table 34. SURC Maintenance and Service Plan Excerpt377 
 
The RST did not, however, include a specific contractor maintenance function in 
the model and constrained the model to reflect only the maintenance that the RF 
personnel would be responsible for during the scenario.  As discussed earlier, the RST’s 
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intention was to depict the positive impact that additional maintenance personnel would 
have on the SURC operational availability.  It is assumed that additional maintainers with 
increased skill sets will perform certain contractor duties thereby decreasing the RF’s 
dependency on contractor maintenance within the scenario. 
 
5.3.2 Data Outputs 
The EXTEND simulation was based upon a 180-day period, or 4320 hours, where 
the SURC’s were placed into an operational schedule that varied engine operating hours 
from 8.5 to 9.5 hours per mission.  The scheduling function of the model required that no 
less than 4 SURC’s would be sent on patrol at any given time.  Each SURC was assigned 
an attribute of “operating hours” as well as a particular watch section, as to allow the 
model to be able to track the operating hours and status (i.e., on patrol, in maintenance, 
waiting in queue) of each SURC.  Both corrective and preventive maintenance (CM and 
PM, respectively) were highly dependent upon operating hours as.  Each SURC met the 
criteria for CM by reaching a specified amount of operating hours.  In this model, the 
RST chose to use a MTBF of 108 hours, derived from Table 35, as the manufacturer’s 
MTBF from a recent FRACAS report was on an order of magnitude to high for the 
purposes of this study, and only included Mission Critical failures.378 
 
 
Table 35. SURC Reliability379 
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From Table 35, the Repair Group used only F1 failures, those failures which were 
mission critical and require immediate repair, and F2 failures, major failures that could 
lead to mission critical failures and require repair prior to subsequent missions.   A key 
assumption in this model was that only half of the F2 failures were considered to be 
potential mission critical failures.   For the purposes of this study, MTBF was defined as 
Operating Hours divided by the sum of the F1 and F2 failures.  More assumptions 
and limitations of this model are discussed later in this chapter. 
The CM function of the model was enabled when a SURC met the required 
number of operating hours and was then assigned a particular type of fault.  In this case, 
the distribution of failures followed the trend of faults listed in the August 2006 SURC 
RMA report, referred to earlier in this chapter.380  While in the CM loop, the fault would 
be assigned a repair time based upon a triangular distribution of highest, lowest and most 
likely.  For example, 50% of all failures were propulsion related.  When this occurred, it 
required a minimum of 1 hour to repair, a maximum of 9.25 hours, and a most likely 
repair time of 5.32 hours.  These repair times were derived from a recent SURC failure 
report, and the methodology was applied to all five fault categories (i.e., propulsion, 
electrical, auxiliary, hull and transportation).381  The PM function followed a similar 
scheme; however, it was broken down into specific types of periodic maintenance, rather 
than particular failures.  Both the CM and PM functions required particular resources, 
which this model allowed the RST to modify in accordance with our alternatives and 
research data.  Key data outputs included total CM and PM time, total CM and PM 
actions, MCMT, MPMT, Operational Availability, Average Number of SURC’s 
available within the RST scenario, and resource utilization.  The varying the number of  
personnel, maintenance bays, and SURC’s showed that a baseline of 9 personnel (given a 
12-hour shifts), two maintenance bays and 12 SURC’s could produce an Ao of ~90%.  
The Mean Corrective Maintenance and Mean Preventive Maintenance Times varied 
slightly between alternatives; however the model’s configuration made the Ao figure 




5.3.3 Software Processes, Assumptions and Limitations 
Key assumptions included the RST’s assignment of resources with regard to CM 
and PM.  For example, the RST model allowed for 80% of the propulsion faults to be 
repaired dockside, while twenty percent of the propulsion faults required a maintenance 
bay.  Further research into the work break down structure of CM and PM actions within 
the RF, especially considering electronics maintenance in a riverine environment during 
the rainy season, should be of added value to this model.  Another assumption of this 
model was that there was no need to for special tools and that all repair parts were 
available at the FOB.  Furthermore, the maintenance personnel were not responsible for 
any PM below the monthly level (i.e., bi-weekly, weekly, or daily); as such checks were 
assumed to be completed by the boat crews.  With regard to rolling gear and 
transportation equipment, the RST assumed that number of trucks and trailers would be 
minimal, considering the physical layout of the FOB and the requirement for a small 
footprint within the RST scenario.  For this reason, rolling gear maintenance hours were 
restricted only to CM associated with trailers, without any accounting of PM for rolling 
gear.  The RST also discounted administrative delays with the RF maintenance system as 
inconsequential; as such delays do not significantly affect the operational availability 
figures. 
 
5.4 FORCE PROTECTION GROUP 
5.4.1 Software 
The RST used the Map-Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) combat model 




MANA was selected as a choice in modeling due to its high fidelity and 
the nature of this study as a follow on to SEA-10.  MANA is an agent based simulation 
(ABS), meaning that each entity in the simulation is controlled by decision making 
algorithms, instead of specific behaviors dictated by the programmer.382  The primary 
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advantage of MANA over larger physics based programs is the detail and high fidelity of 
MANA.383  “MANA and similar programs are often called complex adaptive systems 
(CAS) because of the way the entities within them react to their surroundings.  There are 
some common properties associated with MANA and CAS combat models.  The first is 
that the “global” behavior of the system emerges as the result of many local interactions.  
The second is that CAS is an example of a process of feedback that is not present in 
“reductionist”, top-down models.   The third is that CAS cannot be analysed by 
decomposition into simple independent parts.  And finally, the fourth common property is 
that Agents interact with each other in non-linear ways, and “adapt” to their local 
environment.   
The MANA model was an attempt to create a complex adaptive system for 
important real-world factors of combat such as: spontaneous change of plans due to the 
evolving battle conditions,the influence of situational awareness on units when deciding 
on a course of action,”384 and the importance of sensors and how to use them to best 
advantage.385 
5.4.1.2 MATLAB 
In addition to MANA, the RST used MATLAB to analyze the effects of 
specific components on the immediate perimeter of the FOB.  “MATLAB is a high-level 
technical computing language and interactive environment for algorithm development, 
data visualization, data analysis, and numeric computation.”386  The model constructed by 
the RST used mathematical analysis with Markovian Chains and a Monte Carlo 
Simulation.  More of the specifics of the mathematical model is discussed further in the 
software set-up for the MATLAB simulation.     
 
5.4.2 MANA Software Setup 
The MANA software was set-up to model the specific architectures for the 
specific threats.  There were four different scenarios modeled according to the 
architectures developed in chapter 4 for the FPS.  The first scenario was a mortar attack 
on the FOB.  The second scenario modeled the commando raid on the FOB.  The third 
300 
scenario modeled the boat attack on the FOB, and the fourth scenario modeled the boat 
attack on the MOB. 
 
5.4.3 Scenario 1: Mortar Attack on the FOB 
In this scenario the Blue force was required to defend against Red insurgents 
firing 82mm mortars. The Red mortar team was modelled as a single man unit capable of 
carrying 15 rounds and a mortar through the use of a slow moving form of transportation, 
such as a horse or cow cart.  The Red mortar personnel were disguised as civilians until 
reaching a certain point at which they set up the mortar within 2 minutes, aim, and fire at 
the operating base as quickly as possible (approximately 10 rounds/minute).  After firing, 
the Red mortar abandoned the weapon and attempted to make a quick exit.  The Red 
mortar had an effective range of 6 km and accurate knowledge and means to aim at the 
FOB through previously gathered intelligence. 
The accuracy of the Red mortar unit could be affected by many factors such as the 
accuracy of the intelligence, crew proficiency, accuracy of the weapon and projectile, and 
size of the intended target.  These inaccuracies were ignored, which enabled the Red 
mortar team to strike at the target with every shot, making this a worst case scenario.  
Figure 105 is a basic diagram of the approaching attack on the FOB. 
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Figure 105.   Mortar Attack Diagram 
 
The terrain surrounding the base was assumed to be flat, but incredibly wet and 
muddy.  This made the use of trucks, such as HMWWVs, impractical as they would get 
bogged down.  The assumption was made that the baseline force protection would only 
be used for peripheral defense. 
In this scenario, 5 Blue defense options would be evaluated against the threat to 
examine their limitations and effectiveness: 
 
a. Baseline base defense without any capability to detect and counter mortar unit  
b. Baseline base defense with UAV and mortar fire support 
c. Baseline base defense with counter-fire radar, mortar fire support 
d. Baseline base defense with counter-fire radar, mortar fire support and UAV 
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The parameters to evaluate effectiveness included: the numbers of Red mortar 
rounds striking the Blue unit and the numbers and the time of Red Mortar unit casualties. 
 
5.4.3.1 Scenario 1A: Mortar  Defense (baseline defense) 




Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Blue TOC Default- Recorded hits from Red Mortar unit
Red Force
Red Mortar unit 82mm mortar (primary)
   Max target/step: 16/100 (4 rds /min). 
   Max effective range: 4km 
   High Explosive (Hit rate): 1 at 0m and 1 
at 6.56m from impact point
   Setup mortar: 1 minutes
   Rounds (per unit): 15
AK-74 5.45mm Assault Rifle (Secondary)
   Max target/step: 200/100 (3 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 500 m max effective 
range 
1km/hr (on to deployment site);
2 km/hr (on retreat)
The unit visual classify 
range was set at 748m
In order to identify and 
able to fire at Blue 
target, the unit was 
linked through inorganic 
situation awareness 
(SA) to a virtual “RED 
REF SEN” unit placed 
beside Blue target. 
Default- Allegiance was set to 0 as a neutral unit and 
unarmed (disguise as civilian). In this state the agent 
was safe from Blue agent.
Reach Final Waypoint – Allegiance was set to 2 and 
threat level 2. At this point a delay was set at 25 steps 
(1min) where Red unit was armed with only AK-74 
rifle as the mortar was deployed. In this state Red unit 
was safe from Blue Mortar counter fire via Counter-
fire Radar Detection, but not if they were visually 
detected by Blue patrol units or UAV that can call for 
Blue Mortar fire or fired it’s own weapon if armed.
Spare 1 –The mortar was armed and waiting for the 
unit to target and fire the first round at Blue unit 
target (Blue TOC or Mortar).
Taken Shot (Pri) –The first round was fired off but 
the threat level remains at 2 for 10 steps (24sec) to 
signify minimum time for counter-fire radar (if 
deployed) to compute Red mortar locations. (Blue 
mortar unit was only able to return fire on Red mortar 
Spare 3 – The threat level was set to 1 where the Red 
mortar unit was now vulnerable to Blue Mortar unit 
counter fire and any approaching Blue unit.
Ammo Out Wpn 2 – Red unit depleted their mortar 
rounds, abandoned the mortar, and head to the 
alternative way point.  Threat level remains as 1 for a 
duration 20 steps (48 sec) as the Red unit was still in 
a region vulnerable to Blue Counter–fire Radar.
Spare 2 – The threat level was set to 2. Now Red 
mortar firer was safe from Blue Counter Battery Fire. 
 
Table 36. Scenario 1A Setup 
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This scenario only consisted of the Red Mortar unit firing at the Blue TOC 
with the described states and weaponry of Table 36.  The Red Mortar unit possessed no 
armor and only took one hit to kill, while the Blue TOC took infinite hits to record how 
many hits struck the base. 
 
5.4.3.2 Scenario 1B: MORTAR DEFENSE (with UAV and mortar fire 
support) 




Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Blue Mortar 120mm mortar (Engage 10 different targets/min)
   Max target/step: 20/100 (5 rds /min). 
   Max effective range: 8200m
   High Explosive (Hit rate):  1 at 0m; 
                          0.5 at 60m from impact
0 8.2 km (UAV 
integrated for fire 
control)
Default- Recorded hits from Red Mortar unit and did 
not fire until fired upon and given Red Mortar 
location through inorganic SA provided by the UAV.  
There were delays in the time to direct counter fire 
from the states built into the Red mortar unit.
Blue UAV None 100km/hr 1.3km Default- Flies patrol route.
Squad Situational Awareness of Enemy contact – 
used to enable the UAV to loiter around any detected 
Neutral, in this case when Red Mortar unit was 
moving towards the firing point, the UAV was able to 
track it.
Red Force
Same as Scenario 
1A
 
Table 37. Scenario 1B Setup 
 
In this scenario, The Blue Mortar unit also functioned as the TOC from 
Scenario 1A in that it recorded the number of hits.  The Blue Mortar used the inorganic 
situational awareness provided by the UAV to locate the Red Mortar Unit.  The Blue 
Mortar unit fired on the Red Mortar Unit when the Red Unit changed their threat level.  It 






5.4.3.3 Scenario 1C: MORTAR DEFENSE (with counter-fire radar, 
mortar fire support) 




Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Blue Mortar with 
integrated 
Counter-fire radar
120mm mortar (Engage 10 different targets/min)
   Max target/step: 20/100 (5 rds /min). 
   Max effective range: 8200m
   High Explosive (Hit rate):  1 at 0m; 
                          0.5 at 60m from impact
0 8.2 km (counter-fire 
radar was integrated 
into the mortar)
Default- Recorded hits from Red Mortar unit and did 
not fire until fired upon.  The enemy location was 
provided through the counter-fire radar that was 
integrated into the mortar.  There were delays in the 
time to direct counter fire from the states built into 
the Red mortar unit.
Red Force
Same as Scenario 
1A  
Table 38. Scenario 1C Setup 
 
In this scenario, the Blue Mortar unit was integrated with the counter-fire 
radar and depended on the Red mortar team to fire first, before locating their target.  The 
Blue Mortar would fire on the Red Mortar unit when their threat level was changed in 
coordination with the Red Mortar unit’s agent states from scenario 1A.   
 
5.4.3.4 Scenario 1D: MORTAR DEFENSE (with counter-fire ground 
radar, mortar fire support and UAV) 
Table 39 describes the entities and their setup used in this scenario.  In this 
scenario, the Blue Mortar with integrated Counter-fire radar was further integrated with 
the UAV to provide continuous coverage of the attacking Red Mortar unit. 
Scenario 1D 
Setup
Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Blue Mortar with 
integrated 
Counter-fire radar
120mm mortar (Engage 10 different targets/min)
   Max target/step: 20/100 (5 rds /min). 
   Max effective range: 8200m
   High Explosive (Hit rate):  1 at 0m; 
                          0.5 at 60m from impact
0 8.2 km (counter-fire 
radar was integrated 
into the mortar)
Default- Recorded hits from Red Mortar unit and did 
not fire until fired upon.  The enemy location was 
provided through the counter-fire radar that was 
integrated into the mortar.  There were delays in the 
time to direct counter fire from the states built into 
the Red mortar unit.
Blue UAV None 100km/hr 1.3km Default- Flies patrol route.
Squad Situational Awareness of Enemy contact – 
used to enable the UAV to loiter around any detected 
Neutral, in this case when Red Mortar unit was 
moving towards the firing point, the UAV was able to 
track it.
Red Force
Same as Scenario 
1A  
Table 39. Scenario 1D Setup 
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5.4.4 Scenario 2: Ground RAID ON FOB 
In this scenario Blue force was required to defend against a huge number of Red 
insurgents (100units) carrying RPGs and rifles. The scenario was modelled as night with 
very low visibility. The Blue unit was aided by night vision giving them the further 
detection range than the Red unit. The Red unit, on the other hand, had intelligence of 
Blue unit patrol position and location of Blue unit firing post as well as lighting from the 
Blue base giving aid in direction. 
The Red had the advantage of numbers and when the Blue unit fired they revealed 
their location for counter fire by Red units.  A Red unit objective was to penetrate into the 
Blue FOB and reach the base centre where they could detonate their bombs.  Red unit’s 
strategy was to concentrate their numbers on one gun post and try to avoid the Blue 
Patrol unit.  Figure 106 is a basic diagram of the raid. 
 
Figure 106.   Raid on FOB Diagram 
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In this scenario, 3 Blue defense options would be evaluated against the threat to 
examine their limitations and effectiveness: 
a. Baseline base defense.  
b. Baseline with sensor fence and 120mm mortar support. 
c. Baseline base defense with 120mm mortar and ROSAM support. 
 
The parameters to evaluate effectiveness included: number of Blue units killed, 
number and time of Red unit casualties, and number of successful Red 
infiltrations. 
 
5.4.4.1 Scenario 2A: GROUND RAID ON FOB (baseline security) 




Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Blue Gun Post (6 units) M2 .50 cal machine guns. 
   Max target/step: 1200/100 (0.5 sec/target). (Since 
two man operate a single M2 gun in each post, each 
man was given a 600/100 max target/step setting)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 1830 m max effective range
0 150m Default- Recorded hits from Red Mortar unit and did 
not fire until fired upon.  The enemy location was 
provided through the counter-fire radar that was 
integrated into the mortar.  There were delays in the 
time to direct counter fire from the states built into 
the Red mortar unit.
Blue Patrol (4 units) M249 5.56mm heavy machine gun (Primary)
   Max target/step: 600/100 (1 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 1000 m from aim point
M16 A2/A3 5.56mm Assault Rifle (secondary)
   Max target/step: 300/100 (2 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 550 m from aim point               
M203 40mm grenade launcher (secondary)
   Max target/step: 50/100 (5 rds/min)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 200 m from aim point
 1 km/hr for 
default state        
2 km/hr for the 
different agent 
state
150m Default- Standard patrol across perimeter defenses at 
1 km/hr.
Inorganic Situational Awareness Enemy contact-  
Patrol Speed increased to 2 km/hr to reached 
detected enemy unit by other Blue agent.  
Blue Personnel (20 
units)
M16 A2/A3 5.56mm Assault Rifle (secondary)
   Max target/step: 300/100 (2 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 550 m from aim point
M203 40mm grenade launcher (secondary)
   Max target/step: 50/100 (5 rds/min)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 200 m from aim point
 0 km/hr for 
default state        
1 km/hr for the 
different agent 
state
150m Default- performing day to day operations, not 
moving
Inorganic Situational Awareness Enemy Contact 1 – 
when Red units were detected, Blue personnel would 
walk towards the waypoint where they can shoot at 
Red units penetrating the perimeter.
Red Force
Red Rifle (50 units) RPK-74 5.45 Light machine gun (Primary)
   Max target/step: 300/100 (2 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 800 m max effective range
1 km/hr 
approaching the 
base                   
2 km/hr when 
fired upon and 
inside the base
100m outside of the 
base, 145 inside the 
base perimeter
Default- Approaching the base.
AK-47 7.62mm Assault Rifle (Primary)
   Max target/step: 200/100 (3 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 300 m max effective range
Squad Situational Awareness Enemy Contact 1- when 
someone in the squad detected a Blue agent, the 
entire squad would engage the Blue agent.            
Shot At (Pri/Sec) – when Blue forces opened fire, 
Red agents began dashing, thus increasing their speed 
from 1 km/hr to 2km/hr.  
Red RPG-7 (50 units)
RPG-7 Launcher (Primary)
   Max target/step: 60/100 (6 rounds/min)
   Accuracy: 0.8 at 300 m max effective range
AK-74 5.45mm Assault Rifle (Primary)
   Max target/step: 200/100 (3 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 500 m max effective range
1 km/hr 
approaching the 
base                   
2 km/hr when 
fired upon and 
inside the base
100m outside of the 
base, 145 inside the 
base perimeter
Default- Approaching the base.
Squad Situational Awareness Enemy Contact 1- when 
someone in the squad detected a Blue agent, the 
entire squad would engage the Blue agent.             
Table 40. Scenario 2A Setup 
 
The Blue Gun Posts were a part of the first layer of base security defense 
ensuring no enemy units could penetrate the peripheral of the base.  Each gun post 
employed required a two man team. A total of  8 gun posts surrounded the FOB, but 6 
were used in this scenario because two of the gun posts were in a position along the river 
where they could not be used against a raid on land. The Blue gun posts were assumed to 
require two hits to kill and had an armour of 10 mm.    The Blue patrol were also a part of 
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the first layer of security and roamed from post to post.  They also were given two hits to 
kill. 
The Blue personnel represented all other personnel within the base that 
were not necessarily a part of perimeter personnel (eg. the resting security team, 
mechanics, cooks etc) that could be deployed in times of emergency to perform the base 
defense role when the base security was overwhelmed by a large number of Red 
insurgent units. In this scenario the Blue personnel were activated when huge numbers of 
Red attacking units were detected by Blue gun post or patrol unit. The Blue Personnel 
would position themselves within range to fire at Red unit penetrating the fence. 
The Red insurgents carried rifle and machine guns without any navigation 
aid, but with intelligence information on Blue gun post positions and visual information 
based on lightings surround Blue FOB.  It was assumed that all of the Red Forces in this 
scenario would only require one hit to kill. 
 
5.4.4.2 Scenario 2B: GROUND RAID ON FOB (with Sensor fence and 
Mortar) 
Table 41 describes the entities and their setup used in this scenario. 
 
Scenario 2B Setup
Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Same as Scenario 2A 
with additional 
Blue Mortar 120mm mortar (Engage 10 different targets/min)
   Max target/step: 20/100 (5 rds /min). 
   Max effective range: 8200m
   High Explosive (Hit rate):  1 at 0m; 
                          0.5 at 60m from impact
0 8.2 km (integrated 
with Sensor Fence and 
Blue Forces for fire 
support)
Default- waited until directed to fire.
Sensor Fence None 0 32 meters Default- sits stationary and detects and sends contact 
identification to other Blue forces and Blue Mortar
Red Force
Same as Scenario 2A  
Table 41. Scenario 2B Setup 
 
In addition to the forces in the previous scenario, the Blue Force added the 
Sensor Fence and the Mortar unit.  The Sensor Fence was setup to deter and slow down 
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Red insurgents penetrating the perimeters.  The Mortar unit was linked to Sensor Fence 
and all Blue units to provide additional artillery support against the attacking Reds. 
 
5.4.4.3 Scenario 2C: GROUND RAID ON FOB (with remote turret) 
Table 42 describes the entities and their setup used in this scenario. 
 
Scenario 2C Setup
Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Same as Scenario 2A 
with additional 
ROSAM (6 units) M2 .50 cal machine guns. 
   Max target/step: 1200/100 (0.5 sec/target). (Since 
two man operate a single M2 gun in each post, each 
man was given a 600/100 max target/step setting)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 1830 m max effective range
0 150m Default- Stationary and ready to fire upon identifying 
an enemy. 
Red Force
Same as Scenario 2A  
Table 42. Scenario 2C Setup 
 
In this scenario, the ROSAM weapon stations replaced the gun posts and 
were assumed to have the same ranges of detection.  The armour was increased to 50mm 
with five hits to kill. 
 
5.4.5 Scenario 3: BOAT ATTACK ON FOB 
In this scenario the Blue force were required to defend against a number of Red 
insurgents in motor boats (12 attacking boats) disguised as civilian crafts carrying hidden 
RPGs and rifles. The scenario was modelled under clear day visibility, as this time of day 
would likely have more traffic and make it easier for the insurgents to blend in.  The main 




Figure 107.   Boat Attack on FOB Diagram 
 
In this scenario, four Blue defensive alternatives would be evaluated against the 
threat to examine their limitations and effectiveness: 
a. Baseline base defense  
b. Baseline base defense with floating barrier 
c. Baseline base defense with floating barrier and ROSAM  
d. Baseline base defense with floating barrier and ROSAM and USV 
 
The parameters used to evaluate effectiveness included the location of Red 




5.4.5.1 Scenario 3A: BOAT ATTACK ON FOB (baseline defense) 
Table 43 describes the entities and their setup used in this scenario. 
 
Scenario 3A Setup
Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Blue Gun Post (4 
units)
M2 .50 cal machine guns. 
   Max target/step: 480/100 (0.5 sec/target). (Since two 
man operate a single M2 gun in each post, each man 
was given a 240/100 max target/step setting)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 1830 m max effective range
0 746m Default- Stationary and ready to fire upon identifying 
an enemy. 
Blue Moored SURCs 
(4 units)
0 0 Default State- the SURCs are not occupied and 
moored  
Red Force
Red Boat RPG-7 Type 
1 (8 units)
RPG-7 Launcher (Primary)
   Max target/step: 24/100 (6 rounds/min)
   Accuracy: 0.8 at 300 m max effective range
AK-74 5.45mm Assault Rifle (Primary)
   Max target/step: 80/100 (3 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 500 m max effective range
12.5 km/hr for 
blending in with 
traffic to 25 km/hr 
on attack
746m Squad Situational Awareness of an Enemy contact 1 
& Taken Shot (Pri/Sec) – when Red units encounter 
approaching Blue or when they reached the way point 
they open fire.  
746m Squad Situational Awareness of an Enemy contact 1 
& Taken Shot (Pri/Sec) – when Red units encounter 
approaching Blue or when they reached the way point 
they open fire.  
Red Boat RPG-7 Type 
2 (4 units)
RPG-7 Launcher (Primary)
   Max target/step: 24/100 (6 rounds/min)
   Accuracy: 0.8 at 300 m max effective range
AK-74 5.45mm Assault Rifle (Primary)
   Max target/step: 80/100 (3 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 500 m max effective range
12.5 km/hr for 
blending in with 
traffic to 25 km/hr 
on attack
746m Squad Situational Awareness of an Enemy contact 1 
& Taken Shot (Pri/Sec) – when Red units encounter 
approaching Blue or when they reached the way point 
they open fire.  
746m Squad Situational Awareness of an Enemy contact 1 
& Taken Shot (Pri/Sec) – when Red units encounter 
approaching Blue or when they reached the way point 
they open fire.   
Table 43. Scenario 3A Setup 
 
For this scenario, the same gun posts used for Scenario 2A are placed 
along the river.  There are only four gun posts against an attacking force of 12 Red boats 
carrying RPGs.  Eight of the boats, RPG-7 Type 1, attack initially and are followed 
shortly after by four more boats. 
 
5.4.5.2 Scenario 3B: BOAT ATTACK ON FOB (baseline defense and 
floating barrier) 
In this scenario, a floating barrier was added that did not have any 
interactions in the scenario other then take away line of sight from the enemy boats to the 
moored SURC’s.  The barriers also made the enemy boats travel snake through the 
barrier instead of charging directly at the moored SURC’S. 
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5.4.5.3 Scenario 3C: BOAT ATTACK ON FOB (floating barrier and 
ROSAM) 
Table 44 describes the entities and their setup used in this scenario. 
 
Scenario 3C Setup
Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Same as Scenario 3B 
with additional
ROSAM (4 units, 
replaced the 4 Gun 
posts)
M2HB .50 cal machine guns. 
   Max target/step: 480/100 (0.5 sec/target). 
   Accuracy:  0.5 at 1830 m max effective range
0 746m Default- Stationary and ready to fire upon identifying 
an enemy. 
Red Force
Same as Scenario 3A  
Table 44. Scenario 3C Setup 
 
In this scenario, the ROSAMs replaced the Blue Gun Posts of Scenario 
3A.  They offered the same amount of armament and hits to kill as they did in Scenario 
2C. 
 
5.4.5.4 Scenario 3D: BOAT ATTACK ON FOB (with baseline defense, 
floating barrier, and patrol boat) 
Table 45 describes the entities and their setup used in this scenario.  This 
scenario was the same as Scenario 3B with the addition of a PB.  The PB conducted a 
patrol around the base of operations and approached any suspicious units moving towards 
the FOB into the restricted zone.  The purpose of the PB was to deter any attack and to 
identify threat early to give more time for engagement.  The PB took 15 hits to kill as it 
was manned by a crew of three and had armor. 
Scenario 3D Setup
Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Same as Scenario 3B
Patrol Boat
M2HB .50 cal machine guns. 
   Max target/step: 480/100 (0.5 sec/target). 
   Accuracy:  0.5 at 1830 m max effective range
25 km/hr 746m Default- Conducting programmed patrol.
Squad Situational Awareness of an Enemy contact 1 
& Taken Shot (Pri/Sec) – when the PB identify a Red 
boat they open fire.  
Red Force
Same as Scenario 3A  
Table 45. Scenario 3D Setup 
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5.4.5.5 Scenario 3E: BOAT ATTACK ON FOB (ROSAM, floating 
barrier, and patrol boat) 
This scenario was the same as Scenario 3C, with the PB that was used in 
Scenario 3D.  The ROSAMs coordinated with the PB to fire on the enemy in the same 
fashion as the manned gun posts. 
 
5.4.6 Scenario 4: BOAT ATTACK ON MOB 
In this scenario the Blue MOB force was required to defend against a number of 
Red insurgents in motor boats (12 attacking boats) disguised as civilian crafts carrying 
hidden RPG’s and rifles. The scenario was modeled with good visibility during the day.  
Two different MOB’s were modeled, the RCSS and the Nobriza and Barge configuration.  
A line of embarkation was assumed to be established around the MOB at 500 meters.  
Whenever a boat crossed the 450 meter range of the MOB it was assumed to be an 
enemy.  Figure 108 is a diagram of the attack against the MOB. 
 
 
Figure 108.   Boat Attack on MOB Diagram 
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In this scenario, 3 Blue defense options would be evaluated against the threat to 
examine their limitations and effectiveness: 
a. RCSS baseline. 
b. RCSS baseline with additional patrol boat. 
c. Nobriza and Barge baseline. 
d. Nobriza and Barge with floating barrier and additional patrol boat. 
 
Parameters to evaluate effectiveness include: 
a. Location of Red casualties. 
b. Number of Blue casualties. 
c. Number of SURC’s destroyed. 
 
5.4.6.1 Scenario 4A: BOAT ATTACK ON MOB (RCSS Baseline) 
Table 46 describes the entities and their setup used in this scenario.  The 
scenario used three red forces to model the RCSS baseline architecture.  There was an 
entity named the MOB which was a focus point of the attack of the Reds along with the 
moored SURC’s.  The 25 mm weapon mounts was also added as the offensive firepower 
for the RCSS.  The attacking Red force was the same as in Scenario 3.  The weapon 





Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
MOB (1 unit) None None None Default-served as a target for the attacking Reds.
Blue moored 
SURCs (4 units)




M242 25mm (Mk38 Mod 2)
Max target/step: 600/100 (1 sec/target). 
Accuracy: 0.5 at 2000 m max effective range
1250m Default- Stationary and ready to fire upon identifying 
an enemy. 
Red Force
Red Boat RPG-7 
Type1 (4 units)
RPG-7 Launcher (Primary)
   Max target/step: 24/100 (6 rounds/min)
   Accuracy: 0.8 at 300 m max effective range
AK-74 5.45mm Assault Rifle (Primary)
   Max target/step: 80/100 (3 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 500 m max effective range
746m Default – Red was given threat 3 which make it safe 
from Blue unit. It was set to move away from USV 
and it’s weapon were all turn on against any detected 
blue units.                                                                   
Reached waypoint & Taken Shot (Pri/Sec) – when Red 
units took a shot at Blue or when they reached the 
waypoint, red units were identified as a threat to blue unit 
and their threat level changed to 2, making them 
vulnerable to Blue fire
Red Boat RPG-7 
Type2 (8 units)
RPG-7 Launcher (Primary)
   Max target/step: 24/100 (6 rounds/min)
   Accuracy: 0.8 at 300 m max effective range
AK-74 5.45mm Assault Rifle (Primary)
   Max target/step: 80/100 (3 sec/target)
   Accuracy: 0.5 at 500 m max effective range
32m Default – Red was given threat 3 which made it safe 
from Blue unit. It was set to move away from USV 
and it’s weapon were all activated but not turn on 
against USV
Enemy Contact 3/ Taken Shot (Pri/Sec) – when Red 
encountered USV or took a shot at Blue units, the Red 
units were identified as a threat to Blue unit and their 
threat level changed to 2, making them vulnerable to 
Blue fire  
Table 46. Scenario 4A Setup 
 
5.4.6.2 Scenario 4B: BOAT ATTACK ON MOB (RCSS baseline with 
Patrol Boat (PB)) 
Table 47 describes the entities and their setup used in this scenario.  This 
scenario added a PB to the defenses of the RCSS.  The PB performed the same task as in 
Scenario 3D.  The PB conducted a patrol around the base of operations and approached 
any suspicious units moving towards the MOB into the restricted zone.  The PB took 15 





Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Same as Scenario 4A 
with
Patrol Boat M2 .50 cal machine guns. 
Max target/step: 480/100 (0.5 sec/target)
Accuracy 0.5 at 1830m max effective range
746m Default- Conducting programmed patrol.
Squad Situational Awareness of an Enemy 
contact 1 & Taken Shot (Pri/Sec) – when the 
PB identify a Red boat they open fire.  
Red Force
Same as Scenario 4A  
Table 47. Scenario 4B Setup 
 
5.4.6.3 Scenario 4C: BOAT ATTACK ON MOB (Nobriza and Barge 
baseline) 
Table 48 describes the entities and their setup used in this scenario.  The 
RCSS was replaced with the Nobriza and barge MOB for this scenario. The dimension of 
the barge was assumed to be similar to previous MOB, with a change in weapon mount 
from the 25 mm cannon to the eight .50 caliber machine guns.  The Nobriza functioned 




Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force








M2HB .50 cal machine guns. 
   Max target/step: 480/100 (0.5 sec/target). 
   Accuracy:  0.5 at 1830 m (max effective 
range)
1830m Squad Situational Awareness of an 
Enemy contact 1 & Taken Shot 
(Pri/Sec) – when the PB identifies a 
Red boat they open fire.  
Nobriza (1 units) 2x Twin M2HB .50 cal machine guns. 
   Max target/step: 480/100 (0.5 sec/target). 
   Accuracy:  0.5 at 1830 m (max effective 
range)
                    0.8 at 320 m 
1x MK19 40mm Grenade MG. 
   Max target/step: 160/100 (40 rds/min). 
   Max effective range: 1500m 
   High Explosive (Hit rate):  1 at 0m;
0 1 f i i
748m Default- Conducting programmed 
patrol.
Squad Situational Awareness of an 
Enemy contact 1 & Taken Shot 
(Pri/Sec) – when the Nobrisa 
identifies a Red boat they open fire.  
Red Force
Same as Scenario  
Table 48. Scenario 4C Setup 
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5.4.6.4 Scenario 4D: BOAT ATTACK ON MOB (Nobriza and Barge 
baseline with barrier and PB) 
Table 49 describes the entities and their setup used in this scenario.  This 
scenario was the same as Scenario 4C with the addition of a PB and a barrier, similar to 
the addition that occurred in Scenario 3D.  The floating barrier took away the enemy’s 
line of sight to the SURC and also made the Red forces snake through the barrier to 





Weapons Moving Speed Identify Range Agent States
Blue Force
Same as Scenario 4C 
with
Patrol Boat M2 .50 cal machine guns. 
Max target/step: 480/100 (0.5 sec/target)
Accuracy 0.5 at 1830m max effective range
746m Default- Conducting programmed patrol.
Squad Situational Awareness of an Enemy 
contact 1 & Taken Shot (Pri/Sec) – when the 
PB identify a Red boat they open fire.  
Red Force
Same as Scenario 4A  
Table 49. Scenario 4D Setup 
 
5.4.7 MATLAB 
The MANA simulation incorporated tactical issues in our analysis, regarding 
sensors, personnel, weapons distribution, and barriers.  Due to the complexity of MANA, 
and our inability to control various parameters, the RST decided to construct a basic-
concepts stochastic MATLAB simulation, where all variables were fully controlled, and 
different dependencies were analyzed.  Specifically, the RST wanted to know the effect 
of the number of sensors, number of personnel, machine guns, bunkers, and IR 
illuminators.  All of these affected the probability to win in combat, and the expected 
number of blue-force personnel that were killed in combat.  This information assisted us 
in deciding on the distribution of sensors, weapons, manpower, and other fighting aids 




A mathematical model was constructed and implemented in MATLAB, as 
a Monte-Carlo simulation of attacks on our FOB.  Each run simulated one attack, which 
ends when one of the sides is annihilated.  The simulation was time-based and uses 
numerical expression rather than event-based because of the complexity of the model and 
the inability to “predict” detection events in analytical expressions.  However, the battle 
itself was modeled using analytical tools of stochastic processes. 
 
5.4.7.2 Matlab Definitions 
 
Blue force Parameters and variables: 
Symbol Description Value taken in the 
simulation
σ Mean atmospheric attenuation at the sensor’s 
wavelength (8-12µm).
2.3Km-1
(Assuming rain rate of 
25mm/h)
NB The total number of armed blue force personnel Variable, 1 to 60
PB-k-R | h The probability that a red-force personnel will 
be killed given that he was hit by a blue-force 
weapon (depends on the type of weapon and his 
body armor)
0.6
BlueErr standard deviation of the angular error of the 
blue-force weapon
10 / 40 mrad 
(With/Without IR 
illumination)
BlueExpH / W The average exposed Height / Width of the blue-
force personnel body, behind cover
Without Bunker: 0.3m x 
0.4m
With Bunker: 0.15m x 
0.25m
Exposed Guards: 1.7m x 
0.4m
BlueFireRate The fire rate of the blue force weapon MAG – 240 min-1
Light Weapons – 40 min
-1
TAve-det Average time of the blue force’s sensors to 
detect a red force in “staring” mode
0.5 sec
FOVH (V) Sensors field of view Horizontal - 20deg
Vertical – 15deg
FOVTOT-V Total vertical FOV, for each sweep 30deg
ScanRateV Vertical scan rate of each sensor (vertical 
“sweep” rate)
Vertical – 10deg/sec
Nsensors Total number of identical IR sensors Variable, 0-20
N50 Number of lines needed to detect and recognize 
a red force
3 lines (“Recognition”)
Tsurprise The time it takes to the blue guards to take cover 
in case of a surprise of the red forces
4 sec
Nguards Number of blue force patrolling guards at any 
given time, that are exposed during a possible 
surprise
4
Tfind-red Average  time to find a red force personnel in 
the bushes
1 or 2 sec (With / Without 
illumination)
NMin-Det-To-Engage Minimal red forces to detect before engaging 5  
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Red force Parameters and variables: 
 
Symbol Description Value taken in the 
simulation
NR The total number of armed red force personnel Variable, 5-30
M-16: 0.8
MG: 0.95
RedErr standard deviation of the angular error of the red-
force weapon
20mrad
RedExpH / W The average exposed Height / Width of the red-
force personnel body
0.4m x 0.4m
RedFireRate The fire rate of the red force weapon 40 min-1 (Light Weapons)
RangeToShoot The range from the blue forces, at which the red 





V Velocity of the red forces – radial, towards the 
FOB
2m/s
∆T Temperature difference between target and 
background
6°K




PercentVisible The percentage of the red force personnel’s 
body that’s thermal radiation can reach the 
sensors (The rest is assumed to be covered by 
vegetation / concealing)
50%
PB-k-R | h The probability that a red-force personnel will 
be killed given that he was hit by a blue-force 
weapon (depends on the type of weapon and his 
body armor)
InitialRange(i) Initial distance of red forces from the FOB. 
Random variables, uniformly distributed 




5.4.7.3 Main assumptions 
• The battle occurred at night, hence visual detection of the red forces 
was irrelevant. Initial detection was made only with thermal imagers.  
Later detection was made either visually or with illuminators. 
• Since the blue forces were stationary in their base, they were more 
easily located and aimed at then the red forces, which were assumed to 
be well camouflaged in the dark forest.  Hence, the shooting error was 
significantly larger for the blue forces, unless they used IR 
illuminators.  However, the shooting rate and range of the blue forces’ 
weapons could be significantly higher if they used heavier weapons. 
• The red forces advanced up to a certain point – RangeToShoot - from 
which they would start their surprise attack, unless five of them were 
already detected.  
• Combat ended when all blue/red forces were killed. 
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• There were no “waves” of forces coming into the fight – whoever 
participated in the battle, arrives right at the beginning of it.  The only 
exception was the exposed guards that may be surprised and fight 
independently of the other forces, until they join them.  
• The sensors on the perimeter of the FOB were thermal sensors. The 
detection model was based on the ACQUIRE model for thermal 
detectors. 
• Only red forces could surprise the blue forces because red forces 
initiated the attack and the blue forces were stationary and being 
surveyed constantly by the red forces.  If red forces were detected, 
they were assumed to notice immediately this detection. 
• This model assumed light-weapons for the red forces and light and 
heavy weapons for the blue forces. 
• Blue forces could use IR illuminators, bunkers to shoot from, and 
always had better body armor.  
• Multiple sensors scanned the field of regard such that each sensor 
received an equal portion of the scene, i.e. the horizontal field of 
regard is 360˚ / number of sensors, for every thermal imager. 
 
5.4.7.4 MATLAB Model 
Step 1:  The number of red forces was distributed uniformly between 
RangeMin and RangeMax. A range R(i) was assigned to each red force personnel, i, 
},...,,{ RNi 21∈ . 
Step 2:  Red forces advanced independently, at velocity V.  The number of 
sensors, Nsensors, were scanning the battlefield.  Probability of detection, per one 
timestep, was calculated according to the ACQUIRE model, with a representative 
thermal sensor for automatic detection, as follows: 
},...,,{ RNi 21∈∀  (For every Red force personnel) 
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The thermal contrast between the target and its background, as received in 
the sensor’s optics plane: 
)/)(exp()( σ⋅−⋅= 1000iRTisignal ∆  





















The formula above was an approximation to an MTF curve of a typical 
thermal imager.387 
Number of cycles resolved by the imager: 
[ ]1000/)(/*)()(Re iRCifiN dRsolvedCycles =−  





























Where 50N  was the number of cycles required to be resolved on the target 
in order to achieve a 50% probability of discrimination (for detect, classify, recognize, 
identify). 
7072 ..)( +=iE   50N
iN solvedCycles )(Re−
 
In order to get the actual probability of detection, Pinf (i) needed to be 
multiplied by the probability that the target will be in the FOV of one of the sensors 
during one time-step 
[ ]11 −⋅⋅⋅−−= τmNtimestepScan sensorsexp  
Where:  










m was the probability that a target will be in the current field of view. 
ScaniPiP ⋅= )()( infdetect  
 
Step 3:  All red forces personnel that were not detected advanced towards 
the FOB at velocity V, during the time-step.  Forces that have reached the minimal range 
of attack – RangeToShoot will stop there.  The scenario did not go to step 2 until all red 
forces reached the RangeToShoot or NMin-Det-To-Engage were detected. 
Step 4:  Surprise of the Blue guards: All of the red forces that reached 
RangeToShoot without being detected shot at the exposed guards for Tsurprise seconds – 
until the guards took cover.  
Step 5:  Battle starts.  The Red and blue forces started shooting 
simultaneously, in their own rate of detection + fire, until one of the sides was 
annihilated. 
Let: 
B-hit-RP - the probability that a red force weapon hit a blue force personnel 
R-hit-BP - the probability that a blue force weapon hit a red force personnel.  
















































(erf stands for the error function.) 
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h|B-k-RP and h|R-k-BP were taken as parameters (see definitions and values in 
the table above), such that the total probability of kill was: 
R-k-BP = h|R-k-BP  x R-hit-BP  (this was for red forces) 
The results of the combat were calculated using the Markov chain 
technique, where the transition between each stage occured when one person was killed 









Where: I was the identity matrix, R was the transition sub-matrix from 
transient states to absorbing states, Q was transition sub-matrix from transient states to 
transient states, 0 was the zeros matrix.  Since we assumed that our battle ends when 
either side was completely annihilated, our absorbing states were when either nb=0 or 
nR=0, where nb was the transient number of blue forces, and nR was the transient number 
of red forces. 
The R-matrix was built from the different combinations of numbers of 

































































































Where each element ),(),,( RBRB nnnn
P 2211  stood for the probability of transition 
from state (n1B, n1R) to state (n2B, n2R).  This was actually the probability that Blue would 
kill a Red first, if n2R = n1R, and n2B = n1B -1, and the probability that Red would kill a 
Blue first, if n2B = n1B, and n2R = n1R -1.  If these four variables did not satisfy one of 
these conditions, then the value of ),(),,( RBRB nnnn
P 2211   would be zero. 
The Q-matrix was built only from the different combinations of numbers 































































































If an exponential distribution of the time to detect and designate a Red 
target in the bush and an exponential distribution of the time to kill, for both sides, was 
assumed, then the case of one illuminator for blue forces becomes (after some algebraic 
manipulation): 
 
( ) ( )
































































B +λ  is the rate (sec-1) of target designation (IR illumination) on 
the Red forces. 
kill






B nP ⋅⋅= λλ   
Notice that nB  is the transient number of blue forces, not the initial – NB. 
kill






R nP ⋅⋅= λλ   
In case of individual and independent designators, we can approximate: 
( ) 111 −−−++ +≈ killBdesignatefindBdesignatefindB λλλ  
The expected number of blue personnel killed in the end of the combat, for 
NR reds and NB Blues would be: 









Where k1 is the transient index with a function f:(i,j)Æk1, and k2 is the 
absorbing index, with a function g:(l,m)Æk2.  KB is a vector of size NB + NR , that holds 
the number of killed personnel for every absorbing state. 
After this step the battle “ends”, and the expected number of personnel 
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6. COST ESTIMATION 
6.1 COST ESTIMATE PURPOSE AND COMPONENTS 
Cost analysis is the art of weapon system cost estimating.  It involves 
using incomplete, inaccurate, and changing data of an outmoded & 
ineffective weapon system to derive the precise cost of purchasing an 
unknown quantity of an undefined weapon to satisfy an overly 
exaggerated and unvalidated requirement at some time in the future, under 
uncertain conditions, with a minimum of funds.  Cost estimate is an 
analysis of individual cost elements using established methodologies to 
project from data to estimated future cost.388 
There are two different purposes for conducting cost analysis.  First, cost analysis 
can be use to “translate system/functional requirements associated with programs, 
projects, or processes into budget requirements to determine and communicate a realistic 
view of the likely cost outcome, which can form the basis of the plan for executing the 
work.”389  Or cost analyst is done “to decide which of the possible alternatives is more 
desirable and recommends a course of action that will steer decision makers towards it 
and away from undesirable alternatives.”390  The RST used cost analysis to compare 
feasible alternatives in supply, repair, force protection, and communications.  Several 
physical systems were derived for each functional area.  In-depth cost analysis was 
performed for each system component.  And costs were normalized to fiscal year 2007 
dollars (FY07$) for “apples to apples” comparison.  The purpose of RST’s cost analysis 
was to articulate to the decision maker what alternatives had the “biggest bang for their 
buck”. 
“Cost analysis is the process of collecting and analyzing historical data and 
applying quantitative models, techniques, tools, and databases to predict the future cost of 
an item, product, program or task. The art of approximating the probable worth (or cost) 
extent, or character of something based on information available at the time.”391  The 
RST primarily focused on operating and support cost (O&S) over a five year span (2012-
2022).  O&S cost are the “estimated cost of operating and supporting the fielded system, 
including all direct and indirect costs incurred in using the system, e.g., personnel, 
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maintenance (unit and depot), and sustaining investment (replenishment spares). The bulk 
of life-cycle costs occur in this category.”392 
Procurement costs were analyzed for the communications and force protection 
alternative architectures since communications and sensor equipment procurement was 
necessary.  “Procurement cost included total cost of procuring the prime equipment; 
related support equipment; training; initial and war reserve spares; pre-planned product 
improvements and military construction.”393  In the developing this cost analysis, the 
RST was careful not to use any proprietary or for official use only material.  All cost 
estimates were developed from open source material. 
 
6.2 SUPPLY GROUP 
The RST looked at the cost of the LCU-1610, LCU-2000, Jim G, and the CH-
53E.  Procurement cost was obtained for all of the platforms regardless of whether or not 
they are in the US inventory.  Operating and support costs were divided into three 
categories:  mission personnel costs, unit-level consumption costs and intermediate 
maintenance costs. 
For the logistic connectors, mission personnel include the costs of the operators, 
maintenance personnel and other direct support personnel.  Unit-level consumption 
includes the cost of POL, support supply parts, and training munitions.  Intermediate 
maintenance includes the cost of labor afloat and ashore. 
Procurement cost of an LCU-1610 is approximately $1,146,000.394  O&S cost for 
the LCU-1610 came from Assault Craft Unit One (ACU-1), who is responsible for 16 
LCUs.  The cost per hour for O&S was recorded and calculated.  Personnel cost was 
based off of the 14 crewmembers.  Unit-level consumption cost was based off of fuel 
consumption of 64 gallons per hour and the average annual cost for supply parts based 
off of their records.  Intermediate maintenance cost came from their records.  In order to 
calculate the average yearly O&S costs, ACU-1 said that the number of operating hours 
per craft is 50 hours per month or 600 hours per year.395  Table 50 shows the breakdown 





Unit Level Consumption $145,288
Intermediate Maintenance $92,702
Total $359,748  
Table 50. One Year O&S Cost for LCU-1610396 
 
Procurement cost of an LCU-2000 is approximately $2,286,000.397  O&S cost for 
the LCU-2000 came from the Army Operating and Support Management Information 
System (OSMIS) and calculations based off of crew and fuel consumption.  Personnel 
cost was based off of 17 crewmembers.  Fuel consumption was calculated from data 
concerning fuel capacity, cruising speed, and range.398  Similar to the LCU-1610, the 
RST assumed that the number of operating hours per craft is 600 hours per year.  Because 
of the LCU-2000’s size compared to the LCU-1610, intermediate maintenance was 
assumed to be 25% more than the LCU-1610 intermediate maintenance cost.  The rest of 





Unit Level Consumption $397,098
Intermediate Maintenance $115,878
Total $568,814  
Table 51. One Year O&S Cost for LCU-2000399 400 
 
Procurement cost for the Jim G is approximately $5 million.401  Note: the 
estimated cost is the general market value based on class and age.  It cannot be construed 
as a quote or offer for sale.  Yearly fuel consumption was calculated by acquiring the fuel 
consumption of 55 gallons/hour and assuming that there will be 600 operating hours per 
year.402  O&S cost for mission personnel, other consumables and maintenance is 
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approximately $2000 a day.403  Assuming an eight hour workday and 600 operating hours 
per year, there are 75 operating days.  Table 52 shows the breakdown of O&S cost. 
 
Jim G FY 07$
Mission Personnel $118,980
Unit Level Consumption $84,810
Intermediate Maintenance $70,680
Total $274,470  
Table 52. One Year O&S Cost for Jim G404 
 
Procurement cost of the CH-53E is $31,185,000.405  O&S cost for the CH-53E 
came from the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC).  O&S cost in fiscal year 2007 dollars (FY07$) from 1997 to 2006 was 
obtained.  The RST calculated annual O&S cost by getting the average cost from the 10 




Unit Level Consumption $560,401
Intermediate Maintenance $435,680
Total $1,619,778  
Table 53. One Year O&S Cost for CH-53E406  
 
The total cost includes procurement cost if applicable plus five year operating and 
support cost.  Assuming an average OPTEMPO, five year O&S cost was calculated by 
multiplying the annual O&S cost by five.  Table 54 and Figure 109 show the total five 






Five Year O&S 
(FY07$)
Total Five Year Cost 
(FY07$)
LCU-1610 $1,146,000 $359,748 $1,798,740 $2,944,740
LCU-2000 $2,286,000 $568,814 $2,844,070 $5,130,070
Jim-G $5,000,000 $274,470 $1,372,350 $6,372,350
CH-53E $31,185,000 $1,619,778 $8,098,888 $39,283,888  
Table 54. Procurement and Five Year O&S Cost for Supply Connectors 
 




















5 Year O&S Procurement
 
Figure 109.   Procurement and Five Year O&S Cost of Supply Connectors 
 
The CH-53E is the most expensive supply connector alternative.  If vessels are 
only used, the Jim G is the most expensive supply vessel alternative.  The Jim G is over 
twice as much as the LCU-1610.  The Jim G, however, has the lowest O&S cost.  It is 
over half of the O&S cost of the LCU-2000. 
 
6.3 REPAIR GROUP 
This section presents cost estimation for our RF maintenance organization.  Parts 
cost estimates were generated from for official use only (FOUO) data maintained by the 
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manufacturer, SAFE Boats International, thus some details are omitted for proprietary 
purposes.  Based on our three alternatives, increases to maintenance bays, number of 
SURC’s, and number of skill sets (personnel), there are seven different combinations of 
alternatives.  This estimation was first developed as an initial cost survey for the baseline 
riverine squadron maintenance section then several alternatives were assessed. 
The mission personnel category of the cost estimation relates to the cost of 
military personnel who perform maintenance on the SURC’s and rolling gear.  The 
baseline maintenance team consists of eleven personnel in the following pay grades:  1 E-
7, 5 E-5’s, and 5 E-4’s.  This cost will consider their regular military compensation which 
includes basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence and housing, and tax advantages from 
untaxed allowances.  The information was obtained from data that was listed in the Navy 
Times 2007 Regular military compensation and represents the average annual military 
salary earned by service members.407  Table 55 represents the total cost of the average 
annual military salary per year for a total for five years. 
 
Pay Grade Number of Personnel
Annual Individual 
Salary        (FY07$)
Total 5 Year Personnel 
Cost (FY07$)
E-7 1 $65,049 $325,247
E-5 5 $51,150 $1,278,748
E-4 5 $42,944 $1,073,593
Total 11 $159,143 $2,677,588  
Table 55. Annual Military Salaries 
 
The remaining four areas of cost estimation, unit-level consumption, intermediate 
maintenance, contractor support, and sustaining support were obtained from the SURC’s 
LCCE provided by the manufacturing company, which consisted of three years of data.408  
Regression was used to estimate the cost for the forth and fifth years, the data was scaled 
for 12 SURC’s then normalized to reflect FY07 dollars resulting in a total cost of 
$5,675,634.82 for the baseline maintenance system and is summarized in Table 56. 
335 
Yearly O&S Cost 
(FY07$
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Consumable Material / Repair Parts 
 
Table 56. Maintenance System Five Year O&S Cost 
 
Operations personnel, other personnel and expendable stores and munitions were 
omitted from this cost estimation due to our focus on those cost affecting solely the 
maintenance system.  POL/Expendable Consumption was addressed in the logistics 
portion of this study. 
Unit-level cost was represented by cost of consumable material/repair parts.  
Consumable repair cost was an estimate from the older riverine assault craft (RAC) and 
includes the cost of all maintenance materials required to sustain the SURC.  Training 
reflected the cost to train the eleven mechanics and is based off an estimate from the cost 
of training the Marine Corps equivalent engineer equipment mechanic.  Intermediate 
maintenance cost reflected the cost of labor related to 3rd/4th echelon support external to 
the unit.  Contractor support and contractor maintenance support estimated the cost of 
labor, materials, and overhead incurred in providing logistics support to the SURC.  
Sustaining support cost includes an estimate of the cost of installing modifications and 
upgrades and is again based on estimates from the RAC. 
In addition to the O&S cost, each alternative contributed a procurement cost 
dependant on how alternatives were applied to the maintenance system.  The following 
table lists the three alternatives and their cost in FY07 dollars.  It is important to note, that 
the SURC will be used as a float boat so we assumed O&S would be negligent and only 
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considered its procurement cost.  Furthermore, in the case of the maintenance bay, the 
procurement cost was only considered, as the O&S for the tent would be minimal. 
 









Personnel $5,675,635 $51,150 $0 $0 $5,726,785
SURC $5,675,635 $0 $671,825 $0 $6,347,460
Bay $5,675,635 $0 $0 $33,628 $5,709,263
Personnel & SURC $5,675,635 $51,150 $671,825 $0 $6,398,610
Personnel & Bay $5,675,635 $51,150 $0 $33,628 $5,760,413
SURC& Bay $5,675,635 $0 $671,825 $33,628 $6,381,088
Personnel & SURC &Bay $5,675,635 $51,150 $671,825 $33,628 $6,432,238  
 
Table 57. Five Year O&S Cost of Repair Alternatives 
 
The cost of an E-5 with 10 years service was chosen as an assumption of the 
various times in service and pay grades of additional personnel.  From the Table 57, we 
can see the great cost comes from the SURC or any alternatives involving the SURC.  
The least expensive means of affecting the maintenance system was through the addition 
of maintenance bays. 
 
6.4 FORCE PROTECTION GROUP 
The cost estimation for FPS was similar to the other sections in the study and 
consisted of procurement and five year operations and support costs.  The estimates were 
generated from open source information available on the internet, discussions with 
vendors, and comparisons with analogous systems.  Personnel cost were a large driver of 
O&S costs for each alternative.  Each person was assumed an E-5 with 10 years.  The 
cost was taken from the Regular Military Compensation, which is the average annual 






6.4.1 Mortar Alternatives 
Table 58 is the cost for the mortar alternatives. 
Baseline (already in RF) $0 $0 $0
Mortar and UAV $93,000 $2,493,500 $2,586,500
Mortar $18,000 -- $18,000
Five man crew -- $1,535,000 $1,535,000
Three Silver Fox UAVs $75,000 $37,500 $112,500
Three UAV operators -- $921,000 $921,000
Mortar and LCMR $668,000 $1,560,000 $2,228,000
Mortar and crew (above) $18,000 $1,535,000 $1,553,000
LCMR $650,000 $25,000 $675,000
Mortar, LCMR, UAV $743,000 $2,518,500 $3,261,500
Mortar and crew (above) $18,000 $1,535,000 $1,553,000
UAV and crew (above) $75,000 $958,500 $1,033,500
LCMR $650,000 $25,000 $675,000
Mortar Alternatives Procurement 5 year O&S Total Cost
 
Table 58. Mortar Alternatives Cost Estimation 
 
The baseline cost for mortar defense was assumed to be zero, as there were no 
components used to counter the mortar threat for the baseline architecture. 
The M120 Mortar costs $18,000 each and requires a 5-men crew.  The RST 
assumed that this was the only crew required as the mortar will not require constant 
manning.  The maintenance for the mortar was assumed as zero because it is an offensive 
weapon which will only be employed in the event of an attack by insurgents.  Daily 
maintenance at the FOB would be carried out by the operators themselves.  The 
operations and support costs included the personnel cost for the 5 members of the crew.  
With 5 members, the total operating and support cost for a five year period was 
approximately $1,535,000. 
The procurement cost for each Silver Fox was assumed to be $25,000 as the 
current prototype costs $50,000,410 and production costs are typically half that of 
prototypes.  Because the Silver Fox has an approximate 8 hour loiter time, three would 
have to have continuous patrol.  The RST assumed that one person would be required to 
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operate the Silver Fox for each eight-hour period, so the cost was generated for three 
people. 
The mortar and LCMR architecture had the equivalent cost of the mortar and 
crew with the addition of the cost of an LCMR.  The LCMR costs approximately 
$650,000 to procure.411  The radar, originally designed for special operations forces, 
consists mainly of electronic parts which will be replaced rather than repaired when 
damaged.  The cost estimate for one system was estimated at $5,000 a year in an 
analogous relationship with the larger AN/TPQ 37 Firefinder Radar.  The estimate was 
based on the data available for the maintenance cost for AN/TPQ 37 Firefinder Radar on 
OSMISWEB412.  The Firefinder Radar cost $50,000 a year to maintain, based on the 
figures available for FY2000-2006. LMCR’s maintenance cost was estimated at 10% of 
the Firefinder based on the size ratio of both the systems, for a total cost of $5,000 per 
system per year, for a total cost of $25,000.  Personnel in the TOC that were already a 
part of the RF would operate and maintain the LCMR, so no additional personnel cost 
was included in the 5 year O&S costs.  The cost of the mortar, LCMR, and UAV 
architecture was a combination of the costs previously discussed. 
 
6.4.2 Commando Raid 
Table 59 is the cost for the Commando Raid alternatives. 
Baseline $0 $11,048,000 $11,048,000
36 Augment personnel -- $11,048,000 $11,048,000
Baseline, Sensor Fence, and Mortar $38,900 $12,598,700 $12,637,600
36 Augment personnel -- $11,048,000 $11,048,000
Mortar $18,000 -- $18,000
Five man crew -- $1,535,000 $1,535,000
Sensor Fence $20,900 $15,700 $36,600
ROSAMS $1,200,000 $6,424,000 $7,624,000
6 ROSAMS $1,200,000 $900,000 $2,100,000
18 Operators $0 $5,524,000 $5,524,000
Commando Raid Alternatives Procurement 5 year O&S Total Cost
 
 
Table 59. Commando Raid Alternatives Cost Estimation 
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The baseline architecture consisted of 12 personnel manning six machine guns.  
The RST established three rotations of these personnel to provide a continuous manning 
in three 8-hour shifts, for a total of 36 personnel.  The cost estimation excludes all the 
training and development of the personnel prior to their deployment in the Area of 
Operations.  The figure is based purely on the compensation that these 36 E5 will receive 
over the period of 5 years. 
The next architecture added the cost of the mortar and Sensor Fence to the 
baseline cost.  The cost of the mortar was the same as that in the mortar alternatives.  
Actual cost of the Sensor Fence could not be gathered, but the cost of the fence system 
employed in this configuration was approximately $20,900.  The RST assumed that 10 
nodes would be needed for the Sensor Fence, with the cost of each node at $8000.  The 
RF would also need to procure a computer and software which would cost approximately 
$12000.  The cost of the waveguide wire, clips, and miscellaneous hardware amounted to 
approximately $1 per meter, and the fence employed was approximately 900 meters long.  
The operating and support cost for the system was assumed at approximately 15% of the 
total cost each year for a total five year O&S cost of approximately $15,700. 
The cost for the ROSAM was $200,000 each for procurement for a total of 
$1,200,000.413  The O&S costs were considered to be %15 of the total procurement costs 
each year.  For a five year period, this put the total O&S cost at $900,000.  The RST 
assumed that one operator would be required for each system for 8 hours, so the total 









6.4.3 FOB Boat Attack  
Table 60 is the cost for the FOB Boat Attack alternatives. 
Baseline $0 $7,366,000 $7,366,000
24 Augment personnel -- $7,366,000 $7,366,000
Baseline and Water Barrier $400,000 $7,374,250 $7,774,250
24 Augment personnel -- $7,366,000 $7,366,000
Water barrier $400,000 $8,250 $408,250
Water Barrier and ROSAMS $1,200,000 $4,291,250 $5,491,250
Water Barrier $400,000 $8,250 $408,250
4 ROSAMS $800,000 $600,000 $1,400,000
12 Operators -- $3,683,000 $3,683,000
Baseline, Water Barrier, and Patrol Boats $608,000 $10,292,250 $10,900,250
Baseline + Barrier (above) $400,000 $7,374,250 $7,774,250
2 Patrol Boats $208,000 $156,000 $364,000
9 PB operators $0 $2,762,000 $2,762,000
ROSAM, Water Barrier, and Patrol Boats $1,408,000 $7,209,250 $8,617,250
ROSAMs + Barrier (above) $1,200,000 $4,291,250 $5,491,250
2 Patrol Boats $208,000 $156,000 $364,000
9 PB operators $0 $2,762,000 $2,762,000
FOB Boat Attack Procurement 5 year O&S Total Cost
 
Table 60. Cost Estimation for FOB Boat Attack Alternatives 
 
The baseline architecture contained four machine gun posts along the river 
requiring eight personnel.  Again, eight-hour watches were assumed making the total 
number of personnel necessary 24. 
The WhisprWave Barrier employed in this architecture was approximately 1000 
feet long.  The manufacturer quoted the required system at $400 per linear foot, making 
the total procurement cost approximately $400,000.414  This configuration was outfitted 
with an additional spare parts kit for repairs per every 200 linear feet, at a cost of $1,650 
per kit.415  The number of kits required would be five, so the total expense was $8,250.  
The RST assumed no other cost other than the initial cost of the repair kits for O&S costs.   
The Water Barrier and ROSAMs architecture had the equivalent cost of the 
WhisprWave barrier in addition to the cost of four ROSAMs.  The ROSAMs had the 
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same breakdown in cost at $200,000 each for procurement, and %15 annual O&S, as 
discussed in the Commando Raid architectures.  For four ROSAMs, the O&S cost was 
$600,000.  Again, the RST assumed the systems required three operators each for a 24- 
hour day for a total of 12 operators. 
This architecture had the same cost estimations for the baseline and Water Barrier 
architectures with the addition of a PB.  The RST assumed that two PBs would be 
procured in case of one malfunction.  The PB required a crew of three, so nine operators 
would be needed for 24-hour operations.  The procurement cost for a PB was $68,000 
each, or $132,000 for both.416  The RST assumed 10% O&S costs for each patrol boat for 
a five year period for a total of $68,000 total O&S.  The crew required to operate a PB is 
three personnel, and to maintain the three shifts, nine personnel were used.  The final cost 
estimation for the ROSAM, Water Barrier, and PB architecture was simply a summation 
of the various components of the previous architectures. 
 
6.4.4 MOB Boat Attack 
Table 61 is the cost for the MOB Boat Attack alternatives. 
 
RCSS Baseline $0 $9,207,000 $9,207,000
30 Weapon Station Personnel $0 $9,207,000 $9,207,000
RCSS and Patrol Boats $208,000 $12,125,000 $12,333,000
RCSS baseline $0 $9,207,000 $9,207,000
2 Patrol Boats $208,000 $156,000 $364,000
9 PBL operators $0 $2,762,000 $2,762,000
Nobriza and Barge Baseline $0 $7,366,000 $7,366,000
24 Weapon Station Personnel $7,366,000 $7,366,000
Nobriza and Barge Baseline, Patrol Boats, Barrier $336,000 $10,287,300 $10,623,300
Norbriza and Barge Baseline $7,366,000 $7,366,000
Barrier $128,000 $3,300 $131,300
2 Patrol Boats $208,000 $156,000 $364,000
9 PBL operators $0 $2,762,000 $2,762,000
MOB Boat Attack Procurement 5 year O&S Total Cost
 
 
Table 61. Cost Estimation for MOB Boat Attack Alternatives 
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The baseline cost for the RCSS was derived from the personnel required to man 
the 8 universal weapon stations and the 25 mm chain guns on the ship.  Each weapon 
station required one personnel and the same shift rotation was applied.  This made the 
total personnel necessary up to 30 personnel. 
The components in the other architectures for this scenario match the components 
in the FOB Boat Attack scenario.  The cost for the PB’s and their required personnel, for 
example, had the same cost.  The cost of the WhisprWave barrier was less in this 
scenario, however because the length of the configured barrier was less than a third of the 
barrier constructed for the FOB, at 320 feet.  With the same cost of $400 per foot, the 
cost to procure the barrier in this scenario was $128,000.  The RST assumed that two of 
the repair kits were procured for the O&S costs, so the O&S costs for the barrier in this 
scenario was $3,300. 
 
6.5 MOBILE OPERATING BASE 
The RST calculated the operating and support cost of the RCSS, RSS-207 
Endurance, KD-1505 Sri Inderapura, Nobriza, and a barge.  Because the RST’s scenario 
involves coalition operations, the RST did not include procurement costs for military 
platforms except for the Nobriza; there exists possibilities of procuring the Nobriza to 
add to the USN inventory.  There was also conversion cost for the RCSS.  Operating and 
support costs were divided into six categories:  mission personnel, unit-level 
consumption, intermediate maintenance, depot maintenance, sustaining support, and 
indirect support. 
Mission personnel include the operators, maintenance personnel and other direct 
support personnel.  Unit-level consumption includes the cost of POL, support supply 
parts, and training munitions.  Intermediate maintenance includes the cost of labor afloat 
and ashore.  Depot maintenance includes the cost of labor in performing major overhauls.  
Sustaining support includes any system improvements or modifications.  Finally, indirect 
support includes programs necessary to maintain a quality of force and installation 
support.  Note: O&S cost for specific platforms could not be found.  Instead, the RST 
343 
compared the cost to similar platforms whose data could be found through VAMOSC and 
estimated the cost based on number of crew and size of the platform. 
Cost for the RCSS came from the RCSS Conversion report as well as VAMOSC.  
According to the report, the conversion cost is approximately $166 million.417  Table 62 








Total $148,000,000  
Table 62. RCSS Conversion Cost418 
 
After inflation the conversion cost in FY07$ is approximately $167 million.  
Because the RCSS is a conversion of the LST-1179 class ship, O&S cost for the RCSS 
came from the average O&S cost of the LST-1179 class from 1989 to 1994 retrieved 









Total $20,697,959  
Table 63. One Year O&S Cost for RCSS (LST-1179 Class)419 
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The same data for O&S cost can be used for the KD-1505 Sri Inderapura since it 
is a former LST-1179 Class ship. 
O&S cost for the RSS-207 Endurance class was obtained by making estimations 
based off of the LPD-4 Austin class amphibious transport dock.  The two ships are 
similar in design and mission, but the Austin is slightly bigger and has a larger crew.  The 
overall length is 570 feet and the crew accommodation is 492.420  Because the length of 
the Endurance is 460 feet, which is 80% of the Austin, the RST estimated the unit level 
consumption, maintenance, and support cost to be 80% of that of the Austin.  Mission 
personnel cost of Endurance was estimated to be 15% of that of the Austin since the 










Total $24,222,406  
Table 64. One Year O&S Cost for RSS-207 Endurance Class (Estimated from LPD-4)422 
 
Cost for the barge came from data collected on the ARL-1 Achelous class landing 
craft repair ship from VAMOSC.  The design of the ship is similar to the APB’s and 
APL’s used during the Vietnam War.  The RST estimated the mission personnel cost to 
be 20% of that of the Achelous since the crew of the Achelous was approximately 190 
and the barge was estimated to be 30.423  Unit level consumption was estimated to be 
10% of that of the Achelous since the barge is not self-propelled.  Other O&S cost was 










Total $9,716,003  
Table 65. One Year O&S Cost for a Barge (Estimated from ARL-1)424 
 
Procurement cost for the Nobriza is approximately $9 million.425  O&S cost for 
the Nobriza was obtained by making estimations based off of data on PC-1 Cyclone class 
patrol craft.  The crew of the Nobriza is close to that of the Cyclone, but the size is 
approximately 25% smaller.426  For that reason, the RST estimated the O&S cost other 
than mission personnel to be 75% of that of the Cyclone.  Table 66 is a breakdown of 









Total $3,330,207  
Table 66. One Year O&S Cost for Nobriza (Estimated from PC-1)427 
 
The total cost includes procurement cost if applicable or conversion cost for the 
RCSS plus five year operating and support cost.  Assuming an average OPTEMPO, five 
year O&S cost was calculated by multiplying the annual O&S cost by five.  Table 67 and 






Five Year O&S 
(FY07$)
Total Five Year Cost 
(FY07$)
RCSS $166,000,000 $20,697,959 $103,489,794 $269,489,794
Endurance $0 $24,222,406 $121,112,032 $121,112,032
Sri-Inderapura $0 $20,697,959 $103,489,794 $103,489,794
Nobriza+Barge $9,000,000 $13,046,211 $65,231,054 $74,231,054  
Table 67. Procurement and Five Year O&S Costs for MOB Alternatives 
 

















5 Year O&S Procurement
 
Figure 110.   Procurement and Five Year O&S Costs of MOB Alternatives 
 
The most expensive MOB alternative is the RCSS because of the added 
modification cost.  The Endurance is the most expensive with regard to O&S cost.  The 
O&S cost for the Nobriza + Barge is nearly half that of the Endurance because of its 
smaller size and lower fuel consumption. 
Operating and support cost for the GFS was based on the LSD-49 Harpers Ferry 
class dock landing ship.  Similar to the MOB, O&S cost was divided into six categories: 
mission personnel, unit-level consumption, intermediate maintenance, depot 
maintenance, sustaining support, and indirect support of the platform.  Cost for the LSD-
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49 came from VAMOSC.  The RST calculated annual O&S cost by getting the average 









Total $34,824,556  
Table 68. Five Year O&S Cost for GFS (LSD-49)428 
 
For analysis purposes, the RST assumed that the GFS will be a military platform, 
so procurement cost was not taken accounted for.  Assuming an average OPTEMPO, five 
year O&S cost was calculated by multiplying the annual O&S cost by five.  Doing so 
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7. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
7.1 SUPPLY GROUP ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
7.1.1 SIMKIT Assumptions 
7.1.1.1 Three Types of Operating Base 
There were three types of operating bases that the supply ship could 
provide supplies to. 
• Forward Operating Base (FOB) 
• Mobile Operating Base at a fixed location (MOB1) 
• Mobile Operating Base at different locations (MOB2) 
 
7.1.1.2 Four Types of Supply Connectors 
The supplies from the supply ship were transported to the operating bases 
using combinations of the following supply connectors: 
• Landing Craft Utility (LCU 1610) 
• Off-Shore Marine Support Vessel (SEACOR Jim G) 
• Landing Craft Utility (LCU 2000) 
• Heavy-Lift Transport Helicopters (CH-53) 
 
7.1.1.3 Number of Configurations (Combinations of Supply Connectors) 
The number of configurations was limited by assuming that there could 
only be a maximum of two supply vessels and two helicopters and that the MOB2 would 
not be able to support an LCU-2000. 
• There were 29 configurations for both FOB and MOB1. 
• There were 17 configurations for MOB2. 
 
Table 69 shows the different configurations of the supply connectors. 
352 
LCU-1610 Jim G LCU-2000 CH-53 LCU-1610 Jim G LCU-2000 CH-53
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 2 0 1 0 2
0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0
0 0 2 1 0 2 0 1
0 0 2 2 0 2 0 2
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 2 1 0 0 2
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 2 1 1 0 2
0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0
0 2 0 1 2 0 0 1
0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 2
1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1
1 0 1 2
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
1 1 0 2
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
Combination for FOB and MOB1 Combination for MOB2
 
Table 69. Configurations for Supply Connector 
 
7.1.2 SIMKIT Limitations 
The simulation model was developed using SIMKIT which is a DES-based 
simulation. The complexity of the model construction increases with the problem scope 
definition. 
The results from the runs for different weather types turned out to have little 
variation. This was due to the supply crafts having the same speed and capacity reduction 
factors for the different weather types. One way to overcome this limitation is to assign 
different speed and capacity reduction factors for all the supply crafts. This is more 
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realistic as some supply crafts can perform better than others in certain weather 
conditions. 
 
7.1.3 SIMKIT Analysis of FOB 
7.1.3.1 Supply Ship On-Station Time 
The Measure of Performance was to minimize supply ship presence 
duration.  Table 70 was generated for the FOB supply ship on-station times for clear 
weather with re-supply varying between 4 and 9 days, and Config: # LCU1610 #Seacor 
#LCU20000 #Helo 
4 Days 5 Days 6 Days 7 Days 8 Days 9 Days
Config: 0 0 0 1 1605.45 2014.79 2419.58 2815.47 3220.19 3622.25
Config: 0 0 0 2 702.97 879.72 1059.56 1234.52 1411.01 1594.60
Config: 0 0 1 0 67.91 84.41 101.02 117.44 1271.88 1339.64
Config: 0 0 1 1 62.83 79.48 96.12 112.96 141.97 427.14
Config: 0 0 1 2 57.76 74.28 90.88 107.71 124.07 189.45
Config: 0 0 2 0 67.79 84.44 101.19 117.71 130.03 131.00
Config: 0 0 2 1 62.65 79.50 96.14 113.04 127.96 131.00
Config: 0 0 2 2 57.61 74.42 91.26 107.68 123.92 130.94
Config: 0 1 0 0 67.83 84.17 101.22 117.71 134.58 151.59
Config: 0 1 0 1 62.69 79.40 96.00 112.95 129.30 146.20
Config: 0 1 0 2 57.81 74.27 90.79 107.73 124.15 141.12
Config: 0 1 1 0 67.75 84.55 101.02 117.70 132.20 141.50
Config: 0 1 1 1 62.70 79.50 96.26 113.05 128.96 139.03
Config: 0 1 1 2 57.57 74.35 90.94 107.58 124.22 136.00
Config: 0 2 0 0 67.81 84.39 101.23 117.99 134.42 151.06
Config: 0 2 0 1 62.83 79.28 96.24 112.25 129.50 145.58
Config: 0 2 0 2 57.71 74.38 91.14 107.70 124.35 141.05
Config: 1 0 0 0 1219.31 1196.18 2274.40 2339.16 3333.67 3411.72
Config: 1 0 0 1 302.89 702.26 1104.56 1202.96 1218.86 1239.55
Config: 1 0 0 2 129.99 305.91 484.94 658.41 840.22 1019.99
Config: 1 0 1 0 63.07 68.62 76.17 64.75 81.09 97.82
Config: 1 0 1 1 60.23 66.28 74.17 66.34 76.20 92.81
Config: 1 0 1 2 57.58 63.88 71.71 72.19 70.68 87.70
Config: 1 1 0 0 62.69 68.66 76.63 90.07 106.83 104.40
Config: 1 1 0 1 60.17 66.23 74.14 85.09 102.67 107.77
Config: 1 1 0 2 57.71 63.78 71.79 80.85 97.80 108.24
Config: 2 0 0 0 54.00 54.00 503.75 1213.15 1233.11 1243.67
Config: 2 0 0 1 55.80 54.00 54.00 203.97 605.88 1018.86
Config: 2 0 0 2 53.91 54.00 54.00 96.18 261.94 436.84  
Table 70. FOB – Supply Ship Presence Duration 
 
354 


























Figure 111.   FOB – Supply Ship Presence Duration 
 
The general trend shows an increase of supply ship on-station times for all 
the configurations from 4 days to 9 days re-supply time.  The re-supply times of 4 days 
vs. 9 days is plotted to further visualize the contrast in the two extreme configurations. 













































































































































































































































Figure 112.   FOB – Supply Ship Presence Duration 
 
From this figure, it is shown that many configurations have nearly the 
same supply ship on-station time.  The connectors that resulted in a low supply ship on-
station time required only one run.  The connectors that resulted in a high supply ship on-
station time required multiple runs.  For example, when the number of re-supply days 
increased to 8 and 9 days, a single LCU-2000 (Config 0010) required an additional run. 
The RST chose the configurations that had the least number of platforms 
while still maintaining a low supply ship on-station time.  Configurations with additional 
platforms did not decrease the duration since the supply load could fit into only one 
platform.  Based on supply ship on-station time, a single Jim G (Config 0100) was the 
best configuration when the supply ship cycle time varies between 4-9 days.  If the cycle 
time is between 4-7 days, then a single Jim G (Config 0100) and a single LCU-2000 
(Config 0010) were the best configurations.  Further analysis was done on all of the 
configurations to measure operating base supply level. 
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7.1.3.2 Operating Base Supply Level 
The Measure of Performance was to maximize operating base supply 
level.  Table 71 was generated for the FOB operating base supply level for clear weather 
with re-supply varying between 4 and 9 days, and Config: # LCU1610 #Seacor 
#LCU20000 #Helo. 
 
4 Days 5 Days 6 Days 7 Days 8 Days 9 Days
Config: 0 0 0 1 382.46 354.37 327.45 299.508 274.72 247.743
Config: 0 0 0 2 402.77 379.76 357.89 335.032 312.60 291.722
Config: 0 0 1 0 402.41 383.25 363.96 344.442 309.15 286.861
Config: 0 0 1 1 404.76 385.09 365.62 345.582 325.45 305.739
Config: 0 0 1 2 406.13 386.55 367.14 346.65 327.07 309.38
Config: 0 0 2 0 402.66 382.94 363.59 343.837 324.19 307.302
Config: 0 0 2 1 405.11 385.24 365.84 345.457 325.15 308.725
Config: 0 0 2 2 406.06 386.07 366.75 346.488 327.17 310.173
Config: 0 1 0 0 401.15 380.71 359.30 338.346 316.90 297.412
Config: 0 1 0 1 404.46 383.31 362.85 340.912 320.11 301.927
Config: 0 1 0 2 405.61 384.81 364.49 342.185 321.55 302.68
Config: 0 1 1 0 401.83 381.51 361.67 340.625 320.17 302.196
Config: 0 1 1 1 404.69 384.00 363.91 343.086 321.65 305.609
Config: 0 1 1 2 406.11 385.69 365.73 344.662 324.06 306.314
Config: 0 2 0 0 401.31 380.56 359.41 337.65 316.29 298.489
Config: 0 2 0 1 404.06 383.40 362.52 342.296 319.80 302.002
Config: 0 2 0 2 405.72 384.68 363.99 342.827 321.47 303.077
Config: 1 0 0 0 408.44 360.58 323.52 300.389 263.71 241.793
Config: 1 0 0 1 417.78 380.99 356.27 332.359 311.64 289.678
Config: 1 0 0 2 419.64 386.65 365.72 344.678 323.97 302.496
Config: 1 0 1 0 416.66 384.05 364.92 345.663 326.54 309.466
Config: 1 0 1 1 418.66 385.46 366.94 348.241 327.63 311.695
Config: 1 0 1 2 420.02 386.72 367.29 348.657 329.59 311.142
Config: 1 1 0 0 416.67 383.30 363.23 342.397 321.36 306.243
Config: 1 1 0 1 418.74 385.37 365.58 344.668 323.55 305.829
Config: 1 1 0 2 419.98 386.54 366.80 345.989 324.39 307.152
Config: 2 0 0 0 402.54 386.13 358.43 329.994 303.90 286.797
Config: 2 0 0 1 419.25 386.87 367.26 347.579 325.15 301.8
Config: 2 0 0 2 406.45 387.46 368.50 348.266 328.99 309.655  
Table 71. FOB – Operating Base Supply Level 
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Figure 113.   FOB – Operating Base Supply Level 
 
From this figure, it is shown that the operating base supply level decreases 
as the re-supply days increase from a 4 day rotation to a 9 day rotation.  The re-supply 
times of 4 days vs. 9 days is plotted to further visualize the contrast in the two extreme 
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Figure 114.   FOB – Operating Base Supply Level 
 
From this figure, it is shown that most of the configurations have nearly 
the same operating base supply level.  Similar to the supply ship on-station time, the RST 
chose the configurations that had the least number of platforms while still maintaining an 
adequate operating base supply level.  Configurations with additional platforms did not 
significantly increase the supply level.  Based on operating base supply level, a single Jim 
G (Config 0100) and a single LCU-2000 (Config 0010) were the best configurations. 
 
7.1.3.3 Data Normalization 
Although a single LCU-2000 and Jim G were the best configurations to 
minimize supply ship on-station time and maximize operating base supply level, the RST 
still analyzed the other configurations’ performance in both categories.  Data was 
normalized to combine both supply ship presence duration and operating base supply 
level into one score. 
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The RST normalized the supply ship on-station time data by scoring 0 
hours as 1.0 and 24 hours as 0.  Operating base supply level was normalized by getting 
the percent of the 15 day supply level.  The RST took the average performance of the 
different configurations when the supply ship cycle time was between four and seven 
days and again when the time was between eight and nine days. 
The RST assumed that the weighting is 0.6 for operating supply level and 
0.4 for supply ship on-station time.  Operating supply level was weighted more because 
the supply level greatly impacts the RF operation.  Table 72 shows the utility score for 
each configuration, where Config: # LCU1610 #Seacor #LCU20000 #Helo. 
 
4 to 7 Days 8 to 9 Days
Config: 0 0 0 1 0.198 0.000
Config: 0 0 0 2 0.578 0.349
Config: 0 0 1 0 0.827 0.399
Config: 0 0 1 1 0.830 0.703
Config: 0 0 1 2 0.834 0.742
Config: 0 0 2 0 0.827 0.746
Config: 0 0 2 1 0.831 0.748
Config: 0 0 2 2 0.833 0.751
Config: 0 1 0 0 0.823 0.733
Config: 0 1 0 1 0.828 0.739
Config: 0 1 0 2 0.831 0.741
Config: 0 1 1 0 0.824 0.739
Config: 0 1 1 1 0.829 0.743
Config: 0 1 1 2 0.832 0.746
Config: 0 2 0 0 0.822 0.733
Config: 0 2 0 1 0.828 0.739
Config: 0 2 0 2 0.831 0.742
Config: 1 0 0 0 0.334 0.000
Config: 1 0 0 1 0.621 0.423
Config: 1 0 0 2 0.750 0.521
Config: 1 0 1 0 0.839 0.761
Config: 1 0 1 1 0.842 0.764
Config: 1 0 1 2 0.843 0.766
Config: 1 1 0 0 0.836 0.751
Config: 1 1 0 1 0.839 0.752
Config: 1 1 0 2 0.841 0.754
Config: 2 0 0 0 0.721 0.414
Config: 2 0 0 1 0.835 0.554
Config: 2 0 0 2 0.840 0.690  
Table 72. FOB Supply Level Utility Score for Configurations 
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As shown in Table 72, many of the configurations performed the same.  
Only some configurations were clearly dominated, but no configuration was significantly 
the best based on utility score alone.  When looking at the configurations that resulted in 
a score greater than 0.8 in four to seven days or 0.7 in eight to nine days, additional 
platforms did very little to the performance.  This knowledge helped the RST calculate 
the efficiency of the different configurations. 
 
7.1.3.4 Cost Performance  
Cost performance graphs were compiled by plotting the cost of the 
configuration and the utility score. Helicopters add very little to the overall performance 
but significantly increase the cost.  In order to reduce the number of data points, the RST 
screened out configurations with helicopters as well as some configurations that were 
clearly inefficient by evaluating single platforms first and then seeing how additional 




Figure 115.   Connector Alternatives Cost Performance Curve for FOB 4-7 Days. 
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Figure 115 shows that one LCU-2000 (Config 0010) was the most cost 
effective configuration.  Adding an LCU-1610 with the LCU-2000 (Config 1010) did 
very little to performance but added to the cost. 
The same strategy was implemented for the supply ship cycle between 




Figure 116.   Connector Alternatives Cost Performance Curve for FOB 8-9 Days. 
 
From Figure 116., the LCU-2000 decreased in performance due to the 
increase in supply level.  The Jim G remained at a decent score, but the LCU-1610 and 
LCU-2000 configuration (Config 1010) performed better with an increased cost.  With 
the performance so close, the Jim G may be the most cost effective configuration. 
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7.1.4 SIMKIT Analysis of MOB1 
The Nobriza+Barge combination was MOB1. 
 
7.1.4.1 Supply Ship On-Station Time 
The Measure of Performance was to minimize supply ship presence 
duration for MOB1.  Table 73 was generated for the MOB1 supply ship presence 
duration for clear weather with re-supply varying between 4 and 9 days, and Config: # 
LCU1610 #Seacor #LCU20000 #Helo. 
 
4 Days 5 Days 6 Days 7 Days 8 Days 9 Days
Config: 0 0 0 1 1754.41 2195.74 2636.04 3067.73 3492.91 3937.01
Config: 0 0 0 2 753.25 947.472 1144.04 1335.55 1520.76 1717.48
Config: 0 0 1 0 72.39 90.0902 108.184 929.72 1331.59 1351.76
Config: 0 0 1 1 67.24 85.1604 102.996 121.27 274.11 688.296
Config: 0 0 1 2 62.34 80.1748 97.9105 115.94 141.24 296.293
Config: 0 0 2 0 72.48 90.192 108.012 125.61 131.00 131
Config: 0 0 2 1 67.41 85.1186 102.959 121.02 130.77 131
Config: 0 0 2 2 62.42 80.1115 98.2386 115.94 129.79 131
Config: 0 1 0 0 72.53 90.316 108.104 126.23 143.88 1240.19
Config: 0 1 0 1 67.36 85.249 102.9 120.78 138.88 156.856
Config: 0 1 0 2 62.38 80.1352 97.9197 116.17 133.35 151.367
Config: 0 1 1 0 72.30 90.1922 108.212 125.49 137.56 146.255
Config: 0 1 1 1 67.23 85.3101 102.876 120.63 134.80 143.904
Config: 0 1 1 2 62.26 80.0721 98.0309 115.89 131.55 141.698
Config: 0 2 0 0 72.38 90.3347 108.252 125.77 143.99 160.917
Config: 0 2 0 1 67.28 85.0368 103.097 120.87 138.67 156.353
Config: 0 2 0 2 62.25 79.9521 97.9158 115.96 133.94 4548.47
Config: 1 0 0 0 1184.98 2133.72 2309.89 2847.16 3410.36 3602.74
Config: 1 0 0 1 414.57 860.395 1189.04 1211.12 1228.96 1320.31
Config: 1 0 0 2 169.85 363.399 561.152 754.56 940.17 1131.68
Config: 1 0 1 0 62.98 71.4387 70.4093 72.14 90.08 108.194
Config: 1 0 1 1 60.59 69.1278 75.3231 67.04 85.09 102.806
Config: 1 0 1 2 57.97 66.6971 75.0282 64.53 80.17 97.7385
Config: 1 1 0 0 63.06 71.4171 81.0116 98.35 108.42 107.831
Config: 1 1 0 1 60.63 68.9741 77.6794 92.91 108.38 104.594
Config: 1 1 0 2 58.12 66.5514 75.2735 87.88 105.94 103.396
Config: 2 0 0 0 54.00 54 1161.34 1223.46 1240.92 1244.31
Config: 2 0 0 1 54.00 54 64.9645 412.47 855.26 1174.72
Config: 2 0 0 2 54.00 54 54.1694 169.55 360.27 553.325  
Table 73. MOB1 – Supply Ship Presence Duration 
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Figure 117.   MOB1 – Supply Ship Presence Duration 
 
The general trend shows an increase of supply ship on-station time for all 
the configurations from 4 days to 9 days re-supply time.  The re-supply times of 4 days 
vs. 9 days is plotted to further visualize the contrast in the two extreme configurations.  























Figure 118.   MOB1 – Supply Ship Presence Duration 
 
From this figure, it is shown that many configurations have nearly the 
same supply ship on-station time.  The connectors that resulted in a low supply ship on-
station time required only one run.  The connectors that resulted in a high supply ship on-
station time required multiple runs.  For example, when the number of re-supply days 
increased to nine days, a single Jim G required an additional run.   
The RST chose the configurations that had the least number of platforms 
while still maintaining a low supply ship presence duration.  Configurations with 
additional platforms did not decrease the duration since the supply load could fit in one 
platform.  Based on supply ship presence duration, a single Jim G (Config 0100) and a 
single LCU-2000 (Config 0010) were the best configuration when the supply ship cycle 
time varies between 4-7 days.  If the cycle time is between 8-9 days, then configurations 
with at least one Jim G or one LCU-2000 along with another vessel is a good 
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configuration.  Further analysis was done on all of the configurations to measure 
operating base supply level. 
 
7.1.4.2 Operating Base Supply Level 
The Measure of Performance was to maximize operating base supply level 
for MOB1.  Table 74 was generated for the MOB1 operating base supply level for clear 
weather with re-supply varying between 4 and 9 days, and Config: # LCU1610 #Seacor 
#LCU20000 #Helo. 
 
4 Days 5 Days 6 Days 7 Days 8 Days 9 Days
Config: 0 0 0 1 405.158 375.013 343.935 315.33 286.125 256.458
Config: 0 0 0 2 429.629 404.458 380.138 356.533 331.716 309.477
Config: 0 0 1 0 429.948 409.48 388.237 356.038 327.472 303.542
Config: 0 0 1 1 432.575 411.565 390.507 368.572 348.124 325.225
Config: 0 0 1 2 433.529 412.421 391.714 369.988 348.904 330.408
Config: 0 0 2 0 429.757 409.044 388.419 366.821 346.502 329.39
Config: 0 0 2 1 432.271 411.554 390.505 368.74 347.513 331.287
Config: 0 0 2 2 433.324 412.243 391.194 369.641 348.122 331.363
Config: 0 1 0 0 428.043 405.58 383.092 359.715 336.97 301.951
Config: 0 1 0 1 431.287 408.64 386.773 363.614 340.345 319.897
Config: 0 1 0 2 432.864 410.063 387.825 364.046 342.23 321.735
Config: 0 1 1 0 429.168 407.246 385.351 363.355 340.852 323.574
Config: 0 1 1 1 431.942 409.958 388.839 366.325 344.08 325.71
Config: 0 1 1 2 433.494 411.395 389.826 367.134 345.419 326.003
Config: 0 2 0 0 428.177 405.434 383.257 360.215 337.121 316.874
Config: 0 2 0 1 431.474 409.1 386.11 363.598 340.786 320.321
Config: 0 2 0 2 432.983 410.609 388.39 364.485 342.031 322.076
Config: 1 0 0 0 407.143 368.973 342.637 310.645 278.336 253.33
Config: 1 0 0 1 430.636 403.662 377.88 354.015 330.759 308.863
Config: 1 0 0 2 434.156 412.713 390.019 367.44 345.479 320.562
Config: 1 0 1 0 430.812 410.283 389.914 370.688 348.869 329.966
Config: 1 0 1 1 432.785 412.119 392.083 372.499 350.453 332.404
Config: 1 0 1 2 433.951 412.84 392.766 373.314 351.162 332.437
Config: 1 1 0 0 430.738 409.506 387.904 364.892 343.551 326.583
Config: 1 1 0 1 432.52 411.492 389.737 368.084 345.702 328.554
Config: 1 1 0 2 433.635 412.506 390.996 369.286 345.154 329.985
Config: 2 0 0 0 430.914 411.884 375.022 349.065 326.581 304.681
Config: 2 0 0 1 433.165 413.279 392.502 370.427 343.815 318.124
Config: 2 0 0 2 434.294 413.976 393.775 372.344 352.137 328.36  
Table 74. MOB1 – Operating Base Supply Level 
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Figure 119.   MOB1 – Operating Base Supply Level 
 
From this figure, it is shown that the operating base supply level decreases 
as re-supply days increase from a 4 day rotation to a 9 day rotation.  The re-supply times 
of 4 days vs. 9 days is plotted to further visualize the contrast in the two optimal extreme 















































































































































































































































4 Days 9 Days
 
 
Figure 120.   MOB1 – Operating Base Supply Level 
 
From this figure, it is shown that most of the configurations have nearly 
the same operating base supply level.  Similar to supply ship on-station time 
measurement, the RST chose the configurations that had the least number of platforms 
while still maintaining an adequate operating base supply level.  Configurations with 
additional platforms did not significantly increase the supply level.  Based on operating 
base supply level, a single Jim G (Config 0100) and a single LCU-2000 (Config 0010) 
were the best configurations.  
 
7.1.4.3 Data Normalization 
Although a single LCU-2000 and Jim G were the best configurations to 
minimize the supply ship presence duration and maximize operating base supply level, 
the RST still analyzed the other configurations’ performance in both categories.  Data 
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was normalized to combine both supply ship on-station time and operating base supply 
level into one score. 
The RST normalized the supply ship on-station time data by scoring 0 
hours as 1.0 and 24 hours as 0.  Operating base supply level was normalized by getting 
the percent of the 15 day supply level.  The RST took the average performance of the 
different configurations when the supply ship cycle time was between four and seven 
days and again when the time was between eight and nine days. 
The RST assumed that the weighting is 0.6 for operating supply level and 
0.4 for supply ship on-station time.  Operating supply level was weighted more because 
the supply level greatly impacts the RF operation.  Table 75 shows the utility score for 
each configuration, where Config: # LCU1610 #Seacor #LCU20000 #Helo. 
 
369 
4 to 7 Days 8 to 9 Days
Config: 0 0 0 1 0.138 -0.324
Config: 0 0 0 2 0.555 0.314
Config: 0 0 1 0 0.766 0.385
Config: 0 0 1 1 0.828 0.648
Config: 0 0 1 2 0.831 0.724
Config: 0 0 2 0 0.824 0.747
Config: 0 0 2 1 0.828 0.749
Config: 0 0 2 2 0.831 0.749
Config: 0 1 0 0 0.819 0.570
Config: 0 1 0 1 0.825 0.733
Config: 0 1 0 2 0.827 0.737
Config: 0 1 1 0 0.822 0.737
Config: 0 1 1 1 0.827 0.741
Config: 0 1 1 2 0.829 0.743
Config: 0 2 0 0 0.820 0.729
Config: 0 2 0 1 0.825 0.734
Config: 0 2 0 2 0.828 0.126
Config: 1 0 0 0 0.217 -0.273
Config: 1 0 0 1 0.589 0.409
Config: 1 0 0 2 0.727 0.490
Config: 1 0 1 0 0.835 0.757
Config: 1 0 1 1 0.837 0.761
Config: 1 0 1 2 0.839 0.763
Config: 1 1 0 0 0.830 0.750
Config: 1 1 0 1 0.833 0.753
Config: 1 1 0 2 0.836 0.754
Config: 2 0 0 0 0.671 0.413
Config: 2 0 0 1 0.816 0.493
Config: 2 0 0 2 0.835 0.659  
Table 75. MOB1 Supply Level Utility Score for Configurations 
 
As shown in Table 75, many of the configurations performed the same.  
Only some configurations were clearly dominated, but no configuration was significantly 
the best based on utility score alone.  When looking at the configurations that resulted in 
a score greater than 0.8 in four to seven days or 0.7 in eight to nine days, additional 
platforms did very little to the performance.  This knowledge helped the RST calculate 
the efficiency of the different configurations. 
 
7.1.4.4 Cost Performance  
Cost performance graphs were compiled by plotting the cost of the 
configuration and the utility score.  Similar to the FOB, helicopters added very little to 
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the overall performance but significantly increase the cost.  In order to reduce the number 
of data points, the RST screened out configurations with helicopters as well as some 
configurations that were clearly inefficient by evaluating single platforms first and then 
seeing how additional platforms affected the score.  Figure 121 is a cost performance 
curve for the screened configurations for 4-7 days. 
 
 
Figure 121.   Connector Alternatives Cost Performance Curve for MOB1 4-7 Days. 
 
Figure 121 shows that one LCU-2000 (Config 0010) was the most cost 
effective configuration.  Adding an LCU-1610 with the LCU-2000 (Config 1010) or 
choosing a Jim G (Config 0100) instead of an LCU-2000 did very little to performance 
but added a lot to the cost. 
The same strategy was implemented for the supply ship cycle between 




Figure 122.   Connector Alternatives Cost Performance Curve for MOB1 8-9 Days. 
 
From Figure 122., the LCU-2000 and the Jim G decreased in performance 
due to the increase in supply level.  The LCU-1610 and LCU-2000 configuration (Config 
1010) performed the best.  Because of the decreased performance of the Jim G, the RST 
recommended an LCU-1610 and LCU-2000 as the most cost effective configuration. 
 
 
7.1.5 SIMKIT Analysis of MOB2 
The RCSS, RSS-207 Endurance, and KD-1505 Sri Inderapura were MOB2 
 
7.1.5.1 Supply Ship On-Station Time 
The Measure of Performance was to minimize supply ship presence 
duration for MOB2.  Table 76 was generated for the average MOB2 supply ship presence 
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duration based on three positions for clear weather with re-supply varying between 4 and 
9 days, and Config: # LCU1610 #Seacor #LCU20000 #Helo. 
 
4 Days 5 Days 6 Days 7 Days 8 Days 9 Days
Config: 0 0 0 1 3253.10 4060.25 4849.46 5636.09 6400.37 7150.13
Config: 0 0 0 2 1268.48 1588.55 1911.47 2229.89 2544.94 2865.45
Config: 0 1 0 0 112.28 139.82 1245.34 1303.76 1331.29 1359.06
Config: 0 1 0 1 106.97 134.71 169.47 747.09 1226.04 1291.66
Config: 0 1 0 2 101.89 129.78 157.03 287.45 604.24 917.63
Config: 0 2 0 0 112.21 139.98 163.96 166.00 166.00 166.00
Config: 0 2 0 1 107.04 134.76 161.18 166.00 166.00 166.00
Config: 0 2 0 2 101.97 129.76 157.42 166.00 166.00 166.00
Config: 1 0 0 0 1760.86 2247.43 2638.72 3237.14 3744.31 4289.45
Config: 1 0 0 1 752.08 966.89 1235.74 1498.02 1753.28 1878.68
Config: 1 0 0 2 545.29 673.55 841.24 1010.61 1109.95 1260.35
Config: 1 1 0 0 67.83 93.69 113.32 141.56 667.93 839.73
Config: 1 1 0 1 66.83 89.43 108.49 136.15 186.02 579.13
Config: 1 1 0 2 67.84 84.49 104.10 131.12 159.11 306.19
Config: 2 0 0 0 732.69 766.40 775.86 1180.06 1468.92 1493.94
Config: 2 0 0 1 101.91 625.23 753.45 772.33 780.42 986.78
Config: 2 0 0 2 61.39 335.41 551.19 678.40 758.21 773.91  
Table 76. MOB2 – Supply Ship Presence Duration 
 


















































































































































Figure 123.   MOB2 – Supply Ship Presence Duration 
 
The general trend shows an increase of the supply ship on-station time for 
all the configurations from 4 days to 9 days re-supply time.  The re-supply times of 4 













































































































































Figure 124.   MOB2 - Supply Ship Presence Duration 
 
From Figure 124, it is shown that most configurations have the same 
supply ship on-station time for four days.  The connectors that resulted in a low supply 
ship on-station times required only one run.  The connectors that resulted in a high supply 
ship on-station times required multiple runs.  For example, when the number of re-supply 
days increased to nine days, a single Jim G required an additional run.   
 
The RST chose the configurations that had the least number of platforms 
while still maintaining a low supply ship presence duration.  Configurations with 
additional platforms did not decrease the duration since the supply load could fit in one or 
two platforms.  Based on supply ship presence duration, two Jim G’s (Config 0200) and a 
LCU-1610 and Jim G, (Config 1100) were the best configuration when the supply ship 
cycle time varies between 4-7 days.  If the cycle time is between 8-9 days, then two Jim 
were the best configuration.  Further analysis was done on all of the configurations to 
measure operating base supply level. 
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7.1.5.2 Operating Base Supply Level 
The Measure of Performance was to maximize operating base supply level 
for MOB2.  Table 77 was generated for the average MOB2 operating base supply level 
for clear weather with re-supply varying between 4 and 9 days, and Config: # LCU1610 
#Seacor #LCU20000 #Helo. 
 
4 Days 5 Days 6 Days 7 Days 8 Days 9 Days
Config: 0 0 0 1 570.64 509.24 452.47 394.33 338.77 276.21
Config: 0 0 0 2 619.75 571.55 523.09 474.63 430.61 380.90
Config: 0 1 0 0 656.05 617.10 567.02 528.46 493.11 454.92
Config: 0 1 0 1 661.76 624.95 578.10 539.31 504.81 468.43
Config: 0 1 0 2 664.96 627.68 591.30 557.46 519.31 485.42
Config: 0 2 0 0 661.53 623.90 589.14 559.93 528.39 499.32
Config: 0 2 0 1 661.74 624.50 589.09 559.96 529.89 503.14
Config: 0 2 0 2 664.82 627.86 591.36 560.47 531.81 504.40
Config: 1 0 0 0 652.78 612.62 573.09 533.76 497.64 461.09
Config: 1 0 0 1 629.83 581.61 536.75 491.65 441.92 397.47
Config: 1 0 0 2 661.52 625.68 586.79 545.63 510.05 474.51
Config: 1 1 0 0 672.51 635.75 599.00 561.81 524.16 489.19
Config: 1 1 0 1 671.85 637.44 604.43 567.60 525.19 488.79
Config: 1 1 0 2 673.17 639.39 606.24 569.58 533.56 500.67
Config: 2 0 0 0 668.63 633.52 601.57 567.03 528.03 495.72
Config: 2 0 0 1 665.67 626.01 591.44 549.80 516.78 480.06
Config: 2 0 0 2 676.87 638.25 600.00 565.58 531.67 497.46  
Table 77. MOB2 – Operating Base Supply Level 
 




















































































































































Figure 125.   MOB2 – Operating Base Supply Level 
 
From this figure, it is shown that the operating base supply level decreases 
as re-supply days increase from a 4 day rotation to a 9 day rotation.  The re-supply times 
of 4 days vs. 9 days is plotted to further visualize the contrast in the two optimal extreme 












































































































































4 Days 9 Days
 
Figure 126.   MOB2 – Operating Base Supply Level 
 
From Figure 126, it is shown that most of the configurations have nearly 
the same operating base supply level.  Similar to the supply ship on-station time 
measurement, the RST chose the configurations that had the least number of platforms 
while still maintaining an adequate operating base supply level.  Configurations with 
additional platforms did not significantly increase the supply level.  Based on operating 
base supply level, a single Jim G (Config 0100) was the best configurations. 
 
7.1.5.3 Data Normalization 
The RST analyzed the performance of all configurations in both 
categories.  Data was normalized to combine both supply ship on-station time and 
operating base supply level into one score. 
The RST normalized the supply ship presence duration data by scoring 0 
hours as 1.0 and 24 hours as 0.  Operating base supply level was normalized by getting 
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the percent of the 15 day supply level.  The RST took the average performance of the 
different configurations when the supply ship cycle time was between four and seven 
days and again when the time was between eight and nine days. 
The RST assumed that the weighting is 0.6 for operating supply level and 
0.4 for supply ship on-station times.  Operating supply level was weighted more because 
the supply level greatly impacts the RF operation.  Table 78 shows the utility score for 
each configuration, where Config: # LCU1610 #Seacor #LCU2000 #Helo. 
 
4 to 7 Days 8 to 9 Days
Config: 0 0 0 1 -0.483 0.000
Config: 0 0 0 2 0.315 0.000
Config: 0 1 0 0 0.640 0.374
Config: 0 1 0 1 0.760 0.407
Config: 0 1 0 2 0.801 0.557
Config: 0 2 0 0 0.806 0.731
Config: 0 2 0 1 0.807 0.733
Config: 0 2 0 2 0.810 0.734
Config: 1 0 0 0 0.149 0.000
Config: 1 0 0 1 0.502 0.203
Config: 1 0 0 2 0.630 0.432
Config: 1 1 0 0 0.824 0.562
Config: 1 1 0 1 0.827 0.666
Config: 1 1 0 2 0.829 0.715
Config: 2 0 0 0 0.613 0.364
Config: 2 0 0 1 0.690 0.520
Config: 2 0 0 2 0.742 0.565  
Table 78. MOB2 Supply Level Utility Score for Configurations 
 
As shown in Table 78, many of the configurations performed the same.  
Only some configurations were clearly dominated, but no configuration was significantly 
the best based on utility score alone.  Based on the score, single platforms did not 
perform as well as multiple platforms.  Also, helicopters did not add a lot to the 
performance of two vessels.  This knowledge helped the RST calculate the efficiency of 
the different configurations. 
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7.1.5.4 Cost Performance 
Cost performance graphs were compiled by plotting the cost of the 
configuration and the utility score.  Similar to the FOB and MOB1, helicopters added 
very little to the overall performance but significantly increase the cost.  In order to 
reduce the number of data points, the RST screened out configurations with helicopters.  
Figure 127 is a cost performance curve for the screened configurations for 4-7 days. 
 
 
Figure 127.   Connector Alternatives Cost Performance Curve for MOB2 4-7 Days 
 
Figure 127 shows that an LCU-1610 and Jim G (Config 1100) was the 
most cost effective configuration.  A single Jim G did not give the same performance.  
The same strategy was implemented for the supply ship cycle between eight and nine 




Figure 128.   Connector Alternatives Cost Performance Curve for MOB2 8-9 Days 
 
From Figure 128., the LCU-1610 and Jim G (Config 1100) decreased in 
performance due to the increase in supply level.  This made two Jim G’s configuration 
(Config 0200) the most cost effective. 
 
7.1.6 Supply Software EXTEND Processes, Assumptions and Limitations 
7.1.6.1 Assumptions 
The capacity for food, fuel and ammunition in the supply ship is an 
infinite resource and will always have what is needed by the basing alternative.  There are 
2 types of operating bases that the supply ship can provide supplies to are the Forward 
Operating Base (FOB) and Mobile Operating Base at different locations (MOB2).  The 
MOB uses organic storage tanks for fuel and water while general stores for pallets of 
food.  The FOB uses SIXCON’s for storage of fuel and water and a tent for storing 
pallets of food.  The food, water, and fuel storage in the FOB and MOB is self-sufficient 
for at least 15 days. 
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The materiel from the supply ship will be transported to the operating 
bases using one of the following supply connectors: Landing Craft Utility (LCU 2000) or 
Off-Shore Marine Support Vessel (SEACOR Jim G).  The LCU 2000 uses an organic 
fuel tank, SIXCON (containers) for water and deck space for delivery of pallets.  
SEACOR uses storage tanks for delivery of fuel and water and deck space for pallets. 
Each logistics connector was modeled as having 90%, 95% or 99% 
survivability.  The model replicates the realism that if only one logistics connector is 
available and has to perform three transport events to move all materiel from the supply 
ship, but is lost on the first run then the other two loads will also not be moved and the 
supply ship will leave to start its normal supply cycle over again.  90% translates to one 
out of every ten transport events a connector will be lost.  95% translates to one out of 
every 20 transport events a connector will be lost.  99% translates to one out of every 100 
transport events a connector will be lost.  The cycle time of the supply ship was varied 
from 4 - 15 days in order to see the effect on logistic connector and basing alternative 
performance. 
 
7.1.7 EXTEND Analysis 
7.1.7.1 Operational Availability of SURC’s due to Fuel (Ao fuel SURC) 
The Measure of Performance was to maximize Ao fuel SURC.  Table 79 




Days LCU Seacor LCU Seacor LCU Seacor
FOB 0.9932 0.9968 0.9977 0.9992 0.9999 0.9999
MOB2 0.9815 0.9986 0.9991 0.9968 0.9993 0.9991
FOB 0.9734 0.9895 0.9905 0.9991 0.9998 0.9999
MOB2 0.9672 0.9797 0.9847 0.9952 0.9992 0.9993
FOB 0.9556 0.9816 0.9832 0.9906 0.9971 0.9973
MOB2 0.9278 0.9687 0.9731 0.9821 0.9974 0.9974
FOB 0.9044 0.9551 0.9645 0.9811 0.9898 0.9958
MOB2 0.9021 0.9406 0.9567 0.9706 0.9923 0.9973
FOB 0.8962 0.9561 0.9451 0.9818 0.9869 0.9924
MOB2 0.8488 0.9067 0.9232 0.9643 0.9871 0.9918
FOB 0.8362 0.9252 0.9258 0.9629 0.9824 0.9921
MOB2 0.7938 0.8826 0.8781 0.9531 0.9706 0.9837
FOB 0.7911 0.9026 0.8843 0.9648 0.9631 0.9941
MOB2 0.7543 0.8513 0.8631 0.8934 0.9402 0.9571
FOB 0.7434 0.8909 0.8441 0.9536 0.9181 0.9812
MOB2 0.7333 0.7867 0.7972 0.8635 0.8832 0.9421
FOB 0.7253 0.8653 0.8049 0.9064 0.8641 0.9527
MOB2 0.6724 0.7742 0.7652 0.8519 0.8382 0.8751
FOB 0.6681 0.8245 0.7515 0.8618 0.8334 0.9214
MOB2 0.6198 0.7332 0.7193 0.7631 0.8044 0.8212
FOB 0.6181 0.8021 0.7226 0.8313 0.7898 0.8591
MOB2 0.5925 0.6608 0.6681 0.7488 0.7535 0.7921
FOB 0.5889 0.7301 0.6627 0.7596 0.7459 0.8167

















Table 79. Ao fuel SURC for All Configurations. 
 
Figure 129 is a two-dimensional visualization of Ao fuel SURC for FOB 
and LCU-2000 configuration for 90%, 95%, and 99% survivability. 
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Figure 129.   Ao fuel SURC for FOB and LCU-2000. 
 
The general trend shows an increase of supply ship cycle time lowers the 
Ao fuel SURC.  The graph also shows in order to maintain .95 Ao fuel SURC a higher 
survivability will increase the supply ship cycle time thus allowing for larger windows of 
delivery. 
Figure 130 is a two-dimensional visualization of Ao fuel SURC for FOB 
and SEACOR “Jim G” configuration for 90%, 95%, and 99% survivability. 
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Figure 130.   Ao fuel SURC for FOB and SEACOR “Jim G” 
 
The general trend shows an increase of supply ship cycle time lowers the 
Ao fuel SURC.  The graph also shows that to maintain .95 Ao fuel SURC a higher 
survivability will increase the supply ship cycle time thus allowing for larger windows of 
delivery. 
Figure 131 is a two-dimensional visualization of Ao fuel SURC for MOB 
and LCU-2000 configuration for 90%, 95%, and 99% survivability. 
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Figure 131.   Ao fuel SURC for MOB and LCU-2000 
 
The general trend shows an increase of supply ship cycle time lowers the 
Ao fuel SURC.  The graph also shows that to maintain .95 Ao fuel SURC a higher 
survivability will increase the supply ship cycle time thus allowing for larger windows of 
delivery. 
Figure 132 is a two-dimensional visualization of Ao fuel SURC for MOB 
and SEACOR “Jim G” configuration for 90%, 95%, and 99% survivability. 
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Figure 132.   Ao fuel SURC for MOB and SEACOR “Jim G” 
 
The general trend shows an increase of supply ship cycle time lowers the 
Ao fuel SURC.  The graph also shows that to maintain .95 Ao fuel SURC a higher 
survivability will increase the supply ship cycle time thus allowing for larger windows of 
delivery. 
 
7.1.7.2 Operational Habitability of Base due to food and water (Ao food & 
Water Base) 
The Measure of Performance was to maximize Ao food & Water Base.Table 80 




Days LCU Seacor LCU Seacor LCU Seacor
FOB 0.9934 0.9962 0.9975 0.9993 0.9999 0.9999
MOB2 0.9596 0.9944 0.9956 0.9936 0.9979 0.9981
FOB 0.9711 0.9881 0.9896 0.9987 0.9999 0.9999
MOB2 0.9305 0.9489 0.9623 0.9851 0.9968 0.9962
FOB 0.9431 0.9747 0.9799 0.9861 0.9974 0.9964
MOB2 0.8463 0.9373 0.9439 0.9639 0.9899 0.9919
FOB 0.8847 0.9331 0.9605 0.9819 0.9909 0.9962
MOB2 0.8104 0.8815 0.9092 0.9425 0.9791 0.9882
FOB 0.8636 0.9422 0.9343 0.9774 0.9825 0.9911
MOB2 0.7153 0.8347 0.8425 0.9143 0.9528 0.9737
FOB 0.7758 0.8813 0.9115 0.9418 0.9809 0.9893
MOB2 0.6251 0.7803 0.7537 0.8945 0.8977 0.9382
FOB 0.7155 0.8541 0.8489 0.9479 0.9669 0.9941
MOB2 0.5611 0.7278 0.7214 0.7864 0.8282 0.8796
FOB 0.6533 0.8371 0.8147 0.9357 0.9186 0.9815
MOB2 0.5387 0.6361 0.6126 0.7298 0.7285 0.8456
FOB 0.6469 0.8174 0.7616 0.8891 0.8521 0.9499
MOB2 0.4641 0.6163 0.5631 0.7064 0.6581 0.7381
FOB 0.5574 0.7731 0.6963 0.8253 0.8279 0.9307
MOB2 0.3981 0.5607 0.5168 0.6045 0.6263 0.6676
FOB 0.4961 0.7347 0.6507 0.8111 0.7694 0.8606
MOB2 0.3602 0.4722 0.4615 0.5788 0.5611 0.6344
FOB 0.4547 0.6381 0.5671 0.6981 0.6885 0.7972
MOB2 0.357 0.4659 0.4363 0.5024 0.5252 0.5842

















Table 80. Ao food & Water Base for all configurations. 
 
Figure 133 is a two-dimensional visualization of Ao food & Water Base for 
FOB and LCU-2000 configuration for 90%, 95%, and 99% survivability. 
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Figure 133.   Ao food & Water Base for FOB and LCU-2000. 
 
The general trend shows an increase of supply ship cycle time lowers the 
Ao food & Water Base.    The graph also shows that to maintain .95 Ao food & Water Base a higher 
survivability will increase the supply ship cycle time thus allowing for larger windows of 
delivery. 
Figure 134 is a two-dimensional visualization of Ao food & Water Base for 
FOB and SEACOR “Jim G” configuration for 90%, 95%, and 99% survivability. 
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Figure 134.   Ao food & Water Base for FOB and SEACOR “Jim G” 
 
The general trend shows an increase of supply ship cycle time lowers the 
Ao food & Water Base.    The graph also shows that to maintain .95 Ao food & Water Base a higher 
survivability will increase the supply ship cycle time thus allowing for larger windows of 
delivery. 
Figure 135 is a two-dimensional visualization of Ao food & Water Base for 
MOB and LCU-2000 configuration for 90%, 95%, and 99% survivability. 
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Figure 135.   Ao food & Water Base for MOB and LCU-2000 
 
The general trend shows an increase of supply ship cycle time lowers the 
Ao food & Water Base.  The graph also shows that to maintain .95 Ao food & Water Base a higher 
survivability will increase the supply ship cycle time thus allowing for larger windows of 
delivery. 
Figure 136 is a two-dimensional visualization of Ao food & Water Base for 
MOB and SEACOR “Jim G” configuration for 90%, 95%, and 99% survivability. 
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Figure 136.   Ao food & Water Base for MOB and SEACOR “Jim G” 
 
The general trend shows an increase of supply ship cycle time lowers the 
Ao food & Water Base.    The graph also shows that to maintain .95 Ao food & Water Base a higher 
survivability will increase the supply ship cycle time thus allowing for larger windows of 
delivery. 
 
7.1.7.3 Average number of lost logistic connectors during operation. 
The Measure of Performance was to minimize number of lost logistic 
connectors.  Table 81 was generated for all configurations to show the differences in the 




Days LCU Seacor LCU Seacor LCU Seacor
FOB 7 4 4 2 1 1
MOB2 7 4 3 3 1 1
FOB 6 4 4 2 1 1
MOB2 7 6 4 4 1 1
FOB 6 5 3 2 1 1
MOB2 8 5 4 3 1 1
FOB 6 5 3 3 1 1
MOB2 5 5 4 3 1 1
FOB 5 4 4 3 1 1
MOB2 6 5 2 2 1 1
FOB 5 4 3 2 1 1
MOB2 6 4 2 3 1 1
FOB 5 4 3 2 1 1
MOB2 6 5 4 2 1 1
FOB 4 3 3 1 1 1
MOB2 6 5 3 2 1 1
FOB 5 3 3 1 1 1
MOB2 6 4 3 2 1 1
FOB 4 2 2 2 1 1
MOB2 6 4 4 2 1 1
FOB 4 3 3 2 1 1
MOB2 5 4 2 3 1 1
FOB 4 3 3 2 1 1
MOB2 4 5 3 2 1 1
5














Table 81. Number of Lost Connectors for each configuration. 
 
The following figures show the number of lost connectors for each supply 
ship cycle time at each of the different configurations.  The general trend of all figures is 
that the lower the survivability the more lost connectors.  This is also a function of the 
number of transport events that must be done in order to move all the materiel required.  
As the supply ship cycle time extends the more materiel that must be moved but the 
number of s times the supply ship shows up is less during the 180 days.  This causes the 
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unique jumps and dips in all the curves of the figures except the 99% survivability curve 
where the expected number of lost connectors is always one. 
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Figure 137.   Lost Connectors using FOB and LCU-2000 configuration as a function of supply 
ship cycle time. 
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Figure 138.   Lost connectors using the FOB and SEACOR “Jim G” configuration as a function 
of supply ship cycle time. 
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Figure 139.   Lost connectors using the MOB and LCU-2000 configuration as a function of 
supply ship cycle time.  
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Figure 140.   Lost connectors using the MOB and SEACOR “Jim G” configuration as a 
function of supply ship cycle time. 
 
7.1.8 EXTEND Cost Performance 
Cost performance graphs were created by comparing the Lost Cost of the 
operation with the supply ship cycle time for each basing alternative.  The Lost Cost 
refers to the amount of cost that will be accrued by losing the average number of logistic 
connectors during the 180 day operation.  The Lost Cost is determined by adding the 
procurement cost for a new logistics connector, the cost of the crew, and the cost of the 
cargo.  For each Lost Cost of an operation there is a window of delivery in which the 
supply ships can be scheduled in order to maintain 95% Ao fuel SURC.  Figure 141 is the 




Lost Cost vs. Supply Ship Cycle Time  Maintaining a 95% 
SURC Ao  at FOB





























Figure 141.   Lost Cost for each configuration of the FOB. 
 
Figure 141 shows a general trend that as the survivability lowers so does the 
delivery window options for supply ship cycle time.  Figure 141 shows the trade space 
between the variables supply ship cycle time, logistics connector survivability, 
operational availability, and lost cost.  By using the full spectrum of the trade space 
Figure 141 can be used as a predictor for the supply ship cycle time.  If using a FOB and 
the threat is high meaning a large chance of losing a logistics connector (survivability 
90%) then the supply ship cycle time should be 4-7 days using a SEACOR “Jim G” for a 
lost cost of $50M or 4-6 days using a LCU-2000 for a lost cost of 53 M$. 
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Lost Cost vs. Supply Ship Cycle Time Maintaining a 95% SURC Ao at MOB




























Figure 142.   Lost Cost for each configuration of the FOB. 
 
Figure 142 shows a general trend that as the survivability lowers so does the 
delivery window options for supply ship cycle time.  Figure 142 shows the trade space 
between the variables supply ship cycle time, logistics connector survivability, 
operational availability, and lost cost.  By using the full spectrum of the trade space 
Figure 142 can be used as a predictor for the supply ship cycle time.  If using a MOB and 
the threat is high meaning a large chance of losing a logistics connector (survivability 
90%) then the supply ship cycle time should be 4-7 days using a SEACOR “Jim G” for a 
lost cost of $55M or 4-6 days using a LCU-2000 for a lost cost of $58M. 
 
7.2 REPAIR GROUP 
When the status quo is compared to the alternatives, it is clear that Measures of 
Performance of the RF maintenance alternatives are statistically identical.  For this 
reason, typical data normalization does not apply.  Table 82 shows the Status Quo’s 
MOP’s compared to the alternatives.  In terms of efficiency, a minor increase in Ao 





Ao of a SURC
with Parts 
On-Hand 
Average Number of 
SURCs Available 
SQ 6.42 7.14 88.84% 8 
INC PERS 5.76 6.17 90.05% 8 
INC ALL 3 5.72 6.02 90.20% 9 
INC BAYS 6.58 7.02 88.82% 8 
INC SURCs 6.42 6.82 89.08% 9 
INC BAY/SURC 6.61 7.01 88.80% 9 
INC PERS/BAY 5.55 6.10 90.27% 9 
INC PERS/SURC 5.62 5.79 90.44% 9 
  
Table 82. Repair Raw Data Matrix 
 
With regard to the model’s demonstration of sensitivity between alternatives, it is 
clear that the there is strong sensitivity across all alternatives to MSRT and MTBF, due to 
the nature of the equation and the value of the mean CM and PM times when compared 
to the larger MTBF and MSRT figures.  Recall the following equation from Chapter 5: 
o
MTBFA
MTBF MCRT MPRT MSRT
= + + +  
 
RST Operational Availability429 
 
From this equation, one can deduce that a MSRT of anything beyond 24 hours 
(Figure 143), when matched with a MTBF of 108 operating hours, reduces SURC 
availability below acceptable operational availability levels. This conclusion is yielded 
despite rapid maintenance response times indicated by MCMT and MPMT. 
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Figure 143.   SURC Operational Ao versus MSRT 
 
For the purposes of this study, the RST used an operational availability threshold 
of 80%, which was derived from a similar platform’s operational requirements 
document.430  Other factors such administrative delays, and increased work delays due to 
resource unavailability had a similar influence on all alternatives.  None of the 
alternatives showed any significant resistance to such changes. 
 
7.3 FORCE PROTECTION GROUP 
7.3.1 Revised Measures of Performance 
The MOP’s that were derived for in the objectives hierarchy for a FPS were 

















Force Exchange Ratio Probability of detection. Number of enemy hits 
on a single entity
Modeling 
limitation.
Time to locate shot after 
detection.
Force Exchange Ratio No change
Time spent on object 
after locating.
Number of enemy 
penetrations
Preference
Range a contact can be 
identified.
Mean distance of 
enemy casualties
Preference
Time to identify after 
contact detected.
Number of RF 
casualties
Preference
Weapon range. Number of SURCs 
destroyed
Preference
Probability of kill of 
enemy with weapon.
Probability of hit of 
enemy with weapon.
Damage to RF personnel 
and structures
Number of friendly 
forces and critical 
structures detected.
Maneuverability of 
critical infrastructures.  
 
Table 83. Force Protection MOP Revisions 
 
The RST derived revised measures of performance because of limitations in 
modeling and preference.  The revised MOP’s were selected because they all captured the 
intent of the original MOP’s, or provided an added evaluation measure that was not 
previously considered. 
 
7.3.1.1 Time of enemy casualty 
This MOP was used as a substitute for time to detect due to modeling 
limitations and preference in the mortar attack scenario.  The RST enabled the single 
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entity that registered hits continuous coverage of the entire area throughout the simulation 
to aide in modeling.  This entity was then weaponized to serve as the mortar/LCMR 
combination for the specific architectures.  This prevented the time of detection from 
serving as an accurate measure because the enemy was detected immediately as they 
were setting up the mortar, rather then when a mortar lands on the FOB, or when the 
UAV detected the enemy firing the mortar.  Every architecture, however, that had the 
ability to detect the enemy, also had the capability to fire on the enemy immediately after 
this detection, so the time of an enemy’s casualty more accurately reflected the intent of 
the time of detection MOP. 
 
7.3.1.2 Number of Enemy Hits on a Single Entity 
This MOP was used in the mortar attack scenario in MANA to 
demonstrate the potential damage inflicted by the enemy mortars.  The scale of the map 
in this scenario did not permit a detailed view of casualties and damage to specific 
facilities, so the number of hits taken on a single entity was used to serve as an 
approximation. 
 
7.3.1.3 The Force Exchange Ratio 













This did not represent a change from the intended MOE, but the equation 
used by the RST was the inverse of the equation that is commonly used, because there 
were results from the modeling that contained runs with zero blue casualties.  This MOP/ 
MOE was only used in the raid on the FOB scenario. 
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7.3.1.4 Number of Enemy Penetrations 
The RST reasoned that the number of enemy penetrations an excellent 
indication of the success of a FPS architecture in denying the commando raid threat.  The 
requirement for an enemy infiltration in the raid was if the enemy crossed a point that 
was 270 grids, or 472.5 yards (1.75 yards/grid for the raid scenario) from the center of the 
FOB. 
 
7.3.1.5 Mean Distance of Enemy Casualties 
This MOP was used in the boat attack scenarios to estimate how far the 
attacking boats could penetrate.  The attacking boats automatically detonated when they 
reached the moored SURC’s, so the average location of the casualties of these boats 
provided insight into the capability of the FPS. 
 
7.3.1.6 Number of RF casualties 
This MOP was used in the boat attack scenarios.  The MOP was used as 
an aspect of the damage to the RF personnel and structures.  For the boat attack scenarios, 
there were specific numbers of hit required to kill blue personnel and other entities.  The 
personnel on in the gun posts for the FOB were given two hits to kill while the personnel 
operating the weapon stations on the MOB were given three hits to kill.  The casualties of 
the personnel on the PBL’s could not be reflected so the RST assumed that 15 hits to a 
PBL would account for the death of the crew and disable the craft. 
 
7.3.1.7 Number of SURC’s Destroyed 
This MOP was selected for the boat attack scenarios because the SURC’s 
represented the enemy’s primary target, as the destruction of the SURC’s would result in 





7.3.2 Statistical Comparison of MOP’s and Raw Data Matrices 
The raw data from the MANA simulations was outputted into excel format.  The 
RST used MATLAB to draw the data from excel and generate the specific MOP’s 
desired for each scenario.  MATLAB was also used to analyze the MOP’s for comparing 
architectures to determine statistical significance. 
The results of the simulation runs, such as the time of first detection or the 
number of forces killed, were expected to distribute in a similar manner for different 
scenarios, but the RST could not differentiate the type of distribution, specifically, 
whether the distribution could be approximated as normal.  Furthermore, there was an 
indication that the distributions were not normal, because the MOP’s assumed positive 
values, and hence the required left “tail” of the Gaussian did not exist.  In cases like 
these, rather than use a standard analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the significance of 
our conclusions about the differences or similarities between the treatments compared, a 
different set of tests, called non-parametric tests, were used.  An appropriate non-
parametric test for our case was the Kruskal-Wallis.  The Kruskal-Wallis tests the 
hypothesis that the mean values of the parameters analyzed are equal for the different 
treatments, with the sole requirement that the variability around the means is taken from 
the same distribution (not necessarily normal).  In the analysis conducted on the MOP’s 
of the FPS architectures, the null hypothesis (H0) was that the MOP’s would have equal 
expected values.  If at least one of them were different (Ha), the analysis revealed the 
difference with a certain level of significance that was calculated in each test. 
The first step of the Kruskal-Wallis test was to rank the entire set of observations 
(for all treatments) according to their value, from lowest to highest.  Let Rij be the rank of 
the jth observation of treatment i (out of total I treatments), N the total number of 
observations and Ji the number of observations of treatment i.  Then the test statistic K 






























The above test statistic was a measure of the extents to which the average ranks of 
the different observations deviated from their expected value (N+1)/2 in the case of equal 
averages.431  For a large number of observations (as in our case – 20 observations of each 
case in each scenario), K will have approximately the chi-squared distribution for I-1 
degrees of freedom.  For a certain level of significant α, if 1,
2 −> IK αχ  the null hypothesis 
was rejected (which means that K holds an improbable value if we assume that Ho is 
true). 
 
7.3.2.1 Mortar MOP Results and Statistical Analysis 
Figure 144 and Figure 145 are the box plots for the MOP’s of the mortar 
attack scenario: time of first detection/enemy casualty and number of hits on the FOB.  
All values that denote time were taken in MANA time steps.  For all of the tests below, 
H0 is the null hypothesis, that all of the cases tested have the same means iµ .  Ha is the 
alternative – that at least one of the iµ ’s is different.  Ha is accepted when the difference 
between the means is statistically significant. 
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Figure 144.   Time of First Enemy Detection/Enemy Casualty 
 
The order of the case numbers corresponded to the following 
architectures; 1, baseline defense; 2, mortar and UAV; 3, mortar and LCMR; and 4, 
mortar, LCMR, and UAV.  The Kruskal-Wallis analysis was conducted as indicated: 
H0: 4321 µµµµ ===  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  > 99.99% 
Case 1 is significantly worse then the others. 
H0: 432 µµµ ==  
They are not significantly different – significance level only 56.11%. 
Ranking (worst – best):  1 – 2, 3, 4  
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Figure 145.   Number of Hits on FOB 
 
The order of the cases is the same as in the box plot of the time of first 
detection/enemy casualty plot.   
H0: 4321 µµµµ ===  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  > 99.99% 
Case 1 is significantly worse than the others. 
H0: 432 µµµ ==  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  99.81% 
Case 4 is significantly better than the others. 
H0: 32 µµ =  
408 
Significance level (That at least one is different):  96.86 % 
Case 2 is significantly better than 3. 
Ranking (worst – best):  1 – 3 – 2 - 4 
 
7.3.2.2 Commando Raid MOP Results and Statistical Analysis 
Figure 146 and Figure 147 are the box plots for the MOP’s of the 
commando raid scenario: Force Exchange Ratio and number of penetrations.  For all of 
the tests below, H0 is the null hypothesis, that all of the cases tested have the same 
means iµ . Ha is the alternative – that at least one of the iµ ’s is different. Ha is accepted 




























Figure 146.   Force exchange ratio (B killed / B0) / (R killed / R0) 
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The order of the case numbers corresponded to the following 
architectures: 1, baseline raid defense; 2, baseline defense with mortar and sensor fence; 
3, ROSAMs.  The Kruskal-Wallis analysis was conducted as indicated: 
H0: 321 µµµ ==  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  99.55% 
Case 1 is significantly worse then the others. 
H0: 32 µµ =  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  97.1% 
Case 2 is significantly better. 

























Figure 147.   Number of Red Penetrations 
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The case numbers are the same as the box plot of the Force Exchange 
Ratio above. 
H0: 321 µµµ ==  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  > 99.99% 
Case 1 is significantly worse than the others. 
H0: 32 µµ =  
The same – no penetrations occurred.  
Ranking (worst – best):  1 – 2, 3 
 
7.3.2.3 Boat Attack on FOB Results and Statistical Analysis 
Figure 148 through Figure 150 are the box plots for the MOP’s of the boat 
attack on the FOB scenario: mean distance of detected reds/ casualty location of reds, 
number of blue casualties, and SURC’s destroyed.  For all of the tests below, H0 is the 
null hypothesis, that all of the cases tested have the same means iµ . Ha is the alternative – 
that at least one of the iµ ’s is different. Ha is accepted when the difference between the 
means is statistically significant. 
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Figure 148.   Mean distance of Red Casualties 
 
The order of the case numbers corresponded to the following 
architectures; 1, baseline FOB boat defense; 2, baseline with floating barrier, 3, ROSAMs 
and floating barrier; 4, baseline, floating barrier, and PB; and 5, ROSAMs, floating 
barrier, and PB.  The Kruskal-Wallis analysis was conducted as indicated: 
H0: 54321 µµµµµ ====  
We should accept Ha with a significance level: > 99.99% 
1, 2 are significantly worse then 3, 4, 5. 
H0: 21 µµ =  
Significance level for Ha (That they are different):  84.05% 
Æ Not significantly different.  
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H0: 543 µµµ ==   
Significance level (That at least one is different):  > 99.99% 
3 is significantly better then 4, 5. 
H0: 54 µµ =  
Significance level (That they are different):   99.95% 
4 is significantly worse then 5. 
Ranking (worst – best):  1, 2 - 4 - 3 
 






























Figure 149.   Number of Blue casualties, Excluding SURC’s 
 
The case numbers represent the same architectures as in the mean distance 
of casualty location plot. 
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H0: 54321 µµµµµ ====  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  > 99.99% 
Cases 1, 2, 3 are significantly better than 4, 5. 
H0: 321 µµµ ==  
Significance level (That at least one is different):   90.29% 
Case 1 has few (positive) outliers – hence it is worse then 2, 3 
H0: 32 µµ =  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  84.81% 
Æ No significant difference 
H0: 54 µµ =  
Significance level (That at least one is different):   99.78% 
5 is significantly better than 4, 5. 
Ranking (worst – best):  4 – 5 – 1 – 3, 2 
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Figure 150.   Number of SURC’s Destroyed 
 
H0: 54321 µµµµµ ====  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  100% 
Case 1 is significantly worse than the others. 
H0: 5432 µµµµ ===  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  60.84% 
Æ No significant difference 
Ranking (worst – best):  1 – 2, 3, 4, 5 
 
7.3.2.4 Boat Attack on MOB Results and Statistical Analysis 
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Figure 151 through Figure 153 are the box plots for the MOP’s of the boat 
attack on the MOB scenario: mean distance of detected reds/ casualty location of reds, 
number of blue casualties, and SURC’s destroyed.  For all of the tests below, H0 is the 
null hypothesis, that all of the cases tested have the same means iµ . Ha is the alternative – 
that at least one of the iµ ’s is different. Ha is accepted when the difference between the 
means is statistically significant. 





























Figure 151.   Mean Distance of Red Casualties 
 
The order of the case numbers corresponded to the following 
architectures; 1, baseline RCSS; 2, RCSS with PB, 3, Nobriza and Barge baseline; and 4, 
Nobriza and Barge baseline with floating barrier and PB.  The Kruskal-Wallis analysis 
was conducted as indicated: 
H0: 4321 µµµµ ===  
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Significance level (That at least one is different):  > 99.99% 
Case 1 is significantly worse then the others. 
H0: 432 µµµ ==  
Significance level (That they are different):  >99.99% 
Case 4 is significantly worse then 2, 3. 
H0: 32 µµ =  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  > 99.99% 
Case 2 is significantly worse then 3. 
Ranking (worst – best):  1 – 4 – 2 - 3  
 































Figure 152.   Number of Blue Casualties, excluding SURC’s 
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The case numbers represent the same architectures as in the mean distance 
of casualty plot. 
H0: 4321 µµµµ ===  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  >99.99% 
Case 1 is significantly better than the others, and 2 is significantly worse. 
H0: 43 µµ =  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  94.41% 
Case 3 is significantly worse than 4. 
Ranking (worst – best):  2 – 3 – 4 – 1 
 
























Figure 153.   Number of SURC’s destroyed 
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H0: 4321 µµµµ ===  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  >99.99% 
Case 3 is significantly better than the others. 
H0: 421 µµµ ==  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  = 99.95% 
Case 1 is significantly worse than 2, 4. 
H0: 42 µµ =  
Significance level (That at least one is different):  = 96.4% 
Case 2 is significantly worse than 4. 
Ranking (worst – best):  1 - 2 – 4 - 3 
 
7.3.3 Raw Data Matrices, Alternative Rankings, and Sensitivity Analysis 
At the conclusion of the MOP statistical analysis, Raw Data Matrices were 
formed for each scenario based off of the measured medians.  The architectures that had 
no statistical difference in their MOP were given equivalent medians so that there would 
be no difference in performance. 
The data was normalized using a linear relationship and the following formulas.  










For each MOP, the MaxValue and MinValue changed. 
After data normalization, weights were assigned to each MOP so a utility score 
comprised of all MOP’s for an alternative could be generated.  The alternative ranking 
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for the architectures of each scenario was based off this utility score, but the rankings 
were also checked for sensitivity based on the weights assigned. 
 
7.3.3.1 Mortar Defense Alternatives 
Table 84 is the Raw Data Matrix for the Mortar threat architectures. 
 
Mortar Defense Time to detect Number of hits received
Baseline (already in RF) 600 24
Mortar and UAV 150 5
Mortar and LCMR 150 8
Mortar, LCMR, UAV 150 2  
Table 84. Raw Data Matrix for Mortar Defense Architectures 
 
This data was normalized using the higher-is-worse equation for both 
MOPs.  The MaxValue for time to detect was assumed to be 600, while the MinValue 
was 60.  The MaxValue for the number of hits received was 30, as this was the most 
mortar rounds the enemy could carry in this scenario, and the MinValue was 0.  Table 85 
is the normalized data matrix. 
 
Mortar Defense (normalized) Time to detect Number of hits received
Baseline (already in RF) 0 20
Mortar and UAV 83 83
Mortar and LCMR 83 73
Mortar, LCMR, UAV 83 93  
Table 85. Normalized Data Matrix for Mortar Defense 
 
Weights were assigned to the MOPs to generate an alternative scoring 
among the mortar defense alternatives, although from the normalized data matrix there is 
a clear increase in performance down the matrix as the time to detect remained constant 
and the number of hits received varied.  The RST reasoned that the number of hits is four 
times as important of a MOP for mortar defense as time to detect, so a weight of .8 was 
assigned to the number of hits MOP, while .2 was assigned to the time to detect MOP.  
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With the assigned weights, utility scores for each alternative were developed.  Table 86 is 
the utility scores for each of the mortar defense alternatives. 
 
Mortar Defense Utility Scores
Baseline (already in RF) 16
Mortar and UAV 83
Mortar and LCMR 75
Mortar, LCMR, UAV 91  
Table 86. Mortar Defense Utility Scores 
 
The utility score confirmed what was already apparent for these 
alternatives because there were only two MOP’s and the performance of the alternatives 
were consistent across the MOP’s.  Sensitivity analysis did not have to be performed for 
these alternatives because the results were clearly insensitive based on the data presented 
earlier. 
 
7.3.3.2 Commando Raid on FOB 
Table 87 is the raw data matrix for the Commando Raid architectures. 
 
Commando Raid Force Exchange Ratio Number of Penetrations
Baseline 0.17 3
Baseline, Sensor Fence, and Mortar 0 0
ROSAMS 0.07 0  
Table 87. Raw Data Matrix for Commando Raid Architectures 
 
Much like the mortar alternatives, there is a clear delineation of 
performance here. The baseline, Sensor Fence, and Mortar alternative was the highest 
performing, while the ROSAMs architecture was second followed by the baseline.  Data 
normalization and utility scoring were still conducted in similar fashion as the Mortar 
scenario to arrive at a utility score for use in efficiency curves. 
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Also like the mortar scenario, both of the MOPs for this scenario represent 
less performance with higher numbers in the raw data matrix.  The MaxValue assumed 
for the Force Exchange Ratio was .5 as this would represent a significant loss to the blue 
force.  The MinValue for the Force Exchange Ratio was 0.  The MaxValue of 
infiltrations for the scenario was 10, as this would represent 10% of the attacking 
insurgents infiltrating the camp.  The MinValue was, of course, 0.  Table 88 is the 
normalized data matrix for the commando raid alternatives. 
 
Commando Raid (normalized) Force Exchange Ratio Number of Penetrations
Baseline 66 70
Baseline, Sensor Fence, and Mortar 100 100
ROSAMS 86 100  
Table 88. Normalized Data Matrix for Commando Raid Alternatives 
 
The RST assigned a weight of .7 to the FER and .3 to the number of 
infiltrations for the utility scoring.  Table 89 is the utility scoring for each of the 
commando raid alternative FPSs. 
 
Commando Raid Utility Score
Baseline 69
Baseline, Sensor Fence, and Mortar 100
ROSAMS 96  
Table 89. Commando Raid Utility Scores 
 
Sensitivity analysis was not necessary to perform as the performance of 
each alternative was consistent across all MOPs. 
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7.3.3.3 FOB Boat Attack Alternatives 
Table 90 is the raw data matrix for the FOB Boat Attack alternatives. 
 
FOB Boat Attack Mean distance of detected reds Number of blue casualties Number of SURCS destroyed
Baseline 200 0.5 4
Baseline and Water Barrier 200 0.0 0
Water barrier and ROSAM 470 0.0 0
Baseline Water Barrier and PB 410 3.0 0
ROSAM Water Barrier and PB 425 2.0 0  
Table 90. Raw Data Matrix for FOB Boat Attack Architectures 
 
In this data matrix, the higher number of mean distance of detected reds 
was favorable, while number of blue casualties and number of SURC’s destroyed were 
desired to be low.  It was clear from the raw data matrix that the water barrier and 
ROSAM alternative is the best performer, and the baseline was the worst performer.  The 
other alternatives having varying degrees of performance across MOP’s.  Table 91 is the 
normalized data matrix. 
 
FOB Boat Attack (normalized) Mean distance of detected reds Number of blue casualties Number of SURCs destroyed
Baseline 39 90 0
Baseline and Water Barrier 39 100 100
Water barrier and ROSAM 94 100 100
Baseline Water Barrier and PB 82 40 100
ROSAM Water Barrier and PB 85 60 100  
Table 91. Normalized Data Matrix for FOB Boat attack 
 
The MaxValue and MinValue for distance was 500 and 0, respectively.  
Five hundred was set as the beginning of an exclusion zone around the base, so once an 
unknown boat crossed this line they were considered a threat.  The MaxValue for number 
of blue casualties was 5, and the MinValue 0.  The RST considered five casualties to be a 
worst case number as this was almost half of the 11 blue personnel that could be in the 
scenario (8 on the MG’s along the river bank and three in the patrol boat).  The 
MaxValue for the number of SURC’s destroyed was 4 and the MinValue was 0, as the 
number of moored SURC’s was 4.  Table 92 is the utility scores assigned for the FOB 
Boat Attack architectures. 
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FOB Boat Attack Utility Scores
Baseline 40
Baseline and Water Barrier 94
Water barrier and ROSAM 99
Baseline Water Barrier and PB 74
ROSAM Water Barrier and PB 82  
Table 92. Utility Score for FOB Boat Attack 
 
The utility scores were derived with a weight of .5 for the damaged 
SURC’s, .4 for blue casualties, and .1 for the mean distance of detected reds/ red 
casualties.  It was necessary to conduct sensitivity analysis on the alternatives because the 
inconsistency of the MOP’s for the different architectures. 
 
7.3.3.4 MOB Boat Attack Alternatives 
Table 93 is the raw data matrix for the FOB Boat Attack alternatives. 
 
MOB Boat Attack  Mean distance of detected reds  Number of blue casualties  Number of SURCS destroyed 
RCSS Baseline 275 0 3
RCSS and PB 326 1.5 2
Nobriza and Barge Baseline 340 1 0
Nobriza and Barge Baseline, PB, and Water Barrier 304 0.1 1  
Table 93. Raw Data Matrix for MOB Boat Attack Architectures 
 
In this data matrix, the higher number of mean distance of detected reds 
was favorable, while number of blue casualties and number of SURC’s destroyed were 
desired to be low.  There was no clear alternative that performed the best from this data 
matrix.  Table 94 is the normalized data matrix. 
 
MOB Boat Attack (normalized)  Mean distance of detected reds  Number of blue casualties  Number of SURCS destroyed 
RCSS Baseline 55 100 25
RCSS and PB 65.2 70 50
Nobriza and Barge Baseline 68 80 100
Nobriza and Barge Baseline, PB, and Water Barrier 60.8 98 75  
Table 94. Normalized Data Matrix for MOB Boat attack 
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The MaxValue and MinValue for distance was 500 and 0, respectively.  
Five hundred was set as the beginning of an exclusion zone around the MOB, so once an 
unknown boat crossed this line they were considered a threat.  The MaxValue for number 
of blue casualties was 5, and the MinValue 0.  The RST considered 5 casualties to be a 
worst case number as this was almost half of the 11 blue personnel that could be in the 
scenario (8 manning the weapons on the MOB and three in the patrol boat).  The 
MaxValue for the number of SURC’s destroyed was 4 and the MinValue was 0, as the 
number of moored SURC’s was 4.  Table 95 is the utility scores assigned for the FOB 
Boat Attack architectures. 
 
MOB Boat Attack Utility Score
RCSS Baseline 58
RCSS and PB 60
Nobriza and Barge Baseline 89
Nobriza and Barge Baseline, PB, and Water Barrier 83  
Table 95. Utility Score for MOB Boat Attack 
 
The utility scores were derived with a weight of .5 for the damaged 
SURC’s, .4 for blue casualties, and .1 for the mean distance of detected reds/ red 
casualties.  It was necessary to conduct sensitivity analysis on the alternatives because the 
inconsistency of the MOP’s for the different architectures.   
 
7.3.3.5 MANA Results 
Figure 154 represents the results of the first five MATLAB scenarios that 
dealt specifically with the combat stage of the model and consisted of the various 
configurations of weapons, bunkers, machine guns, and IR illuminators. 
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Figure 154.   MATLAB Combat Stage Results 
 
The top curve represented six machine guns and no bunkers.  The bottom 
three curves all assumed the use of bunkers.  The IR illuminator curve also assumed six 
machine guns. 
The graph demonstrated IR illuminators were the most valuable asset for 
perimeter defenses.  If less Blue personnel were employed bunkers were also valuable, 
but as the number of Blue personnel increased, machine guns became more valuable. 
Scenario six of the MATLAB analysis was derived the value of IR 
sensors.  This scenario was only applied to the sensing and detection stage of the model, 
so the lives saved were from those spared from a surprise attack by the enemy.  Figure 
155 represents the graph depicting the performance of the sensors.  The graph shows 
approximately five lives could be saved by employing nine or more sensors. 
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Figure 155.   Value of IR Sensors 
 
7.3.4 Cost Performance Curves 
The RST used the original utility scores and the cost estimations for each 
architecture to create cost performance curves that showed the cost versus performance 
for the different architectures in each scenario.  Figure 156 is the cost performance curve 




Figure 156.   Mortar Defense Cost Performance Curve 
 
The cost performance curve for mortar defense demonstrated an almost linear 
relationship between the utility score for each architecture and their associated cost.  
Because of this almost linear relationship, there is no clear alternative that provides the 





Figure 157.   Commando Raid Alternatives Cost Performance Curve 
 
The cost performance curve for the commando raid defense reveals that the 
ROSAMs are the clear choice for most “bang for the buck.”  The ROSAMS had a high 
utility because there use resulted in fewer RF personnel casualties.  The baseline 
architecture was dominated by the ROSAMs in that it was more expensive and did not 
perform as well as indicated by its low utility score.  Figure 158 is the cost performance 




Figure 158.   FOB Boat Attack Cost Performance Curve 
 
The Water Barrier and ROSAMs dominated all other alternatives because it was 
the highest performing and lowest cost.  The lack of personnel had a double effect for this 
alternative.  Not only were less blue forces killed, thus increasing the survivability of this 
alternative, but the O&S costs were reduced because the manning requirement was less.   




Figure 159.   MOB Boat Attack Defense Cost Performance Curve 
 
The Nobriza and Barge baseline was clearly most cost effective in this scenario.  
The operating and support cost for the Nobriza and Barge were less because there were 
less weapon manning requirements than the RCSS.  The Nobriza provided heavy fire 
power without having to use the more vulnerability patrol boats, so the utility was higher 
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 SUPPLY GROUP 
Key factors of riverine sustainment supply success are supply ship cycle time, 
basing alternative, logistics connector survivability, operational availability of the 
SURC’s and cost.  Given the supply ship cycle time, basing alternative, and number of 
assets used, the RST was able to determine the most effective configuration of 
connectors. 
Helicopters added very little to the overall performance of the configuration of 
connectors, but they increase the cost significantly.  If the RF operates from a FOB with a 
supply ship cycle time between 4-7 days, then the most effective connector is the LCU-
2000.  This is because the LCU-2000 can carry the entire supply load in one run.  When 
the supply ship cycle time increases to 8-9 days, then the LCU-2000 can no longer carry 
the entire supply load in one run.  Instead, the Jim G becomes the most effective 
connector.  This is assuming that the RF would have to procure an LCU-1610 and LCU-
2000.  If the procurement of the two crafts is not necessary, then the LCU-2000 with an 
LCU-1610 would be the most cost effective configuration.  If only one vessel is used, 
then the Jim G will allow the maximum supply ship cycle time to maintain a 95% 
operational availability of SURC’s due to fuel if the supply ship cycle time is not 
specified. 
If the RF operates from a Nobriza+Barge MOB with a supply ship cycle time 
between 4-7 days, then the most cost effective connector is the LCU-2000.  Similar to the 
FOB, the Nobriza+Barge requires a seven day supply load that can fit in the LCU-2000.  
When the supply ship cycle time increases to 8-9 days, then the LCU-2000 with an LCU-
1610 is the most effective configuration.  Unlike the FOB, the Nobriza+Barge requires a 
slightly greater supply load that would require a LCU-2000 and a Jim G to do multiple 
runs.  If only one vessel is used, then the Jim G will allow the maximum supply ship 
cycle time to maintain a 95% operational availability of SURC’s due to fuel if the supply 
ship cycle time is not specified. 
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If the RF operates from the RCSS, Endurance, or Sri Inderapura MOB with a 
supply ship cycle time between 4-7 days, then the most effective configuration of 
connectors is a Jim G with an LCU-1610.  The increase in supply load compared to the 
other basing alternatives requires multiple runs when a single Jim G or two LCU-1610’s 
are used.  When a Jim G and an LCU-1610 are combined, they can re-supply the MOB in 
one run.  When the ship cycle time increases to 8-9 days, then two Jim G’s is the most 
effective configuration.  If only one vessel is used, then the Jim G will allow the 
maximum supply ship cycle time to maintain a 95% operational availability of SURC’s 
due to fuel if the supply ship cycle time is not specified. 
For a single connector, the Jim G supported the best supply ship cycle time.  If the 
RF wants to only use one Jim G while having the maximum supply ship cycle time, then 
the RF should operate from a FOB because of its lower supply demand. 
 
8.2 REPAIR GROUP 
Increasing personnel, maintenance bays, or SURC did not have a significant 
effect on improving operational availability with the repair model, and with this in mind 
it is recommended that the status quo remain in place.  However, when considering the 
RST scenario constraint of maintaining at least 9 mission ready SURC’s at all times, the 
alternative of increasing both personnel and maintenance bays was the cheaper than 
procuring additional SURC’s.  Also, the model indicated that MSRT was the biggest 
factor that affected SURC operational availability.  MSRT’s exceeding 24-hours drove 
operational availabilities below 80%.  Given a logistically barren environment as 
presented in the RST scenario, it is vital that an exhaustive PUK is developed for the RF.  
This PUK must not only contain high failure rate items, but also items that fail at 
moderate rates. 
Despite not predicting any significant difference between the baseline status quo 
and the alternatives, the model developed by the repair model can serve as a planning tool 
for future riverine warfare operations.  As key parametric changes can be easily 
implemented within the model, such as environmental concerns, Commander’s 
discretion, medical problems, and so forth, the Repair Group’s model has established a 
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foundation upon which such studies can be made.  Furthermore, with regard to every 
alternative, including the status quo, being very sensitive to MSRT, the repair model may 
serve as a tool for repair re-supply planning and evaluation of logistics alternatives that 
involve faster connectors such as airlift. 
 
8.3 FORCE PROTECTION GROUP 
The analysis conducted in the scenarios revealed some key insights.  The first 
insight revealed was that the current mortar defenses proposed by the RF are insufficient.  
The analysis conducted in this study was with the aide of a host nation providing security 
beyond the FOB’s perimeters out to the expected mortar range.  Even though the best 
alternative improved on the baseline by severely decreasing the number of mortar rounds 
that hit the base, the modeling showed that three mortar rounds still struck the base.  This 
means that even with the mortar defenses proposed in this study, the FOB could expect to 
be hit by mortar rounds each time they are attacked.  If the RF is to based at the a FOB 
ashore, then the host nation needs to provide robust perimeter defense.  For the decision 
maker deciding which basing alternative to consider, this is a major consideration 
because a MOB can move and prove less susceptible to mortar fire, especially with as 
wide a river as the Kampar. 
The analysis also revealed that the ROSAMs were an excellent resource for force 
protection in two different scenarios.  The ROSAMs provide a reduction in manpower, 
which decreased the RF footprint and also promoted greater RF survivability when the 
FOB was attacked. 
The MOB boat attack scenarios revealed that the Nobriza and Barge were the 
most cost effective means to defend the RF when they were operating from a MOB.  The 
Nobriza provided excellent firepower without the added exposure to personnel, which 
was discovered to be a draw back for a patrol boat. 
The MATLAB analysis revealed that for the perimeter defenses, IR illuminators 
coupled with the NVG’s are very valuable assets.  The RF should also consider using 
acquiring RDFW units for the creation of bunkers. 
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8.4 COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 
Tactical communications equipment used by riverine forces needs to continue on 
a path of modernization and increased capacity.  Current technology used by riverine 
forces, though mature in its development, is based on technology requirements and 
operational doctrine which support a narrow view of what a communications system 
should do.  Development of new technologies in communications is progressing at a 
rapid rate and warrants a closer look into their applications for use in tactical 
environments. 
A technology search found that advances in Worldwide Interoperability for 
Microwave Access (WiMAX) technology hold great potential for advancing the 
communications and information sharing capacity of riverine forces operating in a 
tactical environment. 
Since WiMAX technology is a commercial off the shelf product, it holds promise 
as a more readily available and lower cost solution for tactical communications networks.  
Its development around the needs of corporate industry to increase their communications 
and information throughput at greater distances than standard wireless networks parallels 
the riverine forces needs for greater throughput of the same in support of their operations.  
The ability of WiMAX to handle multiple types of communications simultaneously at 
high rates of throughput shows its potential to overcome current limits of bandwidth 

















9. AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY 
The first Navy riverine squadron, RIVRON-ONE, was stood-up 2006 since the 
Vietnam Era.   RIVRON-ONE was deployed to Iraq in February 2007 to relieve the 
Marine Corp’s Dam Security Unit.  The dynamic nature of this force lends itself to 
countless avenues of potential study.  The RST chose to address the sustainment, which 
included supply, repair, and force protection.  During the course of this study the RST 
unveiled several areas of study that were beyond the scope of this technical report.  The 
RST categorized these areas of further study into six groupings: WIED’s, riverine craft, 
supply, repair, force protection and communication. 
The RST recognized that Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WIED’s) 
are a real and emerging threat to the RF.  WIED’s do not require much effort or 
technology to employ and could easily render the RF helpless.  They can be floated down 
river or anchored to the river bank, in either case they are lethal and difficult to counter.  
Measures need to be developed to protect the FOB, MOB, and SURC’s from these deadly 
devices. 
Current U.S. Naval ship inventories do not adequately address the needs of the 
riverine squadron.  The Navy does not have any ships that could provide an adequate 
mobile operating support base for the RF.  A vessel that can travel in excess of 20 knots, 
has a displacement of less than 10 feet, can sustain a RF sized force of 224, is sufficiently 
armored, has a capacity for helicopters/UAV’s, and can support all of the RF’s C4ISR 
needs should be developed.   The RST selected the LCU-2000 and Jim G as the best 
logistic connectors for the RF for their superior throughputs.  However, both vessels 
traverse at speeds below 10 knots when fully loaded.  These slow speeds hamper 
throughput and invite attack from hostile elements.  A logistic vessel with the cargo 
capacity of the Jim G that is capable of transporting goods at speeds in excess of 20 knots 
should be examined.  The SURC, like special warfare’s SOC-R, is highly maneuverable 
and fast (speeds in excess of 40 knots) which makes it perfect for insertion/extraction 
missions where speed is important.  However, the SURC is not the appropriate vessel for 
the riverine squadron’s missions that require a persistent presence like most of the MSO 
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and TSC missions.  Most of these missions require the riverine craft to patrol at speeds 
less than ten knots.  The slower speeds make the SURC crews vulnerable to ambush and 
sniper fire.  A riverine craft that is built like a tank, similar to the Swedish CB-90s, 
should be developed.  All of these ideas were passed on to NPS’s Total Ship Systems 
Engineering (TSSE) group for further study. 
The RST identified areas for further study for supply, based on assumptions made 
for the scenario.  The primary focus of this study dealt with re-supplying the RF with 
fuel, water, food, ammunition, and repair parts.  The process that dealt with how supplies 
were stored and transported is recommended for further study, in particular fuel and 
water.  Other areas of further study include the protection of the supply connectors and 
the ability of the RF to perform MEDEVAC and CASEVAC operations. 
Fuel was stored in 900 gallon SIXCON’s.  Because of the amount of fuel required 
for the SURC’s alone, further study may need to be done on bigger fuel tanks.  Also, a 
more efficient way of transporting fuel, such as fuel tanks in the logistic connectors vice 
carrying SIXCON’s on deck, is an area of further study. 
Water was also stored in SIXCON’s, and the RST looked at transporting potable 
water to the operating base.  An area of further study is the use of water purification 
systems in the river in order to decrease the supply load.  Current water purification 
systems for a riverine environment are very good at removing normal impurities of silt 
and debris plus any micro organisms.  However, in determining the amounts of water to 
be moved up the river the RST discovered that there was no guarantee that highly 
polluted river water from paper factories and industrial waste was able to be removed 
from the water.  This poses a serious health risk to the forces on the ground, especially in 
underdeveloped countries that have not developed laws to protect the environment. 
The RST also recommends analyzing how to protect the supply connectors.  From 
the study, the RST showed how re-supplying the RF in a timely manner is vital to the 
operation.  Further study on the protection of the supply connectors is recommended.  
This protection is recommended to be organic to the logistic connector therefore assets 
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designate for the actual operation would not be taken from there primary mission to 
protect the logistic connectors. 
Another area of further study is the ability of the RF to perform CASEVAC 
operations.  The RST assumed that these operations would be done by the host nation, 
but the RF may not have the same support in a different scenario.  The critical time for a 
casualty is how fast initial stabilization can be done.  If stabilization can occur within the 
first hour after a casualty the personnel have a much higher chance of surviving.  This 
ties in directly to develop a system to that would be able to rapidly deploy and quickly 
retrieve personnel whether in the river or on land. 
With regard to resource allocation and area-specific riverine logistics planning, 
the repair group found that the RF maintenance activities could be modeled after Naval 
Special Warfare Special Boat Teams as well as Naval Aviation Squadrons.  An analysis 
into the pre-positioning of maintenance materiel, non-conventional logistics connectors, 
and the effect of key changes in maintenance doctrine on the utility of the aforementioned 
should greatly benefit the RF of the future.  At present, the Repair Group is satisfied that 
Raytheon CLS is under contract to provide crucial reliability, maintainability and 
availability data on the Small Unit Riverine Craft; however, a more thorough analysis of 
the mean time between failure, mean time to repair by fault category (i.e., propulsion 
related faults, auxiliary, etc.), administrative delays, supply response times given certain 
logistics connectors, and the mean time between maintenance actions is needed in order 
to get a better grasp on the needs of the RF maintenance system.  Such information is 
vital to providing our operators in a riverine environment the resources necessary to 
fulfill their mission successfully. 
In the process of scoping and bounding the problem the RST identified several 
areas for future study of the FPS.  The primary focus of this study was in the area of 
denying the threat a successful attack.  The RST recommends that future studies examine 
the subsystems for predicting the threat and deterring the threat.  The RST recognized 
that the alternative FPS architectures would have an impact in the area of deterrence, but 
did not focus modeling and analysis in this area. 
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The RST also recommends the long term effects of system suitability should be 
examined for the FPS architectures.  The modeling conducted by the RST for the FPS 
architectures were all evaluated only at the actual time of attack in a certain operational 
area.  It would be useful to know the performance of the architectures of the FPS’s in 
different locations and over longer periods of time. 
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APPENDIX B: TASKING LETTER FROM MEYER INSTITUTE 
 
 
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering 
Naval Postgraduate School 
777 Dyer Rd., Monterey, CA 93943 
 
        6 December, 2006 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR SEA-11 STUDENTS 
 
Subj:  SEA-11 CAPSTONE PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 
Enclosures: Tab A: Background for Capstone Project Development 
Tab B: Preliminary Objectives for the Maritime Security Cooperation 
Project 
Tab C: Preliminary Objectives for the Port Security/Force Protection 
Project 
 
1. The objective of this memorandum is to provide guidance for the conduct of the 
integrated projects required for the completion of your degree.  You will be required 
to complete your project by the first week of June, 2007, in accordance with the 
following plan and milestones. 
 
(a) Develop a project proposal and a project management plan during the 
course of Prof Paulo’s SI 3002 Project Management class.  This proposal 
and plan will serve to focus your initial research and analysis. You should 
plan to review and update this plan frequently as you progress with your 
research. 
(b) Conduct project reviews approximately every six weeks, finishing with a 
final brief to be scheduled for the first week of June, 2007. 
(c) Begin outlining and preparing your Project Report as early as you can.  
Work with your faculty advisors, about every week, to prepare your Project 
Report for their approval and signature. The final report is due by 1 June, 
2007. 
 
2. Background information on the character and objectives of the projects is outlined in 
Tab A.  The preliminary objectives statements for the two projects are contained in 
Tabs B and C.  Your initial efforts should be to refine these objectives statements, 




3. You will be expected to identify and integrate students and faculty from across the 
campus -- and other resources from outside the school -- to participate in your 
projects.  This participation could include students who would join your groups, 
students doing related individual thesis topics, and faculty inside or outside NPS who 
have expertise related to your projects.  It will be your responsibility to integrate the 
efforts of outside participants in your projects.  Your faculty advisors will, of course, 
assist in these efforts. 
 
4. Faculty advisors who have agreed to participate with SEA-11 include the following. 
 
(a) Maritime Security Cooperation:  Rear Admiral Paul Shebalin, USNR 
(b) Port Security/Force Protection: Rear Admiral R. D. Williams, USN (ret)  
(c) Management planning and systems engineering advisor:  Dr. Gene Paulo 
(d) Technology advisor:  Prof Craig Smith. 
 
5. The grades assigned to the participants in these projects will be pass/fail, and will be 
assigned by the lead faculty advisors of the individual groups.  Although you will 
work as part of a team, your individual performance will be the basis for this 
evaluation. Successful completion and documentation of your project is a degree 
requirement.  
 
6. I request each SEA-11 member acknowledge that you have read this letter by signing 






Dr. Frank Shoup 
Director 
Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering 





RADM Shebalin, RADM Williams, Profs Hughes, Papoulias, Paulo, Smith, 





Background for Capstone Project Development 
 
Objective 
• Provide educational content appropriate to future professional careers as senior 
leaders. 
• Apply course content to execution of projects. 
 
Character of Capstone Projects 
• Address future security environments. 
• Relate strategic objectives, systems concepts, operational concepts, and 
technologies. 
• Tailor topics to group size and composition. 
 
Guidelines for SEA-11Capstone Project Development 
• New threats and missions 
- Joint missions:  Joint, interagency, and international operational focus 
- Collaboration with NECC on emerging Navy missions 
- Collaboration with USCG and other  interagency groups on interagency missions  
• Interactions with wargaming, experimentation, and other related research efforts 
conducted at NPS and elsewhere 
• Develop international student roles in integrated projects 
 
Sources of guidance on current national maritime objectives 
• NSPD-41/HSPD-11 “Maritime Security Policy” 
• National Strategy for Maritime Security 
• National Plans for Maritime Security 
 
Related CNO guidance 
• Navy Strategic Plan  
• CNO Guidance for 2006 
• Naval Operational Concept 
 
Sources of guidance on future security environments, to include   
 
• National Intelligence Council: “Mapping the Global Future” …  




Maritime Security Cooperation 
 
Design a system of systems for performing selected missions associated with 
coalition operations in littoral and riverine environments.   
 
Potential Focus Areas: 
 
• Capability gaps and potential options for enabling future multi-national operations  
 
• Joint, interagency, and intergovernmental command and control and information 
exchange 
 




Port Security/Force Protection 
 
Design a conceptual system of systems to improve Port Security measures for 
U.S. ports, and Force Protection options for U.S. forces in U.S. and foreign ports. 
 
Potential Focus Areas: 
 
• Develop a system of systems to provide individual ship self protection for U.S. 
Navy combatants 
 
• Develop concepts and systems for the integration of U.S. Navy shipboard self 
protection systems with U.S. Navy shore based systems. 
 
• Develop concepts and systems for U.S. commercial port security systems and the 
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APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS 
APB Self Propelled Barracks Ship
APL Non-Self Propelled Barracks Craft
AO Area of Operations
C2 Command and Control
C3 Command, Control, and Communications
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CI Configuration Item
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COASTS Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System
CONUS Continental United States
CSSE Combat Service Support Element
DES Discrete Event Simulation
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities
ECRC Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center
ETC Expeditionary Training Command
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EMIO Extended Maritime Interdiction Operations
FLS Forward Logistics Site
FMC Fully Mission Capable
FOB Forward Operating Base
FP Force Protection
FPS Force Protection System
FY$ Fiscal Year Dollars
GFS Global Fleet Station
GWOT Global War On Terrorism
HADR Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HMMWV High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
HSV High Speed Vessel
IA Informations Assurance
IMA Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
IPT Integrated Project Team
ITCZ Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone
JFC Joint Force Commander
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JOC Joint Operational Center
KD Kapal Di-Raja (Royal Ship, Malaysia)
KRI Kapal Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Ship) 
LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushion
LCM Landing Craft Mechanized
LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LCU Landing Craft Utility
LEGO Listener Event Graph Objects
LST Tank Landing Ship
LSV Logistic Support Vessel
MADT Mean Administrative Delay Time
MCAG Maritime Civil Affairs Group
MCMT Mean Time to Perform Corrective Maintenance  
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MCO Major Combat Operations
MG Machine Gun
MDS Mobile Diving and Salvage
MIO Maritime Interdiction Operations
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MOB Mobile Operating Base
MOVES Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation
MPMT Mean Time to Perform Preventive Maintenance
MSC Maritime Sealift Command
MSD Mean Supply Delay Time
MSO Maritime Security Operations
MTBMA Mean Time Between Maintenance Actions
MTTR Mean Time To Repair
MTVR Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NAVSCIATTS Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command
NCC Navy Component Commander
NCW Naval Coastal Warfare
NECC Naval Expeditionary Combat Command
NMC Non Mission Capable
NPS Naval Postgraduate School
NUS National University of Singapore
OR Operations Research
OSMIS Operating and Support Management Information System 
PB Light Patrol Boat
PCC Pre-Combat Checks
PCI Pre-Combat Inspections
PUK Pack Up Kit
RAC Riverine Assault Craft
RCSS Riverine Combat Support Ship
RF Riverine Force
RRC Rigid Raiding Craft
RSS Republic of Singapore Ship
RST Riverine Sustainment Team
RS Riverine Squadron
SEA Systems Engineering and Analysis
SURC Small Unit Riverine Craft
TDSI Temasek Defence Systems Institute
TNT Tactical Network Topography
TSC Theater Security Cooperation
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
U.S. United States
VAMOSC Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
VTC Video Tele-Conference  
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APPENDIX D: SURC FUEL CONSUMPTION AND ENGINE 
OPERATING HOUR CALCULATIONS 
1. BACKGROUND 
In order to determine the amount of fuel used by the SURC’s during the MIO 
operation proposed in this scenario, several models were developed.  A major assumption 
in this study is that the SURC’s only refuel at their base of operation and there is no on 
station refueling Fuel consumption rates were determined using the Fuel Consumption 




Figure D1: Fuel Consumption Graph for the Yanmar Diesel 6LY2A-STP432 
 
Figure A depicts fuel consumption rates for a single Yanmar 6LY2A-STP engine.  
From this graph, typical fuel consumption rates for a two engine SURC operating at 
various speeds was derived and are shown in Table D1. 
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Table D1: SURC Fuel consumption at various speeds 
A SURC mission profile was developed to determine the average amount of fuel 
consumed per craft during its on time station.  It was determined from an EXTEND 
model that during a MIO mission, a SURC would consume 18 gallons per hour.  With 
this data, a Monte Carlo Model was created in Excel to determine the total fuel consumed 
by these craft for an entire mission from the three basing alternatives. 
 
2. SETUP 
Table D2 below is the inputs into this Monte Carlo model for MIO missions 
performed from the three basing alternatives. 
INPUTS FOB MOB GFS
Min Distance to MIO Area 1 1 40 nautical miles
Max Distance to MIO Area 15 25 54 nautical miles
Speed if AO<5nm 15 15 15 knots
Speed if AO>5nm 30 30 30 knots
Fuel Consumption Rate @ 15 knots 25 25 25 gallons/hr
Fuel Consumption Rate @ 30 knots 40 40 40 gallons/hr
Average Fuel Consumption Rate Performing 
Mission 18 18 18 gallons/hr
Time on Station Required 8 8 8 hours
Number of SURC's on Mission 4 4 4 craft
Number of Missions performed per week 34 31 21 missions
Pre-op boat checks/pre-watch brief/weapons 
issue 30 30 30 minutes
On-station setup/turnover 30 30 30 minutes
Post-watch debrief/weapon turn in/ post op 
boat checks 30 30 30 minutes  
 




• Minimum Distance:  The minimum distance was set at one nautical mile in 
accordance with the scenario guidelines for the FOB and the MOB.  The 
minimum distance for the GFS was set at 40 nautical miles since the GFS 
would have to operate away from the mouth of the Kampar River in 
permissive waters. 
• Maximum Distance:  For the FOB, the maximum distance was determined to 
be 15 nautical miles with the assumption that the FOB was within the AO.  
For the MOB, the maximum distance was determined to be 25 nautical miles 
allowing the MOB operational flexibility to work and move outside the AO.  
For the GFS, the maximum distance was determined through iterations of the 
model with the assumption that a SURC must have a minimum of 10 gallons 
of fuel on return to the base following an operation. 
• Transit Speeds:  Taking operating procedures and human factors 
considerations into account, the speed for transiting was set at 15 knots if the 
AO was less than five nautical miles away and 30 knots if the AO was greater 
than five nautical miles away.  Human factors considerations were that the 
faster these craft go and for longer durations at higher speeds, physical fatigue 
of the crewmembers becomes a concern.  Transiting at high rate of speeds 
means that the crew can arrive on station faster, but their ability to perform the 
required eight hour mission might be diminished if they are physically 
fatigued. 
• Fuel Consumption Rates:  The transit fuel consumption rates average on 
station fuel consumption rates came from the previously discussed SURC 
mission profile and Table II. 
• Mission Profile:  From the scenario, in order to ensure 24 hour a day/7 days a 
week coverage, it was determined that time on station would be eight hours 
and that 1 detachment of four SURC’s was required for each mission.  Given 
24 hours a day and operating in eight hour, non-overlapping shifts equated to 
a minimum 21 missions per week.  The pre-operation boat checks, on station 
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time, and post watch debrief times were estimated at 30 minutes apiece in 




From these inputs, Monte Carlo Model was constructed for 500 iterations and 
various data was extracted.  A summary of this data is displayed in Table D3. 
FOB MOB GFS
Average Round Trip 
Transit Time 35.66 54.73 189.04 minutes
0.59 0.91 3.15 hours
Average Round Trip Fuel 
Consumed 22.15 35.49 126.03 gallons/round trip
Average Fuel Left to 
perform Mission 277.85 264.51 173.97 gallons
Patrol Data Average Fuel Used On Station 144.00 144.00 144.00 gallons/patrol
Average Fuel Used per 
Mission 166.15 179.49 270.03 gallons/mission
Average Fuel Remaining 
after Upon Return to Base 133.85 120.51 29.97 gallons
Minimum Fuel Remaining 
Upon Return to Base 116.11 89.40 12.05 gallons
Maximum Fuel Remaining 
Upon Return to Base 152.51 152.46 49.30 gallons
Average Round Trip Fuel 
Consumed 88.59 141.96 504.10
gallons/det round trip 
transit
Average Fuel Used On 
Station 576.00 576.00 576.00 gallons/patrol
Average Fuel Used per 
Mission 664.59 717.96 1080.10 gallons/mission
Total Fuel Consumed Per 
Week 13956.39 15077.16 22682.12 gallons
Total Mission Time 10.08 10.43 12.66 Hours
SURC Operating 
hours/day 8.61 8.88 11.13 hours/day
SURC Operating 
hours/week 60.27 62.16 77.89 hours/week






Table D3: Excel Monte Carlo MIO Results 
 
From the above data, there is nothing surprising about the results.  Common sense 
would dictate that the further away a vessel operates from the base of operation and the 
longer the missions are the more fuel will be consumed.  However, one significant item 
to point out from these initial runs was that in order to meet the assumption that a SURC 
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must have a minimum of 10 gallons of fuel upon return to base; the GFS could only 
operate a maximum of 54 nautical miles away from the AO, the boat crews had to be 
very fuel conscience (which could impact their operational abilities), and that the time on 
station could be no greater than eight hours.  This greatly limits the operational flexibility 
and maneuverability of the riverine forces on mission and the GFS basing alternative in 
this scenario. 
Next, various aspects of this model were examined.  If the total fuel consumed per 
week was equivalent among all three basing alternatives the number of missions per 
week for the various basing alternatives was determined.  Essentially by keeping the GFS 
profile constant since it is the limiting factor, it was determined that 34 operations per 
week could be performed from a FOB and 31 missions per week could be performed 
from a MOB.  A typical fuel curve for the basing alternatives is shown below in Figure 
D2.  This increase of 10 to 13 extra missions a week would allow commanders more 








In Conclusion, from this Excel model, the fuel consumption rates for performing 
this operation and engine run time data were incorporated throughout the technical report.  
Some interesting observations were also taken away from this analysis.  Numerous more 
missions could be performed from a FOB or MOB in this scenario.  As stated previously, 
operations from a GFS basing alternative would restrict RF operations.  This topic of how 
to extend the range of riverine forces up river while operating from a GFS was not 




                                                 




APPENDIX E: A STUDY INTO THE POTENTIAL FOR 
WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE FOR RIVERINE FORCES. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Discussion of Military Communications 
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote at the turn of the century, “Communications 
dominate war…they are the most important single element in strategy.”  More to-the-
point, General Mark Clark remarked during World War II that without communications, 
all he could command was his desk.433  Communication in a tactical military environment 
is difficult due to its dynamic nature, changing environment and lack of fixed 
infrastructure in terms of wired connections.  Due to these challenges, the military 
employs various devices that transmit and receive information utilizing the radio 
frequency (RF) spectrum.  By using RF, a military communications device is able to 
move freely about the battlefield without hindrance of being hardwired to any fixed point.  
Consequently, the military is able to freely extend the distance between devices without 
the need for (or extra cost of) running wires throughout the tactical environment. 
For decades, the military has used radio devices to transmit and receive 
information that primarily consisted of voice data in an analog format.  This method 
provided a much needed conduit to transmit and receive information, but this information 
was limited.  These connections were limited to single channel radio and circuit switched 
phone networks.  Now, with the emergence of the concept of Network Centric Warfare 
and the widespread use of the Internet, there is a need for these military radio devices to 
transmit and receive digital data that may consist of text, video, voice and imagery to 
multiple users that are dispersed throughout a tactical environment. 
Small boats, which are the primary operators in Maritime Interdiction Operations 
(MIO) and riverine operations, do not have the multiple communications capabilities 
which have been developing along the NCW transformation in larger vessels.  Much like 
the individual foot soldier, logistics and power considerations have historically prevented 
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the link of communications to these operators.  The technological revolution is changing 
this link to the disadvantaged user.  Unlike the foot solider, the small boat has electrical 
power, similar to land based vehicles, and therefore can be empowered as a 
communications relay more easily than a foot soldier.  This enables more connectivity to 
the small boat operator, who like the foot soldier, relies on battery power for 
communications links. 
One could argue that the US does not need to add newer platforms or weapons 
systems, but instead to improve its command and control interoperability, not only within 
the fleet, but also with coalition Naval and Coast Guard Forces around the globe. The 
guiding principle of interoperability sums this situation up with the need for an 
unprecedented level of information sharing required by all participants.  Riverine 
environments are all significantly different and robust communications capabilities will 
be required to compensate for these differences.  One of the key obstacles to overcome 
this is the communications interoperability with indigenous, paramilitary and military 
forces, which must be connected with US riverine operators.  To link all units of a force, 
radio transmissions must be capable of being transmitted and received by all participants.  
This is easier done where identical equipment is outfitted among the different units, but 
this is often not feasible due to the economic costs and proprietary engineering found on 
modern tactical radios.  The difficulty of integrating the communications of more than 
one military service has been a challenge faced by military forces for some time.  With 
the addition of law enforcement forces, various government agencies, and humanitarian 
response groups, this problem increases in unprecedented complexity.  This is especially 
true today, when current naval communications are inadequate to maintain the modern 
national fleet (combined US Navy and US Coast Guard) with its overwhelming GWOT 
mission requirements. 
The current concept of operations (CONOPS) implemented by the U.S. Navy 
Riverine Force was based strongly on the equipment and procedures used by the Untied 
States Marine Corps (USMC), which until February of 2007, held the primary charter for 
conducting operations in a riverine environment.  The USMC riverine doctrine utilizes 
the concept of distributed operations, which is defined by the Marine Corps Warfighting 
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Lab (MCWL) as “…an operating approach that seeks to create an advantage over an 
adversary – spatial, temporal and psychological – through the intentional use of 
dispersion and independent small-unit tactical actions, which are enabled by increased 
access to functional support.”434  This concept of distributed operations as applied to a 
riverine force requires, “a reliable, secure, rapid communication system.”435 
To address these issues, the US military is developing a working communications 
architecture based around the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).  JTRS is the 
Department of Defense (DoD) attempt to develop software defined ground, airborne, and 
maritime tactical radios that are capable of transmitting multiple waveforms within each 
radio.  It is intended that once this system is fully fielded within the military, it will 
reduce the number of radios needed by the military, to 250,000 radios (vice the currently 
fielded 750,000 legacy radios) by combining communications functions and using 
common components.436  This will cost the DoD an estimated $40 billion to replace every 
currently fielded legacy radio with a JTRS.  A Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
report of the status and outlook of JTRS states the following: 
“The program still faces several managerial and technological challenges 
that could affect the DoD’s ability to develop and procure JTRS radios 
successfully.  These include managing requirements and funding, 
maturing key technologies, integrating system components, testing, and 
developing secure communication.  The most significant challenge we 
identified is the lack of a strong, joint management structure.”437 
 
The operational requirements placed on the riverine forces and their coalition 
partners will call for a reliable, robust, secure and manageable network topology 
architecture to be able to deliver the full scope of their intended communications, and any 
shortfalls will need to be compensated for.  There are numerous benefits to be gained in 
leveraging commercial, off the shelf (COTS) technologies, while implementing the 




1.2 The Systems Engineering Design Process (SEDP) 
The SEDP was used to guide and facilitate the work done throughout the 
development and analysis in this project.  An iterative process, the SEDP allowed for 
constructive generation and organization of ideas based on continuous feedback.  
Progression through the SEDP occurs in four distinct phases: Problem Definition, Design 
and Analysis, Decision Making, and Implementation.  The relationship among the phases 




Figure E1 The Systems Engineering Design Process Flow 
 
Supporting each phase was a unique subset of steps that focused on achieving the 
goals of the individual phase.  Similar to the iterative relationship between the phases, the 
subsets of tasks were also cyclic.  The iterative steps contained within the iterative phases 
allowed for constant refinement and improvement during the process.  The goal of the 
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Problem Definition phase is to unambiguously define the challenge at hand.  Needs 
Analysis and Value System Design are the main steps in this phase.  The Needs Analysis 
step attempts to identify system requirements by involving system decomposition, 
stakeholder analysis, functional analysis and futures analysis.  The Value System Design 
step attempts to arrange and rank the system requirements through the creation of a value 
hierarchy followed by the determination and weighting of measures of evaluation. 
The goal of the Design and Analysis phase is to generate and examine potential 
solutions to the problem.  Alternative Generation and Modeling and Analysis are the 
steps in this phase.  The Alternative Generation step used structured brainstorming to 
develop potential solutions to the problem.  The Modeling and Analysis step seeks to 
compare alternatives by using technical performance models, agent-based models, and/or 
statistical analysis and modeling tools in an integrated overall modeling plan. 
The goal of the Decision Making phase is to compare the modeling results for 
alternatives and recommend the best course of action.  The SEDP was only completed 
through the Alternative Scoring step for this study, since a decision recommendation was 
the desired final outcome.  Therefore, the Decision step was not accomplished.  
Alternative Scoring ranked the alternatives based on four factors: security, transmission 
capability, receive capability, and interoperability. 
The goal of the Implementation phase would have been to execute the selected 
solution, monitor its progress, and solve the determined problem.  This phase in the 
SEDP was beyond the scope of this analysis and, therefore, was not performed. 
Throughout the application of the SEDP, changes and adjustments were made, 
and past work was revisited and revised as new information and insights became 
available.  This constant modification resulted from the continual feedback inherent in 
the SEDP, and led to a more robust solution than would be available with a one-time-
through approach.  Thus, the SEDP served as an extremely useful framework to organize 




2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Needs Analysis was the first step in the Problem Definition phase of the Systems 
Engineering Design Process.  The primary purpose of Needs Analysis is to develop a 
Revised Problem Statement, or Effective Need Statement, that reflects critical 
stakeholder concerns.  It provided justification for proceeding further and expending 
time, effort, and other resources in the design process.  The resulting Effective Need 
Statement is the cornerstone on which the entire subsequent design and decision process 
is built. 
 
2.1 Needs Analysis 
Initially, there was not much concern, on the part of the stakeholders, with the 
configuration and use of the current communications suite fielded on the Small Unit 
Riverine Craft (SURC) that were to be used by the riverine forces.  This resulted in the 
derivation of an initial Primitive Need Statement, from interviews with potential 
stakeholders, to “Design a conceptual system of systems to allow reliable, secure, 
multifaceted communications for riverine forces to use while conducting MIO 
operations.”  The intent was to design and assess integrated alternative architectures for a 
riverine force and coalition partner, focusing on a MIO scenario taking place in the 
Kampar River, in Thailand, supported from a forward operating base (FOB) in the area of 
operations.  The group conducted Needs Analysis by utilizing a variety of tools including 
System Decomposition, Stakeholder Analysis, Input/Output Model, and Functional 
Analysis to determine an Effective Need Statement from the initial Primitive Need 
Statement. 
 
2.2 System Decomposition 
System Decomposition enabled the group to identify a hierarchical structure and 
the major functions and components of a communications system, and is illustrated in 
Figure E2.  The primary functions of communications that were identified were to 
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receive, analyze, store, secure, interoperate and finally disseminate (transmit) 
information. 
The three levels of the hierarchical structure were super, lateral, and subsystems.  
The super systems relative to the communications system were the Joint Forces Maritime 
Command Component (JFMCC), US Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), 
and the US Riverine Forces.  Lateral systems included supply and logistics elements, 
repair and maintenance elements and force protection elements.  Communications 
subsystems included the personnel that would eventually be the end-user of the system 
and its associated equipment. 
The system included structural, operating, and flow components.  The structural 
components consisted of the laptop computers, transceivers and associated antenna.  
Operating components included the necessary operating software and encryption 
algorithms.  Flow components were the information types that could utilize the system, 
specifically in the form of voice, data, video or imagery. 
Possible operational states that the system could exist in were identified as being 
powered on and fully functional, powered off, or powered on yet not operating to 
necessary operational minimums in at least one design parameter. 
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Figure E2 Communications System Decomposition 
 
2.3 Stakeholder Analysis 
Stakeholder Analysis began with the identification of critical assumptions and 
constraints on the problem.  These assumptions and constraints set the boundary 
conditions for the problem and framed the range of problem solutions.  These boundaries 
came from variety of sources and included assumptions ranging from strategic to tactical.  
In many cases, there was insufficient stakeholder access, resulting in additional 
consultation with subject matter experts from the Naval Postgraduate School faculty and 
student body.  Stakeholder Analysis was conducted primarily through research and 
interviews with current and potential stakeholders.  The need for secure, reliable 
communication of information was a common need, want, or desire of each stakeholder.  
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An interview with a United States Navy (USN) communications officer, who has 
technical familiarity and operational employment expertise with current systems, was 
able to provide insights into the operational issues of actual implementation.438  He also 
identified limitations of current capabilities such as single channel operations and 
insufficient bandwidth for the amount of information needing to be passed through the 
system.  These current issues and limitations provided a basis for determining what a 
communications system should do (i.e., its functions). 
 
2.4 Input-Output Model 
A basic system Input-Output Model was designed utilizing the information gained 
from the Stakeholder Analysis, in order to visualize the necessary communications 
architecture as a system with Inputs and Outputs.  The Input-Output Model developed 
(Figure E3) shows the Controllable and Uncontrollable Inputs and the resulting Intended 
Outputs and Unintended By-Products. 
 
 
Figure E3 Communications System Input-Output Model 
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The Input-Output Model separated the communications system from its 
surroundings, giving a different perspective of the system.  This was useful for 
determining which parameters could be used to influence the system outcome, and which 
system outcomes were undesirable.  System design and performance would be affected 
by both Controllable and Uncontrollable Inputs. 
The Controllable Inputs to the communications system were determined to be 
personnel who would utilize the system, equipment configuration and setup, geographic 
location of system employment and the individual system hardware components.  Three 
types of Uncontrollable Inputs were identified: unknown such as threat events or enemy 
tactics; estimable such as location topography; and random such as weather. 
The primary Intended Output of the system was to create a high level of 
situational awareness and response capability that would allow command and control 
decisions to be made and acted on more rapidly.  This intended output would be scalable 
to account for inclusion of coalition partners in utilization of the system.  Unintended By-
Products included detectability of system transmissions, additional training of personnel 
to utilize the system and possible need to a dedicated network manager. 
 
2.5 Functional Analysis 
The Functional Analysis step of the Problem Definition phase determined what 
the system should do to meet the stakeholders’ needs, wants, and desires.  It provided a 
system overview of the process being designed.  From this overview, objectives and 
metrics could be linked to functional areas in order to develop a value systems design for 
the system.  What needed to be accomplished was identified, a hierarchy of these needs 
was established, and resources and components were then identified. 
The system had to receive incoming transmissions of information, analyze what 
was received, organize the information, possibly store the information for later use (for 
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items such as imagery or video), ensure it was secure from compromise, and then 
transmit any information output for use by both coalition partners and own forces. 
The Receive function would allow transmissions of information from external 
sources to be brought into the system.  Once received, the information would undergo the 
Analyze function in order to determine transmission format (either analog or digital) and 
whether the information carried is encrypted.  The system may then execute the sub-
functions of converting the received transmission to the necessary format needed in the 
remainder of the system, and decryption of the information for ready use.  Once 
decrypted and in the system, the information would undergo the organize sub-function 
and be arranged according to type (voice, video, imagery, etc).  This arranged 
information would then allow for the Store function to be performed for information such 
as video and imagery that may be needed at a later time.  The Secure function would take 
necessary actions to ensure that information in the system would not be compromised.  
This would be done in a layered approach, utilizing supporting sub-functions of 
monitoring of the network for unintended activity, authentication of users of the system 
to ensure only authorized personnel would be allowed access in, and encryption of the 
information itself.  Information within the system would now be available for the 
Transmit function and be disseminated externally from the system to other units.  The 
availability of this information facilitates the final function of the system, which is the 
ability to Interoperate with other communications systems. 
Each of these functions and associated sub-functions were determined by asking 
the question, “What does the system component do?,” while ignoring “how” the system 
would perform the function.  A Functional Flow Diagram (Figure E4) was developed as 
part of Functional Analysis in order to delineate the logical functional process of what  
the system would do and gave a chronological view of the way top-level functions related 
to each other.  This perspective was useful for determining how the outputs from some 
functions served as inputs to other functions. 
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Figure E4 Communications System Functional Flow 
 
Stepping through the Functional Flow Diagram provided a picture of how the 
system would work. 
The Functional Flow Diagram was used as an aid in the creation of the Functional 
Hierarchy (Figure E5).  The Functional Hierarchy delineated “what” the system did 
according to its top-level primary functions and any associated sub-functions that would 




Figure E5 Communications Functional Hierarchy 
 
It also gives a snapshot of “how” the system accomplished each top-level 
function.  For example, Secure was accomplished by use of encryption, authentication 
and monitoring. 
The Communications architecture was required to be capable of transmitting and 
receiving multimodally, with the capability to process voice, video, data and image 
exchanges.  In addition to transmitting and receiving relevant data, the communications 
architecture needed to analyze information—converting it and organizing it to make it 
usable and manageable through the system and for users.  In addition, data type would 
need interpretation at various points to ensure proper display and relevance.  The 
communications network would not be effective unless relayed information could be 
readily understood such that individual action elements, regardless of nationality, had a 
clear operational picture and the same understanding of C2 decisions that determined 
actions.  Another consideration arising from the design of architectures for use within a 
multinational force structure was the difference among the nations in technology 
development and existing commercially and militarily available technologies.  Because 
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of these inherent differences, information organizing and processing could differ from 
nation to nation, possibly requiring data conditioning between communications points or 
platforms.  Security was a consistent concern in multinational operations and it 
necessitated encryption and decryption capability at transmission and reception points.  
The Communications architecture could network a variety of equipment, platforms, and 
other applicable technologies and would therefore need to be capable of scaling in size to 
accommodate new users as they enter or leave the network. 
 
2.6 Effective Need Statement 
The product of the Needs Analysis step is a revised problem statement, called the 
Effective Need Statement, reflecting the most significant needs and desires of the 
stakeholder.  After iterative analysis of all components and tasks in the Needs Analysis 
step, the Effective Need Statement evolved to read:  “Design a conceptual secure, 
adaptable architecture that will allow utilization of multiple information types with a 
greater capacity of throughput than the currently used system.” 
 
2.7 Objectives Hierarchy 
The Objectives Hierarchy provided detailed analysis of the functions the system 
must perform and the objectives the system must satisfy.  The Objectives Hierarchy 
delineated the different system functions, which it further broke down into sub-functions, 
objectives, and evaluation measures.  The end product of the Objectives Hierarchy was a 
representation of the system breakdown, from top-level functions and objectives down to 
the evaluation measures that would determine system performance.  The metrics 
developed in the Objectives Hierarchy would be used to help generate system 
requirements. 
The objectives and MOE’s for Communications were developed as an integrated 
effort between SEA-11 and the Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) 
Communications and Information Assurance (IA) tracks.  The professional expertise the 
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TDSI students brought into the process assisted greatly in the development of an effective 
Objectives Hierarchy that included functions applicable to the IA domain.  
Communications MOE’s are given in Table E1. 
 
 




2.8 Requirements Generation 
Alternatives Generation for Communications and IA was primarily conducted by 
the TDSI Communications and IA tracks.  Requirements were derived from the scenario 
description, available CONOPS, Effective Need Statement, and the Objectives Hierarchy.  
The requirements to securely, reliably transmit and receive transmissions among units 
and be flexible enough to scale in size according to addition and subtraction of users 
(including coalition partners) were common items of concern expressed by all 
stakeholders surveyed.  A listing of all requirements provided by stakeholders is given in 
Table E2. 
 
Table E2. Stakeholder Specified, System Requirements 
 
2.9 Communications System Requirements 
The system needed by the stakeholders would have several specific requirements 
that would need to be satisfied in terms of its functionality as a communications system 
and its ability to move information securely. 
When needed for operations, the system would need to transmit information with 
a minimal amount of delay between transmission and complete receipt of usable 
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information.  The communications system would have to be available for use around the 
clock, for as long as an operation is being conducted, with minimal interruption or down-
time.  During this time, it would also have to be able to accommodate multiple, mobile 
users (nodes) entering and leaving the area of operations (AO).  It should be able to 
transmit between units in multiple modes of operation.  Specifically, Point-to-Point 
transmission for directed communication to a specific unit, or Point-to-Multipoint 
transmission for broadcast of transmissions to multiple units simultaneously.  The system 
would have to allow for the interoperability of nodes with minimal complications 
involving system configuration or set-up.  Interoperability is defined as the condition 
achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-
electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and 
satisfactorily between them and/or their users.439  It is intended that this will facilitate 
self-synchronization and shared awareness among forces in a coalition environment.  
Digital formatting of data was determined to be necessary to better facilitate transmission 
and storage of greater amounts of data. 
The communications system that would be needed will have to provide for 
information assurance and security of the transmissions it handles.  It will need to be able 
to secure the actual data transmissions as they move from node to node, in addition to 
protecting the integrity of the data that is transported.  It will need to control who does 
and who does not have access to the system, while at the same time ensuring that data in 
the system will be available for use by authorized users of the system. 
 
3. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS PHASE 
Design and Analysis was the second phase in the Systems Engineering Design 
Process.  The objective of the Design and Analysis phase was to create and evaluate 
potential solutions to the problem.  Progress through the Design and Analysis phase was 
divided into the Alternatives Generation step and the Modeling and Analysis step.  
During Alternatives Generation, solutions to the problem are constructed and the current 
systems are analyzed.  Under the Modeling and Analysis step, the feasible alternative 
solutions and the current systems are modeled and then analyzed.  All the data from is 
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recorded and evaluated.  The Design and Analysis phase resulted in feasible alternative 
solutions and an analysis of the benefits of potential solutions as well as current systems. 
 
3.1 Alternatives Generation 
The Alternative Generation step involved the “creative mental process of 
producing concepts and ideas in order to solve the problem”440.  Brainstorming of 
potential solutions was based on system requirements and objectives.  These 
requirements and objectives bound the design space, and a feasibility screening process 
imposed realistic limitations on the physical and technological characteristics of the 
possible system solutions.  In addition to creating new solutions to the problem, the 
current system (or recognition of the lack of a current system) was also included as a 
possible solution to the problem.  Following the development and selection of possible 
solutions, the alternatives were modeled and analyzed. 
 
3.2 Current Communications Architecture 
The primary communications system currently in use on the SURC consists of a 
single military radio set per craft, the AN/VRC-89, which is actually two radio set 
mounted within a single housing.  During specific missions, a C2 craft may be 
designated, where it will be equipped with an additional AN/VRC-89 radio set to allow 
for added communications capability for the C2 element.  Each craft will also have an 
open channel marine band VHF radio, commonly found on private and commercial 
vessels for safety of navigation communication with other vessels.  Finally, each 
crewmember will be equipped with one of numerous models of commercially available 
personal handheld radios (similar to what you may find in use by civilian police forces), 






The AN/VRC-89 (Figure E6) is a vehicle-mounted, dual-configuration radio 
consisting of one short-range and one long-range, solid-state, securable transceiver 
intended for VHF-FM tactical operations.  The AN/VRC-89 provides long-range (up to 
35 kilometers) and short-range (up to 8 kilometers) operation in two nets simultaneously.  
The AN/VRC-89 is a dual-radio configuration mounted on a single vehicular mount.  It 
replaces existing AN/VRC-47 configurations, as well as separate configurations of 
AN/VRC-64 or AN/VRC-46 in a single vehicle.  The AN/VRC-89 is basically two 
vehicular-mounted, short-range radio sets with an added power amplifier that provides 
one of the radio sets with a long-range communications capability up to 35 kilometers.441 
 
 
Figure E6 AN/VRC-89 Radio Set442 
 
3.2.2 Riverine Craft Upgrades 
As NECC takes custody of their riverine craft from the Marine Corps, they have 
planned an upgrade of the communications suite currently in use.  They are looking to 
increase the communications system capacity to better handle increased amounts of data 
available in a tactical environment and to maximize the availability of the data to 
operators in the AO, to provide better overall situational awareness among units.443  This 
upgraded communications suite will be an arrangement comprised of two different 
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military radio sets, a commercially available marine band VHF radio, uniform personal 




The AN/PRC-117F (Figure E7) multiband, multimission radio uses proprietary, 
Harris Software-Defined Radio (SDR) technology to provide embedded communications 
security (COMSEC) and satellite communications (SATCOM).  It covers the entire 30 to 
512 MHz frequency range, using two antenna ports.  It has the capability for multiband 
scan and cross band/mode retransmit features, which are intended to expand the radio's 
operational capabilities, and a built-in-test mode that checks system performance down to 
the module level. 
This radio is fully compatible with currently fielded cryptographic gear in both 
voice and data modes.  The AN/PRC-117F is US National Security Agency (NSA) 
COMSEC-certified and is compatible with Fascinator cryptographic equipment in voice 
mode and the KG-84C in data mode.  The radio supports both DS-101 and DS-102 
cryptographic fill interfaces and all common fill devices.  The AN/PRC-117F also 
supports a KY-57/Vinson-compatible cryptographic interface to ease backwards 
interoperability with older legacy equipment currently fielded.  An embedded Demand 
Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) and SATCOM modem is Joint Operability Test 
Command (JITC) certified to MIL-STD-188-181B, -182A, and -183A and is software 
reconfigurable to accommodate changes to these standards.  Data rates up to 56 kbits/s 
are supported in SATCOM.  An external GPS interface accepts time and position data.  
Advanced key management techniques help manage the embedded security 
capabilities of the transceiver.  Over 170 keys can be stored and transferred by securely 
encrypting them using benign key fill techniques.  Removal of the cryptographic ignition 
key (CIK), (contained in the Keypad/Display Unit (KDU)) declassifies the keyed radio.  
Reattachment of the KDU restores the radio to its previous operating condition.  
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A High Performance Waveform (HPW) is designed to securely transfer files and 
TCP/IP data between external computers over 5 and 25 kHz SATCOM links and 25 kHz 
LOS links.  This waveform provides error-free data delivery using high-speed over-the-
air data rates, ARQ and automatic waveform adaptation based on channel conditions.  A 
high speed data capability over LOS channels provides up to 64 Kbps data in a 25 kHz 
channel.444 
 
Figure E7 AN/PRC-117F Radio Set445 
 
3.2.4 AN/PRC-150 
The AN/PRC-150 (Figure E8) is a member of the FALCON® II family of NSA-
certified multiband tactical radio systems.  It is an HF/SSB VHF/FM equipment designed 
to provide reliable, long-range, secure, tactical communications.  The transceiver's 
extended frequency range (1.6 to 60 MHz) in combination with 16 kbits/s digital voice 
and data enable fixed-frequency interoperability with other VHF/FM combat net radios.  
The AN/PRC-150 provides US Type 1 voice and data encryption compatible with 
ANDVT/KY-99, ANDVT/KY-100, Vinson/KY-57 and KG-84C cryptographic devices, 
eliminating the need for external encryption.  An integral encryption mode offers secure 
communication interoperability with similarly equipped coalition and Partnership for 
Peace forces. 
Communications range is improved by utilizing advanced waveforms and more 
robust voice encoders.  Mixed Excitation Linear Prediction (MELP) 2,400 bits/s and 
MELP 600 bits/s are also provided for voice compression to enhance the volume of voice 
traffic it can handle. MIL-STD-188-1 l0B serial tone, 39-tone, ANDVT, FSK, and NATO 
Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) 4285 and 4415 modem waveforms are all 
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embedded in this radio.  MIL-STD-188-141 B Appendix A Automatic Link 
Establishment (ALE) provides automatic calling and linking on the best available HF 
channel.  The radio also provides 3rd generation ALE based on STANAG 4538.  A 
removable Keypad Display Unit (KDU) provides access to controls for on-the-move 
operation.  Operation is via a menu-driven human-machine interface (HMI).  Net presets 
combine operating mode, frequency, COMSEC keys and modem settings under user-
defined names.446 
 
Figure E8 AN/PRC-150F Radio Set447 
 
3.2.5 AN/PRC-152 
The FALCON® III AN/PRC-152 (Figure E9) multiband hand-held radio utilizes 
the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Software Communications Architecture (SCA) 
and is the first radio utilizing the JTRS SCA operating environment to receive US 
National Security Agency (NSA) certification for the protection of voice and data traffic 
up to the Top Secret level. 
The AN/PRC-152 single-channel, multimission radio covers the frequency range 
of 30 to 512 MHz and provides an adjustable transmit output power up to 5W.  It 
supports SINCGARS, Have-Quick II, VHF/UHF AM and FM, MIL-STD-188-181B, and 
the High Performance Waveform (HPW) that provides 56 Kbps of data.  Both Have-
Quick II and VHF/UHF AM and FM waveforms are ported versions of the preliminary 
JTRS library waveforms, validating the AN/PRC-152's JTRS architecture 
The AN/PC-152 uses the Harris Sierra™ II software programmable encryption 
module.  This encryption device has been designed to maximize battery life.  Sierra II 
supports all JTRS COMSEC and TRANSEC requirements.  The AN/PRC-152 also 
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supports numerous cryptographic device compatibility modes, including KY-57/Vinson, 
ANDVT/KYV-5, KG-84C, DS-101 and DS-102.  
The AN/PRC-152 is able to store multiple cryptographic fill files, extending the 
time between reconfigurations.  It can include an optional embedded GPS receiver to 
display local position and to provide automatic position reporting for situational 
awareness on the battlefield. 
 
Figure E9 AN/PRC-152 Handheld Intra-team Radio448 
 
3.2.6 Panasonic Toughbook CF-30 Laptop Computer 
The Panasonic Toughbook CF-30 (Figure E10) is a ruggedized, weather resistant 
laptop computer.  It is constructed using an ultra strong magnesium alloy case, is 
vibration and shock resistant to MIL-STD 810F and comes with a 32mm thick, foam 
packed Hard Disk Drive (HDD) casing, enabling it to withstand drops from a height of 
90cm.  A special HDD-heater allows the CF-30 to operate under extreme conditions up to 
–20°C while the anti-sun-reflective silver painting and the internal thermal pipe system of 
the unit prevent heat absorption in hot outdoor conditions.  All joints and external covers 
have been sealed using a gasket method that creates a watertight seal with flexible 
elastomer to ensure dust and water resistance.   
The Intel® Centrino architecture with wireless local area network (WLAN) allows 
for greater flexibility and provides optimal reception with two integrated WLAN-
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antennas located in the top of the display unit.  Depending on overall usage, the CF-30s 
durable battery has been can last up to 8.5 hours, however provisions for power to be 
provided from the SURC have been made.  Other integrated options include Evolution 
Data Optimizing (EVDO), General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Global Positioning 
System (GPS) and Bluetooth, enabling complete wireless mobility.  ‘Hot-swapping’ of 
components is supported and allows for flexibility to swap between several optical drives 
and possibly a secondary battery, if needed.449 
 
 
Figure E10 Panasonic CF-30 Ruggedized Laptop Computer450 
 
Although the current communications architecture (and pending upgrade 
equipment) has proven reliable and rugged in a tactical environment, the equipment can 
be expensive and is currently operating at or near the maximum capacity for data 
bandwidth.  Only the handheld AN/PRC-152 has the capacity to support the Wideband 
Network Waveform (WNW) that is planned to give the JTRS the capability of data 
throughput up to 3 Mbps.  Also, an additional power amplification system will be needed 
in order for this radio to be able to broadcast to the ranges needed for the MIO scenario.  
Finally, the further development of the WNW had been delayed at the time of this writing 
and estimates on when this capability will be fully fielded were not forthcoming.451 
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3.3 Alternative Communications Architecture 
In this study, the project group utilized many brainstorming sessions to identify 
potential solutions to the problem.  Eventually the concept of bandwidth wants and 
shortages initially came up in reference to the ever growing bandwidth need of people in 
the private sector, and what technology was being fielded to give home and corporate 
networks more capacity for bandwidth.  This gave the group a direction in which to focus 
a technology search to see if there was commercially available technology that could fit 
into the context of our scenario as a possible solution to the problem.  This resulted in the 
identification of the Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) 
technology, which utilizes the IEEE 803.16 standard for broadband wireless access, as a 
possible solution.  It was realized that wireless technology is fast extending network 
reaches by providing convenient and inexpensive access in many locations around the 
world  WiMAX systems provide the ability to establish high speed connectivity over 
longer distance than standard wireless networks utilizing the IEEE 802.11 standard.  The 
emergence of the 802.16 family of standards is spurring widespread commercial use of 
WiMAX. 452  The ongoing evolution of 802.16 has the potential to expand the standard to 
address mobile applications, enabling broadband access directly to WiMAX-enabled 
portable devices ranging from smart-phones and PDA’s to notebooks and laptop 
computers. 
Further considerations were given to the commercial availability of necessary 
equipment for implementing use of WiMAX and how scalable this equipment would be 
to address the possibility of intermixed coalition forces, allowing them shared access to 
resulting networks as seamlessly as possible.  Taking the area of operation (AO) and 
MIO tasking from our scenarios into consideration, our conceptual solution must be 
deployable in a varied riverine environment, requiring the transmission of data, voice, 
video and still imagery.  The concept of the proposed architecture is scoped to allow for 
communications between the operational forces conducting the MIO operations on the 
river and the FOB base station only.  Communications beyond the AO are assumed to be 
through the larger FOB communications suite via current military radio systems (to 
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include SATCOM) that the FOB would utilize for long range communication to higher 
headquarters. 
The project group was able to collaborate closely with other research groups at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) which were actively conducting field testing on 
similar architectures utilizing WiMAX technology.  Specifically, the Cooperative 
Operations and Applied Science and Technology Studies (COASTS) research group has 
been conducting field experiments in the jungles of Thailand; a near match for the 
environment of our MIO scenario.  To handle all data types at the anticipated high rates 
of throughput via WiMAX technology, the system will need to be equipped to be able to 
accommodate TCP/IP data transmission, requiring network routers to be employed to link 
and manage all the devices that are on-board the patrol crafts.  Through our interviews 
with the COASTS members, we were able to determine the key components necessary to 
facilitate incorporating a WiMAX capability into the communication capabilities of 
riverine forces.  They recommended an architecture composed of a RedCONNEX™ AN 
50e from Redline Communications, and a FortiGate™ 100A router, from Fortress 
Technologies as the core components, which would interface into the CF 30 laptop 
computers that would be part of the upgraded system on the SURC.  These components 
would allow for a network which would have both a communications and information 
assurance capability. 
 
3.3.1 RedCONNEX™ AN-50e Module 
The RedCONNEX™ AN-50e module (Figure E11) enables a secure 
communications channel via 802.16 to be established between the FOB and riverine craft 
operating on the water.  It operates in the 5.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz unlicensed bands and 
employs Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) technology to deliver 
data rates of up to 49 Mbps supporting long-range operations of over 80 km in clear line 
of sight (LOS) conditions.  This module is also capable of operating in non-line-of-sight 
(NLOS) and over-the-water applications.  It supports point-to-point (PTP) and point-to-
multipoint (PMP) broadcasting and provides site-to-site connectivity for demanding 
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Figure E11 Redline RedCONNEX™ AN-50e 454 
 
This module ensures that information is transmitted over a secured channel by 
providing an added security function to encrypt the channel frame control information 
over the 802.16 channel.  This will minimize the potential for an adversary being able to 
obtain the frame control information, which could allow him the possibility to ‘sniff’ out 
data information contained within the transmission channel. 
In studying the operational environment for the AO in the MIO scenario, the 
heavy vegetation and the surface of the river present a highly multi-path environment for 
a wireless transmission channel.  Transmission channels in a multi-path environment are 
subjected to both constructive and destructive interference as the signals from the 
transmitter reach the receiver at different times due to the different paths that the signals 
takes.  In addition, this spread in the time taken by each path also results in the spreading 
of the received signals, giving rise to inter-symbol interferences, causing a reduction of 
the achievable data rate to ensure that the transmission has a certain reliability of 
transmission.  The AN-50e implements Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
(OFDM) technology in its communication between the transmitter and the receiver.  This 
technology is able to mitigate the effects of destructive interference and inter-symbol 
interferences caused by the presence of multiple path taken by the signals from the 
transmitter to the receiver, allowing a higher data rate (about 49 Mbps) to be achievable 
between the transmitter and the receiver, allowing for simultaneous capabilities such as 
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video streaming and voice communications to be employed within the patrol group and 
between the patrol group and FOB. 
A point-to-multipoint (PMP) capability will allow the riverine craft on patrol, as 
Subscriber Stations (SS) to establish a communications link with the FOB Base Station 
from virtually any point in the AO without having to adjust the antenna to point directly 
from the craft to the FOB.  Point to multipoint makes WiMAX as scalable and flexible as 
802.11WiFi is in the home. 
The AN-50e module supports long range operations of over 80 km in clear line of 
sight (LOS) conditions.  These performance parameters allow the establishment of 
802.16 networks in the 50 km ranges specified for the AO in the scenario.  Although the 
specified operating range of the module is 80 km, Figure E12 illustrates more realistic 
ranges in the riverine jungle environment in this scenario, and that the expected attainable 
operating range may be lower than reported by the manufacturer, yet within the ranges of 











Figure E12 Expected Operating Ranges of the AN 50e Module as 
Applied to the Jungle Environment of the Scenario 
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This compromise in operating range could be due to several environmental 
factors.  The two main factors that were taken into considerations are: 
• Humidity Level:  Water vapor absorbs electromagnetic energy from 
transmission signal waves.  Higher amounts of water level are present in high 
humidity environments and thus, such environments will tend to degrade the 
maximum transmission range of any wireless communication channel. 
• River Topography:  Operating distances from manufacturer websites are 
based on ideal cases, where a clear, direct Line of Sight (LOS) is possible.  
However, in the actual AO, with the bends of the rivers and the height of the 
trees and river banks, a clear LOS may not always be possible. 
 
Due to these considerations, operating ranges of this module is expected to be 
degraded to some extent.  An estimation of the link budget was performed using 
predictive software tools provided by Redline Communications.  With an understanding 
of the potential for bias in using vendor provided software, the results revealed that under 
the specified operating environment, the system is able to provide WiMAX coverage of 
up to 27 km radius, taking into account the addition of a 70 m tall base station antenna at 
the FOB. 
 
3.3.2 FortiGate™ 100A Network Router 
To be equipped for such capabilities video streaming (and video teleconferencing 
if needed) in any communication architecture, the architecture itself must first be able to 
accommodate TCP/IP data transmission.  Routers would need to be employed in order to 
network all the subscriber stations that are deployed on the patrol craft, in addition to 
providing the primary security for the transmitted content.  
The FortiGate™ 100A network router (Figure E13) features dual Wide Area 
Network (WAN) link support for redundant internet connections, and an integrated 4-port 
switch that eliminates the need for an external hub or switch, giving networked devices a 
direct connection to the FortiGate™ 100A. Dual DMZ ports provide additional network 
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segmentation for web and mail servers, and wireless access points with individual 
security and access policies for increased control of network traffic.455  This router 
contains several network management tools and security features integral to the unit that 
offer a defense-in-depth approach to security of the information transmitted via the 
system by placing multiple layers of protection to prevent attackers from directly 
attacking the system to gain access to the security critical information resources. 
The FortiGate™ 100A provides a firewall capability has the ability to detect and 
eliminate the most damaging, content-based threats contained in email and web traffic 
such as viruses, worms and network intrusions in real time without degrading overall 
network performance.  Additionally, it provides the capability to eliminate spam, viruses, 
spoofing, phishing, spyware and denial of service (DoS) attacks.  Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks were identified as the most probable threat that could disable the network.  These 
are attacks which will render the network useless, regardless of how sophisticated the 
network configuration is and how high the data throughput of the system is.  Hence, with 
the routers ability to detect and prevent over 1300 intrusions and attacks456, FortiGate™ 
is able to not only detect and prevent any DoS attack, but will also prevent further attacks 
from the adversary by blocking the Internet Protocol (IP) address the adversary may be 
using. 
The FortiGate™ allows for data integrity and confidentiality by providing Virtual 
Private Networking (VPN) technology, which allows users to communicate through a 
secured and encrypted transmission link, effectively creating communications ‘tunnels’ 
directly between units.  It can accommodate 80 separate VPN channels (tunnels), which 
will facilitate necessary scalability as units enter or leave the network.  Additionally, 
these channels could be segregated into clusters, handling specific data types that will be 
transmitted on each cluster.  For example, channels 1-20 could be assigned to be used for 
Data transmission, channels 21-40 assigned to be used for voice transmission and so-on.  
In addition, separate username and password controls could be set for different channel 
sets and hence, this could act as a form of filter to ensure that only authorized personnel 
will have access to a particular transmission type. 
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A capability for remote accessibility is a key feature of this system, which 
facilitates interoperability of the system among users.  This capability allows for all units 
that are equipped with the FortiClient™ Host security software (which can be installed on 
any commercially available computer), secure remote access from anywhere within range 
of the transmission footprint.  This can allow for easier scalability in the network, in the 
sense that minimal configuration will be required on the administrator’s end whenever 
there is an authorized user that is within the range of the network and needs to gain 
access into the  network. 
A final feature in this device is the Dual WAN interface capability.  This 
capability is able to provide support for 2 separate connections, providing a built-in 
redundancy when one of the connections goes down.  When one of the connections fails, 
the other one automatically takes over, increasing the reliability of the architecture. 
 
Figure E13 FortiGate™ 100A Network Router 457 
 
3.4 Concept of System Employment 
The primary purpose of this proposed architecture is to enable the communication 
link between the patrol craft and the FOB (Figure 14).  To facilitate this, patrol craft and 
the FOB will need to be equipped with the RedCONNEX™ AN 50e to allow for a 
secured communication link to be established between units.  Information security on the 
part of the patrol craft would not require the FortiGate™ router to be installed in the craft.  
Instead, the FortiClient™ remote software is installed in the patrol craft laptop, and 
interfaces with the FortiGate™ router installed at the FOB. 
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Figure E14 Conceptual Overview of WiMAX System Employment 
 
For the patrol craft crewmen, or authorized coalition personnel to establish a 
secure connection via the VPN feature in the FortiClient™ software, a unique username 
and password will have to be assigned to each and every unit requiring authorization.  
This will be set up by the network administrators on each piece of gear prior to 
deployment of the patrol craft.  For coalition partners using the system, this can be 
facilitated via a technical assist visit by network administrators to install and configure 
the RedCONNEX™ AN 50e, set up the FortiClient™ software and VPN accounts, and 
finally, provide initial training in the system use. 
Upon initiation of the request to setup a secured VPN channel by the 
FortiClient™ software, the laptop will request connection from the network management 
feature of the FortiGate™ router at the FOB.  The FortiGate™ router will request the 
username and password of the unit that is trying to establish the VPN channel.  A session 
key will be sent to the client to establish a secure VPN tunnel only upon confirmation that 
the username and password matches to one stored in the database maintained in the 
FortiGate™ router. 
Once this connection is established, the network is continuously monitored by the 
network management and security features of the FortiGate™ router and data traffic can 
be passed between units.  Commercially available software applications can then be 
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utilized by personnel to interface with the data types being handled.  For instance, in 
passing voice communication between units, VoIP software would be used as an 
interface through the computers and video streaming or conferencing could be conducted 
using Microsoft© Net-Meeting (or equivalent). 
 
3.5 Feasibility Screening 
To evaluate the alternatives considered, feasibility screening criteria were 
developed based on the effective need and assumed system constraints.  To assist with 
the development of alternatives, there were characteristics that select components of the 
system had to possess, and were used as the system constraints.  The feasibility 
constraints are: 
• Security- The system will need to initiate and receive secure transmissions 
while maintaining integrity and confidentiality of the data transmitted. 
• Data Throughput- The system would need to be able to pass transmission 
rates greater than 64Kbps. 
• Ease of Interoperability- The system would need to be able to readily allow 
expansion of the network to authorized users without reconfiguration of 
equipment. 
 
An alternative screening matrix was developed, placing the alternatives against 
the three feasibility screening criteria discussed above (Table E3).  Each criterion of each 
alternative was scored “G” for good, meaning the alternative satisfied the criteria and 
“NG” for no good, meaning the alternative did not satisfy the criteria.  Each was then 
recapped with an overall “G” or “NG” result.  The alternative of the current system, 
comprised of only the AN/VRC-89, listed as satisfying the security criteria, yet it could 
not meet either of the criteria for throughput or ease of interoperability.  The alternative 
of the upgraded system, comprised of the AN/PRC-117, AN/PRC-150 and AN/PRC-152 
radios and Panasonic CF 30 computer, was also able to satisfy the security criteria.  
Although it was capable of greater throughput capacity than the AN/VRC-89, it still was 
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not able to satisfy the throughput or interoperability criteria.  The proposed solution 
utilizing WiMAX was able to satisfy all three of the necessary criteria, showing that it 



















G NG NG NG 
WiMAX 
(proposed) G G G G 
  
Table E3 Alternative Feasibility Screening Matrix 
 
3.6 Analysis of WiMAX Applicability 
During the progression of the study, numerous unanticipated delays were 
encountered while attempting to accurately define the problem and identify alternatives.  
This led to the project group not having as much time as would have been ideal to 
conduct a thorough quantitative analysis of the proposed system.  It was determined that 
a qualitative analysis would be conducted with the time remaining, to get a feel for 
whether the WiMAX system would be feasible as a communication architecture.  This 
was done via the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process is a powerful decision making tool for problem 
solving and decision making in a complex environment.  It provides a proven, effective 
means to deal with complex decision making and can assist with identifying and 
weighting selection criteria, analyzing the data collected for the criteria and expediting 
the decision-making process.  It can capture both subjective and objective evaluation 
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measures, providing a useful mechanism for checking the consistency of the evaluation 
measures and alternatives suggested by the team, reducing bias in decision making. 
 
3.7 Analysis Criteria Formulation  
To facilitate an analysis between the upgraded system and the proposed system, 
four prime criteria for measurement were identified.  They are security, transmission 
capability, receive capability and interoperability.  These criteria were determined to be 
essential for the operation of the communication system in the riverine AO. 
• Security- It is essential that a wireless network is secured from any form of 
network attack.  This criterion identifies how well data is being protected 
during transmission, level of data confidentiality, level of data integrity, and 
data availability and authenticity.  
• Transmission capability- In the riverine AO, it is necessary that the system is 
able to transmit the required signals of voice, video and data, to the receiver 
located as far as 25 km radius from the transmitter.  Thus, transmission 
capability measures how well voice, video and data is being transmitted to the 
receiver. 
• Receive capability- This is the reverse of transmission capability.  It measure 
how well the receiver, located at 25 at away from the transmitter is able to 
receive voice, video and data from the transmitter. 
• Interoperability- The condition achieved among communications-electronics 
systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information 
or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or 
their users.458  It also involved the scalability of the system.  This criterion 






3.7.1 Preference Weight 
In a multi decision problem such as AHP, it is a requirement to judge the relative 
importance or priority on the set of criteria.  The degrees of importance or priority are 
judged in the form of a set of weights.  To compare the importance of each criteria, a 
pair-wise comparison reciprocal matrix is created (Table E4), after which normalized 
weights are computed using the approximation method of Row Geometric Mean (RGM) 
approximation method.  Sub matrices will be eventually be created for each criteria. 
 
 
Table E4 Pair-wise Criteria Comparison 
 
The main pair-wise comparison matrix shows how the relative importance 
between each criterion is specified.  The values for the importance of each of the criteria 
was determined through stakeholder survey response and through consultation with 
panels of subject matter experts, composed of faculty and students from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). 
In a military operational environment, information security was judged as the 
prime consideration, thus security is specified as 2 times more important than 
transmission and receive capability and 4 times more important than interoperability.  
Transmission and receive capability are given the same importance as they are 
interdependent.  Interoperability is rated less important as the other criteria for the 
operation of a communication system.  This led to the formulation of the first sub-matrix 
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for rating the security capability of each system (Table E5). This sub-matrix is to 
determine a score for the security level of the communication systems.  A system is rated 
outstanding if it meets all security requirements of data confidentiality, data integrity, 
data availability and data authenticity.  A system is rated average if it meets only some of 
the requirements.  An unsatisfactory rating is for systems that do not meet any of the 
requirements.  The normalized weight of outstanding is 1, average is 0.405 and 
unsatisfactory is 0.164. 
 
Table E5 Security Criteria Comparison Sub-Matrix 
 
The transmission (Table E6) and receive (Table E7) capability are measured in 
terms of the system’s ability to transmit and receive video streams, voice 
communications, and analog information and digital information.  Video streaming was 
determined to be a slightly more crucial requirement in a MIO operation as it could 
immediately transmit real time situational update to the command element.  Voice 
communication is rated second most important as it would provide for coordinating 
instruction to be communicated. 
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Table E6 Transmission Criteria Comparison Sub-Matrix 
 
 
Table E7 Receive Criteria Comparison Sub-Matrix 
 
The following four matrices compare results between the existing system and 
proposed WiMAX system of the previous sub-matrices.  The proposed system is capable 
of transmitting video stream while the existing system is unable to do so. Thus it is rated 




Table E8 Sub-Matrix Comparison for Video Capability 
 
Both systems are capable of provide quality voice communication therefore they 
have the same rating (Table E9). 
 
 
Table E9 Sub-Matrix Comparison for Voice Capability 
 
Both systems are capable of provide quality analog communication, therefore 




Table E10 Sub-Matrix Comparison for Analog Capability 
 
The proposed system is capable of transmitting digital information such as email 
and instant short message, etc, while the existing system is limited in its capacity to do 
so. Thus it is rated as five times better then the existing system (Table E11). 
 
 
Table E11 Sub-Matrix Comparison for Digital Capability 
 
The overall transmission and receiving capability weighting (Table E12) for both 
the existing and proposed system was then able to be determined.  It is seen that the 




Table E12 Sub-Matrix Comparison for Transmission and Receiving 
Capability 
 
The interoperability of the communication systems was next rated (Table E13).  A 
system is rated outstanding if it able to easily interoperable with other system or if it is 
scalable.  A system is rates average if it requires substantial technical configuration or 
setup before it could interoperate with other system, or not scalable in being able to 
change as units enter or leave the network.  Below average is for a system that is not 
interoperable and scalable.  The normalized weight of outstanding is 1, average is 0.405 
and unsatisfactory is 0.164. 
 
 
Table E13 Sub-Matrix Comparison for Interoperability 
 
Finally, the overall score of the system (Table E14) based the above weights 
could be determined.  Security and interoperability for the existing system was rated as 
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average as it provided limited security and required reconfiguration of the system before 
it could interoperate with other systems.  Security and interoperability for the proposed 
system are rated as outstanding and average, respectively, based on the layered security 
features being included in the design and thus, in the final scoring, the proposed system 
gained a higher score as it better satisfied the specified system requirements. 
 
 
Table E14 Final Comparison of Communication Systems  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Although the time constraints of this study limited the extent of the depth that was 
able to be investigated concerning technologies available for alternative communications 
architectures, the project group felt that much useful information was gained. The 
communications equipment in use by the riverine forces in tactical environments, though 
tried and proven in the field, is designed around dated military technologies that support a 
communications doctrine consistent with the periods they were developed.  However, as 
time and technology have advanced, the information demands of battlefield environments 
have grown to the point of dwarfing the capacities of legacy systems that seem to only be 
able to advance their capacity through lengthy development time and increased financial 
investment.  It is felt that this study supports a more thorough investigation into the 
development of commercially available technologies as alternative communications 
architectures, especially considering the rapid pace at which these technologies now seem 
to be developed. 
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The scenario used with this study was merely representative and it would have 
been preferable to examine the systems under more varied scenario application.  Also, 
hard data that could have been used if it were available; however, the testing that the data 
would result from was still in progress. 
Currently there is room for WiMAX technology to mature to meet greater needs 
of military forces.  The certification of a mobile standard for 802.16 is nearing final 
acceptance and holds the potential for further advancing tactical use of wireless 
networking on more and more varied mobile platforms.  It also holds great promise as a 
potential conduit for smaller units to interface with the Global Information Grid (GIG), 
being implemented. 
WiMAX systems face several obstacles to acceptance as a tactical 
communications network.  Being a newer technology, it is understandably not seen as 
having the maturity of the current technologies, and will require much testing and 
successful exposure to overcome.  This feeds into one of the biggest obstacles to its 
acceptance and that may be the paradigms that operators have toward the use of current 
systems.  These legacy systems have been in service for many years and have the 
advantage of being tried in the combat environments that operators expect, and the fact 
that the newer upgrades are produced by the same manufacturer gives a certain degree of 
confidence. This is compounded by the visibility that 802.11 wireless technology has 
acquired in the commercial market as being highly susceptible to security problems from 
‘hacking’, viruses, interception and exploitation. 
 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although the investigation supporting this study showed promise, additional 
research and testing is required to determine if WiMAX is fully compatible with the 
riverine forces concept of employment.  In addition to construction and field testing of 
the proposed WiMAX architecture in this study, further research should also focus on the 
following: 
1. Cost Analysis- It is anticipated that the financial cost associated with 
acquiring and maintaining this technology will decrease as it matures.  Costs 
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for outfitting and supporting a fully deployable riverine force should be 
analyzed and compared to other systems in currently in use to determine the 
economic feasibility of this technology.  This should take into account the fact 
that coalition partners would either have to purchase or be provided the 
RedCONNEX™ module. 
2. Relay Development- The need for a 70m antenna as part of the FOB could be 
avoided altogether if relay platforms were available to mitigate blind areas 
that may develop due to topography or obstacles.  The lengthening operational 
loitering abilities of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) could be further 
developed to include relay nodes for WiMAX transmissions.  This would need 
to be in conjunction with advancing developments in power cell technologies 
and micro-miniaturization of electronic components.  In this way, UAV’s 
could loiter on station above riverine forces and allow them to relay 
broadband WiMAX transmissions over obstructions.  
3. WiMAX Amplification- Development of ways to amplify the transmission 
signals of WiMAX systems would greatly expand on the usable signal ranges 
that could be achieved.  This would provide a certain measure of greater 
operational flexibility to operational forces conducting riverine operations. 
4. Vulnerability Assessments- Information assurance is a very important concern 
for wireless technologies.  Vulnerabilities are expected to become apparent as 
this technology matures and becomes increasingly available.  It is felt that this 
warrants research into identifying and mitigating security issues with this 
technology. 
5. Ruggedization- WiMAX equipment currently available is designed around use 
in expanding the productivity of commercial corporations, and is thus, 
designed to be installed within fixed faculties where it is protected from 
environmental factors and movement.  Developing methods of making this 
equipment capable of handling the varied environments which are inherently 
hostile toward electronic equipment.  This should include heat dissipation and 
waterproofing in addition to shock absorption. 
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6. Other Equipment Sources- The pace at which WiMAX technology is growing, 
and as interest in this technology use grows in commercial industry, it is 
anticipated that more companies will begin to develop and make available 
alternative components with WiMAX capability, that may have improved 
performance or lower cost than the equipment looked at in this study. 
7. COASTS Integration- The COASTS group at NPS regularly conducts field 
testing of equipment for the propose of increasing coalition interoperability.  It 
is recommended that groups looking into the development of WiMAX use in a 
tactical environment combine their efforts with the COASTS group to develop 
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